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Within the disciplines of education and political science, the phenomenon of 
the voluntary transfer of policy ideas or practices from elsewhere, or “policy 
borrowing”, is often the topic of intense debate and study.  The study of policy 
transfer also has strong links with the field of diffusion.  Scholars in these fields 
study cases of policy transfer to understand (1) what motives and mechanisms cause 
policy diffusion and transfer, and (2) how policies are adapted, or reinvented, in the 
process of being transferred.  The majority of such studies have focused on state-to-
state cases of policy transfer involving predominantly government actors.  Yet, a 
growing but still limited number of studies have considered the ways policy 
entrepreneurs have initiated transfer and utilized networks to bring about and 
implement policy ideas taken from elsewhere.  Teach First provides a unique case-
study through which to investigate the role of policy entrepreneurs and networks in 
shaping the process of policy transfer and reinvention. 
Teach First launched in 2002 as a non-profit organization and innovative 
teacher training programme based in London.  The scheme, proposed and 
implemented by leaders within the private sector but heavily funded by the central 
government, was publicly linked to the U.S. programme Teach For America (TFA).  
Like TFA, Teach First’s purpose was to improve the schooling of disadvantaged 
pupils by recruiting elite university graduates to teach for two years in under-
resourced schools.  My research aimed to uncover how and why this policy was first 
conceptualized and launched as well as how it was reinvented in the process by those 
individuals and groups involved.  Thus, through a case-study of Teach First’s 
emergence, this study investigates: What roles do policy entrepreneurs and networks 
play in policy transfer and diffusion processes? and How are policy entrepreneurs 
and networks involved in reinventing policy during the transfer process?   
To explore these research questions, I carried out semi-structured interviews 
with more than 50 individuals from various sectors who were involved in the 
creation of either Teach First or TFA.  After transcribing all interviews, I used a form 
of narrative analysis to reconstruct the policy story of how Teach First emerged.  In 
the process, I uncovered and accounted for the diversity of motives, institutional 
pressures, and contextual factors shaping Teach First’s development with a focus on 
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the policy entrepreneurs and networks.  Drawing on previous research in policy 
transfer, innovation-diffusion, and institutionalism to analyze the policy story, I 
concluded that both policy entrepreneurs and networks were responsible for bringing 
about transfer of TFA to England and shaping the nature and extent of its 
reinvention.  This temporal process was furthered shaped by the highly politicized 
nature of initial teacher training in England, which limited the autonomy of policy 
entrepreneurs and forced further adaptation of Teach First in ways that its original 
sponsors had not intended.  I also discovered that, while the TFA model played an 
influential role in this process, TFA was not generally used as a guiding model 
during implementation.  Furthermore, I argue that in the process of mobilizing 
support for Teach First and implementing the idea in its first year, a new network 
emerged and represented a potentially influential new voice in education. 
This study aims to contribute to (1) the knowledge of the roles of policy 
entrepreneurs and networks in policy innovation, diffusion, and transfer and (2) the 
growing but still limited research on Teach First.  This study also provides a 
foundation for further studies of Teach For All, an organization co-founded in 2007 
by Teach First and TFA, which works to spread the programme globally.  Through 
Teach For All, at least thirty-eight other countries now have programmes modeled on 
TFA and Teach First, though little research has examined how Teach First came 
about and spread in this way.  Finally, the research also illustrates the value of a 
methodology not often used in transfer studies – narrative reconstruction – through 
which data is formed into a storied narrative to account for the complexities of the 
contexts and the socially–constructed views of the diversity of actors involved in 
















I, Emilee Rauschenberger, declare this thesis is of my own composition, based on my 
own work, with acknowledgement of other sources, and has not been submitted for 














This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a PhD at the 
University of Edinburgh.  
 
Please note the following terms and conditions of use:  
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, 
which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated.  
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge.  
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author.  
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author.  
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 









First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to God, the Most 
Gracious and Most Merciful, for enabling me to carry out and complete this work.  
Next, I would like to thank all the individuals who made my study possible.  This 
includes all my interviewees who gave of their time to talk to me.  I would like to 
thank those of Scottish Overseas Research Award Scheme and the University of 
Edinburgh for their generous scholarship, without which I surely would not have 
been able to carry out this study.  
I also would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to my supervisors, 
Professor Lindsay Paterson and Professor David Raffe, for their guidance, support, 
and patience throughout these years.  Their thoughtful comments and positive 
encouragement always spurred me forward.  Thanks also to my progression board 
advisors, who offered insightful directions in which to take my investigation.  
Additionally, thank you to my dear friends and colleagues for their moral support 
and time-saving advice. 
My final thanks goes to my family.  This includes a big thank you to my 
parents and brothers for all their support and encouragement.  Thanks to my kids for 
preservering through my years of study and all the while making me laugh (and yell) 
too much.  And, though words cannot express how much, thank you to my husband’s 
support, patience, and encouragement, without which I would never have embarked 


















 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Abstract ........................................................................................................... I 
Declaration .................................................................................................... III 
Copyright ....................................................................................................... III 
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................... IV 
Table of Contents .......................................................................................... V 
List of Tables ................................................................................................ IX 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................... X 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction ................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction to Topic............................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Context of the Study:  TFA, Teach First, and Teach for All .................................. 5 
1.3 Motivation for the Study ....................................................................................... 12 
1.4 Purpose of Study ................................................................................................... 13 
1.5 Overview of the Study .......................................................................................... 16 
 
Chapter 2:  Literature Review ..................................................................... 19 
2.1 Rationale and Structure of Chapter ....................................................................... 19 
2.2  The Policy Transfer Perspective .......................................................................... 21 
2.3 Policy Entrepreneurs and Networks in Policy Transfer ........................................ 35 
2.4  Policy Networks in Political Science ................................................................... 39 
2.5 The Institutional Perspective ................................................................................. 43 
2.6  Key Concepts and Current Debates in Institutional Theory ................................ 51 
2.7 The Diffusion of Innovations Perspective............................................................. 66 
2.8  Background Literature on TFA and Teach First .................................................. 80 
 
Chapter 3:  Research Design & Methodology ........................................... 87 
3.1  Introduction:  The Evolution of My Research Focus and Design ........................ 87 
3.2 Data Collection...................................................................................................... 89 
3.2.1 Interview Method and Selection of Interviewees ............................................... 89 
3.2.2  Access and Consent ........................................................................................... 90 
3.2.3  Interview Procedure and Questions .................................................................. 92 
3.2.4  Reflections on Using the Telephone for Qualitative Interviews ........................ 95 
3.2.5 Other Key Sources of Data .............................................................................. 100 
3.3  Data Analysis ..................................................................................................... 100 
3.3.1  Analytic Approach:  “Reconstructive” Narrative Analysis ............................ 100 
3.3.2  The Process of Analysing the Data ................................................................. 104 
3.4  Additional Considerations .................................................................................. 108 
3.4.1  Considerations of Validity .............................................................................. 108 
3.4.2  Consideration of Pro-Innovation Bias ............................................................ 110 
3.4.3  Challenges of Interviewing Elites ................................................................... 111 
 
 
 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page VI 
Chapter 4: Phase I:  The Origins of Teach First ..……………………..... 115 
4.1 BITC and Corporate Social Responsibility ......................................................... 115 
4.2 London First:  Influencing Urban Planning and Policy ...................................... 117 
4.3 The McKinsey Study ........................................................................................... 124 
4.4 Conceptualizing a Graduate Recruitment Scheme .............................................. 128 
4.5 Response to McKinsey’s Results ........................................................................ 130 
4.6 Another Supporter Surfaces ................................................................................ 135 
4.7 Moving Forward with “Teach For London” ....................................................... 136 
 
Chapter 5:  Phase I: Analysis and Discussion ........................................ 139 
5.1  Policy Entrepreneurs and the Decision to Initiate Transfer ............................... 139 
5.2  Contextual Impulse leading to a Cross-National Attraction to TFA .................. 140 
5.2.1  The Intersection of Organizational Interests & External Pressures to Act .... 140 
5.2.2  Partnering with McKinsey:  The First Strategic Step in Policy Innovation ... 144 
5.2.3  McKinsey’s Motives for Pro-Bono Engagements ........................................... 149 
5.3  Engaging in Policy Learning for Potential Transfer .......................................... 150 
5.3.1  The McKinsey Study:  Conclusive but Uninspiring ........................................ 151 
5.3.2 Learning from the Experienced: Accessing TFA through Social Networks .... 151 
5.4  The Making of a Policy Entrepreneur:  Wigdortz’s Perspective ....................... 154 
5.4.1  Unpacking Wigdortz’s Account and Why It Matters ...................................... 154 
5.4.2  Organizational Context, Power Relations and Learning at McKinsey .......... 156 
5.4.3  Wigdortz’s Work Identity................................................................................ 157 
5.4.4  Wigdortz’s Descent into Sensemaking ........................................................... 159 
5.5  Summary of Discussion ..................................................................................... 162 
 
Chapter 6:  Phase II:  Mobilization of Support for TfL ............................ 165 
6.1 The Policy Plot Thickens .................................................................................... 165 
6.2 Building Businesses Support through BITC/London First Networks ................. 166 
6.3. Introducing TfL to Government ......................................................................... 169 
6.4 Involving the Institute of Education .................................................................... 173 
6.5 Ministers Learn More About TFA ...................................................................... 178 
6.6 “Courting” the Unions and Wider Education Establishment .............................. 179 
6.7 Developing the Training Model for TfL ............................................................. 185 
6.8 Engaging the Prime Minister’s Office ................................................................ 189 
6.9 “Pump-priming” the DfES: Funding from Foundations ..................................... 193 
6.10 Discussions Renewed at the DfES .................................................................... 196 
6.11 TTA Head Considers TfL ................................................................................. 199 
6.12  TfL Fails to Earn Approval .............................................................................. 203 
6.13  A “Rescue” Meeting at 10 Downing Street ..................................................... 207 
6.14  Revising TfL:  Wigdortz and Tabberer Meet ................................................... 210 
6.15  Preparing for the Launch of “Teach First” ....................................................... 214 
 
Chapter 7:  Phase II:  Analysis and Discussion ...................................... 219 
7.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, and Reinvention ............................................. 219 
7.2 The Complexity of Contexts and Difficulty of Drawing Lessons ...................... 220 
7.2.1  Understanding the Development of TFA in the U.S. Context ......................... 221 
7.2.2  Problems with Drawing Lessons from TFA for Transfer & Reinvention ....... 224 
7.2.3  Other Contextual Differences Affecting TfL’s Transfer & Reinvention ......... 227 
7.2.4  New Labour’s Education Agenda  (1997-2002) ............................................. 229 
 
 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page VII 
7.2.5  Awareness of TFA among New Labour leaders .............................................. 232 
7.3  The Process of Establishing TfL – Agency through Networks ......................... 233 
7.3.1  Base-Building (mid-December 2001 – mid-February 2002) .......................... 234 
7.3.2  Pressuring Government through Networks (mid-Feb. 2002 – April 2002) .... 238 
7.3.3  Negotiating the Reinvention of TfL  (late-April to mid-May) ......................... 248 
7.3.4  Launching TfL as “Teach First” .................................................................... 254 
7.4  Summary of Discussion ..................................................................................... 256 
 
Chapter 8:  Phase III:  The Implementation of Teach First ..................... 257 
8.1 Goals of First-Year Implementation ................................................................... 257 
8.2 Recruiting Graduates from Top Universities ...................................................... 258 
8.3 The Internal Organizational Struggles of Teach First ......................................... 264 
8.4 Selecting an Accredited Teacher Training Provider ........................................... 267 
8.5 Recruiting Placement Schools ............................................................................ 276 
8.6 Consolidating Support for Teach First ................................................................ 281 
 
Chapter 9:  Phase III: Analysis and Discussion ...................................... 285 
9.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, & Reinvention For Implementation ............... 285 
9.2  The Continuation and Evolution of TfL’s Policy Transfer Network ................. 286 
9.3  Policy Entrepreneurs as the Bricoleurs of Implementation ................................ 288 
9.4  Teach First Undergoes Further Reinvention Under Wigdortz ........................... 291 
9.4.1  Teach First’s Internal Management Emulated Corporate Norms .................. 291 
9.4.2  Graduate Recruitment:  Copying and Competing with Corporate Models .... 293 
9.5  Teach First and Teacher Education in England ................................................. 295 
9.5.1  A History of Radical Change in Teacher Education in England .................... 296 
9.5.2 The Politics of Innovation in Teacher Training ............................................... 300 
9.5.3  First Round of Bidding:  IOE Bid Fails, Other London Providers Abstain.... 303 
9.5.4  Second Round of Bidding:  A Final Reinvention ............................................ 308 
9.5.5  The Responses of Schools to Teach First ........................................................ 309 
9.5.6  Transfer Completed:  Normalizing Teach First .............................................. 310 
9.6  Summary of Discussion ..................................................................................... 311 
 
Chapter 10:  Conclusion ............................................................................ 313 
10.1  Reflections on the Emergence of Teach First .................................................. 313 
10.2 Teach First as an Outcome of Policy Transfer .................................................. 314 
10.2.1 Three Critical Points of Reinvention ............................................................. 314 
10.2.2  Similarities between Teach First and TFA ................................................... 316 
10.2.3  Teach First’s “Corporate” Identity vs. TFA’s “Service” Identity ............... 318 
10.3  Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Transfer .......................................................... 322 
10.4  The Role of Networks in Bringing about Policy Transfer & Beyond.............. 326 
10.5  Using Narrative Reconstruction in the Study of Policy Transfer .................... 329 
10.6  Limitations of Study ......................................................................................... 330 








 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page VIII 
Appendices ................................................................................................ 371 
A.1 TFA Interview List ............................................................................................. 371 
A.2 Teach First Interview List .................................................................................. 372 
A.3 Diagram of Teach First Individuals .................................................................... 376 
A.4 Code Developed to Analyze Transcripts ............................................................ 377 
A.5 Private Funding Sources of Teach First (July 2002 to June 2003) .................... 380 











































 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page IX 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Teach for All Member Organizations & Year First Cohort in Schools ........ 10 
Table 2: TFA Interview List ..................................................................................... 371 
Table 3: Teach First Interview List ........................................................................... 372 
Table 4: Private Funding Sources of Teach First (July 2002 to June 2003) ............. 380 










































 Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page X 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AFT  American Federation of Teachers (national teacher union in the U.S.) 
ATL  Association of Teachers and Lecturers (U.K. teacher union) 
ATS  Articled Teacher Scheme 
BITC  Business in the Community 
CATE  Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (U.K.) 
CCCUC Canterbury Christ Church University College 
CSR  Corporate Social Responsibility 
CTC  City Technology Colleges 
DfES  Department for Education and Skills 
GLC  Greater London Council  
GLA  Greater London Authority 
GTP  Graduate Teacher Programme 
ILEA  Inner London Education Authority 
INTASC Interstate New Teacher Assessment and Support Consortium (U.S.) 
IOE  Institute of Education (associated with the University of London) 
ITE  Initial Teacher Education 
ITT  Initial Teacher Training  
LEA  Local Education Authority 
LTS  Licensed Teacher Scheme 
NAHT  National Association of Head Teachers 
NASUWT National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers 
(U.K.) 
NBPTS  National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (U.S.) 
NCATE National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (U.S.) 
NCLB  No Child Left Behind (U.S. federal education policy) 
NEA  National Education Association (national teacher union in the U.S.) 
NFER  National Foundation for Education Research 
NUT  National Union of Teachers 
Ofsted  Office for Standards in Education 
PGCE  Post Graduate Certificate of Education 
PMPU  Prime Minister’s Policy Unit 
QTS  Qualified Teacher Status 
SCITT  School-based Initial Teacher Training 
SHA  Secondary Heads Association 
SHINE Support and Help In Education (philanthropic foundation) 
TEAC  Teacher Education Accreditation Council (U.S) 
TfL  Teach for London 
TFA  Teach For America 
TTA  Teacher Training Agency 
UCET  University Council Education and Teachers  
U.K.  United Kingdom 
U.S.  United States 
 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 1 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  Introduction to Topic 
 
Within the disciplines of education and political science, the phenomenon of 
the voluntary transfer of policy ideas or practices from elsewhere, or “policy 
borrowing”, is often the topic of intense debate and study.  Educationalists have 
considered which school policies could or should be “borrowed” from elsewhere 
given the differences in national contexts since the nineteenth century (Noah & 
Eckstein 1969; Phillips 2000).  In contrast, political scientists began studying the 
phenomenon of policy transfer more recently, in the last decades of the twentieth 
century (Wolman 1992; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996).  Such studies of policy transfer 
grew out of the diffusion tradition in policy studies within the U.S.  Policy diffusion 
scholars used quantitative methods to analyze the patterns in which policies spread 
among American states as well as across nations and regions.  Policy diffusion 
researchers predominantly focused on explaining the process and conditions for 
diffusion rather than considering the content of policies that were being diffused.   
Such analyses often ignored agency and decision-making dynamics within 
governments, and hence contributed little understanding as to what happened to 
policies as they spread to other countries.  In this field, scholars debated whether the 
diffusion and appearance of policies across groups of nations was evidence of 
convergence, or “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities 
in structures, processes and performances” (Bennett 1991, p.215), at the policy level 
or whether the diversity of national circumstances led to policy divergence.   
Consequently, political scientists began to study cases of policy transfer to 
understand (1) what motives and mechanisms were causing policy diffusion and 
transfer, and (2) how policies were adapted, or reinvented, in the process of being 
adopted.  Mapping policy transfer processes became of particular interest to scholars 
from the 1990s onward as forces of globalization integrated societies, making policy 
transfers seemingly more common.  In the past two decades, both political scientists 
and educationalists have scrutinized the agents, the context, and the outcomes of 
policy transfer as well as the process through which the transfer comes about 
(Finegold et al. 1994; Dolowitz 2000; Evans 2004; Steiner-Khamsi 2004; Beech 
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2006; Benson & Jordan 2011).  Treating policy transfer as both an independent as 
well as dependent variable, researchers have successfully identified a range of 
variables that may affect the process and outcome of policy transfer (Dolowitz & 
Marsh 1996; 2000) and attempted, in various ways, to construct the model of the 
transfer process (e.g., Evans & Davies 1999; Phillips & Ochs 2003). 
However, much of what we know about the topic has been gleaned from 
empirical cases in which governments and policy-makers are the prime donors, 
agents, and recipients of a transferred policy.  Thus, the field suffers from 
“methodological nationalism” (Dale & Robertson 2009), or the tendency to use the 
nation-state as the de facto unit of analysis and comparison, and the majority of 
studies have focused on elected officials, political parties, or bureaucrats as agents of 
transfer.  To account for the effects of globalization and emergence of new forms of 
governance, policy transfer scholars have begun to shift their attention on actors and 
instances of policy transfer that are initiated by individuals or organizations outside 
of government.  A handful of scholars have investigated the role of think tanks (Ladi 
1999; 2005; Stone 2000; 2001b), philanthropic organizations (Stone 2009; 2010), 
and supra-national governmental institutions such as the European Union (Bulmer & 
Padgett 2005; Bulmer et al. 2007).   
These studies are challenging traditional government-centric views of policy 
transfer and call attention to the growing importance of policy entrepreneurs and 
networks in policy transfer.  Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) note that policy 
entrepreneurs may be among the agents of transfer.  However, such actors have not 
often been the focus of study in cases of transfer.  Additionally, the role of policy 
networks in policy transfer has also received limited scholarly attention.  How agents 
of policy transfer, and policy entrepreneurs in particular, may be empowered or 
affected by local or international networks has not been considered.   
To facilitate further study into policy entrepreneurs and networks, scholars 
can begin by drawing on insights from related literature within the field of public 
policy.  Political scientists offer richer conceptualizations and empirical insights into 
both policy entrepreneurs (Roberts & King 1996; Mintrom 1997; Mintrom & 
Norman 2009; Oborn et al. 2011; Beeson & Stone 2013) and policy-related networks 
(Rhodes & Marsh 1992; Haas 1992; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Aldred 2007; S 
J Ball 2008).  In public policy literature, policy entrepreneurs are generally 
considered individuals who operate “from outside the formal positions of 
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government” and who “introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas into 
public practice” (Roberts & King 1991, p.147).  Although variations of the term 
exist, Page (2000) suggests that a “true” policy entrepreneur “identifies the policies 
or practices to be transferred and persuades or otherwise moves others to adopt” such 
policies.   Policy entrepreneurs can be distinguished from paid policy actors who are 
employed by an organization “to look at practices elsewhere and make 
recommendations based on them” (Page 2000, p.3).  He also suggests that policy 
entrepreneurs in policy transfer are understudied because they are often embedded in 
organizations, making it difficult to untangle “precisely how an idea came on to the 
agenda of an organization” (Page 2000, p.4).  As a result, organizations – rather than 
individuals – tend to be more studied in cases of policy-making.   
In addition, public policy scholars have offered numerous theories and 
insights into the role of such networks in policy-making more generally.  For 
example, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) proposed the advocacy coalition 
framework to describe how policy is formed in various sub-systems by competing 
coalitions, each consisting of diverse but like-minded individuals.  The actors come 
from various sectors and coordinate their actions to spur policy change over long 
periods of time (e.g., a decade).  Similarly, Haas (1992) offers the concept of 
epistemic communities, or international networks of knowledge-based experts.  Haas 
details how such networks of experts shape policy-making through defining and 
describing policy problems and their causes, framing the issues for wider debates, 
and promoting particular policies in both national and global contexts.  Again, the 
role of such networks and the policy entrepreneurs within them has been neglected in 
policy transfer studies due to scholars’ tendency to focus on government actors and 
nation-states when selecting and analyzing cases of policy transfer.    
These studies reveal that policy entrepreneurs and networks are prevalent in 
regular modes of policy-making and highlight the need to account for their 
involvement in cases of transfer and reinvention of policy ideas.  Still, only limited 
attention has been given to policy entrepreneurs and networks in bringing about 
policy transfer (Stone 2004a; 2009; 2010).  This study aims to address this gap in the 
literature by examining the creation of Teach First, a prestigious leadership and 
teacher training programme initially based in London.  The emergence of this 
programme represents a case of policy transfer that was initiated and led by leaders 
from the private sector.  Hailed as an idea based on Teach For America (TFA) in the 
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U.S., Teach First was initially proposed and subsequently set up by the London 
business community in 2002 to help improve pupils’ achievement in disadvantaged 
secondary schools.  Teach First appears to be a prima facie instance of policy 
transfer that was led by actors located outside, but with the aid of, central 
government.  I chose Teach First as a case-study of policy transfer to investigate 
what role policy entrepreneurs and networks played in bringing about and 
implementing the transfer.  In addition, I consider how policy entrepreneurs 
translated and adapted, or reinvented, TFA in the process of the transfer and utilized 
networks to further their goals.   
In order to understand the scope and extent of reinvention, this study 
examines in detail the process of Teach First’s creation.  The idea surfaced in 2001 
and by mid-2003 Teach First was set up and was poised to train 186 new teachers in 
a six-week summer training.  In the study, I then reconstruct, through a type of 
narrative analysis, this time period to uncover the events and individuals as well as 
the evidence and interpretations that drove this process and led to a particular policy 
outcome.  By doing so, I aim to account for the differing subjective views of those 
involved and understand how transfer was shaped by individuals’ interpretations and 
their peer networks which informed their actions.  In this way, I adopt an interpretive 
approach to the study of transfer.  In reconstructing the policy story, I incorporate 
histories into the narrative to place individuals, organizations, and institutional 
contexts into proper focus.  Finally, I also ground the analysis in a comparative look 
at both Teach First and TFA to shed light on how contexts differed and how actors’ 
understandings of TFA’s particularities were limited.   
This approach allows for the illumination of detail of interaction of actors at a 
particular moment in time.  Reconstructing the policy story of Teach First ultimately 
brings researchers up close to the policy entrepreneurs and networks responsible for 
bringing about the transfer of TFA to England and reshaping its reinvention during 
that formative period.  However, the story also reveals how this temporal process 
was furthered shaped by the highly politicized nature of initial teacher training in 
England, which limited the autonomy of policy entrepreneurs and forced further 
adaptation of Teach First in ways that its original sponsors had not intended.  In this 
way, the study provides deeper insight into the processes of transfer and reinvention 
as negotiated collaboration among policy entrepreneurs, their networks, and 
government actors. 
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In this introduction, I first provide an overview of TFA and Teach First to 
provide a greater understanding of both organizations.  I also briefly describe how 
leaders of both schemes joined together to form Teach for All to promote the transfer 
and replication of their programmes abroad.  Secondly, I link these developments to 
my study’s aims and objectives, describe the research’s origins and scope, and 
highlight how it contributes to knowledge in the field.  Finally, I provide an overview 
of the structure the study.   
 
 
1.2  Context of the Study:  TFA, Teach First, and Teach for All  
 
What is Teach For America?   
Before Teach First emerged, there was Teach For America (TFA).  TFA was, 
and still is, a prestigious programme that recruits, trains, and places high-achieving 
and mostly non-education graduates in low-income urban and rural schools across 
the U.S. to teach for two years.   As Teach First was modeled on TFA early on, it is 
important to understand the essence and development of the U.S. programme.  Since 
its launch in 1990, TFA drew national attention to the failure of the American 
schools to provide all children, regardless of socio-economic background, with a 
high-quality education.  The TFA programme was the brain-child of Wendy Kopp 
who, as a senior at Princeton University in 1989, proposed the programme in her 
undergraduate thesis.  Her idea for TFA was inspired, in large part, by President 
Kennedy’s Peace Corps and President Johnson’s National Teacher Corps, both 
established during the height of the Civil Rights Movement.  Like these programmes, 
Kopp’s plan was to recruit top graduating university students for the two-year 
programme in order to capitalize on this population’s “idealism” and “indecision” 
and train them over the summer to teach full-time in low-income schools in need of 
teachers.   
The programme’s original goals were both practical and ideological, aiming 
to help alleviate the country’s teacher shortages and also “revolutionize the way 
Americans view teaching” (National Association of State Directors of Special 
Education 1990) by making teaching attractive to America’s “best and brightest”.  In 
addition, Kopp theorized that the experience in the programme would expose a 
generation of young people to the problems of schools in low-income communities, 
thus inspiring them to become life-long advocates of education reform.  Later, Kopp 
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would declare that these goals were the means through which TFA aimed to 
accomplish its visionary mission of “closing the achievement gap” between high- 
and low-income communities.  Adopting the mission statement, “One day, all 
students in this nation will have the opportunity to attain an excellent education”, 
TFA became a call to reform American education (Kopp 2001).  
 Within a year of graduating, the 21-year-old Kopp launched her idea as TFA 
by raising $2.5 million from business leaders and foundations, hiring a young staff of 
approximately 20 people, and creating a Board of Advisers and Directors comprised 
of leaders from business, education, and government.  In 1990, its first year, TFA 
recruited, trained, and placed 500 top graduates in low-income schools in five 
regions:  Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York City, and rural areas of North 
Carolina and Georgia (Kopp 2001).  In their schools, the new TFA teachers, or 
“corps members”, were employed as full-time teachers in primary or secondary 
schools while they continued to work toward certification in their respective school 
districts.  The new corps members had training over the summer in teaching 
methods, curriculum, and classroom management while also gaining some 
experience teaching in summer school. 
Over the next two decades, TFA expanded and evolved its programme in 
what I suggest are three distinct stages.  In the first phase, from 1990-1995, TFA 
recruited an annual cohort of around 500 to 700 elite graduates, thus establishing it 
as a prestigious and selective organization.  With its civic-oriented mission and 
significant corporate support, TFA garnered considerable positive attention from 
national media, helping to raise its profile among a wider audience.  However, Kopp 
struggled to put the organization on secure financial footing which somewhat 
hindered her ability to build a strong reputation for TFA amongst private donors and 
the philanthropic community.  Kopp also struggled with managing the growing 
organization with bases across the U.S. (Kopp 2001).  TFA also experimented with 
pre-service training models, initially employing teacher educators but then choosing 
to develop its own training curriculum.   
Meanwhile, TFA garnered intense criticism from the education establishment 
for its limited training, including a scathing assessment of TFA by Darling-
Hammond (1994) who accused TFA of harming minority students and attempting to 
de-professionalize teaching.  Such arguments also stemmed from Kopp’s (1992; 
1994) calls for states to abolish teacher licensure laws and empower districts to hire 
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and train teachers directly, effectively by-passing schools of education.  Although 
Kopp was able to survive such criticism, she already had, in some respects, alienated 
the education establishment.  Part of this stemmed from Kopp and her colleagues’ 
inexperience and idealism, through which they saw their work as apolitical due to its 
successes in meeting the need for more teachers (Russo 2012). 
In its second developmental phase, spanning 1995-2000, Kopp received 
guidance from business contacts in reforming TFA’s internal structure and 
management, enabling the organization to run more smoothly and efficiently (Kopp 
2001).  With these changes, TFA found itself on stronger financial footing and 
garnered more support from its growing list of sponsors, donors, and expanding 
alumni network.  This was a period of adolescence for TFA during which Kopp 
utilized the lessons from the early years to create a more stable and business-like 
organization while still recruiting between 700 to 1000 graduates annually.  As it 
slowly expanded, TFA worked at the state and district levels to build new 
partnerships and lobby in favor of laws that enabled TFA to operate. 
The third phase of TFA began in 2000 when TFA set ambitious expansion 
plans for the organization, aiming to quadruple its annual cohort size from 1,000 to 
4,000 and enter new regions across the country by 2005 (Kopp 2001, p.183).  To do 
so, TFA became an active advocate for its interests on Capitol Hill (Russo 2012), 
ensuring TFA’s federal funding and laws sanctioning its work were protected. 
Meanwhile, TFA aggressively recruited graduates, fundraised relentlessly, and 
negotiated entrance into new school districts.  While keeping its acceptance rate 
between 11 and 15 percent, TFA continued to expand until 2013, at which point it 
recruited its largest cohort of nearly 6,000 graduates and placed them in 48 regions.  
By 2013, TFA’s annual budget reached nearly $300 million dollars, an increase from 
roughly $10 million in 2000.  TFA’s funding primarily came from private and 
corporate donors, many of whom were linked to the standards and testing movement, 
charter schools, and efforts to deregulate teacher training.   
While expanding, TFA as an organization became more sophisticated in 
managing its public relations and in influencing policy-makers.  Relatedly, many 
TFA alumni became leaders for reform within schools and at the district and state 
policy levels.  The most high profile and controversial figures among TFA alumni 
have been Michelle Rhee (former Washington D.C. school chancellor), Kevin 
Huffman (Education Commissioner in Tennessee), and John White (Louisiana State 
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Superintendent).   As a result, there has been renewed scrutiny of its operations, its 
ideology, and its effects in predominantly poor and minority-populated school 
districts.  Academics (e.g., Bentley 2013; Labaree 2010), journalists (e.g., Joseph 
2014; Miner 2010; Simon n.d.), and even former alumni (Rubinstein 2011; Strauss 
n.d.) became increasingly critical of TFA’s management, motives, and impact in 
schools and on policy-makers.  The influence of TFA was especially controversial in 
post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans where TFA played a role in redesigning and 
staffing schools (Vanacore 2011; Frith 2014).  In addition, the organization also 
courted controversy after the 2008 recession by continuing to expand while school 
districts laid off hundreds of veteran teachers (Sawchuck 2009; Toppo 2009).   
Perhaps as a result of growing criticism and/or a rebounding economy, TFA’s 
applicant numbers peaked in 2013 and began to decline by more than 20 percent in 
the next two years, forcing the organization to reduce its cohort size to 4,100 in 2015 
(Garcia 2015; Rich 2015).  Still, TFA’s annual funding base has continued to 
increase, surpassing $300 million the same year.  This may signal a fourth phase for 
TFA in which the organization needs to evolve once again to meet a changing 
political and educational environment.  Arguably, further organizational change is 
already underway as Kopp stepped down as CEO in 2013 to head the international 
organization Teach For All (though she remains the organization’s chairman). 
Nevertheless, TFA remains a permanent part of the educational landscape and a 
formidable influence in education policy at all levels (Russo 2012). 
 
What is Teach First? 
Teach First, the first so-called adaptation of TFA, appeared in England in 
2002 when the idea for the scheme was proposed by members of London’s business 
community as a way to address underachievement in disadvantaged London schools.  
The idea won backing from influential leaders in business, education, and New 
Labour and was launched with government and private funding.  Initially named 
Teach For London and led by a former McKinsey consultant, Brett Wigdortz, Teach 
First became a non-profit organization that marketed its scheme as a “leadership 
development” programme.  Its mission was to raise pupil achievement by recruiting 
and supporting elite graduates to teach for two years in disadvantaged secondary 
schools.  By summer 2003, Teach First had recruited 186 top graduates to be placed 
in 43 partnering schools around London.  The organization also partnered with 
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Canterbury Christ Church University College, which provided both the initial 
summer training and ongoing support to programme participants with the goal of 
attaining Qualified Teacher Status within their first year teaching.  
Since 2003, Teach First has recruited hundreds of top university graduates 
annually, earning praise and funding from all major political parties.  With such 
support, the programme expanded to Manchester and the Midlands in 2006 and 2007 
respectively and continued growing in both size and geographic scope in the years 
that followed.  As it expanded into new locations, Teach First partnered with 
universities in each placement regions.  The Teach First organization and universities 
jointly run the scheme’s summer pre-service training institute which lasts six weeks.  
While participants learn to teach they also receive training in business leadership and 
management and have opportunities to network and intern during the summer 
holiday with many of the scheme’s blue-chip sponsors. 
In 2008, Ofsted praised the scheme following its assessment of 200 of its 
trainees in London (see Ofsted 2008).  In 2011, Teach First began officially placing 
teachers in primary schools (after piloting the idea for three years) with the goal of 
providing roughly 5% of all primary teachers while pursing its larger goal to provide 
a fifth of all England’s teachers in disadvantaged schools (Richardson 2011).  Two 
years later, in 2013, it began placing its teachers in early years education, working 
with children ages three to five.  Teach First also developed its programme 
internally, especially in terms of its leadership/teacher training.  Notably, after 2008 
and in response to the Bologna Process, Teach First revamped its training and now 
enable trainees to gain a masters-level PGCE while completing the programme (Buie 
2010). 
By 2015, Teach First was the U.K.’s largest graduate recruiter with a cohort 
of 1,685 trainees (Teach First 2016).  Notably, Teach First’s newest cohort came 
from 128 different universities and nearly a quarter were “experienced 
professionals”, suggesting the organization has widened its recruiting scope beyond 
only elite graduates to enable its expansion.  The scheme now operates in 11 regions 
across England and Wales.  The scheme has become a popular and prestigious route 
into teaching, and its leadership acts as an influential voice in education policy.  
Teach First has become well-known to wider audiences in recent years through the 
release of Wigdortz’s (2012) memoir and through the 2014 BBC Three documentary 
series which followed six of its new teachers (Rainey 2014). 
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The Global Spread of TFA/Teach First:  Teach for All  
While both TFA and Teach First rapidly expanded their programmes, the 
CEOs of both organizations – Kopp and Wigdortz – co-founded another 
organization, Teach for All, in 2007.  Teach for All became a separate non-profit 
organization aimed at supporting individuals in setting up a TFA/Teach First model 
in their home country.  Launched at the annual Clinton Global Initiative in New 
York with help from McKinsey and two philanthropic foundations (Dillon 2011), 
Teach for All’s espoused mission is to “expand educational opportunity 
internationally by increasing and accelerating the impact of these independent social 
enterprises” (Teach for All 2015).   To do this, Teach for All assists entrepreneurial 
individuals in developing a viable business plan, securing local government support, 
identifying potential donors, and raising funds.  Once established, each new 
organization receives a “country relations manager” from Teach for All who acts as a 
mentor in sharing organizational experience, programme knowledge, and other 
resources.  In addition, this person reports progress and experiential lessons back to 
the Teach for All organization and its network partners.     
However, to become and remain a part of this global network, individuals (or 
“social entrepreneurs”) starting TFA/Teach-First-type programmes must faithfully 
uphold to the network’s “unifying mission” and “five core principles” (Teach for All 
2011) which pertain to recruitment, training, placement, alumni, and measurable 
impacts.   With the help of this network, TFA/Teach First-inspired programmes have 
been started in 38 countries within the last nine years.  The following table lists the 
TFA-inspired programmes that have been established thus far: 
 
Table 1:  Teach For All Member Organizations & Year First Cohort in Schools  
*TEACH South Africa has an unclear relationship with Teach For All as its status as a 






(COUNTRY) PROGRAMME NAME (Translation) Total 
1990 U.S. Teach For America 1 
2003 England Teach First 1 
2007 Based in U.S. Teach For All, founded by TFA & Teach First - 
 






(COUNTRY) PROGRAMME NAME (Translation) Total 
2008 Estonia Latvia 
Noored Kooli (Youth to School) 









Teach First Deutschland 
Teach For Lebanon 
TEACH South Africa 
Teach For India 
Enseña Chile (Teach Chile) 
Teach For China 






Teach For Australia 









Enseña Por Argentina (Teach For Argentina) 
Ensina! (Teach) 
Teach For Bulgaria 
Teach For Pakistan 






Enseña Por Colombia (Teach For Colombia) 
Teach For Malaysia 









Teach For Japan 
Enseña por México 
Teach For Nepal 
Teach First NZ 
Teach For the Philippines 











Teach For Bangladesh 
Teach For Belgium 
Enseña Ecuador 
Teach For Qatar 
Teach For Romania 
Teach For Slovakia 







Teach For Armenia 
Anseye Pou Ayiti (Teach For Haiti) 






Teach First Danmark 
Teach For France 
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This recent and rapid international spread of the TFA/Teach First models – 
and the Teach For All network designed to assist such transfers – represents a 
distinct phenomenon and invaluable opportunity to study the ways in which policies 
are moving, changing, and affecting schools, teachers, and education policy across 
the globe.  Research into this expanding network has only just begun with scholars 
examining individual programmes in Australia (Rice et al. 2015), Argentina 
(Friedrich 2014), and India (Blumenreich & Gupta 2015) while others compare two 
or more programmes in Latin America (Cumsille & Fiszbein 2015; Friedrich 2016).  
Meanwhile, other scholars are focusing on the Teach for All organization and its 
network (McConney et al. 2012; Olmedo et al. 2013; Londe et al. 2015; Friedrich et 
al. 2015; Straubhaar & Friedrich 2015).  There have also been some quantitative-
based evaluative studies carried out on behalf of certain bodies:  the Inter-American 
Development Bank’s study of Enseña Chile (Alfonso et al. 2010) and of Enseña Peru 
(Alfonso & Santiago 2010) and Australian Government’s commissioned study on 
Teach For Australia (Scott et al. 2010; Weldon et al. 2012; Weldon et al. 2013).  
 
 
1.3 Motivation for the Study 
 
Clearly, TFA and Teach First represent programmes that are sources of 
policy transfer as they continue to be replicated in other countries by individuals and 
networks outside of government.  Their involvement in Teach for All appears to be 
something of a policy franchise and represents novel ways education policy has been 
and continues to be conceptualized, transferred, formed, and implemented in 
different times and places.  However, what the work of Teach for All means in 
practice is not well understood as few have considered what the origins and 
similarities between TFA and Teach First really are.  While considerable amount of 
research has been and continues to be carried on TFA, there is very limited research 
on Teach First.  This is a handicap for scholars who are beginning to turn their 
attention to Teach for All, as they seem to be treating Teach First and TFA as 
essentially the same thing or simply ignoring Teach First in favor of TFA.  But is this 
assumption true?  Was Teach First a case of policy transfer and, if so, to what extent 
does it reflect or differ from TFA and why?  While “Teach For–” programmes 
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dominate the list of organizations in Teach for All, there are three “Teach First–” 
programmes (Israel, Germany, Denmark).  These cases illustrate the importance in 
understanding how and why TFA was first transferred to England and what role of 
policy entrepreneurs and networks played in that process.  Identifying the policy 
entrepreneurs and the networks that were utilized to bring about Teach First will also 
shed further light on the ways in which such actors and networks remain and directly 
influence local policy contexts as well as facilitate further transfers abroad.   
 
 
1.4 Purpose of Study  
 
Research Aims, Scope, and Significance 
 
The aim of my research was to explore: What roles do political entrepreneurs 
and networks play in bringing about and implementing a policy transfer?  I 
examined this question by studying the emergence of Teach First.  I sought to 
uncover and explain how and why Teach First emerged in England in 2002, thus 
establishing how policy entrepreneurs and networks brought about the transfer and 
adapted it to the U.K. context.  To do this, I focused on four objectives: 
1. determine who was involved in supporting or opposing Teach First, what 
their interests and views were, and what role they played in the emergence of 
the scheme 
2. identify why Teach First was proposed in 2001 and launched in 2002 (i.e. 
what circumstance, interests, problems led to its proposal) 
3. examine how the scheme was launched by tracing the process through which 
it gained funding and official government support as well as examine how 
the scheme was implemented in its first year  
4. determine what role TFA played, along with institutional structures, in the 
process of conceptualizing, launching, and implementing Teach First 
 
The study addresses these objectives through the analysis of primary data collected 
through semi-structured interviews with approximately 50 individuals involved in 
the creation of Teach First or TFA.  In this way, the study aimed to uncover the 
origins of Teach First and how it related to TFA. 
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With this aim, my research was limited to certain time periods: from the 
establishment of TFA (circa 1990) to the end of initial implementation of Teach First 
in mid-2003.  Individuals and sponsors that became involved with Teach First after 
this period were excluded from the study.  Relatedly, I do not consider the actual 
summer training of Teach First graduates, their performance in schools, nor how the 
programme developed thereafter.  The purpose of my study is also limited to 
understanding the formation of the scheme.  Thus, this study is not an evaluation of 
the effectiveness, utility, or long-term effects of Teach First.  For the purposes of 
comparing Teach First with TFA, I consider the origins and development of TFA up 
until 2003.  However, I do not assess, judge, or compare the performance or efficacy 
of either programme nor suggest one is in any way superior or inferior to the other.  
Rather, this thesis is an exploratory case-study of policy transfer employing a 
phenomenological and historical approach to understanding the circumstances and 
contexts as well as individuals and organizations that led the establishment of Teach 
First.   
The study aims to contribute to the field of knowledge in primarily three 
ways.  First, empirically, the study documents and provides insight into a particular 
instance of policy-making in the U.K.  Through the voices of individuals present at 
the time, I piece together a multi-faceted and contested account of how Teach First 
was originally established.  Secondly, the study provides an opportunity for theory-
testing and development through a rich qualitative case-study of policy transfer.  
More specifically, the analysis of Teach First aims to shed light on the role of policy 
entrepreneurs and social networks in bringing about and implementing a policy 
transfer.  The insights drawn from this study can be utilized in future studies of 
policy transfer and diffusion as well as other types of phenomenon related to policy 
entrepreneurs and how they utilize networks.   
Insights drawn from this study are particularly helpful for future studies of 
the Teach First, the Teach for All network, and TFA/Teach-First programmes abroad 
– all three areas that are in need of more empirical investigations.  For future studies 
of Teach First, my study provides a snapshot of how Teach First began and thus 
provides the first phase in any historical study of its development and the origins of 
its distinct characteristics.  For future studies of Teach For All and the spread of the 
TFA/Teach First model, my study provides an assessment of how TFA and Teach 
First developed in distinctly different contexts and ways.  
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Thirdly, I add value to the study of policy transfer by utilizing a new 
methodology – narrative reconstruction – as a means through which to study policy 
transfer processes.  This approach and method of analysis enables one to bring 
together multiple concepts and levels of analysis to understand how policy transfer 
came about through the experiences of those who were there.  This approach relies 
on “thick” contextual knowledge and so history becomes an important means 
through which to ground and interpret data.  
 
Origins of Study: Personal Experience with TFA and Teach First 
 
I chose to carry out research on Teach First because of my past experience as 
a TFA corps member and as an employee of Teach First.  I first became interested in 
education while completing a federal work-study programme in disadvantaged 
schools in East Manhattan and Brooklyn as a political science undergraduate at New 
York University.  As a result, I was interested in teaching in low-income schools and 
thus, upon graduating in 2004, I joined TFA.  For the next two years, I taught in a 
Baltimore City middle school while earning a Master’s in teaching.  The systemic 
and structural challenges facing schools and pupils in Baltimore directed my interest 
in education policy and teacher training.  After completing TFA, I relocated to 
Washington D.C. to teach in a charter school run by a TFA alumna.     
In 2007, I moved to Manchester, England to become a “leadership 
development officer” providing pastoral support to participants in Teach First.  
While working at Teach First, I and other staff members who were TFA alumni 
participated in bringing ideas from TFA into Teach First.  I often unintentionally did 
so because I had assumed the programme was a replica of TFA.  However, I was 
surprised when some of my colleagues rejected or disagreed with TFA’s ideas and 
practices, and I began to realize that Teach First’s values and culture – not simply its 
structure – differed from TFA in subtle but significant ways.  The experience also 
made me realise how I, myself, had uncritically accepted some of TFA’s discourse, 
assumptions and narrative, which I now began to question further.  As a result, I 
subsequently left Teach First to study how and why Teach First was established and 
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1.5 Overview of the Study 
 
This thesis consists of nine further chapters divided into three main parts.   In 
the first section, which contains Chapter 2 and 3, I situate the study in the related 
literatures and explain the research design and methodology employed to carry out 
the study.   In Chapter 2, I critically review three research perspectives – policy 
transfer, diffusion of innovations, and institutionalism – that informed and guided the 
study.  In addition, I provide an overview of the research on TFA and Teach First to 
date.  In the process, I indentify notable gaps in the literature and propose the 
research questions to address this while also furthering the stated aim of the study.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss the rationale for the qualitative research design I adopted and 
describe the methods of data collection and analysis I undertook during the study.  I 
also discuss issues related to validity of the data, pro-innovation bias, and challenges 
of elite interviewing.  
In the second section, I present the study’s empirical findings and related 
discussions.  This section, consisting of six chapters (4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9), is organized 
into three analytical phases: (I) the conceptualization, (II) mobilization, and (III) 
implementation of Teach First.  Each phase is presented through two chapters, the 
first detailing the empirical story of Teach First and the second providing critical 
analysis of that period.    
Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 examine the initial conceptualization of Teach First, 
which began in 2001 and ended in mid-December 2001 and documents how business 
leaders came up with the idea for Teach First and why they decided to pursue the 
idea.  While Chapter 4 describes the main players, organizations, and events of this 
phase, Chapter 5 discusses the personal interests, organizational agendas, and actors’ 
social learning that shaped policy preferences and decision-making leading to the 
Teach First proposal.   
 In Chapters 6 and 7, I examine the second phase of Teach First’s emergence 
pertaining to how support leading to the scheme launch was mobilized.  Thus, 
Chapter 6 starts in mid-December 2001 and chronicles how and why individuals and 
organizations across multiple sectors were tapped and came together to form a 
coalition of support for the new initiative, leading to the launch of Teach First in July 
2002.  Chapter 7 provides a comparative analysis of the policy contexts in which 
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TFA and Teach First initially emerged and how policy entrepreneurs utilized their 
networks to shape and politically advance the evolving idea for the new programme.  
In Chapters 8 and 9, I consider the third phase of Teach First’s emergence – 
its implementation – which began in August 2002 and continued mid-2003.  Chapter 
8 documents how Teach First’s founders set up the organization, recruited top 
graduates and London schools onto the scheme, and selected a university with which 
to partner and provide teacher training.  Chapter 9 discusses how the policy network 
built to facilitate the launch of Teach First also contributed to its implementations.  I 
examine how policy entrepreneurs drew on this network to inform the culture and 
practices of the new Teach First organization.  In Chapter 9, I also examine the 
evolution of teacher education policy and practice in England and how the 
implementation of Teach First was very much shaped by the norms, regulations, and 
interests of those within this context.   
Finally, the third section of the thesis consists of a single concluding chapter 
(10) in which I offer further analytical insights gleaned from each phase of Teach 
First’s emergence and provide overarching analysis of the transfer process.  More 
specifically, I discuss the critical points in the policy story at which Teach First was 
reinvented and how the English programme represented a similar but markedly 
different version of its American predecessor.  I also consider what insights the case 
of Teach First offers in regards to policy entrepreneurs and networks in the process 
of policy transfer more genereally.  At last, I also reflect on the limits of the study 
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Rationale and Structure of Chapter  
 
In this chapter, I review three different literatures – policy transfer, 
institutionalism, and innovation-diffusion.  While my study centres on a case of 
policy transfer, my analytical focus centers on the roles of policy entrepreneurs and 
social networks in the transfer process.  To better investigate and understand the role 
and effects of such entrepreneurs and social networks in policy transfer, I argue that 
policy transfer studies need to incorporate insights from institutional literature as 
well as those from innovation-diffusion studies.  Thus, in this literature review, I 
examine and draw upon research in three different traditions to expand policy 
scholars’ views of networks and how policy entrepreneurs use networks to instigate, 
facilitate, and shape policy transfer. 
Consequently, I draw on three major research traditions – policy transfer, 
institutionalism, and innovation-diffusion – to inform my study.  Each tradition looks 
at how change comes about, albeit from different angles (policy-, institutional-, or 
social/network-based).  For each literature, I review the development of the field 
before examining in more detail how each tradition conceptualizes networks, 
entrepreneurs, and innovations as well as processes of transfer, diffusion, and 
change.  The first body of research reviewed is the policy transfer literature, which 
provides insight into the processes, mechanisms, actors and motives for international 
policy transfer.  Research in this field offers comprehensive frameworks and rich 
accounts of how new ideas and networks are spreading globally and shaping 
government agendas and policies nationally.  I also review what the transfer 
literature, as well as the policy sciences more generally, has learned about policy 
entrepreneurs and networks. 
Next, I review institutionalism literature as this research tradition 
complements the more state-oriented and policy-centric perspective of policy 
transfer and provides a deeper understanding and insights into contexts and how they 
shape not only policy but also the views of actors.  Thus, concepts and debates 
within institutionalism provide understanding of how societal structures shape the 
everyday life, including all aspects of the policy transfer process.  Studies of 
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institutional construction and change illuminate how prevailing contexts constrain 
and empower actors and shape outcomes.  The powerful multi-faceted role 
institutions play in shaping societal regulations, norms, and culture is often 
underestimated and under-theorized in the policy transfer literature.  Through 
concepts such as institutional entrepreneurship, networks, and competing logics, the 
literature illuminates how agency is not only shaped by wider institutional structures 
but, conversely, how institutional structures are also changed to accommodate and 
absorb new ideas.  The institutional literature is also critical to understanding 
networks as networks and institutions may be considered co-constitutive and co-
evolutionary, meaning that networks and structures both build and shape one 
another.  Thus, to understand one requires an understanding of the other. 
Finally, I also examine the research in the diffusion of innovations 
perspective.  This body of research examines the development and spread of 
innovations within social systems over time.  This perspective, rooted in a number of 
disciplines, offers further insights into how an innovation is spread through various 
communication networks.  In contrast with “policy diffusion” research, which 
typically adopts a macro-level with governments as units of analysis, the diffusion of 
innovation research is carried out at a more micro- and meso-levels with its focus on 
individuals and networks.  A look at this literature helps illuminate why people 
accept or reject new ideas and how the pace of diffusion can be quickened with the 
help of opinion leaders and heterophilious as well as homophilious networks within 
society.  This literature also illuminates how innovations can be shaped and changed 
by those adopting them, and hence sheds light on the process of adaptation, or 
“reinvention”. 
It is my purpose throughout the chapter to critically review these literatures 
and highlight the areas in which the three theoretical perspectives overlap.  In such 
areas, the literatures offer complementary insights that challenge and/or expand on 
each other.  I also point to the gaps in the literatures, but overall, I prioritize the need 
in all three literatures to better understand the role of policy/institutional 
entrepreneurs and the networks they use and/or build within and outside government 
to promote their innovation.  To address this area, I argue there is a need to bring the 
focus on networks and the temporal aspect of innovation-diffusion studies into policy 
transfer research and pay close attention to sequence of events alongside actors and 
outcomes.  
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Furthermore, there is a need to complement policy transfer studies with 
network-related concepts in the other two literatures to understand how the transfer 
process, as it unfolds over time, directs and shapes the formation of new networks 
and affects relationships within established networks.  On this point, questions 
emerge such as: What types of sub-networks exist in a given context?  What roles do 
they play in furthering policy transfer? and How does that role or the sub-networks 
themselves change as the policy transfer process progresses?  These questions call 
for an analysis of power and influence within the network as well as produced by the 
network.  With these questions in mind, we see how cases of policy transfer that are 
not centered in, nor implemented by government, might represent a more complex 
transfer process than traditional cases.    
With these points in mind, I begin by examining the three literatures 
discussed above.  Afterwards, I discuss how my study addresses gaps in the literature 
before moving forward to briefly review the existing literature on TFA and Teach 
First.  The literature on TFA and Teach First shed light on how these programmes 
have been understood and highlights how little is yet known about Teach First and 




2.2  The Policy Transfer Perspective 
 
From Policy Diffusion to Transfer in Political Science 
The roots of the policy transfer literature in political science emerged in the 
1960s as a central focus of comparative policy studies (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). 
Research in this area first took the form of investigations into how policy innovations 
diffused among American states (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Menzel & Feller 1977; 
Foster 1978).   Such early research drew upon the diffusion studies and findings first 
developed in the fields of sociology and communication studies and consolidated in 
the first edition of Rogers’s work, Diffusion of Innovations (1962).  Political 
scientists adapted its key terms, redefining diffusion as “any pattern of successive 
adoptions of a policy innovation” (Eyestone 1977, p.441) and redefining innovation 
as “a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the 
program may be or how many other states may have adopted it” (Walker 1969, 
p.881).  In later research, the definition of diffusion was broadened to refer to a 
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process in which “policy choices in one country affect the policy choices in other 
countries” (Meseguer & Gilardi 2009, p.528) 
Thus, the policy diffusion research proceeded to analyze the patterns in which 
policies spread among American states as well as across nations and regions.  
Among its first and most enduring insights into policy spread is the idea that 
geographic proximity or “regionalism” appears to play a major role in influencing 
the adoption of new policies (Foster 1978).  These studies mostly draw upon 
quantitative methods of large samples of adopters across time and geographical 
territories in order to analyze patterns of adoption and adopter attributes.  Such 
policy diffusion studies offered “spatial, structural and socio-economic reasons for a 
particular pattern of adoption, rather than on the reasons for the diffusion itself” 
(Bennett 1991, p.221).  As a result, diffusion in terms of policy was often treated by 
political scientists as a subtle and indirect spread of policy over time, displaying an 
“apolitical” and “neutral” character (Stone 2001a).  
Still, policy diffusion studies sparked questions as to why governments 
tended to adopt policy innovations found elsewhere, leading to a major debate in the 
field over the phenomenon of policy convergence, defined by Kerr (1984, p.3) as 
“the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, 
processes and performances”.  The phenomenon was observed and theorized by 
scholars in the 1970s and 1980s although they proposed differing causes.  Two 
notable macro-level arguments put forth to explain convergence were “world 
education culture” and “world system/dependency” theories.  The argument for a 
world education culture was put forth from scholars led by John Meyers and working 
from the new institutionalist perspective, which stresses the impact of cognitive-
cultural elements of institutional environments.  Meyer and his colleagues argued 
that global models of schooling spread in response to ideological and other 
institutional pressures to emulate western nation-states’ models of mass education 
(Meyer & Rubinson 1975; Meyer et al. 1977; Meyer 1977; Meyer & Rowan 1983; 
Boli et al. 1985).  Meyer and colleagues (1992; Meyer et al. 1997) continue to assert 
that policy diffusion, driven by the pressures for development and accompanied by 
beliefs in technical rationality, caused policy convergence and isomorphism.  
Meanwhile, other scholars explained policy convergence from the post-
colonial/critical perspective, which combined two macro-sociological views – (1) 
world polity (Wallerstein 1974b; 1974a), and (2) dependency theory (Frank 1975).  
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Such world polity/dependency scholars argued that the convergence of education 
models globally was due to rich, more powerful countries imposing their policies on 
poor, less powerful countries, dividing the world system into North-South and core-
periphery.  As a result, they rejected the idea that convergence occurs more-or-less 
voluntarily and suggested transfers were being imposed or coerced.  Those working 
in education suggested instead that educational transfer is a type of colonisation with 
the powerful forcing their models and practices on subjugated populaces (Carnoy 
1974; Altbach & Kelly 1978; Arnove 1980). 
While new institutional and dependency scholars did not specifically mention 
or analyze the “policy transfer” as a process, their work theorized its outcomes 
through large N-cases, documenting similarities in education structures, materials, 
and practices (e.g., Benavot et al. 1991).  However, other researchers began to 
question how transfer actually occurred and thus, started to focus more on the 
processes of cross-national policy transfer in the 1990s.  Illustrating a nuanced 
approach to the causes of convergence, Bennett (1991) argued that policy 
convergence among nations was the result of policy diffusion, or transfer, caused by 
(1) emulation stemming from rational decision-making of policy makers to engage in 
direct policy copying, (2) elite networking caused by transnational policy 
communities, (3) harmonization resulting from coordination of nations at the 
transnational level, or (4) penetration stemming from the involvement of external 
actors and interests.  
As debate over the existence of policy convergence among nations continued, 
criticism of the diffusion paradigm grew, suggesting it was only concerned with the 
spread of ideas and thus was ignoring fundamental questions affecting the national 
variation of globalized policy models.  Consequently, scholarly interest turned to 
policy-oriented learning, or “lesson-drawing” (Rose 1993), and studies of policy 
transfer (e.g., Westney 1987; Wolman 1992), a term adopted for all types of policy 
movement across borders that can occur through various pathways and sparked by 
different mechanisms.  Like Bennett (1991), political scientists began to examine the 
motives and contexts that shape transfers, especially among developed countries 
(e.g., Cox 1993; Dolowitz 1997).  In order to provide greater coherence for the 
policy transfer field, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, p.344) reviewed key concepts and 
defined policy transfer as “a process in which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
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development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time 
and/or place”. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000) also provided a comprehensive 
framework and typologies for researchers of policy transfer.   
 
 
Educational Borrowing:  Studies of Policy Transfer in Education 
For educationalists, the interest in voluntarily importing educational practices 
from abroad into one’s home context, or policy “borrowing”, was sparked with the 
establishment and expansion of national school systems throughout the 19th century 
and 20th centuries and was a defining debate in the emergence of comparative 
education (Phillips & Schweisfurth 2008).  Early “travelers’ tales” of education 
systems abroad were mainly descriptive and historical in nature.  Later, policy-
makers sent civil servants to other countries on fact-finding missions and sparked 
debates regarding whether foreign education policies should be imported given 
national contextual differences.  Such debates moved forward with the works of 
Bereday (1964) and Noah and Eckstein (1969) who advocated for the use of 
empirical social science methods.  
This led to greater debate in the field over methodology and theory in the 
following decades.  Thus, “borrowing” was considered a voluntary action although, 
as noted by many scholars in the field (e.g., Phillips & Ochs 2004), the term 
“borrowing” is problematic since it suggests the taking of something that would 
eventually be returned, which is not the case in any kind of policy transfer.  Using 
the term “borrowing” also suggests a one-directional flow of policy from the lender 
to the borrower, simplifying a very complex process of negotiation and adaptation.  
To remedy this shortcoming, other terms have been suggested most notably the idea 
of policy borrowing as “translation” (Dale 2006; Cowen 2009). 
Thus, in past decades, studies of policy borrowing in comparative education 
expanded and diversified.  Incorporating theories from further afield, scholars 
developed new concepts and perspectives, examining more imposed transfers 
(Carnoy 1974; Altbach & Kelly 1978).  Schriewer (1988) built on Luhmann’s (1982; 
1985) theory of self-referencing societies and introduced the concept of 
“externalization”, while David Phillips critically examined cross-national policy 
attraction (Phillips 1989).  Such scholars were among the “first generation” of 
researchers employing a more theoretically-informed and contextually-grounded 
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approach to policy transfer in education (Steiner-Khamsi 2012).  The work of these 
scholars has been organized, by their approaches, into four main strands or 
theoretical lenses: (1) New Institutionalist/Social Positivist, (2) Dependency, (3) 
Phenomenological/Culturalist, and (4) Transcendental /Meta-theoretical (Perry & 
Tor 2009; Spring 2008).  As noted earlier, the first two perspectives were rooted in 
the works of Meyers and colleagues and Wallerstein, Frank and colleagues 
respectively, which drew on policy diffusion, sociological new institutionalism, and 
post-colonial literature.  
In contrast, comparative educationalists such as Phillips and Steiner-Khamsi 
represent the Phenomenological/Culturalist theoretical approach to policy transfer in 
comparative education.  Culturalists question the idea that a common global 
education model and culture exists and instead emphasize the differences in 
seemingly similar ideas as they are expressed through local contexts.  Researchers 
employing a phenomenological approach have used micro-level analysis to 
illuminate the implementation of transfers, offering an explanation of how globally 
transferred policies can vary significantly depending on national contexts.  Focusing 
on the “politics of borrowing and lending”, these theorists have challenged the uni-
directional and all-powerful nature of global forces espoused by macro-level 
approaches.  Instead, scholars of this approach (e.g., Steiner-Khamsi 2004; 2000; 
Ochs & Phillips 2002; Chisholm 1999; 2007) explore the power of cultural 
interpretations and national politics in shaping transferred educational ideas.  Their 
studies point to the existence of a wide variety of alternative knowledge bases, 
models, and practices in education.   
Some also question to what extent transfers actually take place (Whitty et al. 
1992; Halpin & Troyna 1995), suggesting that similar education policies emerged in 
the U.S. and U.K. in the 1990s not necessarily because of “direct policy exchange” 
but for purposes of legitimation.  In addition, these exchanges of ideas were rooted in 
transnational policy networks that shared “mutually reinforcing versions of reality 
which reflect shared reference groups and assumptive worlds” (Whitty & Edwards 
1998, p.223).  By exploring cases of policy transfer in various national and local 
contexts, these scholars show the idiosyncratic nature of policy borrowing.  Their 
qualitative methods reflect the need to understand the way in which contexts shape 
ideas and implementation in both expected and unexpected ways.  
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Similarly, the Transcendental/Meta-theoretical approach also pays close 
attention to how policy is socially constructed and advocates for a multi-level 
analysis of policy transfer.  Such theorists (Luhmann 1997; Schriewer 1988; Dale 
2000) attempt to account for the interplay between micro- and macro- forces shaping 
policy transfers and their outcomes.  They draw heavily on the social constructivist 
perspective of Bourdieu (1989) and acknowledge that both global convergence and 
national variation is occurring as a result of policy transfer and diffusion.  Both of 
these latter approaches have proven popular among educationalists and studies 
employing them have increased in the past two decades (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow 
2011). 
 
Policy Transfer Across the Disciplines 
With rare exceptions (e.g., Steiner-Khamsi 2012), scholars working on policy 
borrowing (and lending) in comparative education and those examining policy 
transfer (and diffusion) in political science do not engage in dialogue with each 
other.  Yet, in the 1990s, perceptions of educational policy borrowing between the 
U.S. and U.K. sparked several studies in both disciplines (Wolman 1992; Whitty et 
al. 1992; Wohlstetter & Anderson 1992; Finegold et al. 1994; Whitty & Edwards 
1998; Dolowitz 2000) and attracted new scholars to the field.  In the 21st century, 
both camps of researchers increasingly share a common focus on the roles non-
government actors and networks in the processes and outcomes of transfer.  From 
here on, I move forward by drawing on both literatures to review the state of the 
field.    
 
 
Policy Transfer Frameworks  
There have been a number of conceptual frameworks proposed by scholars to 
help understand policy transfer as a distinct phenomenon.  I briefly review four here: 
two from the political science field and two from the education field.  
The most cited policy transfer framework, proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000), extends their earlier work (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996) and conceptualizes 
policy transfer researchers as both an independent and dependent variable. This 
suggests studies can provide insight into policy transfer as a process and/or a policy 
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outcome.  To facilitate investigations, Dolowitz and Marsh’s proposed framework is 
organized around six inter-related questions:   
 
1. Why do actors engage in policy transfer?   
2. Who are the key actors involved in the policy transfer process?   
3. What is transferred?   
4. From where are the lessons drawn?   
5. What are the different degrees of transfer?   
6. What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process? 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh’s framework provides a typology of possible answers to these 
questions.  Although their framework draws from a wide range of studies, it relies 
heavily on Rose’s (1991; 1993) concept of “lesson-drawing” and Bennett’s (1991) 
work on convergence.  The framework provided much needed synthesis of the field 
at the time and has served as a guiding framework for many investigations.  
However, some scholars argued that Dolowitz and Marsh’s (1996; 2000) framework 
can mask the complexity of the transfer process (Page 2000; Stone 2001a; Radaelli 
2000).   
To address this complexity, Evans and Davies (1999) propose an alternative 
multi-level framework aimed at accounting for global and international forces 
alongside state-centered forces.  Evans and Davies posed the questions: What 
domestic, international and transnational circumstances are likely to bring about 
policy transfer and how?  To answer them, Evans and Davies created a multi-faceted 
model by combining five theoretical frameworks: (1) international structure and 
agency, (2) the epistemic community approach, (3) domestic structure and agency, 
(4) policy network analysis and (5) formal policy transfer analysis.  Their meso-level 
map also argued for the need to integrate the role of policy networks and lesson-
drawing occurring at the micro-level at various points of the policy transfer process.  
While providing an innovative way of addressing complexity in policy transfer in the 
age of governance and globalization, the model use is limited to addressing basic 
questions about the conditions, scope and dimensions of the transfer (Benson & 
Jordan 2011).  Furthermore, though Evans and Davies state that no study of policy 
transfer is complete without referring to the implementation aspect of policy, they do 
not develop any device nor attempt to guide any deeper analysis of the transfer 
process. 
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Meanwhile, adopting a multi-level, meta-theoretical approach, Dale’s (1999) 
proposed framework focuses on transfer “mechanisms” and aims to compare the 
effects of globalization as a form of policy transfer distinct from other theories of 
policy “borrowing” and “learning”.  In his framework, Dale identifies seven 
mechanisms of policy transfer that vary along eight dimensions.  His work 
challenges the assumption of voluntariness of traditional perspectives and highlights 
the role of global pressures and underlying power relations that shape transfer 
processes.  Notably, Dale (1999) emphasizes that globalization differs from 
“imperialism” or “colonialism” since its effects are felt by all countries, not only less 
powerful ones.   Thus, transfers stemming from globalization are “not the result of 
the imposition of a policy by one country or another... but a much more supra-
nationally constructed effect” (Dale 1999, p.8).  Through his theorizing the effects of 
globalization, Dale also challenges the “methodological nationalism” – the tendency 
to take governments at the level of nation-state as the units involved in transfer – of 
the policy borrowing approaches, suggesting actors not related to government nor 
policy communities could be involved.  
In contrast, Phillips and Ochs (2003) propose a four-stage model of voluntary 
policy borrowing by incorporating the works of Schriewer, Steiner-Khamsi, and 
Mark Bray.  It includes subcategories of actors, motives, and contextual factors to 
guide researchers.  The stages occur in a circular fashion. The first stage, Cross-
National Attraction, is further subdivided into two categories: Impulses and 
Externalizing Potential.  Impulses are the preconditions and/or sparks that generate 
initial interest in borrowing from abroad, and eight possible impulses within the 
borrowing context are indentified.  In the first stage, the model specifies six possible 
elements of a policy (the “foci of attraction”) that have “externalizing potential”, or 
rather, could be borrowed.   In the model’s second stage, Decision, actors’ motives 
for transfer are examined and four types of decisions are identified: theoretical, 
phoney, realistic/practical, and quick fix.  These decision-types reflect different 
motives and modes of learning but do not offer ways in which the decision to 
transfer may be affected by forces beyond or below the national-political sphere.  
The third stage examines implementation and focuses on the factors and significant 
actors that shape the new policy, including people and institutions that resist or 
support the change as well as the speed of change.  The fourth stage, 
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Internalisation/Indigenisation, entails the analysis of the adapted policies that have 
“become” part of the system.   
In sum, these models represent attempts to consolidate learning on the policy 
transfer and offer competing approaches to the phenomenon – some more macro- or 
multi-level with consideration of wider networks and power while one focuses on the 
complexity of local actors and context shaping instances of transfer.   Yet, virtually 
all the models do not provide explanatory theories of policy transfer and neglect to 
address how policy transfer relates to other policy-making processes, both criticisms 
of the policy transfer approach (James & Lodge 2003).   Hence, many have called for 
policy transfer to be combined with other perspectives for empirical investigation 
(Evans 2009; Benson & Jordan 2011). 
 
 
Forms of Policy Transfer and the Role of Learning 
The term policy transfer has become an umbrella term for all types of 
transfer, whether they are voluntarily adopted by policy makers or imposed by an 
outside actor.  Within the education field, these two categories are commonly 
referred to as policy “borrowing” and “lending” respectively.  Between these two 
extremes is a spectrum of transfers that can occur through varying mechanisms such 
as diffusion, pressure from supranational organizations, international networks, or 
coerced by occupier or an authoritarian regime at home (Phillips & Ochs 2003; 
Dolowitz & Marsh 1996).  These various types of transfer help answer Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s first question: Why do actors engage in policy transfer?  Thus, the 
distinguishing factor between these types of transfer is the prime agent(s) of transfer 
and the motive for transfer.  However, researchers acknowledge that the presence of 
multiple actors in the process, such as international consultants and other non-
government actors, makes it more difficult to distinguish between these “forms” of 
transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Perry & Tor 2009).   
A key debate related to the forms of transfer is the role of knowledge and 
learning in the process of policy-making (and transfer).  Concepts such as “lesson-
drawing” (Rose 1991),  “policy learning” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Raffe & 
Spours 2007), and “social learning” (Hall 1993; Boehmke & Witmer 2004) all aim to 
caputre how actors’ knowledge and learning shapes the decision-making and policy 
development.  These concepts represent a policy-as-learning approach to studying 
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policy change and is rooted in work of Hugh Heclo (1974) who declared “policy 
making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf” (p.305).  In the 
literature, “lesson-drawing” specifically and policy learning in general is treated as a 
necessary precursor to transfer.  Yet, few studies of policy transfer question the 
processes of sensemaking involved in the diffusion of an idea through social 
networks.  Most often, a policy innovation is treated as a single idea that undergoes 
adaptation to fit a new context rather than a fuzzy idea up for multiple interpretations 
both in its original context and its new locality.   
Studying policy learning among individuals involved in the transfer process 
can provide a glimpse into the social networks, institutional pressures, and other 
factors related to the transfer process.  Probing the manner in which ideas are 
presented and interpreted can illuminate the potentially diverse motives and 
rationales of actors and expose differences in understanding as well as actors’ social 
influence that would be overlooked otherwise.  Also, paying more attention to the 
role of social learning within policy transfer may help explain the scope of policy 
change, such as when and why transfers result in either an incremental or “first 
order” change, general reform or “second order” change, or a radical paradigm-shift 
in policy or “third order” change (Hall 1993).  Thus, there is valuable potential for 
integrating a policy-as-learning approach with the transfer process literature.  Doing 
so would require scholars to see policy-related learning as on ongoing activity and a 
key component of transfer, rather than simply a precursor to transfer.  In addition, a 
focus on policy learning would help link transfer processes to the broader literature 
on policy-making and change.    
 
Actors Involved in Policy Transfer 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) specify nine broad categories of actors that are 
involved in policy transfer:    
 
1. elected officials 
2. political parties 
3. bureaucrats/civil servants  
4. pressure groups  
5. policy entrepreneurs and experts 
6. transnational corporations  
7. think tanks  
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8. supra-national governmental/nongovernmental institutions  
9. consultants    
 
Clearly, the term “actor” does not necessarily denote an individual person but can 
refer to groups, corporations, networks, and other bodies.  Elected officials and 
bureaucrats, the most common actors examined in policy-making and 
implementation studies, have also been common actors studied in cases of policy 
transfer.  This is understandable given scholars’ tendency to focus on national 
governments as the prime unit of analysis, although Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) 
recognize transfer within local levels of government and between sectors as well as 
between nations.  
In an attempt to account for the effects of globalization and emergence of 
new forms of governance, scholars have begun to focus their attention on actors 
outside government, in civil society, and in international networks and organizations 
that may facilitate cases of policy transfer.  For example, Dale and Robertson (2002) 
examine how regional bodies such as the European Union, North American Free 
Trade Agreement, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation have varying degrees 
of influence on its member states’ education policies.  Others consider how 
international organizations spread policies.  For example, Burde (2004) examines the 
role of an international non-governmental organization in importing foreign “best 
practices” to Bosnia-Herzegovina while Jones (2004) explores how the World Bank 
influences educational policy through its educational loans and ideological beliefs.   
Furthermore, Stone (2000) analyzes the role of think tanks in transferring 
ideas about privatization.  Drawing on the concepts of “social learning” and 
“epistemic communities”, her study highlights the unique role of think tanks in 
producing and distributing policy-related knowledge, their involvement in advocacy 
and transnational networks, and their ability to spark organizational transfer.  In 
addition, Stone’s (2010) examination of the Open Society Institute shed light on how 
an international philanthropic foundation can create and manage an international 
policy network that engages in governance and diffuses ideas and norms that 
influence policy.  These examples highlight how researchers are exploring the 
diversity of actors and networks that, although not centered in government, are 
facilitating policy transfer.  Still, more empirical research is needed on transfer 
facilitated by policy entrepreneurs and networks outside government. 
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Objects and Sources of Policy Transfer  
What is actually adopted in the policy transfer process can vary considerably. 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) identify eight different categories: “policy goals, policy 
content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas and 
attitudes, and negative lessons” (p.12).  They also assert that “policies” and 
“programmes” are not the same concepts as a “policy” suggests a theory of action 
that can result in multiple programmes while a “programme” is a “complete course 
of action in and of itself” (2000, p.16).  Similarly, Phillips and Ochs (2003) specify 
six broader categories of policy elements that may be transferable: a policy’s guiding 
philosophy, ambitions/goals, strategies, enabling structures, processes and 
techniques.   
This gives scholars a flexible itemized list of possible objects of transfer, 
though it says little about how different policy elements may shape the transfer 
process itself.  This is a question that has been taken up by a limited number of 
policy diffusion scholars (Makse & Volden 2011; Wejnert 2002) and relates to a 
central concept within the diffusion of innovation literature (i.e. how the 
characteristics of an innovation affects its rate of adoption).  In this vein, Wejnert 
(2002) discusses how a policy’s “public vs. private consequences” as well as its 
“benefits vs. costs” can influence an actor’s decision to adopt.  In addition, Rose 
(1993) hypothesized that transfer more often occurs when programmes “have single 
goals; the problem in focus is simple to understand; a direct relationship between 
problem and solution is determined; side-effects are perceived to be minimal; a 
programme’s performance in a given environment is known about and the outcomes 
of its transfer are easily predicted”  (Nedley 2004, p.187).   
The source of transferable policy or policy elements can vary from the 
international level down to district and local levels, although the most common unit 
of analysis among transfer scholars continues to be the national governments.  Again, 
this trend has led the field to suffer from “methodological nationalism” (Dale 2005) 
with the majority of studies examining transfers between the U.S.-U.K. (Whitty 
2012; Cook 2008), as well as among European countries (Hough 2005; Turbin 2001; 
Bache & Taylor 2003; Bulmer & Padgett 2005), Australia and New Zealand (Thrupp 
2001; Dale 2001; Fawcett & Marsh 2012).  Meanwhile, policy transfer studies in 
developing countries tend to focus on the flow of ideas from developed to less 
developed nations though a notable minority have looked at “south-south” transfer 
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among developing countries (Nedley 2004; Morais 2005; Chisholm & Steiner-
Khamsi 2009).  Despite this focus on the national-level, it is widely recognized that 
policy transfer can happen at many levels of policy-making – from among city, state, 
or provincial governments to national, regional, or global levels of policy-making 
(Bray & Thomas 1995).  In addition, transfers can take place horizontally (e.g. from 
district to district) or potentially from policy learning among home countries (Raffe 
et al. 1999; Raffe 2007) – as well as vertically (e.g., from local to national levels) 
among these units.  It is important to note that policy transfers can also stem from 
other policy sectors and from past experiences. 
 
 
Degrees of Transfer   
 Within the literature, “degrees of transfer’” refers to the extent to which a 
policy is transferred wholesale into a new environment.  This relates back to debates 
on why actors decide to engage in transfer in the first place since their learning, 
rationales, and intentions dictate to some extent the transfer proposed at the onset of 
the process.  Still, the process can alter the intended degree of transfer, and thus this 
question implies an assessment of overall outcome of policy transfer.  In response, 
Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) specify four different degrees of transfer:  (1) copying, 
which involves “direct and complete transfer”, (2) emulation, which “involves 
transfer of the ideas behind the policy or program”; (3) combinations, which involve 
the transfer of “mixtures of several different policies”; and inspiration, in which 
“policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but where the final 
outcome does not actually draw upon the original” (p.13).  Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000) also distinguish between transfers that are successfully completed and those 
that are not carried out due to being “inappropriate” or “uninformed”.  These are 
policies that fail to be implemented as a result of insurmountable resistance or 
contextual incompatibility. 
These conceptual categories lead to some interesting and yet unexplored 
questions.  To what degree must a transfer resemble its foreign counterpart to be 
considered a successful transfer?  Though scholars expect some adaption to the 
original policy concept due to differences in context, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) 
suggest policy failure can be the result of an “uninformed” or “incomplete” transfer. 
However, these categories do not reflect the ways in which policies may be changed 
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through negotiations among policy actors with varying interpretations of the policy.  
Instead, the focus in the literature appears to emphasize the motivations and intention 
of the lead actors supporting the transfer.  Few scholars examine how the intentions 
and interests of those in favor of policy transfer might change and evolve over time 
during transfer process, perhaps as a result of negotiation, further policy learning, or 
structural influences during the decision-making process.  These issues are usually 
only addressed at the implementation stage, as clearly indicated in Phillips and Ochs 
(2003) model.  In other words, focusing only on questions regarding whether a 
transfer “succeeds” may miss the important point of how policy outcomes (especially 
transfers that take the form of institutional changes or new organizations) can be 
produced at the point of “decision” through negotiated “settlements”, as theorized in 
by institutional scholars (e.g., Rao & Kenney 2008).   
 
 
Factors restricting or facilitating the policy transfer process  
Given the complexity of policy processes, the number of contextual factors 
that help or hinder the transfer process are innumerable.  Still, Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000) echo predictions of Rose (1993) who suggests that a policy’s complexity, and 
its compatibility with previous policies and the structural/institutional and cultural 
context, can constrain or facilitate its transfer.  Lack of “suitability of context” and 
“resistance” to the transfer are commonly cited inhibitors within studies of education 
policy transfer (Phillips & Ochs 2003).  However, these points reflect a rhetorical or 
retrospective (i.e., functional) argument based on outcomes rather than objective 
reality unless a phenomenological approach to transfer is used.   
Surveying the range of transfer studies in different social policy fields, Stone 
(1999) notes that policy transfer may be significantly affected by “time, institutional 
architecture, political culture, and state structures”(p.54).  Other scholars have also 
identified social or policy networks as a critical component of transfer.  Networks of 
actors promoting policy transfer can influence the particular path the process takes 
(Mintrom & Vergari 1998; True & Mintrom 2001) and the level of controversy a 
policy sparks in terms of a moral debate can hinder a policy’s transfer (Mooney & 
Lee 1999).  In this area, the diffusion-innovation and institutionalism literature 
become particularly relevant and useful in understanding how institutional structures 
and social networks affect the transfer process.  
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2.3 Policy Entrepreneurs and Networks in Policy Transfer 
 
As mentioned in earlier sections, national governments and their official 
actors have so far been the most common subjects of policy transfer studies.  
However, policy entrepreneurs and policy networks are two concepts gaining 
popularity in the policy transfer literature, although both have longer histories in 
related fields of public policy studies.  First, I will briefly bring together and discuss 
the theoretical work on “policy entrepreneurs” found in the literatures of policy 
diffusion, governance, and transfer.  Secondly, I will likewise review the evolution of 
the policy network concept and approach in these three literatures.  Finally, I will 
propose that bringing together these two concepts – policy entrepreneurs and policy 
networks – is helpful in studying cases of policy transfer that reflect new governance 
modes of policy-making.  This discussion will also be useful in relating the policy 
transfer literature to related concepts in the “diffusion of innovation” literature. 
 
 
Policy Entrepreneurs and Innovation 
In his influential work Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Kingdon 
(1984) introduced his “policy streams” theory of policy processes and established the 
concept of “policy entrepreneurs” who, he argued, often play an influential role in 
policy change.  In Kingdon’s policy streams model, which rejected rational and 
linear models of policy-making and instead built on Cohen et al.’s (1972) “garbage 
can” model, there are three separate but related policy streams – problem stream, 
policy (solution) stream, and politics stream.  When the three streams intersect, a 
window of opportunity for policy action is created.  Kingdon suggested policy 
entrepreneurs recognize and/or help such windows come about.  He first 
conceptualized policy entrepreneurs as individuals who could be inside or outside of 
government but whose  “defining characteristic… is their willingness to invest their 
resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a future 
return” (p. 122 as quoted by Mintrom (2000), p.57).  For Kingdon, policy 
entrepreneurs could recognize opportune moments or “windows” in which to 
interject their innovative ideas into the policy process, referring to this ability as 
“social acuity”.   
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As the concept was taken up by other researchers in the field, its meaning 
expanded.  Policy entrepreneurs were seen as those possessing the ability to define 
problems, build teams, and lead by example (Mintrom & Norman 2009).  However, 
while Kingdon stressed that a policy entrepreneur can be identified by his/her 
willingness to accept risk, Walker (1981) and Polsby (1985) argued the defining role 
of policy entrepreneurs was to provide and develop innovative ideas.  Roberts and 
King (1989; 1991) furthered the idea of a policy entrepreneur as an innovator, rather 
than risk-taker, by linking the concept of policy entrepreneur to the work of 
economist Joseph Schumpeter (1939; 1934).  Schumpeter, a prominent scholar of 
modern entrepreneurial thought, had suggested that an entrepreneur’s main function 
was to innovate, and he argued that the entrepreneur takes on risk only “indirectly 
and at one removed” (1939, p.104).  By this, Schumpeter meant that the entrepreneur 
experienced limited risk since he/she is primarily challenging the status quo, not 
supplying capital or resources (Roberts 1992).  Instead, in Schumpeter view, the 
capitalist bore most of the risk in an entrepreneurial venture.  Roberts and King’s 
(1989, 1991) work further reinforced the idea policy entrepreneurs are not primarily 
risk-takers but mainly innovators.  
Meanwhile, Roberts and King (1989; 1991) developed the concept of “policy 
entrepreneurs” in other ways.  They altered Kingdon’s definition by asserting that 
“policy entrepreneurs” are individuals who operate “from outside the formal 
positions of government”.  In their view, policy entrepreneurs “introduce, translate, 
and help implement new ideas into public practice” (Roberts & King 1991, p.147).   
They are among a larger class of “public entrepreneurs” who engage in “public 
entrepreneurship” defined as “the generation of a novel or an innovative idea and the 
design and implementation of the innovative idea into public sector practice” 
(Roberts 1992, p.56).  Innovation, in this context, is any new idea that is 
technological or administrative in nature.  In their view, public entrepreneurs are 
involved in the multiple stages of policy formation, from phases of conceptualization 
and policy agenda-setting through decision-making, and implementation.  As a result 
their role is multi-faceted and includes idea generation and problem-framing, 
cultivating networks among a wide variety of stakeholders, attracting media support, 
and carrying out administrative duties and evaluative activities related to 
implementation.  
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 Furthermore, Roberts and King (1991) proposed that public entrepreneurs are 
of four types: 
 
1. Political entrepreneurs, who hold elected leadership positions in government;  
2. Executive entrepreneurs, who hold appointed leadership positions in 
government;  
3. Bureaucratic entrepreneurs, who hold formal positions in government, 
although not leadership positions; and  
4. Policy entrepreneurs, who work from outside the formal governmental 
system to introduce, translate, and implement innovative ideas into public 
sector practice.    
 
It is important to note that while these individuals differ in their location and 
authority within (or outside) the political structure, they are united by their endeavor 
to bring innovative change to a public policy issue.  Roberts and King also stress that 
to be labeled “public entrepreneurs”, individuals must be involved in the multiple 
stages of developing an innovation.  This conceptualization of a “policy 
entrepreneur” is not common among policy transfer studies using Dolowitz and 
Marsh’s approach since the implementation phase of transfers is not generally 
explored in-depth.  And while policy transfer studies in comparative education have 
often examined implementation phases, there has been little examination of the role 
of policy entrepreneurs as conceptualized by Roberts and King, Mintrom, and other 
political scientists 
The existence of four types of a public entrepreneur allows for the conceptual 
possibility of “entrepreneurial teams” composed of the various types.  Roberts and 
King (1996) advanced such a concept following their empirical, in-depth qualitative 
investigation of six public entrepreneurs.  These six, five of whom came from 
outside government, formed a team who engaged in “collective entrepreneurship” 
throughout the 1980s to finally bring about state school choice in Minnesota in the 
form of open enrollment in 1988.  Roberts and King (1996) noted that 
entrepreneurial teams can be highly effective for a number of reasons: (1) their 
diverse backgrounds and combined mix of skills and expertise, (2) common vision 
and commitment to change, and (3) the presence of mutual accountability and 
divided responsibilities.  Such a diverse team can, in turn, help build a diverse 
network of supporters and can avoid the perception of “groupthink”.   
Despite Roberts and King’s conceptual insight into collective forms of public 
policy entrepreneurship, scholarly focus has remained on individual actors, not 
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collaborative teams.  Using quantitative methods, Schneider et al. (1995) compare 
public entrepreneurs to their private sector counterparts by exploring the conditions 
leading to the emergence of such change agents in the public policy sphere.  Based 
on their work, Schneider et al. (1995) proposed a framework for understanding how 
and why public entrepreneurs emerge and operate, given specific contexts.  This 
model was then utilized and combined with Event History Analysis, a common 
quantitative method employed by diffusion scholars, in subsequent studies to assess 
how contextual variables influence the behavior of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom 
1997; Mintrom & Vergari 1998; Mintrom 2000).     
 The main insights from these empirical studies of policy entrepreneurs are 
twofold.  First, when other factors are controlled for, evidence suggests that the 
presence of a policy entrepreneur significantly increases the likelihood of a state 
considering and adopting a certain policy (Mintrom 1997).  Similarly, when the work 
of policy entrepreneurs is linked with their involvement and utilization of policy 
networks, the probability of success in achieving their innovative policy goals 
increases (Mintrom & Vergari 1998).  Mintrom (1997) also suggests that American 
policy entrepreneurs who use external, interstate networks were more effective in 
getting innovative policies onto state legislative agendas, but internal (intrastate) 
networks were more influential in bringing about the adoption of the policy at the 
state level.   
 These results suggest that policy entrepreneurship and policy networks are, 
perhaps, inseparable, and should ideally be examined together to better understand 
their operation and impact.  The need to study networks alongside the work of policy 
entrepreneurs becomes even more clear when considering the possibility of a team of 
entrepreneurs working together to tap into various networks to cultivate a new 
network that can support the adoption as well as implementation of an innovative 
policy.  Oborn et al. (2011), who empirically investigated a policy entrepreneuer in 
London, argue that such actors can do more than open a policy window; a policy 
entrepreneur can also build a network through which policy agendas can be enacted. 
A final insight into the role of policy entrepreneurs comes from Beeson and 
Stone (2013).   They also use the term “policy entrepreneur” in their exploration of 
how one private individual, Ross Garnaut, significantly influenced Australian 
policies regarding the economy and climate change.  Beeson and Stone (2013) 
distinguish between “policy entrepreneurs” who are generally focused on a specific 
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issue they wish to influence, and “public intellectuals” who offer their opinion on a 
range of issues from outside government (usually in a university).  However, unlike 
Roberts and King, they argue that policy entrepreneurs may be based within or 
outside of government and may work in full public view or behind the scenes and 
“target decision-making elites in political parties, government, and corporate offices, 
or the key players and interests in policy communities” (Beeson & Stone 2013, p.2).  
This modification of the concept of policy entrepreneurship is understandable and 
helpful given the emergence of more networked forms of governance in recent 
decades. 
The concepts of public and policy entrepreneurs as developed in studies of 
domestic policy-making can provide a useful start to understanding how policy 
entrepreneurs operate in cases of policy transfer.  This is a topic that has generally 
been neglected by the policy transfer literature, particularly in education.  In many 
ways, Ball and colleagues (Ball 2007; 2008; 2012; Ball & Junemann 2011) are 
tackling this gap through examining and mapping the development of entrepreneurial 
networks of private, non-profit, and philanthropic individuals and organizations 
enacting education initiatives in England.  Yet, their analysis is limited in its 
application in policy transfer cases as their network-mapping approach and focus on 
discourses neglects the temporal and dynamic social processes at work in specific 
cases of innovation-adoption.   
Still, there is much promise in this using the concept of policy entrepreneur, 
especially combined with network analysis, to consider how and from where new 
policies come about.  Together, these tools can help unpack policy transfers that take 
unconventional forms under collaborative governance modes of policy-making.  The 
concept of policy entrepreneurs can also be linked and complemented by the notion 
of institutional entrepreneurs, a point I explore later on. 
 
 
2.4  Policy Networks in Political Science 
 
While policy entrepreneurs have not often been examined by policy transfer 
theorists, the topic of policy networks has gained more attention.  This is likely due 
to the new trends in policy-making brought about by ideas of collaborative 
governance (Bevir & Rhodes 2003; Bevir et al. 2003) and the phenomenon of 
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globalization (Ladi 1999).  Notably, the concept of policy networks has a longer 
history in the field of public policy studies, particularly in the U.S. with its more 
decentralized and federal structures of government.  Thus, roots of the policy 
network concept partially lie in American pluralism and the research on sub-national 
governments (Rhodes 2006).  
 The policy network perspective rejects the rational model of policy-making 
and offers an alternative to the linear and rationalist stages-heuristic models of the 
policy process (Carlsson 2000).  Rhodes (2006) defines policy networks as “sets of 
formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors 
structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public 
policymaking and implementation” (p.424)  He further adds that actors within these 
networks are “interdependent and policy emerges from the interactions between 
them”.  Similarly, Kenis and Schneider (1991) offer the following alternative 
description of a policy network: 
  
A policy network is described by its actors, their linkages and its 
boundary.  It includes a relatively stable set of mainly public and 
private corporate actors.  The linkages between the actors serve 
as channels for communication and for the exchange of 
information, expertise, trust and other policy resources.  The 
boundary of a given policy network is not in the first place 
determined by formal institutions but results from a process of 
mutual recognition dependent on functional relevance and 
structural embeddedness. Policy networks should be seen as 
integrated hybrid structures of political governance (Kenis & 
Schneider, 1991, p. 41-42 as quoted by Carlsson 2000, italics in 
original).  
  
Among political scientists, the concept of “policy networks” in general are 
most often used in three main ways: (1) “as a description of governments at work, (2) 
as a theory for analyzing government policy-making, and (3) as a prescription for 
reforming public management” (Rhodes 2006, p.426).  In an attempt to explain how 
governments work, scholars have conceptualized a number of different types of 
networks that appear to exist, and thus the term “policy network” is a broad category 
that covers a number of subcategories.  Building on previous studies of policy 
networks, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) propose that policy networks be viewed on a 
continuum based on the degree of integration between its members.  This continuum 
contains five types of policy networks ranging from issue networks (which are less 
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integrated) to policy communities (which are highly integrated).  They also posit that 
networks can further be differentiated on the basis of their (1) membership 
composition, (2) the extent of inter-dependence between their members, and (3) the 
distribution of resources among members.  Using this criterion, Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992) suggest there are five types of policy networks: policy communities, 
professional networks, intergovernmental networks, producer networks, and issue 
networks.  While varying in their degrees of integration, stability and exclusiveness, 
these networks can also differ in terms of what types of common interests prevail – 
economic, professional, or political.   
Besides identifying what types of networks exist, scholars also use these 
terms to describe how governments work through networks.  Networks serve as 
avenues for the intermediation of interests (utilized more in the U.S. context), inter-
organizational collaboration (utilized more in the European context), and governance 
(utilized more recently in the U.K, U.S., and European contexts) (Rhodes 2006).   
 
 
Policy Networks in Relation to Policy Learning and Transfer 
Policy networks are often discussed as key sites of policy learning and 
transfer.  Policy networks are key features of Haas’ concept of epistemic 
communities, through which policy ideas are formulated, shaped, and put forward, 
some which may represent policies transferred from other places.  Haas (1992, p.2) 
defines a epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge”.  Within these networks, actors share common principles and 
beliefs about the nature and causal links in a policy area and notions of valid 
evidence.  As a result, epistemic communities produce knowledge that is widely 
respected and are able influence political debates and policy-making. 
Relatedly, policy networks are also at the heart of Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith’s (1993) advocacy coalition framework to policy change over a significant 
period of time (i.e, a decade).  An advocacy coalition is comprised of “people from a 
variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, researchers) 
who share a particular belief system – that is, a set of basic values, causal 
assumptions, and problem perceptions – and who show a non-trivial degree of 
coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993, p.25).  These 
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coalitions compete with each other to dominate policymaking in sub-systems, which 
are issue-specific networks.  Such sub-systems, they argue, are common site for 
policy-making because elected officials rely on civil servants who regularly consult 
with interest groups on an issue.    Thus, advocacy coalitions and networks are 
intimately intertwined and represent means and sites of policy-learning, -making, and 
even transfer.  
More recently, Evans and McComb (2004) offer the concept of a “policy 
transfer network” which differs from others in that it is created in an ad-hoc fashion 
in order to facilitate a specific policy transfer.  The concept draws on elements of the 
advocacy coalition framework and applies them to the policy transfer process.  Evans 
and McComb theorize that a policy transfer network exhibits limited membership by 
(1) extending to those who have shared beliefs and provide inputs and resources to 
advance a certain policy transfer but (2) excluding those whose views are not seen as 
supportive.  This approach focuses upon actors and their knowledge and sense-
making as they learn through the transfer process while also taking into account the 
organizational structures and interpersonal relationships that shape the context. 
 
Bringing Together Policy Entrepreneurs & Networks to Understand Policy 
Transfer 
Clearly, both policy entrepreneurs and networks are implicated in policy 
transfer on various levels.  Though some scholars have already begun examining 
such phenomenon (Sissenich 2008; Cao 2012; Legrand 2012; Ball & Exley 2010; 
Ball 2012; Beeson & Stone 2013), more work is needed, particularly on the 
formation and evolution of such networks.  This becomes ever more important 
because, as Stone (2010) points out, civil society has become a key driver in 
“creating new transnational processes and networks of policy-making” (p. 272).  She 
further argues that such non-governmental networks appear to collaborate with 
government in ways that do not disrupt “hierarchies [by] opening participation and 
dispersing power” but instead “represent new constellations of privatized power” 
(Stone 2010, p.272).  For this reason, emerging policy entrepreneurs and related 
networks need to be further examined.  Given this need, the concept of a policy 
network is a promising tool for analyzing policy transfer processes, not least because 
it is a “meso-level concept that links the micro-level of analysis, dealing with the role 
of interests and government in particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of 
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analysis, which is concerned with broader questions about the distribution of power 




2.5 The Institutional Perspective 
 
The institutional perspective brings important conceptual frameworks and 
theoretical insights into understanding how “contexts” shape those actors, networks, 
and processes involved in policy transfer and vice versa.  Although this body of 
literature focuses on the development of societal institutions, including 
organizations, it also provides insights into the complex role of social networks in 
shaping society.  For this reason, institutionalism is a perspective that enables a 
deeper probing of the ways in which “contexts” can be better understood and studied 
in policy transfer research and, significantly, how social networks in this process 
may promote or stifle and ultimately shape innovation.  Before focusing on these 
relevant points, I first ground my discussion in a brief examination of the 
development of institutionalism. 
 
 
The Development of Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory views the social world as made up of institutions – 
consisting of enduring rules, practices, and structures that set conditions on action.  
Thus, through institutional theory, scholars theorize and investigate how institutions 
emerge, are sustained, and shape society.  They consider how institutions are 
reproduced and are modified by individuals and organizations.  Institutionalism is a 
growing research perspective that scholars in a number of fields have adopted, most 
notably in the disciplines of economics, political science, sociology, and 
organizational studies.  The value in the institutional perspective lies in its ability to 
connect present events and processes of the social world with those of the past.  
Furthermore, the perspective encompasses both macro- and micro-approaches, 
bridging the gap between them and providing meso-levels of analysis as well.  
Finally, institutional theory can be widely applied to social phenomenon and thus can 
transcend boundaries between social science disciplines and its subfields, creating a 
space for dialogue and cooperation (Scott 2014).  The literature on institutionalism 
can help illuminate how policy transfers, and the networks and entrepreneurs 
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involved, are shaped by institutional contexts as they are translated, negotiated and 
implemented in new contexts.  Next, I selectively review the development of 
institutional literature across three disciplines – political science, sociology, and 




Early Institutional Theory in Political Science  
Institutionalism is an interdisciplinary field of research that emerged in the 
mid 19th and early 20th century.  It developed in response to questions regarding the 
organization of modern society, its nature, and massive changes happening within it 
since the arrival of the Industrial Revolution and the rise of the nation-state.  While 
scholars in Europe and the U.S. focused on addressing such issues, they also 
theorized how such environmental structures shape the choices and behavior of 
individuals.  These issues remain at the heart of institutional theory, despite its 
considerable evolution over time. 
The roots of institutionalism in political science can be traced back to Alexis 
de Tocqueville (1835), who first theorized that civil society actively organized and 
built institutions when state power was weak.  Following his observations of 
American society, political scientists of the time focused on political bodies –
documenting the origin and philosophical basis of such formal political institutions.  
This trend continued until the 1930s when many political scientists shifted away 
from the study of institutions and adopted the behavioralist approach to studying 
politics, focusing on individuals’ interests, voting patterns, party formation, and 
shifts in public opinion.  Thus, political scientists became predominantly preoccupied 
with the theorization of political attitudes, behavior, and the distribution of power in 
society until the 1970s when institutions again became a primary focus through work 
on new institutionalism.    
 
 
Early Institutional Theory in Sociology 
During the same time, sociologists took a rather different approach to 
institutional theory than political scientists.  Sociological theorists sought to explain 
how societal institutions developed to meet the needs of societies and the role culture 
played in influencing both individual behavior and institutional structures.  Scott 
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(2014) identifies three different strands of early sociological thinking that contributed 
to the development of institutional theory, all of which evolved in the late 19th and 
early 20th century and led to distinct but related conceptual contributions.   
The first set of works that jumpstarted the development of institutional theory 
in sociology were by of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber.  Marx led the 
development of the European tradition of institutional analysis with his theoretical 
ideas on the nature of human history and society.  Marx rejected Hegel’s 
philosophical view that the material world was not real but an expression of a deeper, 
abstract idea or spirit.  Instead, Marx argued that the material world was the real one 
and that the driving force in society through history was economic gain.  Witnessing 
the Industrial Revolution, he postulated that the structures of mass oppression and 
exploitation only appeared to participants to be external and objective.  In reality, he 
argued, such structures are products of human interests and activities and are 
justified by ideas and ideologies that seek to uphold them.  Such ideologies create a 
“false consciousness” in which people misinterpret reality (Marx 1844; 1845).  Thus, 
Marx theorized the way in which economic interests structured institutions and was 
among early institutional thinkers to express the notion of reality being a social 
construct.  In addition, Marx utilized Hegel’s concept of dialectics, a reference to the 
struggle to resolve contradictions, or conflict, to explain the conditions for social 
change within society. 
 While Marx sought to explain the changes in society at the onset of industrial 
capitalism, Durkheim focused his attention on the sources of social order.  He came 
to view society as shaped by normative and cognitive frameworks that are 
constructed through human interaction yet are experienced by individuals as 
objective.  Thus, his work emphasized the influential role of symbolic systems, 
including knowledge systems, beliefs, and moral frameworks (Morrison 2006), and 
studied these elements as the basis of social institutions such as the family, religion, 
and education in addition to the economic and political institutions studied by 
political scientists.  In his work, Durkheim introduced the concept of “social facts” to 
refer to the “ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable 
property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual” (Durkheim 1982, 
p.51).  Scott (2014) summarizes social facts as “phenomena perceived by the 
individual to be both external (to that person) and coercive (backed by sanctions)” 
(p.14).  Durkheim’s work also brought attention to the role of rituals and ceremonies 
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in expressing and reinforcing various types of beliefs, not only religious.  These 
concepts led the development of sociological institutional theory, which would later 
be incorporated into new institutionalism.  
Weber built on the ideas of both Marx and Durkheim and, in many ways, 
tried to bring together their contrasting approaches to understanding social systems.  
Weber argued that the social sciences, unlike the natural sciences, studied human 
social action in society and thus needed an interpretive approach which seeks to 
understand the individual’s inner and subjective states to explain human action and 
behavior (Morrison 2006).  He argued that rational behavior could stem from 
different logistics – concerned with either upholding tradition, addressing emotion, 
abiding by ultimate values, or strategically reaching practical goals (Weber 1978).    
As Weber applied his interpretive theory of action to understanding bureaucratic 
structures, he developed a typology of different administrative structures (traditional, 
charismatic, and rational-legal) based on varying sources of legitimate but ultimately 
subjective authority (Weber 1958).  Although Weber did not use the term 
“institution” in his writings, his study of bureaucracy set a precedent for how 
institutions could be approached and theorized. 
Meanwhile, an alternative strand of sociological institutional research began 
with the work of Herbert Spencer (1876) and William Graham Sumner (1906).  They 
likened society to a biological organism that developed specialized institutions to 
serve specific functions (Scott 2014).  Their studies were comparative and historical 
and gave insight into the origins and operation of institutions in different societies.  
In their work, they viewed an institution as both a concept and a corresponding 
structure and introduced the idea that society increases in structural complexity over 
long periods of time as society evolves.  This refers to the progression of human 
activity from the individual level to more organized and then institutionalized 
structures.  Although the biological analogy Spencer first likened society to was 
eventually discarded, the central focus on institutions, levels of activity within 
society, and the functional purpose of environmental structures became enduring 
ideas that promoted theoretical development in institutionalism.    
Finally, another strand of sociological work contributing to institutional 
theory began with the works of Charles Cooley (1902) and, later on, W. I. Thomas 
(1928) and Herbert Blumer (1969).  They brought attention to the complex and 
interdependent relationship between society’s culture and organization and an 
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individual’s own personality and behavior, suggesting an early form of structuration 
theory.  The works of George Mead (1930; 1934) and Alfred Schutz (1932) furthered 
this interactive, interpretive approach, bringing attention to the importance of 
individuals’ own interpretations of situations and the influence of such 
interpretations on their decisions and actions.  Thomas supported this idea, stating, 
“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequence” (Thomas & 
Znaniecki 1927, p.81 as quoted in Rogers 2003, p. 219).  This interpretive view and 
the works of Cooley, Thomas, and Blumer helped promote empirically-based 
research on the micro-level of institutional processes, a topic that has been 
overshadowed by the macro-level analysis that still dominates the field.  However, as 
new institutionalism emerged in the late 1970s, a handful of scholars again utilized 
the micro-level interpretive approach, starting notably with Lynne Zucker (1977). 
 
 
The Emergence of New Institutionalism 
A series of works published in the late 1970s and early 1980s captured 
scholars’ attention and led to the development of what many call the “new” 
institutionalism.  The new institutionalism drew heavily on recent developments in 
ethnomethodology and phenomenology in the 1950s and 1960s.  Ethnomethodology 
is an alternative branch of sociology first developed by Harold Garfinkel that focused 
on the micro-level decision-making of individuals, specifically how individuals make 
sense of society in their day-to-day interactions with it.  Among his insights was the 
significance of face-to-face interactions in facilitating the construction of common 
cognitive understandings and the proposition that, after such interaction, an 
individual reforms his understandings and intentions (DiMaggio & Powell 1991).  
This approach to understanding micro-level social processes, as opposed to Parson’s 
and other institutionalists’ focus on macro-level analysis, also challenged the 
dominant focus on rules and norms that had started with Durkheim.   Garfinkel 
argued that human action is not motivated by rules and shared norms and values, 
which are still open to diverse interpretations, but by common cultural and cognitive 
understandings that develop among individuals through interaction.    
Similar ideas were echoed by sociology scholars working in phenomenology, 
an approach originating in philosophy that “stressed the in-depth exploration of the 
meanings associated with symbols” (Wuthnow 1987, p.42).   In their influential work 
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The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and Luckmann (1966) sought to 
understand how commonsense, everyday knowledge shared among ordinary people 
organized and reproduced society.  Agreeing with Garkfinkel that everyday face-to-
face interactions are most important to sense-making, Berger and Luckman 
considered social realities—that is, what we regard as real and meaningful— are 
created through reciprocal, fluid, and flexible interactions on a constant basis.  
However, Berger and Luckmann moved to the macro-level of analysis to explain the 
existence of institutions.  They argued that institutions are symbolic systems that are 
constructed over time and thus are “experienced as possessing a reality of their own, 
a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact” (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966, p.58).  Berger and Luckmann’s work introduced the term “social 
construction” into the social sciences and were among the first to suggest that 
“beliefs” were not primarily internalized and subjective but were manifested in 
external behaviors and structures.  These arguments had profound effects on the 
scholars who went on to establish the “new” institutional theory. 
In the context of these theoretical developments, John Meyers and his 
colleagues introduced an alternative view of institutions and organizations that 
privileged their cultural-cognitive origins and elements.  First, Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) challenged structural-contingency and resource-dependency theories, which 
view organizations as strategic actors steered by managers responding and adapting 
to environmental circumstances.  Instead, they examined how and why formal 
bureaucratic organizations had become so prevalent and similar across modern 
societies and focused on explaining the effects of the institutional contexts, primarily 
the widespread social understandings embedded in such contexts (1977, p.346).  In a 
later work, they describe institutional contexts as “the rules, norms, and ideologies of 
the wider society” (Meyer & Rowan 1983, p.84).    
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued that institutionalized ideological forces 
drive the growth and prevalence of formal organizations in modern society, declaring 
“once institutionalized, rationality becomes a myth with explosive organizing 
potential” (p.346).  This, they argued, is a result of institutional rules that “function 
as myths depicting various formal structures as rational means to attainment of 
desirable ends” (p.345).  Formal structures are defined as blueprints for 
organizational activities including its internal organization, programmes, and 
positions (p.342).  These formal structures are offered by the institutional 
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environment as templates or “building blocks” for forming organizations that “are 
considered proper, adequate, rational, and necessary” (p.345) and hence desirable 
and essential for organizations to adopt.    
Meyer and Rowan (1977) stressed the power of beliefs that are 
“rationalized”, referring to beliefs that are designed in ways that “specify the design 
of rule-like procedures to attain specific objectives” (Scott, 2014, p.50).  Rational 
beliefs are the basis of myths, they argued.  Meanwhile, as organizations conform to 
the myths of their institutional environment, they adopt organizational structures 
ceremonially to increase their external legitimacy rather than improve efficiency.  
Furthermore, Meyer and Rowan argue that institutional isomorphism not only helps 
legitimate organizations but also promotes their stability, survival, and success.  
However, because organizations incorporate formal structures are based on external 
criteria, they must loosen or “decouple” structures from one another and from 
internal organizational work.  Scholars of organizational studies had observed the 
phenomenon of decoupling of formal and informal activities before.  However, new 
institutional theorists made the aspect of “decoupling” central and provided an 
explanation of why it occurred (Jepperson 2002).   
In another foundational work, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) built on Meyer 
and Rowan’s ideas and further cemented the concept of institutional isomorphism, 
defining it as “a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions” (p.149).   They then 
set out their argument that the increasing isomorphism among organizations occurs 
through three mechanisms – coercive change stemming from peer or societal 
pressures, mimetic change in response to internal or external sources of uncertainty, 
and normative change brought about primarily by professionalization.  In some 
ways, their explanation for institutional isomorphism relates to policy transfer 
theorists’ debates on policy convergence and the causes and motives for such 
similarities in educational policies and structures.  While institutionalists focus on the 
diffusion of structures, or “institutional transfer” (e.g., Locke & Jacoby 1995), policy 
transfer scholars tend to focus on the movement of policy.  However, these two 
entities – structure and policy – are very much related.  Marsh and Sharm (2009) 
suggest both perspectives would benefit from a more dialectical synthesis of agency 
and structure and need both the pattern-finding (emphasized by diffusion studies) 
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and process-tracing (emphasized by transfer studies) to fully explain either 
phenomenon.    
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also made another major contribution to the 
field with the introduction of the concept of “organizational field”.  They argued that 
coercive, mimetic, and normative mechanisms facilitate the diffusion of institutional 
effects through a “field” of organizations, an adaptation of Bourdieu’s idea of “social 
fields”.  DiMaggio and Powell defined organizational field as “those organizations, 
in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life [including] key 
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations that produce similar services or products” (p.148).  Around the same 
time, Scott and Meyer (1983) also proposed a similar concept – a sector.  Both ideas 
refer to a meso-level field of analysis that includes inter-connected populations of 
organizations that are not necessarily bound to one geographic locality.  The 
introduction of a new unit of analysis was an important step forward that enabled 
scholars to identify a diverse but connected set of relevant actors and organizations 
on which to focus their attention.  The concept of field, or sector, has also led to a 
lmited number of studies on the influence of one sector on another through the 
transfer ideas or practices (e.g., Hwang & Powell 2009). 
While the analyses of Meyer, Rowan, Scott, DiMaggio and Powell and others 
developed new institutional theory at the macro-level, Zucker (1977) examined the 
“microfoundations” of institutions.  The micro-level approach seeks to understand 
the process of institutionalization in contrast to the macro-level approach that treats 
institutionalization as a state, without explaining how it is achieved (Zucker 1991). 
Without a micro-level foundation, Zucker suggested that scholars would be left with 
simply examining the content of institutions, which limits the potential for 
explanatory theory-building.   
The ideas of Meyers and colleagues invited scholars to challenge or expand 
such propositions through empirical research, leading to the development of 
additional strands of new institutional theory, notably historical and rational choice 
institutional perspectives (Schmidt 2010).  However, the enduring theme of the new 
institutionalism literature is that institutions construct actors and their interests 
through shaping society’s culture and others’ perceptions of reality.  Such theoretical 
insight influenced the related and relatively newer field of organizational studies 
(March & Olsen 1984; 1989), offering an alternative to resource dependency and 
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strategic contingency models, and led scholars to re-examine notions of 
organizational learning (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). 
 
 
2.6  Key Concepts and Current Debates in Institutional Theory 
 
Consolidation of Research into a Three-Pillar Framework 
The study of institutions in both the new and old institutional literature led 
Scott to revise the conceptualization of institutions as comprising of three pillars, or 
elements, which “together with associated activities and resources, provide stability 
and meaning to social life” (Scott, 2014, p. 56).  In this framework, first detailed by 
Scott in 1995 and based heavily upon DiMaggio and Powell (1983), institutions are 
made up of regulatory, normative, and the cultural-cognitive elements, and each can 
be defined and differentiated from the other by the type of motivation for 
compliance, enforcement mechanisms, underlying logic, types of indicators, affect, 
and bases of legitimacy.   
Legitimacy, in this context, refers to “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, belief, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p.574).  
Unlike some organizational theories that consider legitimacy as a commodity or 
resource, institutionalists view legitimacy as “a condition reflecting perceived 
consonance” with prevailing rules, laws, normative values, or cultural cognitive 
frameworks (Scott 2014, p.73).  Furthermore, while legitimacy confers status and 
power on institutional structures, organization forms, and/or practices, such 
structures and their legitimating bases can still be contested and privilege some 
individuals over others (Martin 1994).   With this point in mind, I discuss each of 
Scott’s framework delineating the three institutional elements before turning to how 
his framework has furthered developed in the institutional theory in the past decade.  
First, the regulatory element of institutions is perhaps the most evident, with 
scholars all acknowledging that institutions limit and habitualize actions and 
behaviors.  Thus, Scott (2014) describes the regulatory pillar as “a stable system of 
rules, either formal or informal, backed by surveillance and sanctioning power” 
(p.64).  Thus, scholars examine how rules, inspections, rewards, and punishments – 
ranging from the formally legalized (i.e., laws, jail time) to more communal 
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consequences (i.e, classroom rules, school punishments) – influence behavior.  This 
element of institutions relies on coercive mechanisms and derives its legitimacy from 
being legally sanctioned.  Scott (2014) also suggests that the power of regulatory 
systems – backed by force and/or sanctions – stems from its ability to affect 
individuals emotionally, creating feelings of “fear, dread, and guilt,” or “relief, 
innocence, and vindication” (p.63).  While rules are seen as constraining, the rewards 
from following them can be empowering with individuals receiving certain status, 
licenses, or other benefits.  Scott further makes two notable points on regulatory 
systems.  The first is that “when coercive power [i.e., sanctions, force] is both 
supported and constrained by rules, we move into the realm of authority [in which] 
power is institutionalized” (Scott, 2014, p.61).  Secondly, economic institutionalists, 
who liken regulatory systems to “rules of the game in a competitive team sport” 
(North, 1990, p. 4), point out that those who set and enforce the rules are not 
necessarily neutral actors.  This point was taken up by historical institutionalists who 
argue that governments develop their own interests as actors somewhat separate and 
autonomous from society.   
While some scholars give primacy to the regulatory aspects of institutions, 
others emphasize the normative element of institutions, which shapes how such 
formal and informal rules are interpreted and applied.  Scott (2014) describes the 
normative pillar as relying on collectively shared rule systems, consisting of both 
values and norms, which “introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
dimension into social life”(p.64).  In his definition, values are “conceptions of the 
preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which 
existing structures or behavior can be compared and assessed” while norms refer to 
“how things should be done [and] define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” 
(Scott 2014, pp.64–65).  In other words, normative systems determine both the 
generally-accepted logic of how things should be done as well as what ultimate goals 
should be pursued.  In this way, normative elements of institutions shape the 
“appropriate” ends and the means of individual and collective action.   
Moreover, while some values and goals are espoused for everyone, others are 
reserved for specific groups or types of individuals, leading to a differential of 
values, norms, and goals based on roles, defined as “conception of appropriate goals 
and activities for particular individuals or specified social positions” (Scott 2014, 
p.64).  On this point, Scott (2014) argues that roles are “prescriptions” held 
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externally by others but also internalized by individuals and can be either formally 
constructed (such as in organizations) or more informally understood as a guide to 
action.  Thus, through roles, normative systems can both impose constraints on 
social behavior as well as “empower and enable” social action, conferring on 
individuals “rights as well as responsibilities, privileges as well as duties, licenses as 
well as mandates” (Scott 2014, p. 64).  Such normative systems are evident in the 
form of certification and accreditation set by standard-setting bodies (that expect 
voluntary compliance rather than regulatory agencies that enforce it) (Ruef & Scott 
1998).  Other empirical indicators of normative roles could likely be found in less 
formalized but still communally-voiced expectations concerning various social roles 
(i.e., parenting, religious congregation obligations, etc). 
The normative elements of institutions are understood to affect individual 
behavior through the social shaming or shunning of disobedience while honoring and 
rewarding individuals and groups who fulfill expectations.  Unlike regulatory 
systems, which are backed by legally sanctioned force, normative systems are less 
explicit and base their authority in the moral/social obligations that are externally 
imposed by others in society and internalized by individuals.  Thus, instead of being 
guided by rational instrumentality based on self-interest, individuals within 
normative systems consider a given situation and make decisions that seem 
appropriate given their particular role.  In this way, normative institutional elements 
shape identities and guide individual behavior. 
While Durkheim and other early sociologists embraced a predominantly 
normative view of institutions, new institutionalist scholars highlighted the ways in 
which institutions operate on a deeper, cultural-cognitive level.  Scott (2014) defines 
the cultural-cognitive element of institutions as “the shared conceptions that 
constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is 
made”, noting the hyphenated label “recognizes that internal interpretive processes 
are shaped by external cultural frameworks” (p.67).  This much less empirically 
visible institutional structure stresses the use of wider symbols and meanings to 
makes sense of “reality” as we experience it through the ongoing stream of 
experience and events.  To explain what is happening, researchers must not only 
analyze an event or action but also what meaning, or interpretation, the actors 
involved were operating on as individuals with different societal roles or cultural 
perspectives.  Given differences in personal backgrounds and social roles, some 
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actors may act upon very different rationales or interpretations of events than other 
actors.   
Yet, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) stressed, cultural-cognitive frames do 
not simply occur in one’s mind but are formed through interactions with others and 
the environment.  Individuals follow and rely on cultural-cognitive frames in their 
actions, not out of obedience to the law or fulfillment of obligation, but because 
actors fail to question their taken-for-granted assumptions.  As a result, they render 
other beliefs or types of behavior “inconceivable” or illogical (Scott 2014, p. 68).  In 
this line of thinking, individuals’ roles in society are not so much based on normative 
obligations than on powerful templates.  These cultural-cognitive templates designate 
certain types of actors that are guided to action through corresponding scripts, much 
like a drama which depends on actors to enact it (Berger & Luckmann 1966). 
Cultural-cognitive systems operate on many nested levels, from the 
organizational sphere to local situation to sector/field logics and dominant political 
and economic paradigms.  As a result, such cultural systems are fragmented and 
often contradictory but “penetrate and shape individual beliefs” while still being 
malleable to individual constructs which modify those frames (Scott 2014, p. 68).  
Unlike normative systems, which often require maintenance or rituals to maintain, 
cultural-cognitive forms prevail with less effort as they provide the foundation for 
sensemaking.  Scholars suggest that individuals assume dominant cultural-cognitive 
frames, not to avoid punishment or social stigma, but to feel competent, confident, 
and connected to others, rather than disoriented, confused, or at odds with their 
community.   
Cultural-cognitive frames, which also vary in the extent which they have 
been institutionalized, have been examined by scholars on the macro-
level/international level (as exemplified by Meyers and colleagues) as well as at the 
meso-levels of sectors (DiMaggio & Anheier 1990) and organizations (Martin 1992; 
2001).  The methods used to study cultural-cognitive institutions have evolved from 
long-term ethnographic studies of communities (or organizations) based on 
observation to more quantitative surveys that capture views within a group or 
community.  More recently, however, with computer-based qualitative analysis 
programmes available, scholars have turned to methods such as content and 
discourse analysis and network analysis to interrogate a wide variety of materials 
such as organizational reports, political speeches, and media stories (Scott 2014).   
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In studies of cultural systems, the media is considered a particularly powerful 
avenue of cultural-cognitive legitimation due to its role in disseminating information 
about organizations and sectors and by condoning or condemning its practices.  
Thus, because media enables the sharing of experience and knowledge, the discourse 
found in media both reflects and creates public opinion and perception (Gamson & 
Modigliani 1989; Pollock & Rindova 2003; Rindova et al. 2006).  Due to this ability 
to influence the public, the media represents “a site on which various social groups, 
institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social 
reality” (Gurevitch & Levy 1985, p.19 as quoted by; Gamson et al. 1992, p.3).  Both 
positive and neutral media attention can increase the legitimacy of new organizations 
or sectors by establishing and raising its profile among the public, and thus 
increasing its acceptance by fostering the public perception of it as a “standard 
cultural category” (Sine et al. 2005, p.211).  In this way, new organizations may gain 
credibility and status, which further confirms their legitimacy. 
In sum, the three pillars of institutions discussed here provide an integrated 
framework for understanding and investigating how structures shape actors and 
agency.  Regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive elements of institutions 
represent powerful, complex, and inter-related organizing structures.  While each 
pillar rests on different mechanisms, logics, and bases of legitimacy, most empirical 
cases examining institutional forms usually represent more than one element.  These 
elements can be powerful when intertwined and mutually reinforcing.  In many cases 
though, one element will assume primacy.  However, the presence of multiple 
elements can also expose contradictions and cause conflict between them and often 
prompt institutional change (Dacin et al. 2002).   Most notably, the existence of these 
different institutional pillars continue to fuel debates around which rules – legal or 
normative/cultural-cognitive – assume primacy in shaping human behavior and thus 
throw into question whether individual and collective decision-making is more based 
on rational/instrumental reasoning or embedded in social/situational logic. 
 
 
Networks in Institutional Theory  
 
In this section, I discuss the relationship between institutions and networks – 
(1) how institutional contexts structure and shape social relations in and across 
organizational fields and (2) the role of networks in reflecting and preserving, but 
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also challenging and reorganizing, organizational and institutional contexts.  In the 
process, I illustrate the view, articulated by Owen-Smith and Powell (2008), that 
social networks and institutions are co-constitutive and co-evolutionary.  As a result, 
a study of policy transfer focusing on social networks benefits greatly from a firm 
grounding in institutionalism with complementary insights from network theory.   
Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) argue that institutions and networks cannot 
be studied in isolation because they “mutually shape one another”, leading to a “co-
evolutionary process [that] creates, sustains, and transforms social worlds over time” 
(p.596).  Their view is rooted in new institutional theory in which scholars have 
argued that networks have played a central role in transmitting institutional effects, 
namely rules, norms, and taken-for-granted ideas.  According to Scott (2014), 
“relational systems”, or social networks, (along with symbolic systems, activities, 
and artifacts) were among the four types of carriers, or vehicles, that “allow us to 
account for how ideas move through space and time, who or what is transporting 
them, and how they may be transformed by their journey” (Scott 2014, p.95).  Strang 
and Meyer (1993) also highlight and contrast the nature of relational carriers versus 
symbolic carriers of institutional effects in their study of institutional conditions 
affecting diffusion.  Scott (2014) names examples of “relational systems” within 
each type of institutional pillar:  (1) governance and power systems as reflective of 
regulative pillar, (2) regimes and authority systems as reflective of the normative 
pillar, and (3) structural isomorphism and identity-based networks as reflective of the 
cognitive-cultural pillar. 
Studying how such relation systems, or networks, act as carriers of effects as 
well as new ideas are important for understanding how policy transfer works as well 
as how institutional structures change.  While noting the overlap between the concept 
of carriers and the study of diffusion, transfers, and learning (among other topics), 
Scott (2014) highlights that scholars in all fields are in agreement that carriers, 
including networks, are “never neutral modes of transmission, but affect the nature of 
the message and the ways in which it is received” (p.96).   
 The view that networks act as a carrier of institutional effects has its roots in 
Meyer and Rowan’s seminal article (1977), which stated that all organizations are 
embedded in both relational and institutionalized contexts.  While Meyer and Rowan 
focused on the role of “rational myths” in developing institutional contexts, they 
argued the increase in the number and spread of rationalized myths was due to the 
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increasing density and complexity of relational networks (1977, p.351).  Moreover, 
Meyer and Rowan suggested that centralized states, trade and professional 
associations, unions, and inter-organizational coalitions represented the organized 
networks at the centre of the transmission process of institutional myths, thus helping 
stabilize and standardize relational networks.   
Like Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also suggested 
that the professions and the modern state – with their networks spanning 
organizational and field boundaries – have been influential rationalizing forces.  In 
their view, networks play a central role in translating institutional pressures into 
organizational isomorphism.  In their concept of organizational fields, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) incorporated network theory concepts (namely relational and 
structural embeddedness) into institutional theory to widen the analytical view of 
researchers.  They suggested that organizations are best understood as part of distinct 
organizational fields that include the “totality” of organizations that were either 
connected, meaning interacting in some type of relationship with each other, and/or 
structurally equivalent, meaning occupying a similar network position as the another 
(although not necessarily interacting).   
Furthermore, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that status hierarchies 
within inter-organizational and personal networks of a field shape the patterns of 
communication and information exchanges.  This “commonly-recognized hierarchy 
of status”, reflecting a centre and periphery structure, directs “information flows and 
personnel movement across organizations” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.153).  
Clearly, in DiMaggio and Powell’s view, networks acted as carriers of institutional 
effects.  Thus, in the new institutional view, networks serve to transmit institutional 
beliefs and practices in distinct ways.  
In addition to explaining how networks transmit institutional effects, Owen-
Smith and Powell (2008) make an additional point – that networks are stamped and 
highly influenced by institutional categories.  They emphasize that “networks are 
shaped by social comparison processes in which institutional categories are highly 
influential” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.599).  Owen-Smith and Powell assert 
that the same elements that give institutions their force – i.e., “cognitive categories, 
conventions, rules, expectations, and logics” – also  “condition the formation of 
relationships and thus the network structures that function as the skeletons of 
fields”(2008, p.596).  To illustrate this point, Owen-Smith and Powell highlight three 
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notable empirical studies: Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991), Palmer et al. (1993), and 
Davis and Greves (1997).  Building on these insights, one can begin to see how 
networks and institutions are intertwined and difficult to study in isolation. 
To show how networks and institutions co-constitute each other, Owen-Smith 
and Powell (2008) highlight a longitudinal study carried out by Scott et al. (2000).  
Scott and his colleagues examined the dramatic institutional change in the healthcare 
system in San Francisco Bay between 1945 and 1995.  The study traces the 
emergence of new rules, new belief systems, and new modes of governance as well 
as new types of healthcare organizations and new modes of financing, managing, and 
delivering services to a range of factors – i.e. new legislation, the increase of medical 
specialization, and the growing complexity of service delivery.  These developments 
spurred further changes in social networks, such as the appearance of new inter-
organizational alliances and coalitions, new network linkages created by 
accreditation bodies, new affiliations between organizations across and beyond the 
healthcare field, and shifting organizational control structures.   
These network extensions and realignments, in turn, expanded the boundaries 
of the field and brought in new players who, with their novel ideas, continued to 
reshape the meaning of healthcare. During these dramatic shifts in the field, 
institutional meanings within these networks also began to change.  The taken-for-
granted understandings within the healthcare field shifted, and three distinct logics – 
professional, public, and corporate – came to compete alongside one another within 
the now complex and multi-level field.  Thus, Scott et al. (2000) is a unique study 
that helps illustrate Owen-Smith and Powell’s (2008) argument that networks act as 
carriers for institutional effects and hence cannot be studied without considering their 
institutional context.  Scott et al. (2000) illustrates how institutions and social 
networks co-evolve, continually affecting one another over time.  
By highlighting these studies, Owen-Smith and Powell (2008) emphasize that 
networks are more than simply “the scaffolds and circulatory systems of 
organizational fields” (p.596).  Rather, networks act as “the source of ‘horizontal’ 
distinctions among categories of individuals, organizations, and actions, as well as 
‘vertical’ status differentials” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.596).  Networks, 
they argue, “reflect key micro-level interactions that influence institutional 
dynamics” (Owen-Smith and Powell 2008, p.598).  Thus, while institutions “shape 
[network] structures and condition their effects”, networks “generate the categories 
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and hierarchies that help define institutions and contribute to their efficacy” (Owen-
Smith and Powell 2008, p.596).  As a result, institutions and networks must be seen 
as intertwined, constantly influencing and shaping each other over time.  Any effort 




Agency and Institutional Change:  The Concept of Institutional Logics 
For the study of policy transfer focusing on policy entrepreneurs and their 
narrative accounts of policy development, it is important to undertand how 
institutions and networks shape people’s perceptions and agency.  Networks are 
carriers of institutional effects.  Networks are also conduits through which 
institutional logics flow.  Thus, policy entrepreneurs can draw on multiple logics to 
innovate and change contexts.  To illuminate how this may work, I briefly review the 
concept of institutional logics. 
Friedland and Alford (1991) proposed the concept of institutional logics to 
help explain institutional stability (as opposed to change) and account for why 
diffused new organizational forms were institutionalized or not.  In doing so, they 
were building on the similar concept in Jackall (1988) and the related concept of 
“logics of actions” (Fligstein 1987; 1990; DiMaggio 1991; Boltanski & Thévenot 
1991).  Friedland and Alford (1991, p.248) defined institutional logics as “a set of 
material practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organizing 
principles and which is available to organizations and individuals to elaborate”.  
They came up with this concept after noting that social scientists were concentrating 
their analysis on individual agency and/or the power of organizations, effectively 
ignoring how societal environments inevitably shaped both.   
After identifying five dominant macro-level institutions in modern Western 
society, Friedland and Alford (1991, p.248) proposed five broad, corresponding 
types of societal-level institutional logics: (1) capitalism, based on “accumulation 
and commodification of human activity”, (2) the state, based on “rationalization and 
the regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies”,  (3) 
democracy, based on “participation and the extension of the popular control over 
human activity”, (4) family, based on “community” and human activity motivated by 
“unconditional loyalty” and “reproductive needs”, and (5) religion, or science, based 
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on “truth, whether mundane or transcendental, and the symbolic construction of 
reality”.  Friedland and Alford went on to argue that these logics are “symbolically 
grounded, organizationally structured, politically defended, and technically and 
materially constrained, and hence have specific historical limits” (1991, p.248-9).  
Moreover, they stressed that dominant institutions were “potentially contradictory” 
and thus offered both individuals and organizations “multiple logics” with which to 
interpret, act, and enact their environment.  
 From the late 1990s, scholars – primarily led by Patricia Thornton and 
colleagues – developed this concept further (Thornton 2004; Thornton & Ocasio 
2008; Thornton et al. 2012).  Thornton and Ocasio (1999) expanded the categories of 
societal-level institutional orders and corresponding logics from five to seven by 
adding the professions, the corporation, and community (their replacement for 
democracy) and drew on Scott’s Three Pillar framework to revise the definition of 
institutional logics to include all three elements.   Thus, Thornton and Ocasio (1999, 
p.804) redefined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 
produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality.”  Empirically, they employed the concept to 
investigate executive power and succession in the higher education publishing, 
finding that executives’ focus and power as well as the criteria for succession of 
executives changed as the field’s logics shifted from personal and professional-based 
values to more market-based values.  Thornton (2004) continued this investigation 
into the mixed logics of the market and the professions to more fully explain 
evolutionary change in the higher education publishing industry in the U.S.   
Meanwhile, others also contributed to the conceptual development of 
institutional logics.  Haveman and Rao (1997) examined how such structures co-
evolve with organizational forms that express them, thus highlighting the dynamics 
between the societal level and organizational fields.  Likewise, Scott and colleagues 
(Scott et al. 2000; Ruef et al. 1998) investigated the healthcare field in San Francisco 
and detailed how institutional change occurred as the logics of the field shifted from 
being based on professionalism to being heavily based on the logics of the state, 
market, and  the corporation.  Ocasio and Thornton (2008) provide further insights 
by summarizing and discussing four ways prevailing institutional logics shape 
individual and organizational action by: 
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1.  Influencing collective identities and identification, the former which Ocasio 
and Thorton (2008, p.111) define as “the cognitive, normative, and emotional 
connection experienced by members of a social group because of their 
perceived common status with other members of the social group”, which 
emerges of out social interaction and leads to increased cooperation, shared 
norms, and common interests among group members   
 
2. Conditioning (or setting up the rules and means) in contests for status and 
power and noting that “social actors rely on their understandings of 
institutional logics in the competition for power and status and in doing so 
generate the conditions for the reproduction of prevailing logics” (Ocasio and 
Thorton 2008, p.112) 
 
3.  Providing social classification and categorization, thus shaping individual 
cognition as detailed by DiMaggio (1997) 
 
4.  Structuring attention, meaning that institutional logics direct the attention of 
individuals and organizations to certain types of problems, solutions, and 
shape how those are linked and explained and how those issues relate to 
individuals’ identity and interests  
 
More recent work continues to demonstrate the utility of institutional logic concept, 
with Skelcher and Smith (2015) theorizing the novel ways multiple institutional 
logics are combined to create hybrid forms of organizing in the non-profit sector. 
Institutional logics represent a relatively new approach to understanding the 
content and meaning of institutions and how those shape individual action and 
organizational structures.  The approach differs from earlier approaches in new 
institutionalism in at least two significant ways: (1) by no longer focusing on 
isomorphism at various levels but instead examining “the effects of differentiated 
institutional logics on individuals and organizations in a larger variety of contexts”, 
and (2) by incorporating the embedded agency of actors (albeit embedded in 
prevailing institutional logics) and considering ways actors select and change 
institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p.100).   In a way, the aim of 
institutional logics approach parallels that of phenomenological/transcendental 
policy transfer approaches in that both seek to explain the processes of diffusion and 
account for convergence, divergence, and how the macro and the meso/micro co-
construct and modify each other.  Since a transferred policy can represent 
programmes, organizations, and other types of institutional elements, policy transfer 
and institutional scholars often examine similar cases.  Thus, there are scholars who 
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combine both approaches in their studies of transfer and change (e.g., Bulmer & 
Padgett 2005; Ferner et al. 2004; Laguna 2010).   
 
Institutional Entrepreneurs 
The concept of an “institutional entrepreneur” emerged from DiMaggio’s 
(1988, p.14) suggestion that “New institutions arise… when organized actors with 
sufficient resources see in them an opportunity to realize interests that they value 
highly”.  In this way, DiMaggio offered institutional entrepreneurship as a way to 
solve the so-called “paradox of embedded agency” and theorize the role of actors in 
creating new and changing established institutional structures and practices.  Thus, 
such entrepreneurs are those who envision an innovative organizational form or 
practice to advance certain goals or interests and thus challenge the prevailing 
institutional structure.  Building on DiMaggio’s (1988) work and studies of 
institutional entrepreneurship since, Battilana et al. (2009, p.68) define an 
institutional entrepreneur as an actor that both initiates and actively participates in 
the implementation of “divergent changes”, which are changes that “break with the 
institutionalized template for organizing within a given institutional context”.  
Linking the concept to diffusion-innovation research, they suggest institutional 
entrepreneurs are a type of change agent that take the form of an organization, 
groups of organizations, an individual or a group of individuals. 
Institutional entrepreneurship can be examined at many levels from the sub-
organizational to the field and institutional levels.  While Lockett et al. (2012) noted 
most studies have primarily been at the organizational level, they advocate for more 
research to examine institutional entrepreneurship at the intra-organizational level – 
among individuals and groups of individual (e.g., Hardy & Maguire 2008; Battilana 
et al. 2009) – in order for scholars to account for the complex nature of subjective 
interpretations, interpersonal relations, and the power dynamics underpinning them.  
To answer questions regarding what factors spur and enable (as well as 
prevent and stifle) institutional entrepreneurship, researchers have begun exploring a 
range of topics.   These topics, often referred to as enabling conditions, range from 
characteristics of actors’ to various aspects of the environments in which they are 
embedded.  Battilana et al. (2009, p.74) divide these characteristics into two 
categories of enabling conditions –  actors’ social position and field characteristics – 
which, they argue, are not independent but intertwined categories.  This stems from 
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the point that, while environmental factors empower or constrain an actor’s agency 
(and hence entrepreneurship), an actor’s perception of field conditions is shaped by 
their social position, or location, within it – a position that is not static but 
nevertheless reflects the power relations within the field (Oakes et al. 1998).  Thus, 
Battilana et al. (2009) argue that the two categories of enabling factors shape, and 
possibly interact, with one another.   
In terms of actors’ social position, scholars have considered how actors’ 
“subject positions” – which refers to both “an actor’s formal position as well as all 
socially constructed and legitimated identities available in a field” (Battilana et al. 
2009, p.77) –  significantly  determine access to resources and hence affect the 
potential for actors to become institutional entrepreneurs.  Actors whose “subject 
positions” provide them widespread legitimacy and the ability to build bridges (or 
networks) among diverse stakeholders can access more resources to become 
institutional entrepreneurs (Maguire et al. 2004).  However, some studies (i.e., 
D’Aunno et al. 2000; Maguire et al. 2004) have found that actors occupying 
positions at the periphery of a field may be more likely to become institutional 
entrepreneurs pursing change.  According to Lockett et al. (2012, p.357) this may be 
because such actors are:   
 
(1) most disadvantaged by current institutional arrangements and thus have 
agency for change (Haveman & Rao 1997) 
(2) less embedded in current institutions and so have less difficulty “throwing 
off” current norms and values;  
(3) more likely to be exposed to, or be part of, alternative fields with different 
ways of working;  
(4) more likely to be exposed to “contradictions” in the current institutions 
(Seo & Creed 2002)  
 
Still, many actors in peripheral field positions lack the power to influence and enact 
change.  Instead, actors occupying central positions in a field that have authority and 
access to resources appear to be best placed to enact change though may be less 
inclined to do so. Moreover, actors who engage in multiple fields appear more likely 
to engage in institutional entrepreneurship as they are exposed to a greater diversity 
of ideas (e.g., Boxenbaum & Battilana 2005) 
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Meanwhile, in regard to the enabling role of field-level characteristics, 
researchers have suggested that dramatic changes in environments (i.e., jolts, crises, 
social upheaval, technological disruptions, etc.) provide opportunities for 
institutional entrepreneurship by weakening taken-for-granted assumptions and 
making environments more receptive to new ideas (Fligstein 1997; 2001b; Holm 
1995; Greenwood et al. 2002; Child et al. 2007).  In addition, Delbridge and Edwards 
(2008) have suggested, after studying change and developments in one industry over 
two decades, that actors can also bring about the enabling conditions that allow 
individuals’ to act as institutional entrepreneurs, a conclusion also supported by 
Powell and Colyvas (2008).  Battalina et al. (2009) also note the degree of 
heterogeneity and institutionalization within a field can also affect the potential for 
institutional entrepreneurship.  Finally, Ocasio and Thornton (2008) discuss two 
other environment circumstances that may enable actors to engage in institutional 
entrepreneurship: (1) structural overlap, or “when individual roles and 
organizational structures or functions that were previously distinct are forced into 
association (e.g., mergers, acquisitions,) (p.116) and (2) competing logics, or when 
multiple institutional logics are present, contradictory, and competing, allowing for 
actors to elaborate, recombine, or alter them to promote change.  
The research on cases of successful institutional entrepreneurship typically 
focuses on three clusters of activities institutional entrepreneurs engage in to bring 
about, or implement, divergent change.  These sets of activity, which are usually 
ongoing, evolutionary, and intertwined, are:  “developing a vision, mobilizing people 
behind that vision, and motivating them to achieve and sustain it” (Battilana et al. 
2009, p.78).  Notably, these activities mirror the work of teams of policy 
entrepreneurs in Roberts and King’s (1996) study.  To understand how institutional 
entrepreneurs develop a vision, researchers examine how actors frame problems, 
solutions, and narratives to legitimize their position and motivate others to support 
them (e.g., Markowitz 2007).  In determining how others are mobilized to support 
change, studies have examined how institutional entrepreneurs use discourse and 
gain access to – as well as utilize – resources, formal authority, and networks.  
Battilana et al. (2009) note that most studies focus on discourse and highlight the 
need for more research to understand how resources are garnered and put to use.  
Finally, investigations into the implementation of change led by an institutional 
entrepreneur have entailed analyzing how they counter, or overcome, political 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 65 
opposition and “institutional defenders” who benefit from the status quo and defend 
existing beliefs and practices (DiMaggio, 1988; Levy & Scully, 2007). 
 On a final point, Hardy and McGuire (2008) identify two contrasting types of 
narratives regarding institutional entrepreneurship in the research literature.  They 
note that one approach “is more actor-centric and focuses on the deliberate strategies 
of particular institutional entrepreneurs” while the other is “more process-centric and 
focuses on the struggles associated with institutional entrepreneurship” (p.211, 
emphasis added).  Suggesting that the former reflects the approach taken up by the 
majority of empirical studies, Hardy and McGuire (2008, pp.211–212) deconstruct 
the two narratives (which they stress are not two distinct, mutually exclusive 
categories), and outline actor-centric narratives as those that: 
  
1. portray the institutional entrepreneur as possessing a degree of reflexivity 
or insight (Seo & Creed 2002; Mutch 2007) and superior political and 
social skills   
2. focus on how the institutional entrepreneur intervenes strategically to 
produce institutional change through the mobilization of discourse, 
resources, networks, and social capital in creative ways (see Fligstein 
2001b; Fligstein 2001a)  
3. marginalize other actors who (if present) play minor, supporting roles 
4. portray institutional entrepreneurship as a “relatively rational, linear, win-
win problem-solving activity” 
5. tend to minimize or relegate conflict to the background  
6. result in new or changed institutions that usually do not suggest or reflect a 
radical reconfiguration of power relations in the field but rather appear to 
be changes that Colomy (1998, p.276) refers to as  “elaborative” rather 
than “reconstructive” in scope 
7. assume a functionalist orientation portraying the enacted change as an 
improvement on the prior status quo  
8. often fail to problematize the subjective notion of “better” institutional 
arrangements  
9. typically neglect to question who actually benefits from –  and who is 
disadvantaged by – institutional entrepreneurship  
 
In contrast, Hardy and McGuire (2008, p.211) describe process-centric narratives as 
those that: 
 
1. focus on institutional entrepreneurship as an emergent outcome of 
activities of a number of dispersed actors with divergent interests and who 
face considerable difficulty in achieving effective collective action (Wijen 
& Ansari 2007; Lounsbury & Crumley 2007) 
2. emphasize diffuse struggles over – and through – meaning, where gains 
for one group may imply significant losses for others, providing greater 
scope for examining conflict as well as failure 
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3. reflect researchers’ interest in how particular outcomes are negotiated 
materially and discursively 
4. lead to outcomes that are more varied in scope and impact, ranging from 
little or no change to radical transformations in the field 
5. are more likely to acknowledge the disadvantages and potential negative 
outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship (see Khan et al. 2007) 
6. pay attention to the opponents of institutional entrepreneurs and other field 
actors who often construct counter-frames (Creed et al. 2002), counter-
narratives (Colomy 1998), and/or counter-discourses (Munir & Phillips 
2005) to legitimate, defend, or strengthen their own position   
 
Hardy and McGuire’s (2008) analysis, which to some extent echoes of Roger’s 
(2003) advice on minimizing pro-innovation bias in diffusion studies, reminds 
researchers who investigate cases of innovation not to ignore or marginalize 
alternative accounts and perspectives that may expose hitherto undetected conflict or 
unexpected outcomes.  
While the concept of institutional entrepreneurs has refocused a number of 
scholars on change agents in institutional fields, it has attracted some criticism, 
stemming from claims it promotes an instrumental and disembedded view of agency 
(Delmestri 2006; Meyer 2006). However, overall the concept of institutional 
entrepreneurs mirrors, and in many ways expands, the role of policy entrepreneurs 
but from another angle.  Both concepts, however, help enable researchers to trace the 
origins and emergence of new ideas, policies, and institutional arrangements and the 
actors and forces that seek to counter them.   
 
 
2.7 The Diffusion of Innovations Perspective 
 
The innovation-diffusion perspective is “a particular type of communications 
research” (Rogers 2003, p.47) which offers a general, arguably universal, process 
model of social change based on regularities observed in the innovation-diffusion 
process.  The modern innovation-diffusion research tradition grew from micro-level 
studies of the spread of technical innovations among a population in the 1940s and 
1950s.  However, the first theorizations of the diffusion phenomenon appeared 
around 1900.  These studies explored how and why innovations spread and 
discovered early on that social relations and networks among individuals play key 
roles in the process.  In time, diffusion studies also illuminated how individuals’ 
knowledge, culture, and other contextual factors influenced their decision whether or 
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not to adopt an innovation.  Thus, the process of innovation diffusion is “essentially a 
social process in which subjectively perceived information about a new idea is 
communicated from person to person” (Rogers 2003, p.xx) and as a result, “the 
meaning of an innovation is thus gradually worked out through a process of social 
construction” (p.xxi).  This resonates with the concept of policy-making as “social 
learning” in which decision-makers collectively “puzzle” (Heclo 1974) about the 
causes and meanings of problems.  Thus, I take the position that the diffusion of 
innovation provides a related and complementary perspective to both policy transfer 
and institutional literature, a point I illustrate throughout this section.  I proceed by 
reviewing the development of the research perspective before discussing its central 
features and themes. 
  
The Development of Innovation-Diffusion Research 
The beginnings of diffusion research (which also, by extension, represents the 
roots of policy transfer studies) emerged in the early twentieth century in Europe 
with the work of some of the forefathers of sociology: Gabriel Tarde, George 
Simmel, and two groups of diffusion researchers in Britain and in Germany/Austria.  
Tarde provided insights into the variables in the diffusion process and noted that the 
rate of adoption for a successful innovation usually followed an S-shaped curve, with 
only a few people adopting a trend at first, and then the number of adoptees 
increasing exponentially for a time until the number of new adoptees generally 
leveled off again.  He also noted opinion leaders’ adoption helped increase the 
overall rate of adoption, implicating the role of networks in the diffusion process.  
Finally, Tarde also observed that innovations that resembled already-accepted ideas 
tended to be more successfully diffused, foreshadowing the concept of perceived 
compatibility of an innovation. 
Around the same time, Simmel came up with the concept of the stranger as 
someone who did not arrive and then leave a social group but one who came and 
remained part of a group but still retained the freedom to go, much like a trader.  
According to Simmel (1950, p.402), a stranger is one who: 
 
is fixed within a particular spatial group, or within a group whose 
boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries. But his position in this group 
is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from 
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the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot 
stem from the group itself.  
.   
As a German Jew trained in philosophy and one of the first university lecturers of 
sociology, Simmel himself embodied, to some extent, the concept of a stranger as 
one who is part of a social group but still not considered by others as one of that 
group.  Simmel’s concept identified a type of individual (the cosmopolite) more 
likely to bring new ideas to insular populations and highlighted the need to consider 
network structure and social distance of actors in diffusion. 
 Finally, British and German/Austrian anthropologists contributed to 
innovation-diffusion by introducing the concept of diffusion.  They studied diffusion 
as the introduction of innovation in an attempt to explain how social change in a 
population comes about.  However, this group’s views became less relevant as they 
failed to consider how innovations were created in the first place and resisted the 
idea that an innovation could be changed, or reinvented, in the process of its 
diffusion. 
 Still, from the 1920s until the 1960s, research on diffusion developed rather 
independently in strands of different disciplines with researchers employing various 
methods (i.e., surveys, statistical analysis, interviews, observations) to examine 
particular types of innovation in their field.  For example, anthropologists focused 
more on cultural groups and technological innovations using participant observation 
while early sociologists tended to use quantitative research methods to study a single 
innovation as it spread across geographic territories.  This led anthropologists to 
highlight the influential role of indigenous knowledge systems in encouraging or 
constraining diffusion while sociologists offered early insights into how 
environmental factors affected diffusion.  
 However, it was a study by two rural sociologists (Ryan & Gross 1943) 
focused on the diffusion of hybrid corn in Iowa (which puzzled experts at the time) 
that led to the central questions that sparekd to the emergence of a more coherent 
innovation-diffusion paradigm.  The defining questions of that paradigm became: 
 
• What variables are related to innovativeness? 
• What is the rate of adoption of an innovation over time, and what factors 
(i.e., attributes of innovation) explain its speed of adoption? 
• What role do different communication channels play at various stages in 
the innovation-decision process? 
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(Rogers 2003, p.55) 
 
Ryan and Gross’ (1943) study also set the template for future diffusion research 
design, which consisted of a large number of survey interviews followed by 
quantitative coding and analysis to understand the significance of different variables.  
The first publication of Everett Rogers’s Diffusion of Innovation in 1962 further 
organized and established diffusion as a distinct field of research that spanned 
diverse disciplines from marketing, technology, communication, and public health to 
political science, geography, and sociology.   
In the recent decades, the elements and processes of innovation-diffusion 
have been examined across cultures and nations, leading to the development within 
the field of broad generalizations based on evidence suggesting trends that remain 
consistent across various contexts and disciplines.  Still, with the onset of 
globalization and development of new technologies such as the internet, innovation-
diffusion scholars continue to explore how the process of diffusion is affected by 
changes in communication and the diminishing relevance of spatial distance.  
 
The Innovation-Diffusion Process 
The diffusion of innovations is a process that actually has two main parts – 
(1) innovation-development process, or the generation of the innovation, and (2) 
innovative-decision process, or how an individual decides to adopt or reject an 
innovation.  Although most research has examined the innovative-decision process, 
most recognize the importance of considering the initial innovation-generation stage.  
During the innovation-development process, a problem or need is recognized, or 
becomes prioritized, and an innovative solution is generated to address it.  This 
process can involve basic and/or applied research and is often funded by companies 
or governments although this is not always the case.  Innovations can be generated 
by lead users who are ahead of the marketplace and develop their own innovations, 
which interested companies then commercialize (Von Hippel 2005; 1986).  Within 
the process of developing an innovation, the most critical point is the decision 
whether or not to move forward and diffuse the innovation to others, leading to the 
second stage of the diffusion of innovation process – the innovative-decision process.  
Once the decision is made to diffuse an innovation, then individuals in the social 
system must pass through five stages which entail (1) learning about the innovation, 
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(2) being persuaded to adopt/reject it, (3) deciding to adopt/reject it, (4) 
implementing or using it, and (5) continuing to utilize it.  
Still, the innovation-decision process is also viewed as a whole among a 
population of actors over time.  In this case, diffusion is defined as “the process in 
which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (Rogers 2003, p.5).  Thus, the study of the innovation-
diffusion process entails looking at four key elements:  the innovation, 
communication channels, time, and a social system.  A closer look at each of these 
elements provides a better understanding of diffusion and how it relates to areas of 
the policy transfer and institutional perspectives. 
The first element, innovation, is defined as “an idea, practice, or object that is 
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003, p.12).  As 
the definition indicates, whether or not an idea is actually new or only presented and 
perceived as such is not important in the study of diffusion.  It is sufficient for the 
innovation to be considered new to the person adopting it regardless of its newness, 
which may be “objectively” measured by the time elapsed since its first discovery or 
use.  Instead, Rogers argues that “newness” of an innovation may be expressed in 
terms of an individual’s awareness of it, persuasion to see it favorably or not, or a 
decision to adopt.  Moreover, Rogers (2003) uses the term “technology” and 
“innovation” synonymously but points out that he is using the term technology in an 
abstract sense – as a “design for instrumental action that reduces the uncertainty in 
the cause-effect relationships involved in achieving a desired outcome” (Rogers 
2003, p.13).  Thus, technology can also refer to innovations that are only idea- or 
information-based, such as religions, political philosophies, or a news event.  In 
policy transfer studies, this type of “soft” innovation is the focus of Stone’s (2010; 
2004b) studies of the transfer of ideologies and norms through trans-national 
networks and organizations.  Of course, such ideational innovations can be 
challenging to study since the origin and spread of such information is often times 
difficult to observe and track.  Consequently, the majority of innovation-diffusion 
research is most often on innovations with both material and immaterial components. 
To diffuse, knowledge of an innovation must be shared through 
communication channels, defined as “the means by which messages get from one 
individual to another” (Rose 2003, p.18).  The two communication channels in the 
innovation-diffusion literature are mass media and interpersonal.  While the mass 
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media can rapidly transmit messages about an innovation to large numbers of people, 
thus making them aware of a new idea, diffusion studies have revealed that person-
to-person communication, either individually or in a group, is much more influential 
in persuading another to adopt an innovation (Rogers 2003).  Relatedly, evidence 
from diffusion studies suggests that most individuals base their judgment of an 
innovation on others’ subjective evaluations of the innovation rather than on 
scientific evidence regarding its value or effectiveness.  While the evaluation of 
formal studies is not completely irrelevant, especially to those who first adopt the 
innovation, peer influence is clearly paramount in the process of innovation-
diffusion. 
The third element of the innovation-diffusion studies is time, which is 
considered in during the process of diffusion in three ways – (1) how long an 
individual takes to decide to adopt or reject an innovation after first learning of it, (2) 
what type of actors adopt an innovation relatively early or late, and (3) the rate of 
adoption in a system (typically measured in terms of how many individual adopt in a 
given time period).  Studies suggest how long individuals take to decide to adopt or 
reject an innovation varies considerably.  However, by sorting adopters into 
categories reflecting their adoption sequence (innovators, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and laggards), researchers have found that innovators and 
early adopters are generally more highly educated, more cosmopolitan, and of higher 
socio-economic status while those with less education, mainly local ties, and lower 
socio-economic status tend to be later adopters.   
Furthermore, researchers were able to define the five categories of adopters 
mentioned above due to the common S-shaped curve they found most innovation-
diffusion produced (based on the rate of adoption in the social system).  This 
attention to temporal sequencing and cause-and-effect of social influence, wherein 
early adopters influence the decision whether to adopt or not of others after them, is a 
unique strength of the innovation-diffusion literature.  I argue, with others, that 
researchers studying cases of policy transfer need to pay closer attention to time 
frames and the sequencing of events and decisions (i.e., Dussauge-Laguna 2012). 
The fourth element of innovation-diffusion is a social system, defined as “a 
set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a 
common goal” and members may be “individuals, informal groups, organizations, 
and/or subsystems” (Rogers 2003, p.23).  Whatever the form, the members of the 
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social system are bound together in some common role or objective.  The structure 
of a given social system is defined as “the pattern of arrangements of the units in a 
system”, which includes formal hierarchies, norms, and patterned communication 
flows, “gives regularity and stability to human behavior in system” (Rogers 2003, 
p.23).  This complex structure is examined to understand how norms, opinion 
leaders, change agents, and other structural elements affect the diffusion of an 
innovation.  The use of members of a social system as the units of study provides 
much flexibility in defining the relevant actors in a case of diffusion. 
 
Criticisms of Innovation-Diffusion Research 
Rogers (2003) identifies four strands of criticism that diffusion studies suffer 
from: (1) pro-innovation bias, as researchers tend to treat innovations as inherently 
“good” or desirable, (2) individual-blame bias, as problems are often seen in terms of 
deficiencies attributed to individuals rather than systemic flaws, (3) recall problem, 
since individuals’ memories of how and why they adopted an innovation may not be 
accurate, and (4) issues of equality as the consequences of innovations tend to benefit 
those with more education and higher socio-economic status.  
 
Perceived Attributes of Innovations 
Innovation-diffusion scholars note that how the innovation is perceived 
among potential adopters is key to understanding their reaction to it.  In innovation-
diffusion, how others perceive an innovation is the primary basis for their decision to 
adopt or reject it.  Thus, diffusion researchers have examined this concept 
extensively and identified at least five types of attributes of innovations that 
generally increase or decrease its likelihood of being adopted by others and thus, 
widely diffused.  The five attributes of innovations are: relative advantage, 
compatibility, complexity, trialabiltiy, and observability. 
 The first attribute, relative advantage, refers to the “the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes” (Rogers 2003, 
p.15).  This definition encompasses a vast range of different factors depending on the 
innovation and the context into which it is introduced.  Notably, relative advantage 
can be viewed in terms of economic factors or more social factors such as prestige.  
Other common relative advantages include convenience and satisfaction.  The 
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greater an individual perceives an innovation to have relative advantage, the more 
likely it is they will adopt the innovation. 
 The second attribute, compatibility, is “the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as being consistent with the existing values, past experience, and needs of 
potential adopters” (Rogers 2003, p.15).  The greater an innovation is perceived is 
compatible, the more likely it is to be diffused.  It is important to emphasize that 
judgment of compatibility rests on three planes – values suggesting morals and 
beliefs, past experience suggesting experiential knowledge, and needs suggesting 
desires and/or actual needs.  Diffusionists argue that compatibility, along with 
relative advantage, are the most significant in explaining the rate of adoption for an 
innovation. 
The third attribute of innovation in the innovation-diffusion literature, 
complexity, is “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to 
understand and use” (Rogers 2003, p.16).  Mirroring Rose’s (1993) hypothesis in 
policy transfer, the complexity attribute suggests that more simple or easy to 
understand innovations will more likely be diffused that complex ones.  On this point 
in particular, but other attributes as well, it is important to keep in mind the ways an 
innovation can be positioned in order to make others perceive it in a favorable way, 
from giving the innovation a particular name to incorporating market research on 
targeted audiences to inform the framing of the innovation.  The literature on 
institutional entrepreneurship highlights other strategic ways that problems, 
solutions, and inspiring stories can be discursively framed to appeal to audiences.  
Finally, the fourth attribute, trialability, refers to “the degree to which an 
innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis” while the fifth attribute, 
observability, is “the degree to which the results of an innovation are visible to 
others” (Rogers 2003, p.16).  The greater the perceived trialability and observability 
of an innovation, the more likely it is to diffuse.  In other words, innovations that can 
be adopted on a trial basis and its results observed in the process are more likely to 
be diffused.  One may also observe the effects of an innovation through a live 
demonstration or an already tested example.  In this way, potential adopters can 
reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with a new idea, making it easier to judge 
the innovation. 
Some scholars have suggested other categories of attributes for an innovation. 
Moore and Benbasat (1991) propose voluntariness of use defined as “the degree to 
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which use of the innovation is perceived as being voluntary or of free will” (p.195).   
Others have suggested the social prestige or image, meaning the degree to which an 
innovation is likely to enhance one’s social standing, should be a separate attribute 
rather than lumped into the relative advantage category (i.e., Holloway 1977 as cited 
in Rogers (2003)).  Moore and Benbasat (1991) also highlight that the perceived 
attributes of an innovation may differ from the perceptions of actually using the 
innovation. 
The concept of perceived attributes of innovations links and expands on areas 
within the policy transfer literature.  In policy transfer, scholars speculate on the type 
of policies that are easier to transfer than others, suggesting that the “complexity of a 
programme affects its transferability; the more complex a policy or programme is the 
harder it will be to transfer” (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, p.353).  This concept is 
similar but related to diffusionists’ “attributes of innovations” concept.  The 
difference being that diffusion scholars are taking “adoption” as the dependent 
variable while transfer scholars take  “transferability” as such.  In attempting to 
predict “transferability”, Rose’s (1993) hypotheses focus on the degree of 
complexity, amount of information available, and whether results are observable or 
predictable.  Clearly, there are similarities between Rose’s hypotheses and the 
attributes of innovation typology.   
However, a key difference is the basis of judging an innovation.  While 
transfer scholars seem to make judgments of a policy’s traits themselves, diffusion 
scholars determine an innovation’s attributes by how they are perceived by others, 
reflecting a more social constructionist (rather than a positivist) view of knowledge 
and learning.  Scholars working in the policy diffusion strand have drawn on 
innovation-diffusion’s typology of innovation attributes (e.g., Clark 2000) but 
generally have not employed a qualitative approach, thus limiting their ability to 
understand individuals’ translational processes in informing perceptions.  
 
Reinvention 
The concept of reinvention refers to the “degree to which an innovation is 
changed or modified by a user in the process of adoption and implementation” 
(Rogers 2003, p.17).  Reinvention can occur to the innovation itself and/or how it is 
used or implemented (Rice & Rogers 1980).  The occurrence of reinvention was first 
noted by Charters and Pelligrin (1972) in their study of how the innovation of 
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“differentiated staffing” was implemented in four schools.  Rogers (2003, p.181) 
suggests that it was primarily because their study looked at the implementation stage 
that reinvention was discovered.  Consequently, while early diffusion scholars 
discouraged or looked down upon reinvention, diffusion scholars began to examine 
this concept in the 1970s and how to measure it.  Some suggested reinvention should 
be measured by the degree the innovation is altered from its “mainline” version as 
propagated by a change agent.  
Evidence from studies of reinvention has lead diffusion researchers to suggest 
that: (1) reinvention occurs often at the implementation stage, and (2) the ability to 
reinvent an innovation helps increase its rate of adoption and institutionalization 
(Rogers 2003).  The reasons why reinvention occurs vary but stem from either the 
innovation itself or the person/organization adopting it.  Lack of knowledge and a 
desire to make an innovation appear locally generated are among the many reasons 
diffusion scholars have found innovations are reinvented.  Notably, the concept of 
reinvention relates to the concepts of social learning/translation and contextual 
adaptation of ideas in policy studies.    
  
 
Innovators and Change Agents vs. Opinion Leaders and Champions 
 
In the literature, the diffusion of an innovation can be attributed to 
innovators, change agents, and opinion leaders.  Although ideal types, these 
categories reflect trends in roles played by individuals in diffusion who often have 
certain attributes.  Innovators are those who come up come up with or identify a new 
idea for diffusion.  They represent the first category of adopters in a given S-curved 
diffusion model.  According to studies, they are usually venturesome individuals 
who, like Simmel’s stranger, often associate with innovative peers outside their local 
social system.  In addition, innovators often have access to significant financial 
resources (either their own or others) in order to absorb potential losses from an 
unsuccessful innovation.  In addition, innovators often possess considerable technical 
knowledge and have a high tolerance for uncertainty about an innovation.  Finally, 
innovators – like early adopters – tend to be more highly educated and cosmopolitan, 
of a higher socio-economic status, have greater exposure to mass media and 
interpersonal communication channels, have higher rates of social participation and 
more contact with change agents. 
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Relatedly, change agents are those who advocate for the adoption of a new 
idea on behalf of a change agency.  They provide “a link between a resource system 
with some kind of expertise and a client system” (Rogers 2003, p.368).  They usually 
have a high level of expertise regarding the innovation being defused, often making 
it difficult for them to relate to target audiences.  As a result of their position between 
two groups – experts and audience – change agents often play an important yet 
sometimes limited role in promoting diffusion.  To facilitate the diffusion process, 
change agents are expected to (1) highlight or even dramatize the importance of a 
problem, (2) build positive relationships with audiences and learn of their 
perspectives on the issue, (3) persuade audience to adopt the innovation and 
encourage its continued use beyond adoption and after the change agent is gone.  
Both change agents and innovators, thus, are not typically leaders or even full 
members of the targeted communities in which they aim to launch their innovation.  
In contrast, opinion leaders are members of a social system who are able to 
“influence other individuals’ attitudes or overt behavior informally in a desired way 
with relative frequency” (Rogers 2003, pp.37-38).  They are simply “people who 
influence the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and behaviors of others” 
(Valente & Pumpuang 2007, p.881).  Relatedly, champions are “charismatic” 
individuals who throw their “weight behind an innovation, thus overcoming 
indifference or resistance that the new idea may provide in an organization” (Rogers 
2003, p.473).  Thus, while opinion leaders are influential within particular networks, 
champions are typically set in an organizational context in which they often hold 
some formal position of authority.  Of course, it is also possible (and likely) for one 
person to be both. 
These ideal types are important as they serve to support the study of 
institutional- and policy entrepreneurship and highlight the importance of actors’ 
positions and relationships with others in a given social field.  The research behind 
these roles also warns against assuming the innovator or initiator of ultimately 
success policy transfer or new institutional arrangements are the centre of influence. 
 
Diffusion Networks 
Among the most useful insights the innovation-diffusion literature provides is 
a look into how social networks are utilized in the spread of a new idea.  As 
Granovetter (1973, p.1360) stated, “In one way or another, it is through these 
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networks that small-scale interaction becomes translated into large-scale patterns, 
and that these, in turn, feed back into small groups”.  These networks are illuminated 
through patterns in communication flows as well as their use in facilitating sequential 
adoptions (or, theoretically, rejections as well though this is much less studied).  One 
of the most important findings regarding communication channels occurred early on 
in the 1940s when investigations into the role of mass media found that it did not 
have all-powerful effect on individuals’ adoption decision as previously thought.  
Instead, mass media was found to spread awareness knowledge of an innovation to 
opinion leaders who informed others in their community of the new idea (Lazarsfeld 
et al. 1944; 1944).  This “two-step flow model” of communication turned scholarly 
attention to how mass media channels and interpersonal channels interacted to shape 
perceptions of innovations (Rogers 2003, p.304).   
However, the two-step flow model was misleading because it did not 
consider the timing nor the source and communication channels of different types of 
knowledge.   Later studies revealed that mass media channels primarily served to 
spread awareness knowledge of an innovation, or knowledge of its existence, among 
much of a population, not simply leaders.  Meanwhile, opinion leaders and other 
person-to-person communication channels played a more influential role in 
persuading actors to adopt or reject a particular innovation because they provided 
how-to knowledge about how to use an innovation and/or principles knowledge 
about what an innovation actually worked (Rogers 2003, p.173). 
Finally, diffusion scholars starting with Tarde have highlighted the 
significance of homophily and heterophily within diffusion networks.  These terms 
refer to “the degree to which two pairs of individuals who interact are similar 
(homophily) or different (heterophily) in certain attributes” (Rogers 2003, pp.305-
306).  “Certain attributes” refer to individuals’ occupation, education, socio-
economic status, and beliefs among other things.  Evidence suggests that 
heterophilous networks help facilitate diffusion because they often serve as a link 
connecting two different cliques of actors, exchanging information between two 
socially-dissimilar groups of people.  Meanwhile, homophilous networks can often 
represent an “invisible barrier” to diffusion, slowing down an innovation’s rate of 
adoption, since the members of such networks are rather dense and insular and, 
hence do not interact and exchange information with individuals in other networks 
(Granovetter 1973; 1981).  Thus, whether innovative or traditional in its norms, a 
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network that tends to be homophilous is less able to encourage adoption of 
innovations on a wider scale. 
 
 
Overlap Between Innovation-Diffusion and Institutional Perspectives 
As a case of policy transfer prima facie, the emergence of Teach First also 
serves as an instance of innovation-diffusion and institutional change.  Colyvas and 
Jonsson (2011) noted there was much conceptual muddling between the two 
literatures, particularly regarding “successful” diffusion and “institutionalization”.  I 
review their argument briefly here to help distinguish between these concepts and 
demonstrate how both literatures can offer insight into the study of policy transfer.     
First, Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) note that diffusion scholars often equate 
the widespread adoption and use of an innovation (its ubiquity) as evidence of its 
institutionalization without considering whether the new idea or practice has the 
legitimacy to persist long-term (e.g., fads, fashions, etc).  Relatedly, Colyvas and 
Jonsson point out that some rules or ideas are institutionalized but rarely used or 
acted upon.  To aid in clarifying how diffusion and institutionalization differ and 
relate, Colyvas and Jonsson (2011) argue that diffusion is focused on “the spreading, 
or how things flow” while institutionalization refers to the “stickiness, or how things 
become permanent” (p.28).  They also highlight that diffusion is based upon 
“reinforcement and contagion” while institutionalization is based upon the 
“reproduction and integration into cultural and cognitive frames” (p.28).   
In addition, Colyvas and Jonsson offer a useful way of conceptualizing how 
diffusion and institutionalize relate.  They suggest that the diffusion of an innovation 
is considered in terms of behavioral elements (“how widespread a practice or 
organizational structure has become”) and institutionalization is considered in terms 
of its cultural and cognitive aspects (“how legitimate it is”).  With this distinction, 
they present a simple 2x2 table with diffusion categories (yes/no in terms of spread) 
as the rows and institutionalization categories (yes/no in terms of legitimacy in a 
legal, normative, and/or cognitive-cultural sense) as the columns.   
Innovations that diffuse widely and gain widespread acceptance as legitimate 
represent the top-right cell in the table but is the most observable phenomena, and 
hence, the most studied type of innovation.  In contrast to those “successful” 
innovations, other innovations that neither diffuse nor gain widespread acceptance 
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are complete “failures” and occupy the bottom-left cell.   Meanwhile, the top-left cell 
features innovations that become ubiquitous but not accepted or deemed appropriate.  
Finally, the bottom-right cell contains innovations that had a very limited 
spread/adoption total but were widely accepted as legitimate legally, normatively, 
and/or cognitive-culturally.  These types of innovations occupy a kind of grey-area 
between “success” and “failure” and are rarely studied.  This framework highlights 
how the spread of an innovation and its institutionalization are linked yet not 
necessarily dependent on each other.    
This brings attention to the importance of understanding the processes 
leading to both “adoption” and “legitimacy” for the success of policy transfers, 
which arguably need both to succeed.  Studying social networks, which are central in 
both innovation-diffusion and institutional literatures, can help researchers 
understand how a policy innovation imported from elsewhere diffuses through a 
social system and builds institutional legitimacy.  Thus, drawing upon the literatures 
on innovation-diffusion and institutionalism serve to provide deeper theoretical 
insight into the role of networks in policy transfer processes including the 
implementation phase.   
 
 
Research Questions:  Drawing on the literatures to investigate the gaps  
 
In this chapter, it has been my aim to review concepts from three theoretical 
literatures to complement each other and provide a multi-perspective analysis of the 
creation of Teach First and especially focusing on the role policy entrepreneurs and 
networks play in the process.  In the course of this chapter, I emphasize that while 
these three literatures have distinct origins and offer different perspectives, they also 
share considerable conceptual overlaps.  Nevertheless, there remain gaps in the three 
literatures that I aim to address in the course of this study.  One of the pressing areas 
in need of attention is non-government policy transfer and, relatedly, the significance 
of policy entrepreneurs and related social networks, both already existing and newly 
emerging for the purpose of transfer.  Thus, I aim to understand:  What is the role of 
policy entrepreneurs and networks in the policy transfer and diffusion process?   
To this end, the study addresses the following research questions: 
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1. Who were the policy entrepreneurs advocating for Teach First and what were 
their motivations?  
2. How did policy entrepreneurs utilize networks and institutional structures to 
achieve their aims?   
3. How did they, as actors embedded and enmeshed in institutional structures, 
change that same context?   
4. In what ways did institutional structures shape policy entrepreneurs’ goals 
and strategies and ultimately the policy outcome?    
 
While the overall aim of the research is to uncover and explain how and why 
Teach First emerged in England in 2002, and thus establishing how and what ways 
the scheme was (and was not) a transfer of TFA, these theoretical questions 
regarding policy entrepreneurs, networks, and relevant institutional structure are 
examined as well.  Finally, before proceeding to present the results of my empirical 




2.8  Background Literature on TFA and Teach First 
 
Research and Debates Regarding TFA 
In the U.S., TFA has been a polarizing force in educational debates over 
teacher certification, effectiveness, and retention since its founding.  The 
organization’s first years were marked by rather disjointed training and high attrition 
rates among corps members (Kopp 2001), leading to initial harsh criticism of the 
TFA from the education establishment.  However, as TFA expanded, debate soon 
turned to whether the programme produced effective teachers, particularly in 
comparison to traditionally certified teachers.  Three notable studies (Raymond et al. 
2001; Decker et al. 2004; Xu et al. 2007) concluded TFA teachers were equally and, 
at times, more effective than traditionally certified teachers.  Meanwhile, three other 
studies (Laczko-Kerr & Berliner 2002; Pilcher & Steele 2005; Darling-Hammond et 
al. 2005) argued against such a notion, claiming that the performance of TFA 
teachers in the classroom was inferior to those holding full certification.   
All of these studies are limited in their generalizability to the entire TFA 
teacher population.  All the studies with the exception of Decker et al. (2004) 
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collected data on teachers in only one region.  In addition, all the studies except one 
(Xu et al. 2007) assessed TFA teachers in the elementary or middle school level and 
“achievement” was always measured in terms of student achievement in maths and 
reading.  Meanwhile, TFA teachers are placed in a wide range of grade levels and 
subject areas.  Furthermore, all the studies mentioned above focus almost exclusively 
on urban schools, ignoring the TFA’s increasing number of teachers in rural 
communities.  Thus, again, the results of the studies can only provide a glimpse into 
how effective a typical TFA teacher may be.  Moreover, debates over these studies 
show significant differences in research design and methodology, including what 
teachers TFA’s trainees should be compared against and how should differences 
between student groups be accounted for.  Thus, the results of these quantitative 
“teacher-effectiveness” studies have been contradictory and used selectively by TFA 
supporters and adversaries alike in debates about the scheme.  These studies 
continued to focus critical attention on TFA’s training and also prompted further 
debates regarding the retention rate of its alumni in teaching (Donaldson & Johnson 
2010; Donaldson 2008; Boyd et al. 2005).    
Although studies of TFA’s effectiveness were contradictory, many 
politicians, businesses, and major media outlets continued to portray a positive 
public image of the programme through the years, helping it retain a generally 
positive image publicly.  Numerous mainstream media stories about TFA – ranging 
from books and television documentaries to magazine and newspaper articles – have 
appeared since its launch in 1990.  These stories generally emphasized the success of 
TFA and its corps members (Viadero 2004; Greenwell 2008; Azimi 2007; Foote 
2008) or sought to defend TFA and/or debunk negative “myths” about the 
organization (Rotherham 2011; Koerner et al. 2008; Lowe 2010).  Others have 
highlighted the notable careers of its alumni (St. John 2010; Higgins et al. 2011) and 
called for more public support for TFA when its federal funding appeared threatened 
(Cohen 2011; Anderson 2010; Klein 2003).  In addition, books by TFA alumni 
describe and reflect upon their experiences in the classroom (Ness 2003; Johnston 
2003; Sentilles 2005; Piekara 2011).  Politically, TFA has enjoyed the support of 
every presidential administration since its inception, with former president George 
W. Bush encouraging young people to serve in TFA (Klein 2003).  Moreover, some 
of TFA’s corporate sponsors often run promotional fundraising campaigns that not 
only bring money to TFA but also spread awareness of its work (Miner 2010). 
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Still, despite the many endorsements of TFA, critical critiques continue to 
call into question TFA’s mission, methods, and effect on schools and teacher 
professionalism.  Veltri (2010; 2008), a teacher educator who mentored hundreds of 
TFA corps members, provides qualitative insights into why graduates enter the 
scheme and how they are socialized in the organisation and the profession.  She also 
discusses how TFA negotiates with district and federal governments. Other studies 
have analyzed TFA’s “master” narrative, discourse, and underlying assumptions 
about the nature of teaching, education, and equity.  In this vein, Cradle (2007) 
examined the values, viewpoints, and social capital of TFA’s founding staff, arguing 
the programme embodied the interests, perspectives, and power of elites.  Similarly, 
Popkewitz (1998) identifies ways in which TFA’s marketing and training rely on 
certain constructed ideas of poverty, the urban/rural child, and a missionary-type of 
teacher while also endorsing a largely experiential view of learning.  More recently, 
Lahann and Reagan (2011) use documentary analysis and interviews to argue that the 
TFA programme operates with an organizational philosophy that combines elements 
of neo-liberal ideas and progressive values.  Bentley (2013) adds to the debate by 
critiquing TFA’s highly publicized model of teaching as a remedy for educational 
inequity and inequality while Cann (2013) argues TFA promotes the same false myth 
as “white teacher savior films” in which “white teachers, with little training and 
experience, perform miracles in urban classrooms where trained, experienced 
teachers have failed” (p.1).  
Finally, other studies have focused on the ways TFA and its alumni are 
affecting education policy and practices.  Kretchmar and colleagues (2014; 2014) 
scrutinized TFA leadership’s and notable alumni’s close links with business 
interests, reform-minded philanthropists, and the charter movement in the U.S.  
Media stories have also highlighted these links, suggesting TFA and its alumni 
promote a conservative, pro-corporate, and anti-union agenda in education policy 
(Sommer 2014; Strauss 2011b; 2011a; 2012a).  Another notable study by McAdam 
and Brandt (2009) challenges the TFA narrative which claims it is creating a cadre of 
committed educational advocates.  In this study, survey data indicated TFA alumni, a 
decade after they finished their TFA teaching, were less engaged in activism, civic-
service careers, and civic behaviour (such as voting) than control groups.  According 
to McAdam and Brandt, this suggests that some TFA alumni experienced 
disillusionment or service burn-out from their TFA experience (a conclusion also 
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voiced by Brewer (2014)).  Meanwhile, other researchers have examined the careers 
of alumni after TFA (Boyd et al. 2005; Téllez 2011; Donaldson & Kappan 2011).   
The studies and debates reviewed here are a wide sampling of the questions 
and debates that have surrounded TFA since its founding.  TFA, which is now the 
largest single source of new teachers in the U.S., is a unique and influential 
programme but one that plays a deeply controversial role in education reform.  
Despite its contested status, TFA attracted international interest and soon sparked 
cases of policy transfer in 2000s.   
 
 
Current Research and Issues regarding Teach First 
 
Research studies of Teach First have been limited but are increasing in 
number.  The earliest study, by Hutchings et al. (2006), was commissioned by the 
Teacher Training and Development Agency and examined Teach First’s innovative 
features, considering how those may be applied to mainstream training routes.  
Utilizing data from this initial evaluation, Smart et al. (2009) argued that the  
discourses used in Teach First marketing and by its participants reinforce middle-
class values and stereo-types of poor communities, obscured advantages in schooling 
enjoyed by more wealthy families, and ultimately provided additional social capital 
to its trainees.  In these ways, the Teach First programme and its participants, while 
well-intentioned, were reproducing middle-class privilege.   
Meanwhile, Stephen Ball and his colleagues include Teach First among their 
investigations into new education-business partnerships, emerging policy networks 
and communities, and the rise of education philanthropy (Ball 2007; Ball 2012; Ball 
& Junemann 2012).  Ball (2007) suggests that Teach First represents how that 
“philanthropy is increasingly incorporated into state policy and is an avoidance of 
both bureaucratic and market difficulties [and] provides a form of ‘fast’ and often 
very personal policy action” (p.126).  In a more recent work, Ball (2012) refers to 
Teach First as another example of “the mobility of policy ideas via networks of 
business philanthropy” (p.110).  However, his analysis of Teach First is based on his 
interviews with Wigdortz and others involved with numerous business-education 
partnerships, and thus do not examine Teach First in-depth.  Instead, his work maps 
wider network relations, highlights individual biographies, and examines policy 
discourses.  Similarly, Leaton Gray and Whitty (2010) examine the nature of Teach 
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First’s training model and discourses in a wider discussion of how New Labour 
reforms have shaped teacher professionalism.  Leaton Gray and Whitty (2010) argue 
that Teach First represents a “shift in the nature of teacher professionalism” (p.12) as 
it downplays professional preparation (i.e., education studies) and emphasizes 
generic leadership and management skills.  The programme also treates its 
participants more like self-interested customers than developing professionals.  
In addition, research on the effectiveness of Teach First teachers in the 
classroom has begun.  Ofsted evaluated Teach First in 2006-2007 and reported that 
approximately half of the 202 trainees evaluated achieved an “outstanding rating” by 
QTS standards, a third were rated “good”, and the remaining were found 
“statisfactory” (Ofsted 2008, pp.5–6) which, it was noted, were commendable 
outcomes and on par with other good initial teacher training courses.  Ofsted (2008) 
also noted trainees were highly committed to “countering educational disadvantage” 
and highlighted ways many Teach First participants were positively impacting 
schools.  However, the report did note that roughly half of the trainees seen were 
only “satisfactory” in managing pupils’ behavior and suggested that their 
competence in classroom management “could have been improved with more 
sustained, focused training and supervision in the school from an early stage in the 
year” (Ofsted 2008, p.11).   
Meanwhile, Muijs et al. (2010; 2013a; 2013b) conducted a study 
commissioned by Teach First.  Using mixed-methods, they found the scheme’s 
second-year teachers were somewhat effective, helping their schools raise test scores 
and taking on some leadership roles.  More recently, Allen and Allnutt (2013) 
studied Teach First using quantitative methods and a much smaller sample size than 
Muijs et al. (2010).  They concluded that Teach First teachers produced modest gains 
in terms of pupils’ GCSE scores. 
These studies, coupled with Teach First’s ambition to expand, have prompted 
discussions regarding the scheme’s potential to operate in other parts of the U.K., 
particularly in Scotland’s schools (Murtagh 2011).  While Scotland’s General 
Teaching Council changed its policy in 2010 to allow Teach First alumni with 
PGCE’s to teach in Scotland (Buie 2010), the reaction to potentially bringing the 
scheme to Scotland has been mixed.  Teach First has reportedly found support 
among some government leaders in region (Sutherland 2011).  Moreover, the 
Donaldson Report (2011) recommended consideration of the scheme, commenting 
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that Teach First could “complement” the standard ways of entering the profession.   
Still, some critics have called the scheme elitist and pointed out almost half of Teach 
First alumni leave the classroom; moreover, with public funds limited, many leaders 
doubt government’s ability to fund the scheme (Sutherland 2011).  In 2013, it was 
reported that Teach First had met with some Scottish local authorities to discuss the 
potential for expansion there but Scotland’s largest teaching union, the Educational 
Institute of Scotland (EIS), remains opposed to the scheme (Denholm 2013). 
Clearly, there is substantially more research on TFA and its impact than on 
Teach First.  Reviewing this literature highlights the need for further empirical 
research on Teach First and the effects of its rapidly expanding work, not least 
because leaders of Teach First help export its model worldwide through its 
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CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1  Introduction:  The Evolution of My Research Focus and Design 
 
The focus and design of my study evolved over the course of my doctoral 
studies.   From the beginning, I wanted to understand how the idea of TFA had 
spread to the U.K. and, in the transfer process, how and why Teach First was 
different from TFA.  I originally planned my research as a qualitative comparative 
case-study of policy transfer examining three programmes – Teach First, TEACH 
South Africa, and Enseña Peru – all of which had been modelled on TFA.  To this 
end, I planned to utilize interviews, observations, and focus groups to discover how 
each programme emerged in its own unique contexts and the role of global policy 
networks played in the process.   This, I reasoned, would help shed light on how 
policy transfer occurred and was reinvented in new localities.  
However, during the course of preparing for and conducting my first 
interviews on Teach First, I identified the need for a more historical and interpretive 
perspective that took into account the complexity of contexts and diversity of actors’ 
views.  In other words, I realized the complexity of situated actions and contexts was 
immense and difficult to untangle, and I became preoccupied with understanding in-
depth just how Teach First emerged.  As a result, I refocused my study on Teach 
First exclusively to understand, within a set time period (2001-2003), how the idea 
appeared, gained approval, and was implemented.  By limiting my focus exclusively 
to Teach First, I was able to carry out an in-depth study that provided for a more 
nuanced analysis of what transpired, how, and why.  
This revised goal reshaped my methodological approach as I sought to 
understand the complexity of human actions and the motivations behind them.  As a 
result, I adopted an interpretive paradigm, which is a perspective shared by 
researchers in symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and constructivism alike 
(Crotty 1998).  Those adopting this paradigm consider reality as socially constructed 
and dependent on meaning derived from contexts and social interactions.  
Consequently, understanding social reality depends on an individual’s point of view, 
or perspective, and thus is inextricably tied to one’s location in the social context.  
Moreover, in the interpretive paradigm, social reality is seen as negotiated and thus 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 88 
dynamic and in a constant state of being reproduced.  Hence, social reality is also a 
social process.  Thus, I drew from the traditions within the interpretive paradigm to 
redesign my study as a qualitative investigation, employing semi-structured 
interviews with a wide range of individuals and social networks involved in the 
emergence of Teach First as a prima facie case of policy transfer.  To understand and 
interpret the interviews, further research data was collected from a wide variety of 
sources including media accounts, books, diaries, and other academic studies.  
Following the data collection phase, I adopted a reconstructive form of narrative 
inquiry in order to interpret and reconstruct the “story” of Teach First from the 
diverse accounts I gathered from approximately 50 interviewees.   
Throughout the study, I maintain a focus on entrepreneurs and networks in 
the policy transfer process.  Although studies of social networks often utilize more 
quantitative approaches to map and study such structures, there are many potential 
benefits of employing a qualitative approach in network research.  Hollstein (2011) 
states that studies seeking to focus on understanding the concrete interaction between 
actors can benefit from investigating the strategies and network orientations “at the 
level of individual actors” (p.410).  In this way, the richness of qualitative data has 
the potential ability to (1) explain the problem of agency, (2) uncover linkages 
between network structure and network actors, and (3) address questions regarding 
the constitution and dynamics of social networks.  Furthermore, qualitative studies 
can also enable the exploration of new or unexplored “forms of networks, integration 
patterns, and network practices” (Hollstein 2011, p.406).    
Thus, I adopted a holistic, ethnographic approach in my study that was 
“marked by utmost openness toward its subject matter and aimed at achieving as 
comprehensive as possible understanding of the phenomenon in question” (Hollstein 
2011, p.410).  To this end, as much data as possible was collected from multiple 
sources to shed light on the phenomenon from various angles.  In the following 
sections, I discuss how I carried out my data collection and analysis in more detail 
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3.2 Data Collection  
 
3.2.1 Interview Method and Selection of Interviewees 
 
I collected first-person accounts on the emergence of Teach First, as well as 
TFA, through semi-structured one-on-one interviews with individuals who had been 
involved with the programme prior to and/or during its first year.  In total, I carried 
out 51 interviewees: 10 related to TFA and 41 related to Teach First.  (For a list of all 
TFA and Teach First interviewees see appendices 1 and 2 respectively, and for a 
diagram of key Teach First interviewees see appendix 3.)  I chose to use semi-
structured interviews for my study rather than structured or unstructured approaches.  
Semi-structured interviews are the most commonly used method in studies 
employing interpretative, and particularly phenomenological, modes of analysis. 
This is because semi-structured interviews allow “the researcher and participant to 
engage in a dialogue whereby initial questions are modified in the light of the 
participants’ responses and the investigator is able to probe interesting and important 
areas which arise” (Smith & Osborn 2003, p.57).  Thus, I selected this method as the 
most productive manner in which to gain insight into individuals’ experiences, 
values, and viewpoints. 
With one exception, all interviews were conducted over the telephone, or in 
two cases, through Skype (using only audio), as this was often most convenient for 
both interviewees and myself.  For me, telephone interviews were preferred because 
interviewees were dispersed over a wide range of locations, both in the U.K. and the 
U.S., and a few in other countries.  Using the telephone to conduct interviews saved 
both time and money during the data collection period.  Only one interview was 
carried out face-to-face, as preferred by the participant, although later on a second 
interview with this participant was conducted over Skype (again, using only audio).  
Telephone interviewing is not commonly used in qualitative studies and hence, I 
return to a discussion of my experiences with this medium below. 
My initial set of interviews was with individuals involved with launching 
TFA.  These interviews were carried out in early 2012.  I identified and selected 
these individuals based on a 1990 TFA-published promotional document that listed 
the individuals on the organization’s first board of directors and board of advisors as 
well as all its staff members.  I attempted to contact as many of those individuals as I 
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could find emails or phone numbers for through internet searches.  Unfortunately, 
given more than twenty years had passed since TFA’s creation, I had only limited 
success in finding many.  However, I found ten individuals that agreed to be an 
interviewee.  Of the ten, I spoke with three former staff members, two advisory 
board members, one independent advisor to Kopp, three teacher educators and one 
researcher involved in TFA’s first summer institute.  
In the case of Teach First, I began my data collection by interviewing its 
founding CEO, Brett Wigdortz and other individuals who had been involved in 
Teach First’s founding as identified in media accounts of the time.  From these 
interviews, I identified additional interviewees to contact based on the narratives 
told.  I also asked interviewees to suggest the names of other individuals they 
recalled as being involved in the launching of the programme but had not yet 
mentioned.  Thus, through interview data and snowball sampling, further participants 
were identified, contacted, and interviewed.  I made it a priority, however, to contact 
individuals from various sectors and with different roles related to Teach First.  
Whether simply “advisors” or funding sponsors, I sought out a diverse range of 
individuals to speak with in order to obtain a rich account of Teach First’s 
emergence.   
Upon the publication, in late 2012, of Wigdortz’s own memoir about starting 
Teach First, I compiled a list of all the staff members and contacted them for 
interviews.  By 2013, I had interviewed 32 individuals from government, 
universities, foundations, businesses, and Teach First.  This represented the bulk of 
my primary data.  Later on, after transcribing and analysing data, I carried out a set 
of additional nine interviews in the first half of 2015 to verify other accounts and 
widen the diversity of perspectives included in the study. 
 
3.2.2  Access and Consent 
 
To gain access to participants, I first contacted each person individually 
through an email from my university account.  The contents of the email introduced 
myself as an American PhD student at the University of Edinburgh who “was 
examining how and why prominent individuals from a range of organizations and 
sectors came together to establish TFA and Teach First”.  After a brief description of 
my doctoral research, I described how I had learned of their involvement in the 
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emergence of either programme and requested a telephone interview with them at 
their convenience.  Formal consent was not solicited in writing other than 
individuals’ responses but was discussed during early in the interview process. 
If individuals I emailed for an interview did not respond to my initial request 
within a week or two, I sent them a follow up email to ask if they had received my 
initial interview request and stated that I would still like to interview them.  In that 
second email, I stressed that I would value their unique perspective and be 
appreciative of any time they had available to speak with me.  If they responded 
favourably, a mutually agreed time was then set up to speak.  There was only one 
exception to this pattern of interview coordination, which was one high-profile 
policy-maker who literally called me within minutes of receiving my email and said 
he had 20 minutes to talk right then.  Though not fully prepared for this interview, I 
took the opportunity to interview this individual, a chance that may have not be 
possible later.   
My approach to gaining access to interviewees may be described as 
“minimalist” in the sense that I was straightforward and brief in my initial interview 
request.  I feared a longer and more formal email would either not be fully read or 
potentially dampen the reader’s interest in participating.  Instead, I simply stated who 
I was, the focus and purpose of my study, and emphasized my eagerness to interview 
them because of their involvement with Teach First, however small or large their role 
actually was.  When a previous interviewee referred an individual to me, I usually 
stated this in my email to him/her.  In this way, I signaled I was directed to them, 
hoping this would further encourage their participation.  Using this direct but 
minimalist approach, I aimed to catch their attention, convey my overall purpose, 
and emphasize my interest in their help.  Upon reflection, though, this lack of 
detailed information on my study could have been resolved without losing the 
desired tone of the email by attaching an informational sheet describing in detail the 
research aims, outcomes, and participants’ rights.   
Notably, a handful of interviewees requested the questions in advance of our 
interview.  In response, I always sent a general outline of my questions to them.  
However, in most other cases, I did not give interviewees any questions ahead of 
time as I hoped to avoid formulated responses and cultivate more of a candid 
conversation when I called.  Given that some researchers indicated that telephone 
interviews were often shorter than in-person interviews, I also wanted to avoid 
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creating an expectation that simply answering the set of questions was all that was 
required.  In retrospect, providing an outline of topics for discussion to the 
participant prior to the interview could have helped them better prepare for the 
interview by allowing them time to revisit their memories and contemplate their 
answers.   
 
3.2.3  Interview Procedure and Questions 
  
The procedure I used for carrying out interviews was straightforward.  In 
preparation for the interview, I researched the background of the interviewee on the 
internet, gathering biographical details that helped me become somewhat acquainted 
with the person.  In this process, I noted details that seemed related to their views and 
involvement with Teach First. Later, I often asked about these details during the 
interview, which was helpful in sometimes uncovering network connections or 
understanding the person’s viewpoint.  Other times, doing so alerted me to the 
irrelevance, or lack of connection, between individuals or experiences, which was 
equally helpful. 
When I called participants to start the interview, I typically began by 
explaining who I was and how I had come to study this topic.  I sensed that my brief 
story of becoming a TFA teahcer myself and then moving to England to work for 
Teach First established an open conversation and common link with my interviewees 
that enabled me to begin building a positive rapport.  I then briefly described my 
study again, how I came to know of their involvement in Teach First, and asked 
permission to record the interview, which all but one agreed.  Many interviewees 
were accustomed to being interviewed and hence expected such formalities.  With 
interviewee’s permission, I recorded each interview using an ear-microphone 
attached to an Olympus digital recorder.   
Before proceeding to ask my questions, I asked interviewees to notify me in 
the course of the interview if they did not want certain comments on the record or if 
they wished any details to be considered “anonymous”.  I did not explicitly offer 
anonymity to interviewees since I contacted them for their particular role in 
launching Teach First.  At the time, none of them asked me not to use their real 
names in my study, and so I was operating on the assumption that I had permission 
to use their identity in my written work.  Of course, some interviewees asked certain 
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quotes not be attributed to them or stated when information should be considered 
“off the record” and thus not included in any reporting.  I, of course, followed these 
instructions and only reported on information that was freely shared with consent.  
Overall, interviews ranged in time from 13 minutes to two and a half hours, 
depending on the time interviewees had available and how much they could recall.  
Most interviews, however, lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.  Each interview 
was unique in terms of its pace and sequence of questioning.  Although the questions 
varied for each interviewee, the general outline of interview questions was: 
 
1. Personal Background Questions:   
a. When you became involved with Teach First, what was your 
position/job at the time?  What were your job responsibilities?   
b. Had you been involved in the education sector prior to this time?   
c. Which university did you attend?  How had you decided, or 
proceeded, on your particular career trajectory from there? 
 
2. Policy-Oriented Learning and Social Network Questions:   
a. How did you first learn of the idea for Teach First?   
b. Who approached you with the Teach First idea?   
c. Who else was supporting the idea?   
d. What were your initial thoughts or reactions to the idea?  Did you 
have concerns about the idea?   
e. What problem(s) did you see Teach First addressing?   
f. How did others in your department/group think of the idea?   
 
3. Policy-Borrowing/TFA-related Questions:   
a. Upon learning of (or becoming involved in) the Teach First idea, 
what was your level of knowledge, or awareness, of the American 
programme, TFA?   
b. What was your view of TFA? 
c. How did your knowledge (or view) of TFA shape your view of the 
idea for Teach First?   
d. Did you consider Teach First to be modeled on (or a replication) 
of TFA or something different?   
e. In what ways did you think the idea behind Teach First/TFA 
needed to be changed or adapted to work in the U.K.? 
 
4. Action/Advocacy Questions:   
a. What actions did you take, or roles did you take on, to develop or 
promote Teach First?  Why?    
b. What were the main challenges in moving the idea forward?  
What were the arguments/rationales for and against the idea?   
c. Who was opposed to the idea?  How was opposition to the Teach 
First idea overcome?    
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d. Which factors or individuals were influential in your views? 
 
Although I seldom asked explicitly about an individual’s personal or professional 
networks, I usually asked follow-up questions regarding how the interviewee knew 
so-and-so or how and why certain contacts were tapped for additional support or 
resources.  I also asked for interviewees to recommend the names of others who they 
felt played important roles in launching Teach First.  In this way, I was able to gather 
details about existing and emerging social networks and their uses in the diffusion of 
the Teach First idea. 
To understand interviewees’ personal histories, I asked about their own 
educational background and career paths.  However, for a number of interviewees, 
details of their professional biographies were already available on the internet (i.e., 
through LinkedIn or on their current employer’s website), and thus I was able to 
incorporate these details into my interview questions to probe deeper into personal 
and professional narratives.  Occasionally, I had difficulty integrating these 
biographical questions into the interviews as some interviewees did not expect them 
or fully see the relevance of such questions.  However, most interviewees were 
happily willing to describe their professional backgrounds and career choices.  
Interestingly, through retelling their backgrounds and shifts in career, many 
interviewees seemed to open up further to explaining the origins and influences on 
their views and actions in regard to TFA and/or Teach First.  This phenomenon 
encouraged me to draw upon social psychological perspectives (i.e., Lave and 
Wenger (1991) and Weick et al. (2005)) in my later stages of analysis of interview 
data.  These perspectives highlight how an individual’s identity shapes how he/she 
understands and makes sense of the social world and his/her own role in it. 
Hence, my interviews were a mix of questions about their professional 
experiences, involvement with Teach First/TFA, and how their knowledge and views 
of these programmes emerged and spurred them to act.  Through these sets of 
questions, I gained valuable qualitative data despite the fact that all but one of my 
interviews were conducted over the telephone or Skype (using audio only).  It is 
worth noting that, at the end of the interview, I generally asked participants if there 
was anything they would like to add or a topic I had not brought up but they thought 
was important.  This often led to some interesting final thoughts and reflections that 
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added to the richness of the data.  Other times it allowed the interviewee to reveal 
contextual nuances and topics that I had not been previously aware of.   
 
 
3.2.4  Reflections on Using the Telephone for Qualitative Interviews 
  
My study is unusual in the fact that I relied almost exclusively on telephone 
interviewing for gathering in-depth qualitative data from participants.  While 
telephone interviewing is an accepted and well-studied approach for collecting 
quantitative data (and the most widely used method for conducting surveys in 
industrialized countries (Bryman 2008)), face-to-face interviews are considered more 
appropriate for data collection in qualitative studies.  Through conducting a 
systematic review of the literature on the use of telephones for qualitative 
interviewing, Novick (2008) found that few research books addressed the topic and 
scholarly discussion on the topic in academic journals was limited.  Novick also 
reported that comments from researchers using telephone interviews had low 
expectations of gathering rich, high-quality data and several admitted using the 
telephone only when an in-person interview was not possible.    
There are several disadvantages of telephone interviewing that have led to 
this widespread preference for in-person interviews among qualitative researchers.  
Such disadvantages include (1) the supposed difficulty of building rapport and hence 
trust between the researcher and interviewee, (2) the inability to see visual or non-
verbal cues between the researcher and participant, (3) the reliance on telephone 
infrastructure or mobile reception to reach participants, and (4) the decreased 
opportunity to take short breaks during the interview (Irvine et al. 2010).  Shuy 
(2002) suggests such disadvantages may negatively affect the quantity, quality, and 
type of information one can capture in an interview.  Researchers also tend to assume 
that in-person interviews are preferable because they offer the advantages of 
allowing the researcher to build rapport with interviewees and, in some cases, set the 
ambience of the interview (Stephens 2007).  As a result, face-to-face interviewing 
remains the preferred mode of data collection in qualitative research involving semi-
structured and in-depth interviews (Sturges & Hanrahan 2004).   
Telephone interviews, however, do offer some distinct advantages for both 
researchers.  As often discussed in the context of quantitative data collection, 
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telephone interviewing (1) eliminates the costly and time-consuming task of 
traveling to participants, (2) allows one to reach a geographically-dispersed 
population, (3) enhances the safety of the interviewer, and (4) allows for the 
possibility for the interviewer to be monitored by a supervisor (Bryman 2008).    
Despite the stereotypes against telephone interviewing, a small but increasing 
number of qualitative researchers have used telephone interviews in their studies and 
shared insights gleaned from their experience.  For example, Taylor (2002) and 
Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) both initially conducted in-person interviews before 
switching to telephone interviews for their studies of adolescent boys and prison 
visitors and guards respectively.  In these studies, the researchers concluded that the 
information gathered in both types of interviews was equally robust in terms of 
breadth and depth.  Similarly, Stephens (2007) initially conducted semi-structured 
face-to-face interviews with elite macro-economists before using the telephone to 
conduct five additional interviews.  He found telephone interviews were largely just 
as successful as those conducted in-person although he noted that, without visual 
cues, the interview required more direction and fewer interruptions from the 
researcher.  He also suggests that telephone interviewing allows the researcher to 
gain more control of their social space as he/she is not seen by the participant and 
thus is free to take notes or do other interview-related activities.   
Flexibility was also identified as a key advantage for those using telephone 
interviews, notably Harvey (2011) and Holt (2010).  Harvey (2011) conducted 
qualitative research on elites using telephone interviews and noted providing 
flexibility in the timing and locations of interviews was critical to maximizing 
response rates.  Similarly, from her experience interviewing 20 single parents in 
impoverished communities by telephone, Holt (2010) noted that participants may 
reschedule, or even end the interview, more easily and with “no embarrassment or 
difficulty in re-arranging the appointment (as there may have been had I turned up at 
their door)” (2010, p.116).  In this way, she notes that telephone interviews give not 
just the researcher but also allows interviewees a far greater degree of control over 
their circumstances than a face-to-face interview may.   
Notably, Holt (2010) goes further to challenge stereotypes against telephone 
interviewing by suggesting that the absence of visual and non-verbal cues can be an 
advantage of telephone interviewing as “everything had to be articulated by both the 
participants and myself” and thus produced “a much richer text… from which to 
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begin analysis” (p.116).  In addition, she points out that telephone interviewing does 
eliminate the researcher’s chance to gain “‘ethnographic’ information derived from 
participants’ homes, communities and, indeed, their ‘selves’” (Holt 2010, p.115).  
However, she reasons this may be an advantage as it “enabled the subsequent 
discourse analysis of data to ‘stay at the level of the text’” (Holt 2010, p.115).  
Lastly, Trier-Bieniek (2012) boldly argues in favor of using the telephone for 
qualitative interviewing, suggesting it can empower some participants.  She 
conducted semi-structured telephone interviews on a sample of 39 women on a range 
of sensitive topics and traumatic experiences.  Consequently, Trier-Bieniek (2012) 
argues telephone interviewing may be characterized as “participant-centered” and 
suggests such interviews “yield the potential for more honest discussions because of 
the anonymity involved” (p.642).  Her interviewees indicated they would not have 
typically agreed to be involved in an academic study but were more willing to do so 
through a telephone interview.  This, they indicated, was because a telephone 
interview allowed them to remain in the comfort of their own surroundings and 
relieved them of the concern of how they were presenting themselves.  Thus, the 
telephone interview was alluring, in part, because participants just had to answer 
questions and “take part in a conversation” (Trier-Bieniek 2012, p.640).   
With such positive insights into the potential for telephone interviews to 
accommodate participants and yield quality data, it should be no surprise that 
telephone interviews for the collection of qualitative data are slowly becoming more 
common (Block & Erskine 2012).   This trend is helping to address the gap in critical 
discussions of the realities of using the telephone, and more recently Skype (Deakin 
& Wakefield 2013; Hanna 2012; Janghorban et al. 2014), for qualitative 
interviewing.  This increasing acceptance of telephone interviews encouraged me to 
utilize this medium and provided some insight into how best to conduct them.   
In my study of Teach First, I found telephone interviewing to be a valid and 
efficient way to collect valuable data from my participants.  I conducted all my 
interviews over the telephone or Skype (using audio only) with the exception of one 
interview in-person.  As a result, I did not have a large comparison group from which 
to judge what type of interview yielded the most useful results.  (However, such a 
comparison would not likely have been much help as questions varied by participant 
and the specific role and experiences of each person differed considerably.)  Still, 
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from my experience using the semi-structured telephone interviews as my primary 
mode of data collection, I offer some useful reflections. 
 From the onset of my research, I chose to request telephone interviewing 
rather than in-person interviews for several reasons.  First, the most logical rationale 
behind this decision was efficiency – to conduct as many interviews as needed with 
limited resources (namely time and money).  Since my interviewees were dispersed 
around the U.K. and abroad, telephone interviews were pretty much necessary.  
Secondly, I decided to conduct interviews over the phone in order to help persuade 
individuals I contacted to participate in my research.  Since many of the individuals I 
wanted to speak with were elites – government officials, corporate executives, union 
heads, etc. – I assumed their schedules were busy and thus time and flexibility 
important.   
In hindsight, I believe interviewing by telephone was preferable to in-person 
in my study for an additional reason – the disconnect between interviewees’ current 
circumstances and my research topic.  Teach First had launched more than a decade 
prior to my study, and hence, most of my interviewees were no longer in jobs that 
were directly related to Teach First.  Most individuals had moved on in their careers 
while others had relocated to other countries and some had retired.  The positions or 
settings in which they occupied at the time of our interview were not often relevant 
to my research topic.  Thus, since most of my interviews took place during the 
business day (as requested by participants themselves), the use of the telephone 
rather than face-to-face interviews was likely helpful in ensuring that my interview 
was not seen as a disruption or intrusion into their current workplace.  
The quality of the data I obtained from telephone interviews was generally 
high, allowing me insight into decision-making, social networks, and individuals’ 
personal viewpoints.  With many interviewees, I felt able to establish a degree of 
trust and rapport with them by explaining how my own background related to TFA 
and Teach First.  However, I did find the lack of visual cues difficult to manage.  
When I needed clarification on a comment, I could not indicate without verbally 
interrupting the participant.  To deal with this, however, I wrote down questions or 
unfamiliar terms to ask about later in the conversation. 
I also found there are some drawbacks to the freedoms telephone 
interviewing allows.  First, while I found the flexibility and control a telephone 
interview provides researchers and interviewees an advantage, it can also lead some 
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interviewees to multi-task and hence affect the quality of the participants’ responses.  
For example, one interviewee was providing short, straightforward answers, and I 
struggled to effectively probe his responses.  Later in the interview, he asked if I 
could repeat a question because he had just been “overtaking a car on the 
motorway”.  Although I immediately offered to call him back at a later time, he 
insisted on continuing the interview, but I sensed his answers were not as complete 
as they could have been if we had sat down to an in-person interview.   
Second, in a telephone interview, researchers have less control in determining 
when an interview ends, which can be understandable but frustrating.  While 
working through my series of questions, some interviewees would indicate they had 
to go soon.  While I usually asked for 30 to 45 minutes for the interview in my email 
request, I did graciously accept whatever time a participant was willing to give me 
because I wanted to secure their participation.  Thus, while inviting individuals to 
telephone interviews and being flexible may help lure individuals into participating, 
they may not always allot enough time to answer all the researcher’s questions.  This 
was simply a trade-off I was willing to accept in order to gain access and maintain a 
positive rapport with my interviewees.  Fortunately, most participants indicated I 
could contact them again if I had any additional questions afterwards.  I took 
advantage of such offers later on in the analysis process and emailed or re-
interviewed key participants, most of who responded helpfully.   
In conclusion, although face-to-face interviews remain the dominant 
interview technique in the social research field, I found telephone interviews enabled 
me to reach a large number of geographically dispersed individuals whom I needed 
to speak with and did not prevent me from gaining valuable, quality data in the 
process.  From my experience, I recommend to others that telephone interviewing 
not be considered only a second-rate alternative to in-person interviews but an 
equally effective method of data collection.  However, some modifications to one’s 
strategies for conducting interviews should be made to ensure the lack of visual cues 
does not inhibit the flow of communication.  I also recommend others be aware of 
the tradeoffs of telephone interviewing – what one gains in flexibility, access and 
efficiency sometimes comes at the cost of losing control of the timing of the 
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3.2.5 Other Key Sources of Data 
 
In addition to interview data, I collected a range of other documents related to 
Teach First’s first years.  Particularly important documents were early newspaper 
articles on Teach First, a TTA programme evaluation of Teach First’s first years, and 
an archived diary of one interviewee that revealed the key dates of meetings related 
to Teach First.  In addition, an interviewee provided the internal financial records 
kept by Teach First during its first year.  These sources were used to both 
complement and triangulate the interview data I collected.  Moreover, I conducted 
extensive background research into the organizations involved in launching Teach 
First and their respective institutional settings to shed light on the contextual 
influences alluded to in interviews.   
Finally, I also gathered background data on interviewees through extensive 
and exhaustive Internet searches.  Combining such personalized background research 
with the qualitative interviews reflects a type of data collection that Ball and 
colleagues (Ball 2016; Ball & Junemann 2012) have referred to as  “network 
ethnography”.  Unlike Ball and Junemann, I did not focus on mapping networks but 
rather understanding conceptually how networks were used to manage the diffusion 
and transfer of a policy idea.  Still, Ball and Juneman’s research on business and 
philanthropic networks in education (including Teach First) reinforces our shared 
approach that emphasizes the importance of personal histories and social 
relationships in the formation and spread of policy ideas.  
 
 
3.3  Data Analysis   
 
3.3.1  Analytic Approach:  “Reconstructive” Narrative Analysis  
 
In the course of my research, I employed a strand of narrative inquiry to 
collect and analyze my data.  Narrative inquiry, with roots in postmodernism, social 
constructionism, constructivism, and feminist theory, is an overarching term that 
refers to personal and human dimensions of experience over time and accounts for 
the relationship between an individual’s experience and their cultural context 
(Clandinin and Connelly 2000).  There are various forms of narrative inquiry, 
depending on one’s philosophical orientation.  Yet, at its core, within this mode of 
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inquiry, researchers can consider individuals’ accounts as a window into a knowable 
reality.  
In the context of narrative inquiry, narrative refers to a discourse form in 
which events and happenings are configured into a temporal unity by means of a 
plot.  In simpler terms, narratives are texts that are thematically organized by plots.  
To analyze my data, I adopted a particular form of narrative inquiry that is less 
common among qualitative research and entails building an explanatory story 
through the “emplotment” of data consisting of accounts of events and happenings.  
This type of analysis is termed narrative analysis by Polkinghorne (1995), though I 
have opted to rename this approach reconstructive narrative analysis for the sake of 
clarity.  This is because many scholars use the term “narrative analysis” to refer to 
the collection and analysis of stories told by interviewees as the primary sources of 
data (e.g., Wells 2011).  However, Polkinghorne uses the term “narrative analysis” 
differently to refer to “the procedure through which the researcher organizes the data 
elements into a coherent developmental account” (1995, p.15).  While both types of 
analytical approaches involved the use of narratives, they are fundamentally different 
in the type of data used and the analysis produced.  To understand the difference (and 
the method I adopted), I briefly explain Polkinghorne’s discussion of the use of 
narratives in qualitative research.   
Polkinghorne calls for the recognition of two distinct types of narrative 
analysis – the paradigmatic-type and the narrative-type.  In short, the paradigmatic-
type “gathers stories for its data and uses paradigmatic analytic procedures to 
produce taxonomies and categories out of the common elements across the database” 
while the narrative-type “gathers events and happenings as its data and uses narrative 
analytic procedures to produce explanatory stories” (Polkinghorne 1995, p.5).  
Polkinghorne differentiates between these two categories of analysis by using the 
work of Bruner (1986) to argue that each is based on a distinct form of cognition: 
paradigmatic and narrative.   According to Polkinghorne (1995), paradigmatic 
reasoning “operates by recognizing elements as members of a category” (p.5) and is 
a process of linking “the particular to the formal” in order to make generalizations 
(p.10). Polkinghorne highlights that knowledge based on paradigmatic reasoning has 
been the more commonly accepted form of academic knowledge and has been 
promoted by the Western scientific tradition.  This form of knowledge is based on 
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rationality and logic and reflects a positivist orientation toward knowledge and its 
creation. 
In contrast, narrative reasoning “operates by noticing the differences and 
diversity of people’s behaviour… [and] attends to the temporal context and complex 
interaction of the elements that make each situation remarkable” (Polkinghorne 
1005, p.11).  Narrative reasoning combines elements into an emplotted story to 
explain human behaviour.  Polkinghorne describes how knowledge based on 
experiences and carried through stories, or narratives, has traditionally been 
categorized as “expressive” and more based on emotion than logical reasoning.  
Bruner (1986) was among the first in the cognitive sciences to argue that narratives 
are legitimate forms of reasoned knowing and hence, both paradigmatic and narrative 
cognition produce useful and valid knowledge.   
By incorporating Bruner’s ideas into narrative-based qualitative research, 
Polkinghorne (1995) argues there are two main types of narrative inquiry based on 
these two types of cognition.  He terms the type that utilizes paradigmatic reasoning 
in its analysis, analysis of narrative, while labelling the type that uses narrative 
reasoning, simply narrative analysis.   He states: 
 
In the first type, analysis of narratives, researchers collect stories as data 
and analyze them with paradigmatic processes.  The paradigmatic 
analysis results in descriptions of themes that hold across the stories or in 
taxonomies of types of stories, characters, or settings.  In the second type, 
narrative analysis, researchers collect descriptions of events and 
happenings and synthesize or configure them by means of a plot into a 
story or stories (for example, a history, case study, or biographic episode). 
Thus, analysis of narratives moves from stories to common elements, and 
narrative analysis moves from elements to stories.  
(Polkinghorne 1995, p.12 emphasis in the original) 
 
I propose another way to conceptualize the difference between 
Polkinghorne’s analysis of narratives and narrative analysis is to see the former as a 
process of deconstructing others’ narratives to uncover meaningful categories and 
themes across accounts while the latter is a process of constructing an explanatory 
narrative from given accounts of various reported events and happenings.  Thus, to 
avoid confusion between Polkinghorne’s “narrative analysis” and others’ various 
uses of the term, I prefer to rename Polkinghorne’s term “reconstructive narrative 
analysis” to signal that this approach uses data to produce narratives rather than 
analyse others’ narratives. 
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Notably, both types of narrative inquiry rely mainly on what Polkinghorne 
terms diachronic, as opposed to synchronic, qualitative data.  According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2016), diachronic is a term that means “concerned with 
the way in which something has developed and evolved through time”.  Thus, 
Polkinghorne (1995) uses the adjective to refer to data that “contain temporal 
information about the sequential relationship of events” (p. 12).  Such data are often 
personal accounts that describe when and why an action or actions took place and 
how those actions affected what happened next.  In contrast, synchronic is a term that 
means “concerned with something as it exists at one point in time”, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary (2016).  Hence, Polkinghorne (1995) employs the term to 
describe data that “lack the historical and developmental dimension” and instead “are 
framed as categorical answers to questions put by an interviewer” (p.12).  
Synchronic data usually provides information about current circumstances or 
personal views of an interviewee.   
Although both paradigmatic (or analysis of narratives/deconstructive) and 
narrative (or narrative analysis/reconstructive) forms of analysis use diachronic data, 
Polkinghorne (1995) emphasizes that the former relies on data told in stories while 
the latter relies on data that are “descriptions of events and happenings” (p.15).  A 
researcher employing the latter form of narrative analysis (reconstructive) then 
interprets and combines these descriptions – which are typically responses to 
questions such as “How did this happen?” or “Why did this come about?” –  to form 
a plausible theory of events to create a narrative. As Polkinghorne (1995) notes, “The 
story constituted by narrative integration allows for the incorporation of the notions 
of human purpose and choice as well as chance happenings, dispositions, and 
environmental presses” (p.16). 
 In the process of developing the story, data from sources other than 
interviewees can be used such as information from media accounts, personal and 
public documents, observations, journals, and articles among others.  The types and 
numbers of data sources a researcher utilizes are only limited by the time horizons 
with which he/she has framed the study.  The researcher’s job then is to interpret and 
selectively integrate all these sources to create an emplotted narrative to explain a 
phenomenon. To this end, I chose to employ Polkinghorne’s described narrative 
analysis, (which I refer to as reconstructive narrative analysis from here on) to 
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interpret and synthesize my collected data into a plausible developmental account of 
how and why Teach First emerged.    
 
 
3.3.2  The Process of Analysing the Data  
 
As reconstructive narrative analysis is not a common methodology in 
qualitative studies of policy transfer, I admit I did not initially realize this was the 
most fruitful way forward in my case study.  Since the data I gained from 
interviewees was not generally lengthy storied accounts, but rather descriptions of 
events, meetings, decisions taken, and personal viewpoints, I did not consider using 
narrative inquiry initially.  I was, at that point, unaware of Polkinghorne’s use and 
burification of the term and did not yet see my study in the light of historiography.   
Instead, I began my analysis by seeking to establish a casual timeline of 
events complemented by thematic analysis based around the relevant actors, 
networks, and contexts shaping the process and outcomes of the policy transfer.   To 
do this, I first experimented with using the indexing and Table of Attributes features 
of Microsoft Word to thematically code my data, following a process developed by 
Hahn (2008).  Unsatisfied with the pace and outcome of my results, I then turned to 
using Dedoose, a relatively new form of qualitative analysis software.  Dedoose is an 
online-based application for mixed-methods research developed by scholars at the 
University of California – Los Angeles.  Using this program, I developed and applied 
a much more extensive set of thematic codes and sub-codes to my interview 
transcripts and began utilizing its analysis features to isolate, examine, and cross-
reference the data.  (These sets of codes are available to review in Appendix 4.)   
However, I came to realize I could not fully capture, using conceptual 
themes, the complexity of the transfer and reinvention processes nor the intersection 
of personal and professional influences.  I knew I needed to organize the data into a 
story that brought together the actors as real characters with unique histories and 
views located not only in networks and organizations but in wider shifting contexts.   
Thus, I began to look for an analytic approach that could support the use of data to 
create a policy transfer story, with plots and subplots, which could illustrate the 
complex connections and patterns revealed by the data.   
This revelation led me to adopt a reconstructive narrative analysis approach 
as depicted by Polkinghorne (1995).  Though I shifted my approach to the data, the 
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time I had already spent coding and sub-coding transcripts had helped me “get close” 
to the data and know most of my interviewees’ biographical details, network 
contacts, and said responses by heart.  This proved extremely helpful in the next step 
of my analytical process – building the story of Teach First.   
Among the first steps in the process of forming a narrative for Teach First 
was organizing the events identified in the data along a before-after continuum.  This 
process requires the researcher to deal with “the temporal and unfolding dimension 
of human experience” (Polkinghorne 1995, p.16).  To begin this process, I grouped 
the appearance of actors, their meetings and decisions, and other events into three 
phases, roughly reflecting policy transfer stages of cross-national attraction, political 
decision-making, and implementation (e.g., Phillips & Ochs 2003).  These stages, 
which became Phase I, II, and III served to help establish a beginning, a middle, and 
an end to the emerging policy story.  I then re-examined and analysed the interview 
transcripts and secondary data for each phase to begin filling in temporal sequences 
and linking cause-and-effect happenings within these periods.  This was not a simple 
process, but I highlight the main steps I took. 
Focusing on one phase at a time, I began to build the narrative for each phase.  
In Phase I, I was aware of the need to “set the scene” so to speak and thus focused on 
grounding the interview data in the organizations and individuals involved as well as 
the immediate contexts related to these entities.  In Phase II, I built the narrative 
through organizing my writing into sectoral accounts.  This made the most logical 
sense to me and enabled me to discuss groups of inter-related actors, their social 
networks, and relevant contexts.   In Phase III, the focus became the implementation 
of Teach First, and hence I shifted into emplotting the data based on milestones 
achieved in its formation.  For each phase, I examined and incorporated, gradually, 
the data I had previous coded including:  
  
(1)  chronological clues regarding events, actions, and meetings  
(2)  interviewees’ biographical data, (e.g., education, career history, etc.) 
(3)  interviewees’ knowledge and view of TFA and source of that knowledge  
(4)  rationales for action in support/opposition of the idea for Teach First, and  
(5) references to prevailing contexts and networks that served to shape 
(empower or constrain) action and/or opinions 
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Building the story was a slow and detail-oriented process that required me to 
repeatedly read accounts, paying close attention to every reference to sequences, 
personal connections, and underlying contexts that shaped the meaning.   Stitching 
together data to form an evolving plot was a continuous process of triangulating a 
wide variety of primary and secondary data sources in addition to my interviews.  In 
my first drafts of each phase, I initially drew upon and incorporated as much of the 
interview data as possible to create the most comprehensive, collective retelling of 
events.  Although every detail would not turn out to be needed (as some did not 
move the emerging plot forward), I did not make those judgments until later in the 
analytical process.  My first priority was to bring all the interview details together.   
Then, to complement and further contextualize the interview excerpts, I 
incorporated information on the context and history of the organizations, sectors, and 
politics of the time period.  This contextual research helped uncover relevant 
network configurations, status hierarchies, and other institutional structures that were 
not usually clear from interview accounts alone.  Next, in addition to interview data 
and contextual data, I also incorporated interviewees’ biographical data in order to 
further illuminate their personal perspectives and show how individuals’ views were 
often deeply shaped by their life histories and constructed identity.     
By combining these three types of data, I ended up writing an expansive 
empirical story for each phase of Teach First’s development.  My initial drafts of 
Phase I, II, and III (Chapters 4, 6, and 8) were very detailed stories varying in length, 
between 37,000 and 54,000 words each.  By creating this thorough story of events, I 
was able to begin to identify significant shifts in the narrative and discovered 
inconsistencies between accounts that revealed individuals’ particular positions 
within networks.  In identifying these critical points, I moved to a higher-level of 
analysis – identifying wider themes coming together as a plot, including the 
development of the policy idea, shifts in influence between actors, casual sequences, 
and the formation of new networks.  Thus, I began to revise and condense each 
chapter – taking out material that was redundant, cutting out information not relevant 
to outcomes, and editing or simply summarizing lengthy quotes.  This type of 
revision in the creation of narratives is referred to as narrative smoothing 
(Polkinghorne 1995; Spence 1986).  All the while, I continued to develop my 
secondary analysis of the policy transfer process and related insights into the roles of 
policy entrepreneurs and social networks.  
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However, the mega-narrative I had constructed (and which constantly 
refined) also exposed contradictions amongst accounts and highlighted missing 
details (e.g., dates or network links) that left unanswered questions.  Sometimes, 
those contradictions alerted me to mistakes in my chronology or casual sequence.   In 
these cases, I then re-examined that part of the narrative and came up with different 
possible scenarios, which I then narrowed down through a process of elimination 
based on the existing data and contextual clues.  If a conclusion to the contradiction 
did not become apparent, I attempted to resolve the discrepancy (and to test the 
validity of my constructed chronology and meaning of events) by re-interviewing a 
handful of key participants, emailing others with clarifying questions, and seeking 
out additional interviewees whose perspective could potentially provide further 
clarification.  This situation is common in reconstructive narrative analysis as 
Polkinghorne (1995, p.15) highlights:  
 
If major events or actions described in the data conflict with or contradict 
the emerging plot idea, then the idea needs to be adapted to better fit or 
make sense of the elements and their relationships… The creation of a 
text involves the to-and-fro movement from parts to whole that is 
involved in comprehending a finished text.  
 
 In this way, the process of putting together my empirical data and analyzing it 
was a messy multi-step process that stopped and started as I tried different tools and 
discovered new meanings in the interview data inline with my increasing 
understanding of particular contextual nuances.  I was struck by how often I felt my 
work was akin to what historians and detectives alike must do – interview 
participants, verify accounts, develop possible theories, explore contexts and pay 
close attention to sequences – building a collective narrative yet being ready to revise 
the story or subplots if confronted with contradictory evidence or newly-discovered 
meanings.  In the end, my analysis produced both the empirical and discussion 
chapters of my thesis.  While empirical chapters detailed the action-oriented story of 
Teach First’s emergence I had constructed, my accompanying discussion chapters 
expressed my analysis of the plots, subplots, and factors influencing the action.   In 
this way, the combined narration and discussion aimed to make sense of the data and 
bring an order and meaningfulness that was not apparent in the interview data 
themselves.  
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3.4  Additional Considerations  
 
3.4.1  Considerations of Validity  
 
Through qualitative interviewing, individuals recall their memories of the 
topic at hand.  A common obstacle to interviewing participants about events in the 
distant past is that memories fade and can become distorted over time.  I interviewed 
individuals regarding events which occurred ten years ago or more.  Hence, I was 
keenly aware, as were many of my interviewees, of the difficulty in recalling 
situations and sentiments accurately.  To anticipate and address possible mistakes in 
memory recall during the interview and analysis process, I familiarized myself with 
the ways memories can be distorted.  According to Schacter (2002), there are seven 
ways in which memories are corrupted  These are:  
 
1. transience, or when memories fade 
2. absent-mindedness, or being distracted from the task at hand and forgetting 
what was done automatically 
3. blocking, or sudden loss of memory such as not being able to remember a 
name when about to make an introduction 
4. misattribution, or confusion about who did what and when 
5. suggestibility, or incorporating new knowledge or experiences into “old” 
memories  
6. bias, or being influenced by what’s going on currently or common 
stereotypes 
7. persistence, or not being able to get rid of unpleasant memories that haunt us 
 
 These sources of memory errors are important to consider as Teach First was 
a programme that came about through coalition-building amongst individuals both 
inside and outside of government.  There were no official policy texts or 
accompanying “context of text production” (Bowe et al. 1992) through which to aid 
in the data collection and analysis of policy formation.  Consequently, my data was 
primarily the recollections of individuals.  Thus, I made a point to anticipate and 
attempted to counter potential errors of memory in those accounts. 
 In the course of my interviews, all seven sources of errors in memory recall 
identified by Schacter (2002) were potentially present.  Thus, during interviews, if 
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individuals could not recall memories likely due to transience, absent-mindedness, or 
blocking, I usually offered any background information, aiming to prompt additional 
recall.  In these instances, interviewees were usually aware of their problems of 
recall and were apologetic.  If the interviewee still had no clear recollection of an 
event after more background details were provided, I accepted this and moved on. 
Other potential inaccuracies in memory recall were more challenging to identify but 
more important to understand.  Misattribution errors were anticipated and did occur 
in some interviews.  However, many such errors were relatively minor and easy to 
identify and correct through triangulation with other interviewees’ accounts.  Exact 
dates in particular often eluded interviewees.  Instead, I was able to estimate when 
events or decisions occurred by asking them what had happened up to that point 
(sequencing) and/or asking about other events at the time (i.e., what the season it 
was, notable current events, etc.).   
For other interviewees, memories were also potentially corrupted by bias, 
consciously or subconsciously, revising the past to fit the present or enhance one’s 
own role.  I attempted to identify such biases by contextualizing and triangulating 
interviewees’ accounts.  By investigating not only the background of individuals but 
also the history, practices, and influence of organizations and wider networks, I 
aimed to gain additional insight into the thinking and perspective of each interviewee 
as an individual.  This helped me in constructing a more dynamic and hopefully 
more accurate account of what was happening at the time.   
Finally, I identified suggestibility as a potential for data errors in my study for 
at least two reasons.  First, Teach First continued to thrive and expand in the years 
following its creation, thus interviewees may have confused or forgotten details 
about its original form.  Secondly, in September 2012, Teach First’s founding CEO, 
Brett Wigdortz, published a memoir of the scheme’s founding and development.  In 
it, he provided details that others may have relied on and incorporated into their own 
recollections to fill in gaps in their memory.  However, after completing all my 
interviews, Wigdortz’s written account did not seem to widely influence others’ 
accounts as half my interviews occurred before the book’s publishing and most other 
interviewees afterwards said they had not read the book.  For interviewees who had 
read the book, they named Wigdortz’ account as the source of recall for certain 
details.  By becoming thoroughly familiar with Wigdortz’s account and the contexts 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 110 
at the time, it became possible to account for potential suggestibility errors stemming 
from this source. 
To further address potential errors in memory and to confirm or correct the 
accuracy of interviewees’ recollections when they conflicted, I re-interviewed some 
individuals for a second time during my analysis process.  I also sought out 
additional interviewees that could shed more light on conflicting accounts.  During 
this process, I also identified (again) the need to explore individuals’ backgrounds, 
organizational histories, and relevant contexts to explain conflicting points in their 
recollections, which were often times clashes of perspectives rather than memory.   
 
 
3.4.2  Consideration of Pro-Innovation Bias  
 
In the diffusion literature, researchers have drawn attention to a pro-
innovation bias among studies, which stems from studies of profitable innovations 
funded by change agencies and the methodological ease of studying “successful” 
cases of innovation rather than unsuccessful cases.  First noted in the 1970s by 
Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) as well as critics of diffusion studies (e.g., Downs & 
Mohr 1976), the pro-innovation bias refers to the latent assumptions in many 
diffusion studies that “innovation” (like “efficiency”) is inherently good, that 
innovations should be diffused rapidly and adopted by all members of social system, 
and that innovations should not be rejected nor reinvented.  This bias, Rogers (2003) 
argues, can lead researchers to “ignore the study of ignorance about innovations, to 
underemphasize the rejection or discontinuance of innovations, to overlook re-
invention… and to fail to study anti-diffusion programs” (Rogers 2003, pp.106–7).  
He concludes that such blind spots in diffusion research limit the perspective. 
 For researchers to address this bias, Rogers (2003, p.115) recommends 
investigating the broader context in which an innovation diffuses, such as: 
1. how it was decided to conduct the research and development that led to the 
innovation in the first place 
2. how the initial policy decision is made that the innovation should be diffused 
to members of a system 
3. how the innovation of study is related to other innovations and to the existing 
practice(s) that it replaces  
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Rogers asserts that by illuminating the broader system in which the diffusion process 
occurs, pro-innovation biases can be addressed.  He also recommends focusing on 
uncovering the motivations for adopting or rejecting an innovation, noting such 
“why” questions have rarely been rigorously studied by researchers but also present 
methodological difficulties in doing so.   
In my study, I utilized these suggestions by drawing from multiple 
perspectives – innovation-diffusion, policy transfer, and institutionalism – to widen 
the focus of the study.  More specifically, I choose to analyze how and why the 
innovation (Teach First) was conceptualized and how actos’ motivations played into 
the decision to diffuse and adopt the innovation.  In addition, I examined the motives 
of both supporters and opponents of Teach First and how the scheme was related to 
other innovations as well as the existing practice(s) and policies in teacher training.  
Finally, I followed the implementation of Teach First to uncover how it was 
reinvented in practice. 
 
 
3.4.3  Challenges of Interviewing Elites 
  
Many of the individuals I interviewed were among the power elites, meaning 
they held influential and/or powerful positions within the field they were located 
(i.e., business, government, or education, etc.).  Interviewing such individuals 
presents unique challenges in accessing, interviewing, and interpreting data (Walford 
1994; 2011; 2012).  I discuss here a few of those challenges I found relevant to my 
own research. 
 In terms of access, I found the overwhelming majority of interviewees willing 
to participate in this study.  Their willingness to be interviewed was likely due to 
several factors, but chief among them seemed to be a shared pride in being involved 
in launching Teach First.  Several expressed the wish that such a programme had 
been around when they were young graduates and others spoke of Teach First as a 
noble initiative that they were pleased to still be associated with.  Just as others have 
noted that gaining access to elites can be particularly difficult when the policy at the 
centre of the research is controversial and/or fiercely contested (Walford 1991; 
Whitty & Edwards 1994), the opposite may be likely as well, meaning access is 
eased when policies are rather uncontroversial and seen as largely successful.  
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Meanwhile, other interviewees with more critical perspectives appeared willing to be 
helpful and to give their insider view of what happened.  All interviewees were 
aware I was a PhD student as well as a female and an American, which in some cases 
may have prompted some to be less threatened and/or more willing to participate in 
my study (Mickelson 1994; Deem 1994).  While I did not usually reference my 
involvement in TFA or work for Teach First to gain access to interviewees, I did so 
while introducing myself during the interview.    
After gaining access to elites, Ball (1994) highlights the ways in which such 
powerful individuals often have a stake in the outcomes of the research project and 
are experienced in controlling interviews, ensuring certain topics are emphasized 
while others dismissed.  Thus, Ball suggests that interviews with elites should not be 
considered by the researcher as separate from the subject being studied but instead 
part of the “play of power” that shaped it.  As a result, Whitty and Edwards (1994) 
suggest this makes elites more difficult to interview and makes decoding their 
accounts harder than other types of interviews.  Yet, Ball insists that elite 
interviewing is not a flawed instrument for studying policies or the powerful but 
rather a richer and more challenging exchange of information that researchers need 
to take care in analyzing.  To some extent, I adopted Ball’s “game-like” perspective 
retrospectively in helping make sense of conflicting accounts. 
Finally, while analyzing transcripts, I was keenly aware of Cookson’s (1994) 
argument that powerful individuals commonly use a “power discourse”, embodied in 
social scripts, that appear value-free or apolitical but, in reality, are uncritical of 
structural inequalities and power asymmetries among classes.  He describes power 
discourses as a “coded language” through which ideological perspectives are 
expressed and supported by political, economic, and social power.  He emphasizes 
that, through such language, underlying power relations or class interests are ignored 
while the pursuit of universal ideals or values such as democracy is highlighted.  
More specifically, Cookson (1994) argues that power discourses of elites are 
communicated often through language that conveys “the benefits of hierarchy, social 
authority, moral righteousness, reasoned judgment and reliance of the facts” (p.124).  
Relatedly, Cookson notes that, if the listener does not accept the message of the 
discourse, then it is treated by the interviewee that the listener has essentially “failed 
to understand and not because the message is flawed” (p.124).   
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I took these points into consideration as I conducted and analyzed interviews 
and formed an understanding of contrasting perspectives in order to avoid being 
naïve and unwittingly presenting an inaccurate picture of the social world.  However, 
while some researchers (i.e., Mickelson (1994)) advise interviewers to take on 
“confrontational” stance to challenge elites’ accounts,  I consciously chose to adopt 
an “inquisitorial” stance, as advocated by Priyadharshini (2003).  I listened 
uncritically and carefully to interviewees’ accounts to understand their unique 
perspective and to build a positive rapport with them, asking questions for context 
and understanding rather than challenging their stories.  Using an inquisitorial stance 
to interview elite participants enabled me to gather valuable data while also treating 
interviewees and their accounts with respect.  In this way, I sought to collect as 
accurately, objectively, and ethically as possible.  While I was conscious that stories 
may be altered to present participants or ideas in a certain light, I was able to 
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CHAPTER 4: PHASE I:  THE ORIGINS OF TEACH FIRST 
 
 
Introduction:  The Circumstances Leading to the Teach First Proposal 
This chapter examines the initial conceptualization phase of Teach First in 
which the idea for scheme was first proposed.  This phase began in the summer of 
2001 and ended when efforts shifted toward advocating for the scheme in mid 
December 2001.  During this period, an investigation took place in which education-
related problems were identified, evidence gathered, and solutions formulated by 
individuals and organizations within the London business community.  This initial 
phase of development culminated in the proposal for a scheme dubbed “Teach For 
London”.  
The story of Teach First starts with the work of two influential business 
coalitions based in London, Business in the Community (BITC) and London First.  
The older of these two organizations was BITC, a high-profile national coalition of 
hundreds of large businesses across the U.K. established in the early 1980s.  BITC’s 
mission to engage businesses in improving communities overlapped with the work of 
London First, a business-led coalition established in 1992 “to make London the best 
city in the world in which to do business” (Anon 2015).  I briefly highlight the 
history and development of these two organizations to illuminate their agenda, 
influence, and roles generally and in education initiatives specifically, both which set 
the stage for the emergence of the idea for what later became Teach First.   
 
 
4.1 BITC and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
 BITC was founded by Stephen O’Brien and fellow business leaders in 1982 
in response to two events  – (1) a 1980 conference, organized by government, in 
which American business leaders shared regeneration strategies of Baltimore and 
Detroit in the 1970s, and (2) the appearance of riots in depressed urban areas around 
England in 1981 (Grayson 2007a).  As a result, U.K. business leaders established 
BITC to help struggling communities, modeling their work on organizations engaged 
in urban regeneration.  Early supporters of BITC included IBM, British Petroleum, 
Shell, British Steel, Marks and Spencer, Barclays Bank, W.H. Smith, and Midland.  
The coalition’s underlying focus became promoting corporate social responsibility 
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(CSR), which for BITC entailed “businesses seeking to minimize their negative 
environmental and social impacts and maximize their positive environmental and 
social impacts within an ethical decision-making framework” (Grayson 2007a, p.5).    
The history of CSR is often related to corporate philanthropy, which emerged in the 
19th century industrial era in both the U.S. and the U.K. but waned in the early 20th 
century Britain as government took the lead in improving conditions of the new 
industrialized society (Tomkins 2009).  However, the ethos of corporate philanthropy 
re-emerged in the 1980s in the form of CSR as governments scaled back their 
budgets and privatized industries, increasing business’s influence and role in social 
policy.  The original mission statement of BITC promoted CSR principles and cross-
sector cooperation, stating: 
 
“[BITC] is an association of major UK businesses committed to working 
in partnership with each other, with local and central Government, 
voluntary organizations and trades unions to promote corporate social 
responsibility and revitalize economic life in local communities” (1988)  
(quote cited in Grayson 2007a, pp.70–71). 
 
At its core, BITC aimed to “inspire, challenge, engage, and support business in 
continually improving its positive impact on society” (Grayson 2007a, p.11).  To this 
end, BITC cajoled its corporate members into becoming involved in partnerships, 
arguing that such collaboration benefitted both businesses and communities. 
Throughout the 1980s, BITC primarily organized business support for local 
enterprise agencies in an attempt to revive local economies around the U.K. 
depressed by corporate closures.  Its work received additional recognition and 
support in 1985 when the coalition was designated as one of “The Prince’s 
Charities”, a group of non-profits for which Charles, Prince of Wales, acted as patron 
and/or President.  In the 1990s, BITC widened the scope of its work, directing 
corporate attention and resources to a range of social problems such as the 
environment and diversity in the workplace.  In this way, BITC’s CSR was not only 
about philanthropic donations or business-community partnerships but also pressured 
businesses to operate more ethically.   
Since its inception, BITC attracted the most influential leaders across the 
private, voluntary, and public sector to its mission, working collaboratively on 
developing and implementing goal-driven initiatives.  As CEO, O’Brien was a 
driving force for change within and beyond the business community.  Julia 
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Cleverdon, who joined BITC in 1988 as its Director of Business and Education after 
spending years building business-education partnerships at the Industrial Society, 
recalled being drawn to BITC by O’Brien’s ability to inspire action.  “O’Brien had 
the ability to get to the most senior level in business and really engage them in the 
issues,” Cleverdon recalled, adding “I hadn’t realised enough that the power of BITC 
was that it only played in the boardrooms” (Davidson 2007).  Cleverdon, herself a 
prolific networker with a persuasive manner to match, became a mentee of O’Brien.  
She then became BITC’s second CEO when O’Brien left in 1992. 
In the five years leading up to the emergence of Teach First in 2001, BITC 
rapidly expanded in size and income.  This was due, in part, to its merger in 1995 
with the Action Resource Centre, a similar well-established coalition, as well as 
strong support for BITC from the Blair government.  In this period, the number of 
executive secondees serving on staff (still primarily coming from member companies 
but also from government departments and executive agencies) grew from around 
100 in 1995 to more than 250 by 2001, with the number of permanent employees 
increasing in nearly identical numbers.  Meanwhile, BITC’s annual budget tripled 
from approximately £5 million in 1995 to £15 million in 2001, with public sector 
grants providing an additional £2 to £5 million annually starting in 1997.  By 2001, 
BITC was clearly hitting its stride by diversifying its social aims and reaching into 
more executive boardrooms, government corridors, and local communities to inspire 




4.2 London First:  Influencing Urban Planning and Policy  
 
While BITC expanded its agenda and organizational reach, former BITC 
CEO Stephen O’Brien founded a new coalition, London First, in 1992 to promote the 
interests of London’s business community and develop the capital as a competitive, 
“world-class” city.  The formation of the organization was encouraged by the then 
Conservative government to help provide a vision and policy coordination in the 
capital since the abolition of the Greater London Council in 1986.  Thus, London 
First’s declared goal was to: 
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 “establish a strategic framework for the capital and to pull together 
current initiatives.  The group will apply business principles to policy 
issues … in partnership with others, business leaders can provide the 
spark by developing a credible vision for the future and promoting action 
towards that vision”  
(1992 London First publication cited by Newman & Thornley 1997, 
p.978) 
 
Thus, while BITC represented businesses across the U.K. and organized initiatives in 
various regions, London First focused their efforts exclusively on making London an 
attractive city in which to do business.  Though the missions of the two business-led 
coalitions differed, their work often overlapped in addressing problems such as 
unemployment, regeneration, and homelessness.  In addition, the two coalitions 
maintained a close relationship since both organizations were London-based and had 
many members in common. 
Like BITC, London First was set up as a non-profit organization; however, 
unlike, BITC, it was funded solely by the dues and other donations provided by its 
member organizations, including The City (Corporation of London).  London First’s 
early members included leading U.K. companies such Grand Metropolitan, National 
Westminster Bank, British Telecom, and British Airways.  Regional utilities also 
joined the newly formed coalition, as did large London-based international 
companies.  By the early 2000s, London First was supported by approximately 300 
corporations from more than a dozen sectors.  Although property and housing, 
professional services, hospitality, and retail sectors provided the largest pools of 
members for London First, companies from the media, IT, healthcare, 
transport/infrastructure, and entertainment sectors were also members.  According to 
London First (2003, p.2), its members represented 17 percent of all employees in 
London and contributed nearly a quarter of the capital’s gross domestic product.  
While universities, further education colleges, churches, and third sector 
organizations were also members, private interests dominated the coalition (Newman 
& Thornley 1997).   
Throughout the 1990s, the coalition lobbied for greater government 
investments in London with the aim of making London attractive for international 
companies, investment, and tourism.  London First also produced strategy planning 
and policy recommendations for central government, which had stepped in to 
manage London since the 1986 dissolution of the Greater London Council.  
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Recommendations often took the form of reports incorporating surveys of the private 
sector.  The coalition lobbied on a range of issues such as urban regeneration, 
regional development (e.g. East London), and affordable housing (Kleinman 1999a).  
The business-led coalition was particularly concerned with transport and air quality, 
and like BITC, it championed the building of public-private partnerships to tackle 
social issues.   
In these roles, London First developed a close relationship with political 
leaders. 
 
London First had a very deep connection with local government in 
London.  It had been responsible for promoting the idea that London 
should have its own elected mayor and things like that.  So London First 
knew the political world and [could] get around extremely well. 
– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First 
Interview, 31/05/2012 
 
While London First was not the only large influential business coalition in the 
capital, it served to represent the views of big business, especially global firms.  
London First’s main rival was London’s century-old Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry.  The Chamber had more than 3,000 members and tended to reflect the 
views of small and medium-sized companies although it also had large multinational 
companies as members.  However, its influence was fragmented across the capital 
(Newman & Thornley 1997).  Another influential group was the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI).  Set up in 1965, CBI had a membership of more than 100,000 
companies and other organizations nationally, and thus it focused more on national 
and international issues.  While CBI lobbied to influence planning in London on 
behalf of the private sector (Newman & Thornley 1997), London First took the lead 
role in this area.   
Moreover, in contrast to the Chamber and CBI, London First’s leadership 
believed its role was to be more of an innovator and catalyst for action than as a 
representative of all business (Kleinman 1999b, p.165).  As a result, London First 
took the lead in advocating for corporate interests and shaping policy related to the 
long-term planning and management of the capital, and at times supported more 
controversial initiatives (such as a traffic congestion charge).  In this way, it was 
more progressive and creative than its more conservative counterparts. 
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BITC and London First Look to Start a New Education Initiative 
In 2001, the leaders of London First and BITC both decided to enlist 
McKinsey and Company to help assess how they could support London’s 
disadvantaged schools.  The leaders of the two coalitions described coming to this 
arrangement but under different circumstances.  According to BITC’s CEO Julia 
Cleverdon, the desire to improve schools stemmed from a meeting of school and 
business leaders in the summer of 2001 (Cleverdon 2012).  The high-profile event 
was held at the royal family’s Highgrove Estate and brought together headteachers 
and business leaders to discuss the progress of BITC’s “Partners in Leadership”, a 
peer-mentoring programme first set up in 1996 by a KMPG executive before being 
branded and launched country-wide by BITC.  The aim of Partners in Leadership 
was to improve school leadership by offering business expertise in management.  
The partnership was also seen as beneficial to business leaders for providing the 
opportunity to engage with and learn about the operation of schools (Ball & 
Junemann 2012, pp.99–100).     
At Highgrove, the Prince of Wales remarked that while successful, the 
scheme seemed of limited help to headteachers.  Thus, he recommended that a 
formal assessment be carried out to determine how businesses could better support 
London schools.  As a close personal friend and advisor of Prince Charles, 
Cleverdon took the suggestion seriously and, in response, had the BITC Education 
Leadership Team meet the next day to discuss how to better support schools.  In this 
meeting, the managing director of McKinsey & Company offered to have his 
consultants produce a pro-bono study on the topic.  This study would produce the 
idea that evolved into Teach First.  
BITC’s Director of Education, John May recalled McKinsey’s eagerness to 
help BITC.  May was responsible for leading BITC education-related projects.  He 
was a former primary school teacher who had become a headteacher by age 28.  
Having successfully turned around two struggling schools during the 1990s, May 
joined BITC in 1999 to help schools in a different way. 
 
Business in the Community [was] a club, at that time anyway, for the 
largest companies in the country who want to do good in the community.  
And certainly the most popular activity the companies chose was to be 
involved in was education.  And it was my role to create national 
campaigns and programmes that companies could get into and to account 
manage a wide range of companies and help them to develop their… 
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corporate responsibility activity dedicated to education.  And ideally, to 
bring the two together, because it [was] my view and the view of the 
charity [BITC], that actually rather than going off and doing your own 
thing, if one can get companies to work collaboratively on a cause, 
actually the sum of that is better than its parts.  
– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC 
Interview, 2/05/2012 
 
May recalled, “McKinsey approached Business in the Community to say, ‘look, we’d 
love to do a piece of pro-bono work for you’ and… so we took McKinsey up on their 
offer and combined with London First.”  It was agreed that McKinsey should carry 
out a study into how business might help to support raising achievement in London 
secondary schools.   
The leaders of London First had a somewhat different perspective.  According 
to O’Brien and Kiley, they had been responsible for recruiting McKinsey to carry out 
the study.  O’Brien had hired Kiley in early 2001 to find ways London First could 
become involved in education.  “London First didn’t have a track record, 
deliberately, of working the education sector til Teach First came up,” O’Brien 
recalled (Interview, 31/05/2012), “because we didn’t want to confuse the business 
world by doing something that was similar [to what] Business in the Community was 
running.”  But O’Brien said he had decided it was time for London First to engage 
with local schools because “the corporate responsibility movement had rather lost its 
way in terms of making a real difference in education”.  Thus, O’Brien, who met 
Kiley previously in the 1990s while visiting New York City, said he immediately 
hired Kiley when she moved to London in 2001 “to help me improve the position of 
schools in London.”   
Kiley was an American whose husband had recently been recruited by 
London’s new mayor, Ken Livingston, to be the city’s Transport Commissioner.  
Upon arriving in the capital in January 2001, Kiley was welcomed into London’s 
social, political, and business networks. 
 
When we first moved to London, I got to know the Mayor right 
away… and we got on very well.  He said, “Well, I want to help you 
find things you want to do and I know this man who is very involved 
with the whole charitable sector and he’ll have a lot ideas for you.”  
And he introduced me to Stephen O’Brien who was head of London 
First.  And Stephen said,… “I want you to come work for us and have 
a look at education.”  And I was on a lot of boards when we lived in 
New York and was active in the non-profit sector across the board, a 
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lot of things connected with education.  And so, he asked me to look at 
schools and see what kind of programmes were going on in New York 
that could be brought over and it would make sense and that sort of 
thing.  So I said “ok”, that I’d be happy to and it would be interesting 
for me.  And he was very supportive.  And all of London First was 
very supportive of [me] who knew nothing about schools in England.  
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Although Kiley knew little about education in the U.K., she was an experienced 
advocate on social issues, including education, in the U.S.  Born in 1943 and raised 
in a small Pennsylvania town, Kiley had attended an all-white high school as the 
U.S. Civil Rights Movement gained momentum in the 1960s.  The lack of racial 
diversity within her school sparked Kiley’s interest in social inequality.   
 
It was the time of life that women didn’t even think about careers, but I 
knew I wanted to do something and I got very caught up during my years 
at university in civil rights.  It was during that era that people went on 
freedom rides to the South and tried to integrate restaurants and things 
like that.  And I got involved with that… I went on a few freedom rides 
my freshman year, and then I did some tutoring with minority students in 
low incomes areas of Philadelphia... and it had a huge impact on me.  
– Rona Kiley, Director of Education and Business, London First  
Interview, 30/04/2012 
  
These experiences prompted her to earn a degree in social work, focused on 
community organizing, in 1965.  After graduating, she worked with foster children 
as a social worker and then worked temporarily with people connected to the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations and the founding of the Peace Corps, which 
further fueled her interest in social issues.  Kiley then lived a few years in Chicago, 
where she worked and learned from another influential civil rights advocate and 
organizer of the time, Saul Alinsky, before moving to Boston where she gained her 
master’s degree in social work.  She later worked for a federal grant programme 
helping low-income students gain admission to higher education and helped draft 
guidance and counseling policy for the state.   
During this time, Kiley met and married Bob Kiley, who was then Boston’s 
Deputy Mayor.  Subsequently, in 1975 her husband was appointed to revitalize 
Boston’s mass-transit system, a job he did so successfully that he was recruited to 
improve New York City’s deteriorating transport system from 1983 to 1990.  Then, 
throughout the 1990s, he worked in private equity and served as CEO of the New 
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York City Partnership – a business coalition working to address the city’s social and 
economic problems.  While her husband had high-profile jobs, Kiley also worked for 
a number of well-regarded organizations in Boston and New York including the 
NAACP-affiliated Legal Defense Fund, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
and the Nature Conservancy.  She admitted that during this time, “I had learned 
something about raising money” and became a prolific networker – both skills which 
she utilized for the non-profits she worked for to help raise their profile and attract 
wealthy donors.  Still, Kiley said she remained committed to social work goals and 
youth education, seeing education “as a means of improving the social status of 
young people... I mean, I think of education as really the route to civil rights” 
(Interview, 30/04/2012). 
 In her new position at London First, Kiley said she saw an opportunity to 
continue her aim of being “an agent of change”.  Kiley recalled she initially worked 
in a small unit of London First that was involved with the universities, most of which 
were members of the coalition.  In this position, she met all university Vice 
Chancellors in the London area and learned about the university system.  As Kiley 
settled into her new role and considered how London First could help schools, she 
decided to recruit McKinsey as a partner in coming up with an initiative due to her 
previous relationship with the firm. 
 
I had worked with McKinsey when I lived in New York – not on their 
staff but in the non-for-profit work I did, especially with the Nature 
Conservancy.  One of the lead partners of McKinsey was one of my 
major contacts.  And he just loved the Nature Conservancy and wanted to 
change it and mold it and do studies and do things… So he was my 
mentor [while I was at] the Conservancy and did a lot of work.  And I 
knew that McKinsey had the capabilities of being very helpful, and if you 
got McKinsey to do a study that it would be respected and looked at.  So, 
I said to Stephen [O’Brien] that if we are going to do something 
meaningful, we really should get somebody like McKinsey to work with 
us.  So that was my idea. 
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Although the McKinsey’s London office was only a five-minute walk down the 
street from London First’s office near Trafalgar Square, McKinsey was not a 
member of London First.  However, McKinsey was a member of BITC, so Kiley 
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discussed her idea of involving McKinsey with O’Brien, who was receptive to the 
suggestion. 
 
I knew McKinsey pretty well.  We talked about it and McKinsey’s role as 
supporters of BITC… So I talked with Julia Cleverdon at BITC, who was 
my successor, and Rona Kiley about what we could do.  From there, [we 
decided] to see if we could get McKinsey to look at the whole position of 
corporate responsibility in London and come up with some suggestions as 
to what we could do to show our support and that was the beginning of 
[Teach First].  
– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First 
Interview, 31/05/2012 
 
Combining these accounts suggests that London First and BITC were discussing the 
possibility of tapping McKinsey for help when, in August 2002, the BITC education 
team convened to take action on Prince Charles’s recommendation for a study.  For 
these reasons, the head of McKinsey in London then extended his firm’s services 
free-of-charge.   
In sum, in 2001, both BITC and London First wanted to focus on helping 
London’s education sector but for different reasons.  BITC was following up on the 
Prince’s suggestion while London First was hoping to jumpstart their engagement in 
education.  As a result, BITC and London First teamed up and involved McKinsey in 




4.3 The McKinsey Study 
 
A team of McKinsey consultants was assembled to carry out the study, which 
was scheduled to take three months – from early September to early December 2001.  
The team was led by senior McKinsey partner Nick Lovegrove, who had in recent 
years worked on a number of government projects, including an overhaul of the BBC 
and an influential report on town and country planning reforms, both engagements 
on a pro-bono basis (Hirst 2002).  However, because senior partners typically share 
their time across a number of clients, the day-to-day management of the team was 
delegated to others, notably John Kirkpatrick, a Cambridge graduate who had joined 
Civil Service Fast Stream and worked for twelve years for the Department of 
Employment (which merged with the Department of Education in 1996).  He had 
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recently completed an MBA and decided to join McKinsey in 1999.  He recalled, 
“McKinsey [was] looking to diversify their sources of recruits and I was looking to 
diversify my experience and career into the business world and the two matched 
well.”  At the time, Kirkpatrick said that McKinsey’s work within the public sector 
was primarily limited to pro-bono engagements because “government wasn’t 
prepared to pay for it” (Interview, 13/05/2015). 
Kirkpatrick said the pro-bono study he managed on behalf of London First 
and BITC examined the problem of low attainment among pupils in London 
secondary schools.   
 
The question that was in their minds, which was the question that 
animated the study, was that secondary education in the U.K. was a 
problem.  From a London First perspective, this is a problem for London 
businesses, which was who they represented, because they can’t get 
recruits that they want and they’re concerned by the state of the education 
and environment in which they operate.  From Business in the 
Community’s perspective, they would have shared that to the extent that 
they were London businesses but also had a long history in corporate 
social responsibility and the general thought that there might be 
something that business could do, or at least could catalyze, to achieve 
improvement.  So the question that the two of them wanted to ask us was 
– Is there something useful that business can do to improve secondary 
education in London? 
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
Kirkpatrick selected two junior associates to be on the team of consultants carrying 
out the study, one of which was Brett Wigdortz, a 28-year-old American who had 
joined the firm in 2000 and specialized in East Asian markets.  Wigdortz was the 
most junior member of the team and had been recently rotated into McKinsey’s 
London office in early 2001 to gain additional experience.  Originally from New 
Jersey, Wigdortz had earned an Economics degree from Virginia’s University of 
Richmond in 1996 and then took a two-year position at Honolulu’s East-West 
Centre, a research organization founded and funded by the federal government since 
1960.  The position allowed him to work and earn a Masters in Economics at the 
University of Hawaii.  Wigdortz’s work and studies took him to Jakarta, where he 
also reported on the political and economic upheaval Indonesia was experiencing in 
1997.  A year later, he returned to the U.S. and worked briefly at the Asian Society, a 
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non-profit based in New York City, before joining McKinsey and being posted in 
their new Southeast Asian offices in Jakarta.   
Wigdortz (2012) pointed out he had never worked in a bank or business, but 
at McKinsey he subsequently “learned the skill of condensing complex ideas into 
simple structures, and how to convince experienced bankers that I knew what I was 
talking about” (p.34).  While in Southeast Aisa, he helped banks and other financial 
institutions set up insurance units, retain high-net worth clients, and follow 
McKinsey’s “War for Talent” – a strategy for attracting and keeping the “best 
employees” to increase profits (Wigdortz 2012).  When Wigdortz was sent to 
McKinsey’s London in 2001, financial projects were suddenly in short supply and 
thus Wigdortz applied for the pro-bono study on London schools.  Despite 
Widgortz’s lack of expertise in education, Kirkpatrick selected Wigdortz as part of 
the research team. 
To carry out the study, Kirkpatrick said the team did “a combination of 
information gathering from written sources and talking to relevant people... to try 
and reach some broad, evidence-based conclusions about the state of the system” 
(Kirkpatrick Interview, 13/05/2015).  Wigdortz (2012) described the methodology of 
the study as McKinsey’s method of “looking at a problem ‘without boiling the 
ocean’” (pp.38-39), a euphemism referring to analyzing “absolutely everything”.  
Through this strategy, the complexity of a client’s given problem was simplified and 
divided up using a technique know as a “logic tree” in which possible solutions were 
defined using the “mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive”, or MECE, 
principle.  This required all possible factors or causes be categorized in a way that 
did not overlap but covered all possible options.  The outcomes identified through 
these procedures were then prioritized based on other pre-determined criteria to 
assess which areas have the potential to make the most impact on the problem.  In 
this way, the team identified promising avenues for future solutions, which then 
formed the work stream on which each team member led on independently. 
Wigdortz was assigned to focus on “teaching” and recalled spending two 
weeks quantitatively analyzing Ofsted reports and calculating statistical correlations 
to determine trends in the data.  Wigdortz also visited schools to interview staff 
regarding possible interventions.  The conditions inside schools shocked Wigdortz, 
who noted a lack of order in school hallways, basic levels of instruction occurring in 
classrooms, and a low expectation of pupils as voiced by some teachers (Wigdortz 
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2012).   Later, Wigdortz (2012, p.41-44) reflected that these schools visits, which he 
recalled as “horrifying” and “eye-opening”, led him to believe that these schools 
were suffering from a lack of leadership at all levels – among teachers, 
administration, and wider society – a “leadership gap” for which he felt pupils were 
unfairly paying the price. 
With data collected and analyzed, the team concluded that “the greatest 
determinant of whether a school had great or poor results was the background of the 
students in the school, which was heavily segregated by income” (Wigdortz 2012, 
p.37).   Kirkpatrick said they decided that, “of the things that might have any scope 
for external intervention, leadership and the quality of teaching were the two biggest 
influencers of the standard of achievement in schools”.  Kirkpatrick recalled they 
then brainstormed interventions that might appeal to their clients. 
 
Therefore we looked for proposals that would make a difference to one or 
both of those variables, …only a subset of which of course was things 
that business might have an interest or a role in.  Then one does a variety 
of consultancy things like assessing the various proposals that emerged 
against various criteria, mapping them against desirability-versus-
achievability-type assessments and coming out with the things that we 
thought were the likeliest to make a difference.    
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
Kirkpatrick admitted, however, that the data analysis was actually far from 
conclusive but indicated it was sufficient for the purpose of promoting plausible 
action-oriented results. 
 
If I’m honest this was by no means the most analytically rigorous study 
that McKinsey ever did, and I hope that even Brett [Wigdortz] would 
admit that – he did most of the analysis.  I say [because] although there is 
plenty of data, it’s very, very hard to draw any genuinely, statistically 
robust conclusions from any of the data about anything...  But if I stand 
up the broad contention that quality of teaching is what primarily 
determines educational outcomes, there are only two possible responses 
to that.  One is that it intuitively sounds right, and the other is that 
statistically it can’t be demonstrated.  But, because our audience was 
business, we were able to apply the consultants’ way of thinking which is, 
“ok, how can one tell a compelling and well-evidenced story that we 
genuinely believe to be right that will interest and impress the business 
community and… will enable us to make clear recommendations that 
they might buy into”.  And the quality of our analysis is more than robust 
not for that purpose...  The point is that the academic standard of 
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statistical analysis in education policy is very high.  We simply weren’t 
playing in that world.  
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
Wigdortz (2012), meanwhile, did not echo Kirkpatrick’s admission, but instead 
stated, “We prided ourselves on the intellectual rigour of our analysis” (p.19). 
Through his analysis, Wigdortz insisted that: “Even taking deprivation levels into 
account, ‘excellent’ teachers can increase the percentage of pupils who gain 5+ A*–
C GCSEs by 40% over what would normally be expected” (quote noted by Smart et 
al. 2009, p.35).  As the team considered what initiatives they should propose to 




4.4 Conceptualizing a Graduate Recruitment Scheme 
 
At this point in the study, with data collection and analysis essentially 
complete, Wigdortz described coming up with the idea for a scheme aimed at 
attracting talented elite graduates into teaching at disadvantaged schools.  He 
explained his thinking that led to the scheme was based on McKinsey’s “War for 
Talent” and the concept of leadership.  
 
I remember staying in my office all night one night writing a business 
plan for Teach First, which was about five pages, and basically the 
whole idea of Teach First centered around the idea of leadership…  
The approach that my thought processes [was] based on is this War for 
Talent, [which] was something that McKinsey used and it’s something 
that I learned and it’s just the idea that – what attracts talent? …  What 
attracts the best talent is the idea of leadership.  You know, talent 
wants to have leadership opportunities. 
  – Brett Wigdortz, Lecture at Cambridge (2011) 
 
In this way, Wigdortz described the “War for Talent” as a significant influence in his 
conceptualization of Teach First.   
The War for Talent was a term first devised by a team of McKinsey 
consultants in 1997 to describe how companies were scrambling to attract and retain 
talent, particularly at the senior and executive levels.  Based on data gathered from 
large top-performing U.S. companies, the consultants wrote a report detailing why 
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“many companies had hundreds of vacancies they couldn’t fill” (Michaels et al. 
2001, p.1) and urged companies to make talent recruitment a top priority.  The 
consultants argued that globalization, deregulation, and the rapid development of 
new technologies had increased the need for executive and managerial talent, and 
that talent had become critically important due to the economy’s increasing reliance 
on “knowledge workers”.   
They also attributed the heightened labour market competition to the growing 
trend of talented workers moving frequently to other companies for promotion, a 
type of career climbing that emerged after massive corporate downsizing in the 
1980s which eroded traditional employee-employer relationships based on loyalty in 
exchange for job security (Michaels et al. 2001).  Given this business environment, 
McKinsey advised companies to adopt the War for Talent “mindset” to attract and 
retain talented workers.   The firm coached companies on how to aggressively seek 
out new talent pools, craft irresistible “employee value propositions” (essentially 
hiring agreements) to attract talent, and provide ample feedback, coaching, and 
leadership opportunities to retain top talent.  The War for Talent philosophy, which 
took a militaristic tone and promoted evolutionist thinking by celebrating the 
survival of the ‘fit’ and rejection of the ‘unfit’ (O’Mahoney & Sturdy 2015, p.7), 
resonated with many business leaders and shaped recruitment practices in large 
companies despite criticism from various quarters (e.g. Gladwell 2002), especially 
after the 2001 collapse of energy-trading company Enron (due to accounting fraud) 
that McKinsey had highly praised in its research.  In 2001, McKinsey’s research was 
published by Harvard Business Press, with which McKinsey had a long-standing and 
close institutional relationship, further diffusing the War for Talent concept among 
business elites.  In this way, the War for Talent became what some called a battle 
plan, but essentially a business strategy, in which companies were urged to “elevate 
talent management to a burning corporate priority” (Chambers et al. 1998).  
Wigdortz was well-versed in the principles of the War for Talent as he had 
been responsible for helping financial institutions utilize such strategic advice while 
in Southeast Asia.  Wigdortz said the War for Talent helped him conceptualize his 
idea for using “leadership” to recruit top graduates into teaching.  In his mind, 
attracting such elite graduates could alleviate “the leadership gap” he observed in 
schools and satisfy business’s desire to develop leadership in schools and possibly 
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recruit such leaders to their business.  After coming up with the idea, Wigdortz 
shared it with Kiley who linked his idea to TFA.   
 
Basically, I think I had written this idea about the War For Talent and I 
showed it to Rona [Kiley] and at that point she said, “Oh you should talk 
to my friend Sue Lehmann who does this similar thing in America.”  I 
hadn’t heard of Teach For America at that point but then Rona connected 
us. 
– Brett Wigdortz, McKinsey consultant 
Interview, 30/06/2015 
 
Whether this connection through Kiley happened informally before 
concluding the study or more formally after presenting results to the leaders of BITC 
and London First remains unclear.  In his book, Wigdortz (2012) described Kiley 
linking his idea to TFA after formally hearing the results of the study.  Kirkpatrick 
was unable to recall when they first learned of TFA but indicated it played a role in 
developing their idea.  Whatever the exact timeline of events, Wigdortz insisted he 
first came up with the idea to attract top graduates into teaching and Kiley then 
brought his attention to the existence of TFA.  Kiley and the McKinsey team then 
conducted a series of interviews to learn more about TFA – again which could have 
happened before or after the study’s results were shared formally with London First 
and BITC.  To move forward, I return to the narrative of events, placing the formal 
McKinsey-client meeting first and interviewees learning more about TFA afterwards. 
 
 
4.5 Response to McKinsey’s Results 
 
Once Wigdortz came up with his idea to attract talented, elite graduates into 
disadvantaged schools, he described Kirkpatrick as supportive of the idea though 
other McKinsey colleagues were skeptical.  Nevertheless, Kirkpatrick agreed to 
allow Wigdortz to, for the first time at McKinsey, present his idea to BITC and 
London First at the upcoming client meeting (Wigdortz 2012, p.46).  The client 
meeting took place in early December 2001 at the offices of London First.  The 
leaders of the McKinsey team explained their data analysis and conclusions in the 
form of a PowerPoint of more than 50 slides filled with graphs summarizing the 
structure, governance, and financing of the U.K. education system and detailing the 
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organization and performance of London schools, which varied by borough1.  
Among the several factors they identified as impacting student achievement, they 
argued that teaching quality and school leadership were the most influential.  The 
McKinsey team then proposed two recommendations, one of which was Wigdortz’s 
idea.  Wigdortz presented his scheme to recruit talented university graduates into 
inner-London schools.  
Wigdortz’s idea was new to some but not all of the individuals in the room.  
For Kiley, the idea was similar to a programme she was already familiar with – TFA. 
 
We got the study… and [one of] the answers [was] getting better teachers 
in the schools.  Obviously I knew about Teach For America, but I had 
never worked with them.  I had a former colleague of mine work for 
them… I had friends whose children did Teach For America.  But I didn’t 
know that much about the details of it.  I knew that really bright young 
people did it and wanted to do it and had amazing experiences.  Some had 
bad experiences [though] too.  
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
After the meeting, Kiley, Wigdortz and Kirkpatrick learned more about TFA through 
phone conversations with its stakeholders. 
 
I didn’t know Wendy [Kopp] at all, but I knew Sue Lehmann who was 
one of the founding board members of Teach For America.  And that’s 
who we talked to on the phone who got us all excited about this.  
[Initially] we didn’t know if we could do it, but we decided that after 
talking to Sue Lehmann and to Wendy Kopp, we got enthusiastic, and 
thought it was worth a try to see what we could do.    
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Lehmann was an independent management consultant who shared Kiley’s passion 
for Civil Rights issues.  She had started her career working for McKinsey in 1966 
and gone on to consult for a number of big businesses and non-profit organizations.   
 
What inspired me to get involved [in TFA] is the opportunity to change 
kids’ lives.  I went to university during the Civil Rights Movement.  I sat 
with my feet in the reflecting pool at the Washington Monument when 
Martin Luther King told us about his dream, and it became my dream and 
the dream of my friends at the University of Michigan, … as a small 
incredible group of people, [we] have committed our lives to making sure 
                                                        
1I base this description on a revised July 2002 version of that McKinsey powerpoint presentation 
provided to me by Wigdortz. 
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that “One day all children will have the opportunity to attain an excellent 
education” [TFA’s mission statement].  
– Sue Lehmann (Anon 2011) 
 
In the early 1990s, Lehmann supported TFA as the start-up struggled financially and 
faced mounting skepticism after being strongly criticized by Linda Darling-
Hammond at Columbia University’s Teachers College.   
 
I met Wendy [Kopp] at the time that TFA was being challenged by the 
educational establishment.  At the time, it looked like this was a brilliant 
idea but wasn’t going to get anywhere, and I became involved because I 
became so angry at my generation for having encouraged people like 
Wendy to stand up and be counted and the moment there were questions 
from the educational establishment about TFA, my generation was joining 
in the fray and was not there to stand up and say “this has to be”.  
– Sue Lehmann (Anon 2011) 
 
Because of her passion for TFA’s mission, Lehmann had encouraged others to 
support TFA, and she herself personally lent $60,000 to TFA on one occasion when 
Kopp desperately needed to meet payroll (Kopp 2001). 
The role these conversations played in developing the idea for Teach First 
differed in the accounts of Kiley and Wigdortz.  In Kiley’s view, the idea for what 
became the Teach First scheme came from her connection to TFA.  “They 
[McKinsey] didn’t propose it,” she recalled, “they came out with two needs that 
schools of London had… [which] were very general things… We all knew about the 
Teach For America model, but we hadn’t initially thought that’s what was going to 
come out, so it wasn’t a shock by any means.”  
Wigdortz, on the other hand, described TFA as playing a minor role, that of a 
helpful reference for his idea.  Wigdortz said, “What I did do is once I was writing 
the business plan I then used TFA as one of my data sources basically” (Interview, 
28/03/12).  Later, in his 2012 book, he wrote that upon learning more about TFA, he 
viewed the programme as “an interesting model” but one that he felt did not fully 
“translate into the British context” (p.51-52).  In this way, Wigdortz suggested that 
TFA played a minimal role in the development of Teach First, though all other 
interviewees recalled TFA being a guiding model and inspiration.  
Ironically though, while Kopp shared her experience in starting and leading 
TFA with those in London, she indicated that she did not want to be associated with 
setting up a replica of TFA in the U.K.   
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Wendy [Kopp] talked to us.  I mean, she was very nice and she eventually 
came just as we were about to launch… But then of course, Wendy didn’t 
want us – we wanted to call ourselves Teach For London, or Teach For 
Britain – but Wendy said “No, we’re not a franchise.  If you do that, I 
won’t talk to you.” 
–  Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
 Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Nevertheless, Kiley recalled her conversations with TFA led her to believe that such 
a programme could work in the U.K.  O’Brien, supported the idea as well because 
he, too, was already aware of TFA. 
 
We already knew Teach For America because I visited them once a long 
time ago… I used to visit the U.S. quite often to see what was going on 
there… And Rona [Kiley], of course, knew exactly what she was talking 
about. 
– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First 
Interview, 31/05/2012 
 
Thus, O’Brien said he thought the idea of a programme similar to TFA in London 
was “an excellent suggestion”. 
 
The basic idea was that the quality of teaching isn’t where it ought to be 
and top level graduates were not coming into teaching, and therefore if 
you could attract them into teaching, you might make a huge difference in 
the profession and therefore too in school children’s performance.  And 
that was the idea, very simply, that everybody bought… that this was a 
root for changing the quality of teaching in school… I think we never 
really valued teachers in the way we should, and so many of our schools 
suffered from pretty low-quality leadership and low-quality teaching… 
So it was changing that and that was what people understood. 
– Stephen O’Brien, CEO, London First 
Interview, 31/05/2012 
 
Although Kiley and O’Brien endorsed the idea, BITC’s leadership was less certain.  
May recalled having doubts about the underlying premise of the scheme. 
 
I must confess that to start off with I was initially fairly cynical, or at the 
very least agnostic, about whether one could have an effect.  As a trained 
teacher myself, I recognized that there are a whole set of skills that you 
develop as a teacher that perhaps it would be hard to have with people 
coming directly out of university with very little training.  And all the 
other sort of mega issues that everybody always puts up as a concern.  
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Kirkpatrick also recalled the skepticism BITC’s leaders had of the idea of recruiting 
recent graduates to become teachers in tough schools with limited pre-service 
training. 
 
[For] the Business in the Community clients, the concern was what we 
were [proposing] was putting probably sub-standard, brand new novice 
teachers, however talented these people were, in front of some very 
difficult classrooms – it wasn’t obvious that that would work.  And we 
persuaded them that it was nonetheless a good idea [by] reminding them 
of what the alterative was... supply teachers and London heads scouring 
the labor market of assorted commonwealth countries to recruit teachers, 
and [saying], “Look, a programme [like TFA], with a measure of quality 
assurance behind it in terms of the sorts of people you’re gonna get – it 
may not be perfect, indeed it isn’t the ideal, but it’s gotta be a whole lot 
better than the alternative that you are currently dealing with.”  And that 
argument… persuaded them that it was at least worth trying. 
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
May also credited TFA in convincing him of the merits of such a scheme.  
 
[After] having done a little bit of reading around Teach For America, I 
was then struck by how successful it had been, but also noticed that whilst 
the story of Teach For America was a very positive one, there were also 
plenty of people within the profession in the U.S. who were detractors as 
well.  
– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC 
Interview, 2/05/2012 
 
Still, May saw the greatest benefit of a TFA-type scheme in London as being its 
ability to expose a new generation of business leaders to the “reality” of educational 
issues. 
 
I think Business in the Community, and certainly I, was keener that young 
people should do two years and then get into business because what I saw 
then was a cohort of junior managers who would eventually be senior 
managers and directors within firms having a much better idea about the 
realities of the British education system than they currently do.  And so 
that was certainly my desire.  And there’s always been a tension between 
the educationalists – who might see Teach First as simply another way of 
getting young people into teaching and that retaining them in teaching 
was the priority and desire of the programme – [and] those of us who 
were at least agnostic and in my case actually positively wanting young 
people, having had their Teach First experience, to take that experience 
into the wider workplace. 
– John May, Director of Business and Education, BITC 
Interview, 2/05/2012 
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May’s support subsequently brought BITC behind the idea.  Although Cleverdon, as 
BITC’s CEO, had the final say on the BITC’s behalf, O’Brien noted, “If John May 
had been opposed to it, I’m sure Julia [Cleverdon] would’ve supported him.”  
Cleverdon’s support was particularly helpful because, as O’Brien mentioned, she 
“understood the education world very well, better than I did.”  With the support of 
both CEOs of London First and BITC, the decision was made to try to establish a 
scheme similar to TFA. 
 
 
4.6 Another Supporter Surfaces 
 
Serendipitously, an independent consultant and self-described serial 
entrepreneur named Jo Owen became another advocate for establishing a TFA-type 
programme in the U.K during this time.  Owen, a Cambridge graduate, had spent the 
previous twenty years working across the corporate consulting world before 
becoming a partner at Accenture and setting up new businesses in Europe, North 
America, and Japan.  In early 2001, he had set up a mid-sized U.K. bank, but by that 
October, he said his role in the venture ended because of a buy-out by Halifax.  As a 
result, he found himself on a short break in California where he learned of TFA. 
 
I was in San Francisco and listening to a radio programme… [discuss] a 
project which gets great graduates teaching in inner-city schools.  I 
thought, “Well that’s interesting.”  So I rang up the radio station and said, 
“What was the name of that project again?”  They said it was Teach For 
America.  So I rang up Teach For America and… got through to Wendy 
[Kopp].  I said, “Right, Wendy, you’ve got to bring this across to the 
U.K.”  And she said, “I’m actually a little bit busy but, some people from 
McKinsey were interviewing me.”  So I got hold of McKinsey and they 
said, “Yeah, we are doing a project to see what can be done about 
problems in inner-city schools.”  And I said, “I know you are, but I’ve got 
the solution”.  And from that point – I met Brett [Wigdortz], who was 
working on the study. 
– Jo Owen, management consultant/serial entrepreneur 
Interview, 25/06/2015 
 
Owen said he quickly became involved in advocating for a TFA-type programme for 
the U.K.  He recalled, “I just thought that [TFA] was a really simple and neat 
solution to a very pressing problem, and I was going, ‘Why isn’t anyone doing it in 
the U.K.?’”  Owen recalled the outcome of the McKinsey study “was, essentially, get 
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more great teachers in and you might have an impact on results… It’s not a very 
surprising finding, but it’s a very important finding.”  Yet at that point, he said “there 
was absolutely no bloody plan whatsoever, there was just an idea, and it was about 
getting some great teachers into London schools”. 
Wigdortz (2012) described meeting Owen in mid-December and Kirkpatrick 
only vaguely recalled being introduced to Owen after which Kirkpatrick moved on to 
other consulting projects.  Subsequently, Owen became an advocate for a TFA-type 
programme in England as well as a mentor to Wigdortz.  His enthusiasm for the TFA 
model confirms Wigdortz’s plan would establish a similar programme.  
 
 
4.7 Moving Forward with “Teach For London” 
 
As Kirkpatrick, Wigdortz, May, and Kiley became convinced that a TFA-type 
scheme could help London schools, they decided to try to establish such a 
programme in the U.K.      
 
We got everybody at McKinsey pretty enthusiastic about it.  We were 
around a table, and it wasn’t just Brett [Wigdortz] and the analysts who 
were about 23 or 24.  We had a [McKinsey] partner who was head of 
government practice – somebody who was very much on the partnership 
track.  Stephen O’Brien thought it was a great idea, and Jo Valentine 
[Managing Director of London First] did, and we thought we should go 
for it.  
–  Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First  
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Although BITC was also supportive, Kiley indicated it was agreed that London 
First would lead on the project since the scheme would initially target only London 
schools.  Although Wigdortz’s role as data analyst in the McKinsey study had 
technically come to an end, he wanted to help establish it.  As a result, he took an 
unpaid six-month leave of absence from his position at McKinsey to join Kiley and 
her colleagues in getting the scheme started.  Due to the idea’s close resemblance to 
the high-profile success of TFA, they agreed to refer to the U.K. scheme “Teach For 
London” (TfL).   
It is worth noting that Wigdortz (2012) describes contemplating and deciding 
to try to establish the scheme, with encouragement from Owen and a promise from 
Kiley to help him fundraise.  In this way, he portrays the decision to campaign for 
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the idea as more of an individual one with himself leading the efforts.  This was not 
the perception of a majority of interviewees, and thus, I defer to their version of 
events.  However, this is not to minimize the commitment of Wigdortz and 
McKinsey’s role in helping advocate for the idea.  From the start, Kiley knew 
McKinsey’s influence and connections would be critically helpful in starting a new 
initiative.  Nevertheless, London First played a leading role in the campaign to 
establish TfL with one interviewee referring to Wigdortz’s initial role as “a very 
small cog in the wheel” given his limited social influence.  
At this point, in mid-December of 2001, the activities of these key individuals 
shifted from looking for a solution and discussing the potential of a TFA-type 
programme in London to seeking to mobilize support and resources for its creation.  
Thus, the first phase of the development of what later became Teach First concluded.  
Although the idea for the scheme would undergo further development in Phase II, 
Wigdortz apparently went along with Kiley and her colleagues’ vision of the scheme 
as an import and adaptation of the TFA model to London.  However, Kirkpatrick 
said he warned Wigdortz against relying too heavily on TFA to sell the idea to some 
audiences. 
 
I encouraged Brett [Wigdortz] to play down [the association with TFA] in 
the public rhetoric because I think… just on an emotional level a “this-is-
an-American-model-they’re-importing-it-over-here” pitch might have put 
some back up amongst the educational establishment.  It was better 
almost to let the concept stand on its own two feet, which it does, and 
when necessary explain that it’s worked elsewhere and in these 
circumstances. 
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant/manager 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
It was likely that only later on, after Wigdortz was pressured to abandon reference to 
TFA in terms of training models, that he began to develop a view of Teach First as a 
scheme primarily derived from his original application of the War for Talent concept 
to teacher recruitment rather than TFA.  But in Phase I, even if Wigdortz resisted the 
comparison of “his” initial idea to TFA from the start (as he in effect portrays in his 
2012 memoir), most accounts indicate Wigdortz and Kiley developed the initial idea 
through learning more about TFA.  In this sense, TFA became the model on which 
TfL was, at least in part, originally based.  Calling the scheme “Teach For London” 
signaled this likeness, and led Kiley, Wigdortz, and colleagues to advocate for the 
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idea.  Thus, the plot moved into its second phase – the mobilization of support and 
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CHAPTER 5:  PHASE I: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 
5.1  Policy Entrepreneurs and the Decision to Initiate Transfer 
 
In Phase I, a small group of individuals from intersecting and overlapping 
corporate networks came together for the explicit purpose of finding a suitable 
course of action to improve London schools.  In this chapter, I first examine how 
organizational interests coupled with contextual triggers led this group to come 
together, engage in policy learning, and ultimately decide to become policy 
entrepreneurs.  In the process, I aim to answer the central research questions related 
to impulses of policy borrowing and decision-making – What sparked individuals’ 
cross-national attraction to TFA? – And the subsequent, related question – Why and 
how did these actors decide to initiate steps to bring about the transfer of TFA to 
London?  In short, I focus on what factors led individuals to engage in policy 
entrepreneurship and how resource-rich networks, within shifting and fragmented 
institutional contexts, enable such agency. 
Secondly, I explore the varying views individuals within the group held of 
TFA and the benefits of transferring such a model to England.  Too often in policy 
transfer research it is assumed the collective decision of individuals to initiate policy 
transfer signals a unity of understanding and purpose.  This was not the case in Phase 
I as the perspectives of Kiley, May, and Wigdortz indicate how differently they felt 
towards TFA and the rationale for TfL.  The existence of such differences in 
viewpoints does not, of course, preclude collective action amongst actors.  However, 
such contrasting views does raise an awareness of how policy transfer relies on 
actors’ agreement on action but not necessarily on meaning.    
Finally, I dive into the mindset of one group member, Wigdortz, to theorize 
why he did not return to his job as a management consultant but chose instead to 
become, essentially, an unpaid policy entrepreneur.  Wigdortz’s account of events 
and rationales during the learning and decision-making process differed in a number 
of ways from the account of others.  As a result, I deconstruct his perspective to and 
explain these discrepancies and highlight how his learning process in this period 
differed from others.  Explaining Wigdortz’s learning and perception is particularly 
relevant for understanding policy outcomes because he eventually becomes the CEO 
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of the scheme and put in charge of its implementation.  A closer look at Wigdortz’s 
perspective also illuminates the power dynamics at play between individuals, as well 
as within McKinsey, in this and subsequent phases and illustrates how the most 
passionate of policy entrepreneurs may feel personally committed to what they see as 
“their” idea and see themselves as the de facto leader of efforts to establish it.  
 
 
5.2  Contextual Impulse leading to a Cross-National Attraction to TFA   
 
5.2.1 The Intersection of Organizational Interests & External Pressures to Act  
 
The original impulse behind the decision of London business leaders to 
initiate policy transfer lies in the intersecting interests of London First and BITC, two 
resource-rich network-based organizations representing corporate interests at the 
local and national level respectively.  Although the history and causes behind this 
eclipse of interests differed for each organization, the CEOs of both London First and 
BITC were both seeking to respond to either direct or indirect external pressures to 
act.  In the case of BITC, direct pressure to act came from an influential member of 
its network while in the case of London First, the pressure to act was more indirect 
and stemmed from the organization’s need to redefine its relevance and role in a 
changing institutional context.  To explain how all this came about requires a closer 
look at BITC’s and London First’s histories, agendas, and their privileged position in 
the wider political context.  
For BITC, schools had always been high on its agenda as education tied in to 
training and employment.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, BITC had worked with 
governments to form business-education partnerships (initially based on the Boston 
Compact model) and helped develop Partners in Leadership as a national mentoring 
scheme between business leaders and headteachers.  BITC was involved in a number 
of other education-related campaigns including initiatives to teach students about 
enterprise and to encourage employee volunteering in schools.  With education rated 
the most popular CSR priority for businesses, (Grayson 2007b), BITC’s central focus 
on schools was logical.  During the Thatcher years and later under New Labour, the 
government welcomed business leadership and involvement with schools.  Still, by 
the late 1990s, the government’s expectations frustrated BITC head Julia Cleverdon 
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because policy-makers assumed financial contributions were the best way for the 
corporate sector to help schools.  Cleverdon, meanwhile, had publicly campaigned to 
convince others that businesses had much more to offer than simply funds and 
suggested that business-education links were more effective when businesses became 
involved in schools (Nash 2002).  New Labour was warming to this approach, 
particularly with its support for the concept of academies in which business sponsors 
had a management role in school affairs (Adonis 2012).   
In this political context, BITC was further motivated to seek out a new way to 
approach the problems plaguing schools following Prince Charles’s comment in the 
summer of 2001.  His concern regarding the limited effect of the Partners in 
Leadership spurred Cleverdon to re-examine BITC’s business-education links.  She 
realized that the business community should be saying: “Isn’t there more we can do 
to help schools other than mentoring and reading support?” (Nash 2002).  With 
BITC’s recent expansion in size and hence funding, it had the capability to enact new 
initiatives.  The Prince’s recommendation was a particularly powerful motive for 
action as he held the largely symbolic position of President of BITC and was a close 
professional friend of Cleverdon.  In fact, Cleverdon was used to receiving “reams of 
hand-written notes, sometimes three a day, [which] Prince Charles shower[ed] her 
with, full of ideas and suggestions” (Davidson 2007).  Davidson (2007) further 
noted, “BITC is one of Prince Charles’s favorite ways of getting things done in 
Britain, and Cleverdon knows the power this gives her”.  As a result, the Prince’s 
comment motivated Cleverdon to respond.  
Unlike BITC, the decade-old London First had not engaged with schools in 
the past.  Although O’Brien was the former head of BITC, his role at London First 
was to lead the private sector in taking up a more central role in strategic planning 
for London and policy implementation through partnerships.  However, the political 
contexts were shifting as a popular referendum had brought about the creation and 
election of a municipal government for London in 2000.  The introduction of a city-
wide level of government known as the Greater London Authority (GLA) brought 
about a shift in institutional context and political climate to the city.  As O’Brien 
mentioned, London First had a “very deep connection with local government in 
London” and “had been responsible for promoting the idea that London should have 
its own elected mayor” [Interview, 31/05/2012].   
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Actually, London First had initially ignored calls for a new city-wide 
government earlier in the 1990s as the power vacuum – created when the Labour-
dominated Greater London Council (GLC) was abolished – was precisely why and 
how London First emerged as a powerful voice for the capital and key ally of the 
central government.  However, with Londoners’ growing concerns regarding the lack 
of democratic accountability and the need for a democratic city-wide government, 
the coalition eventually came to advocate for its establishment as New Labour came 
to power.  After a 1998 referendum gave central government the mandate to create a 
new London-wide council, London First became influential in shaping the plans of 
the city-wide government, expressing their preference for a strong executive mayor, 
comparable the role of mayors in several U.S. cities.  London First had also insisted 
that any elected assembly be designed to work in “real” partnership with businesses, 
stating: “London’s prosperity and competitiveness depends on business.  For London 
to remain competitive, business needs access to decision-making, a coherent voice to 
articulate its needs and the ability to make things happen” (London First quoted by 
Kleinman 1999b, p.165).   
These concerns were, for the most part, taken into account by New Labour 
leaders who created the Greater London Authority (GLA), which was more limited 
in size and powers and more business-orientated than its predecessor, the GLC.  
Furthermore, with the election of Ken Livingstone, London First found itself with a 
mayor who, despite having deep Old Labour roots, ultimately upheld businesses’ 
privileged access to policy-makers and worked in partnership with corporate leaders 
in formulating the city government’s strategic priorities (Thornley et al. 2005a; 
Mcneill 2002).   
In these new institutional arrangements and a changed political climate, 
London First had ceded part of its visionary role to the new GLA but felt confident to 
look for ways of expanding its role in new directions.  Education was one area in 
which the coalition had not yet been involved but was of high relevance to the 
economic competitiveness of London.  Furthermore, in London, education was a 
sector that the new GLA had limited power over as schools remained run and 
overseen by the borough authorities and central government since the early 1990s 
when the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) as abolished.  As a result, the 
GLA relied on the boroughs to implement its strategy through their own plans and 
policies (Thornley et al. 2005a).   This meant that schools remained a policy issue 
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over which power was institutionally fragmented across the metropolitan area, 
making it a policy issue on which London First was uniquely experienced to 
coordinate action.   
However, as Newman and Thornley (1997) point out, London First acted 
primarily as a lobby, with few resources or staff of their own.  It summoned expertise 
and resources on an ad hoc basis, “setting up and dissolving working groups and 
networks for specific purposes” (Newman & Thornley 1997, p.983).  This loose and 
rather flexible organizational structure depended on key individuals to provide 
overall guidance.  As a result, London First was in need of an education director able 
to organize and coordinate future action – a job that O’Brien offered to Kiley, a well-
connected and experienced organizer herself, who was also the wife of the Transport 
Commissioner. 
Furthermore, O’Brien was motivated to consider how London First might 
become involved in schools by his view that BITC had “lost its way in terms of 
making a real difference in education” [O’Brien Interview, 31/05/2012].  BITC had 
become heavily involved in other issues in the recent years including protecting the 
environment, developing benchmarks for corporate responsibility, and starting 
initiatives in rural areas.  At the time, BITC’s main education programmes were 
headteacher mentoring and employee-volunteering schemes through which workers 
coached pupils in reading and maths.  O’Brien felt the need for a new initiative 
through which business could renew their focus and commitment to schools. 
In sum, London First and BITC came together to start a new education 
initiative for different reasons but similar interests.  The changing institutional and 
political context of London coupled with O’Brien’s belief that businesses could do 
more for schools (shared by Cleverdon) led London First to seek out a new education 
initiative.  Meanwhile, BITC became focused on schools due to the concerns of its 
President, Prince Charles.  BITC CEO Cleverdon was also keen to show government 
that business involvement in schools should go beyond financial contributions and 
involve businesses in a more meaningful way.  It is important to highlight the 
signficance of organizational contexts of Phase I.  While all individuals involved 
here shared a concern and dissatisfaction for the status quo within London’s failing 
state schools, organizational priorities were driving their actions.  London First and 
BITC had their own agendas to pursue as well as their influential relationships and 
privileged position to maintain, both which were shaped and driven by the views and 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 144 
interests of its members, primarily big business.  BITC existed to organize and 
coordinate business involvement in improving communities while London First 
existed to build partnership and policy goals to improve London’s economic 
competitiveness.  Thus, the two business-led coalitions were seeking new ideas to 
enact their own organizational priorities.   
What is also particularly notable is the political influence and agency both 
business-led organizations possessed, rooted in their extensive and resource-rich 
network of members, which enabled and empowered them to engage in “puzzling” 
about a persistent policy problem and act accordingly.  Both coalitions had close ties 
to central government, Prince Charles, community leaders, and (of course) business 
heads.  Through these influential networks, London First and BITC were 
organizations that had significant experience in policy – at times initiating it, and 
other times shaping it, but most often implementing it in a range of areas through 
building cross-sector partnerships at various levels (local, regional, national).  In 
these ways, BITC and London First were expected to come up with new ideas and 
lead action – effectively acting in as policy entrepreneurs who build new and 
extended old networks to foster cooperation and bring about policy initiatives.  
Because of this, London First and BITC were in the empowered position to engage 
in prospective policy learning to address a persistent problem – education 
underachievement – affecting London communities and their business members.  In 
this context, London First and BITC agreed to commission a report to determine 
what ways businesses could better support schools – choosing McKinsey to do so. 
 
 
5.2.2  Partnering with McKinsey:  The First Strategic Step in Policy 
Innovation 
 
To find an innovative new way for businesses to engage with schools, the 
leaders of both BITC and London First agreed to recruit McKinsey to carry out a 
study on the topic.  Why did they seek out a consulting firm, and why did they 
specifically want McKinsey to propose ways to solve an education-related problem?  
The decision was based on a number of reasons that are very worth discussing at 
length here to provide insight into why consultants, particularly elite ones, are 
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increasingly common sources of policy innovation as well as agents of policy 
transfer (Saint-Martin 1998; Prince 2012).   
First, there were practical and strategic reasons for hiring McKinsey.  
Research on management consultancies suggests business managers hire such 
consultants for primarily three reasons: (1) to facilitate the introduction of new ideas 
or practices, (2) to utilize a consultancy firm’s expertise in certain areas, and/or (3) to 
add temporary skilled workers to their work force (Bennett 1990).  The leaders of 
London First and BITC turned to McKinsey consultants for all of these reasons.  
Kiley, O’Brien, and Cleverdon wanted McKinsey to (1) come up with innovative 
solutions, (2) use their management expertise to solve the coalitions’ stated goals, 
and (3) potentially use their social influence and well-connected network to 
introduce the idea to wider audiences.  In short, Kiley and her colleagues hoped 
McKinsey could act as an innovator, legitimator, and facilitator – effectively coming 
up with a new idea and, if decided, promote its adoption.  I briefly discuss how and 
why McKinsey was considered capable of filling all of these roles – knowledge 
expert, “rational outsider”, and social influencer – to illustrate why consultants, and 
McKinsey in particular, became the partner of choice for London First and BITC. 
Social Influence   London First and BITC’s choice of McKinsey was based 
on its elite profile, networks, and influence. McKinsey could be described as an 
organization located at or near the center of the corporate consulting field’s informal 
status hierarchy and, thus, within the social network of elites, the firm’s influential 
status was well-known.  Kiley indicated she wanted to partner with McKinsey 
because she had learned of and had been impressed by McKinsey’s ability to 
influence while working with them in the past.  A McKinsey consultant helped her 
raise the profile of the non-profit she represented among New York City’s wealthy 
and powerful.  As a result, she knew McKinsey had an expansive network of alumni 
and clients and thus could provide access to elites and the credibility needed to 
jumpstart a new idea.  In London, McKinsey had strong relations with both 
multinational businesses and local elites.  The global firm, founded in Chicago in 
1926 and second in size only to Anderson Consulting by 2001, had set up its first 
European office in London in 1959 and grew its U.K. practice rapidly in the decades 
to follow.  In the U.K., McKinsey worked primarily with businesses but also built a 
strong relationship with central government leaders, first working on projects for the 
Bank of England in the 1960s and then carrying out assessments of Britain’s colonial 
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administration in Hong Kong during the 1970s (Kipping 1999).  McKinsey’s 
influence only grew in the 1980s and 1990s as the government hired record numbers 
of management consultants to help plan reforms related to the New Public 
Management (Saint-Martin 1998).   
Over time, McKinsey’s influence and relationship to centers of power was 
furthered strengthened and institutionalized through the movement of its consultants 
out of the firm and into heads of corporations, government positions, and other 
influential roles in the U.K. and other countries (O’Shea & Madigan 1997; Kipping 
1999, p.218).  Because of this influential alumni network, McKinsey had been 
labeled by one London newspaper, the Independent, as “Britain’s most powerful old 
boys’ network”, reporting that the firm “can count more former partners running 
Britain than anyone else” (Hirst 2002).  This sentiment echoed the earlier findings of 
O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.252) who, after their investigation into a number of 
global consulting firms, concluded that “there is no consulting firm in the world that 
carries more weight into corporate boardrooms than McKinsey & Co… by large 
measure the most influential of them all.”  Thus, Kiley wanted to partner with 
McKinsey again to accomplish her and London First’s goals.  
Organizational Ties   In addition to providing social influence, McKinsey 
was also an attractive choice for BITC because of the positive organizational 
relationship between the two, dating back at least ten years.  Kiley and O’Brien 
alluded to McKinsey’s membership and past collaboration with BITC as one of the 
reasons that they partnered with BITC – to ensure access to McKinsey.  BITC had 
often tapped McKinsey consultants for different causes.  In 1992, upon Prince 
Charles’s request to consider the impact of future employment trends for businesses, 
BITC assembled a team of experts from member companies, including McKinsey, to 
carry out the analysis (Grayson 2007b, p.36).  In 1994, the BITC board chose 
McKinsey to complete a pro-bono strategic review of BITC as an organization 
(Grayson 2007b, p.52).  These past collaborations between BITC and McKinsey (and 
there were likely more) point to a close relationship between the two, which made it 
easy for BITC to tap McKinsey to work on a new project. 
Expertise   Kiley and her colleagues also wanted McKinsey because the firm 
had expertise in managing corporations, financial institutions, and growing expertise 
restructuring public sector bodies.  Though management consultants lacked 
experience in managing educational organizations, this was irrelevant as business 
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leaders felt new ideas and perspectives were needed and the problems facing large 
school systems were not unlike those in the private sector.  This sentiment was 
reflected in BITC’s headteacher mentoring programme, Partners in Leadership, as it 
was based on the realization – initially made by an executive of KMPG – that many 
of the challenges facing headteachers were the same management problems 
businesses encountered (Ball & Junemann 2011, p.656).  Thus, the national 
programme sought to provide business management expertise to school heads that 
often lacked such training.  In short, while McKinsey had little educational expertise, 
it was not required as London First and BITC were looking for advice from a 
strategic management perspective and McKinsey was a leader in this field. 
Objective Outsider  In addition to management expertise, London First and 
BITC wanted McKinsey because its assessment would be seen by the business 
community and potentially government leaders as objective and impartial, further 
bolstering the legitimacy of the study’s claims.  Studies indicate that business 
executives generally hire consultants because they symbolize the rational approach to 
business issues, providing analytical expertise and data-driven objectivity 
(Armbrüster 2004b; Sturdy et al. 2009).  Consultants are also seen as providing an 
outsider perspective, having a position outside the client organization and drawing 
upon knowledge from a wider base.  It is because of their rational outsider status that 
consultants tend to be viewed as either “innovators”, transferring new knowledge to 
their clients, or “legitimators”, providing outsider approval or recognition of existing 
client knowledge or agenda (Sturdy et al. 2009).  Of course, in reality, consultants 
are often both.  Thus, instead of seeking out researchers specializing in education, 
London First and BITC preferred to utilize consultants’ expertise in business 
management, their quantitative and (perceived) objective approach to problems, and 
their unbiased, outsider perspective.    
A Common Managerial Outlook  Related to the last point, McKinsey was 
also an attractive partner for the coalitions to seek out because its consultants 
prioritized the needs of clients and generally shared clients’ entrepreneurial outlooks 
and market-oriented beliefs.  A shard understanding of problems and solutions was 
particularly important given that any idea the two London coalitions backed had to 
appeal to their corporate members.  McKinsey consultants were aware of the needs 
and outlooks of clients and built their business around them.  McKinsey’s success, 
like other elite consulting firms, was built on the business of repeat clients.  Satisfied 
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clients signaled the effectiveness and value of consultants’ advice, and the 
maintenance of client relationships was a high priority for consulting firms (O’Shea 
& Madigan 1997).  Thus, McKinsey was known to address and remedy the problems 
of their clients with confidentiality, competence, and a common outlook with 
corporate executives, making McKinsey an attractive firm with which to partner.  
To summarize, London’s leading business coalitions preferred management 
consultants to carry out a report on schools because of the firm’s (1) management 
expertise and outlook, (2) rational approach to problem-solving, (3) ability to 
generate and spread new ideas, and (4) influence centres of power through its 
extensive elite social networks and high-status reputation.  In addition, McKinsey 
was a familiar choice for BITC to tap due to the history of collaboration between the 
two, illustrating the mutual respect and trust each organization had built with the 
other.   
Furthermore, London First and BITC’s motives for partnering with 
McKinsey also bring attention to the nature of their client-consultant relationship, 
which was collaborative.  In the existing literature on management consultants, 
clients are often only portrayed as anxiety-ridden managers, seeking the expertise of 
confident consultants who pass on latest management trends (Sturdy et al. 2009; 
Sturdy 1997).  This was not the case for the London First/BITC-McKinsey 
partnership which was interactive with the coalitions’ leaders asserting their agency.  
Thus, the relationship amongst BITC, London First, and McKinsey was one in which 
power and respect were shared amongst the organizational leaders.  This dynamic 
facilitated collaborative learning among the parties.  It is important to note, BITC 
and London First were seeking to assess educational problems – not problems within 
their own organizations.  They were looking to improve education, and McKinsey 
represented trusted and influential friends with problem-solving approaches that 
businesses respected as rational and apolitical.   
As a result, BITC and London First partnered with McKinsey to engage in a 
form of policy-orientated social learning, or to “collectively puzzle” (Heclo 1974, 
p.304), about how to solve London’s educational problems.  McKinsey ensured that 
this learning took place in a client-consultant relationship in which outlooks and 
priorities were mutually shared and in which BITC and London First ultimately 
controlled the focus and, once the project was complete, determined future actions.  
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For these reasons, choosing management consultants, and McKinsey in particular, 
was a strategic and logical choice for London First and BITC.   
 
 
5.2.3  McKinsey’s Motives for Pro-Bono Engagements  
 
While the leaders of London First and BITC saw calculated benefits from 
working with McKinsey, why did McKinsey agree to complete a pro-bono study on 
education for the two business-led coalitions?  Despite an elite global reputation and 
ability to command high fees for their consultants, McKinsey often engaged in pro-
bono projects because doing so served the firm’s own organizational interests.  First, 
McKinsey’s senior partners were not only encouraged but “expected to reach out to 
their communities by serving on boards and doing the kind of pro-bono work that 
enhances The Firm’s reputation” (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, p.255).  (This strategic 
thinking likely prompted McKinsey to become a member of BITC in the first place.)  
Secondly, pro-bono projects promised to expand McKinsey’s knowledge and 
contacts in a new area, which the firm was always keen to do as it shunned 
advertising and instead relied on many of its new clients coming through word-of-
mouth referrals (Sturdy 1997, p.406).   
Thus, it was already part of McKinsey strategy to offer their services on a 
pro-bono basis to gain new clients.  O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.17) report that 
“McKinsey finances economic studies of nations such as France, Germany, Brazil, 
South Korea, and the Netherlands and then shares the results with the government as 
a way to get a foot in the door for future business”, adding that in the U.K. in 
particular, such consultants have “reaped huge fees studying institutions such as the 
Department of Health and Social Security and the [BBC].”  Thus, carrying out work 
on a pro-bono basis was a known strategy employed by McKinsey to expand its 
organizational knowledge and experience, build key relationships, gain additional 
contacts and new clients, and enhance its own reputation.  (Note: McKinsey also 
attracted new clients by producing high numbers of books, reports, and Harvard 
Business Review articles and arranging executive-level discussion seminars through 
courted new business leaders (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, p.260)) 
 The pro-bono study for BITC and London First served these interests as well 
as immediate needs.  In the short-term, McKinsey offered to complete this task for 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 150 
the London business community because, in 2001, the firm needed additional work 
as it had recently experienced a drop in corporate client projects.  This was primarily 
due to the bursting of the dot-com bubble (Armbruster 2006) and a downturn in the 
U.K. economy in this period, which caused corporations to reduce staff and seek to 
save money.  McKinsey had fewer projects, which forced Wigdortz, whose specialty 
was financial institutions, to internally apply for any project available within the 
firm.  Thus, in this period of slower-than-usual business, McKinsey needed to keep 
its army of consultants busy and pro-bono work provided that.  In the long-term, an 
education-based study could help McKinsey build up its consulting expertise and 
contacts in this area.  Despite its four-decade history in the U.K., McKinsey 
apparently had not carried out any work related to the country’s education sector.   
In sum, McKinsey agreed to have its high-paid consultants carry out a pro-
bono study on education on behalf of London First and BITC because the work could 
serve its organizational priorities in the short- and long-term.  McKinsey aimed to 
enhance its reputation and improve its relationships with London businesses as well 
as expand its knowledge in education fields and keep its consultants busy.  With 
these goals, McKinsey’s consultants approached their study of London schools with 
methodic rationality although not without interests of their own.   
 
 
5.3  Engaging in Policy Learning for Potential Transfer 
 
 Once the results of McKinsey’s study were presented and the link to the idea 
of TFA made, how did individuals from London First, BITC, and McKinsey decide to 
initiate a policy transfer in the form of TfL?  The decision to transfer TFA to London 
was not simply a decision made in response to McKinsey’s presentation.  It was a 
decision produced through a social process of learning from others’ opinions and 
experiences and rooted in individuals’ experiences (or lack thereof in Wigdortz’s 
case).  It was also a learning process that drew on a network of TFA insiders for 
lessons.  Below, I examine in more detail how policy learning among the group 
members took place and why TFA quickly became a more plausible and inspiring 
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5.3.1  The McKinsey Study:  Conclusive but Uninspiring  
 
McKinsey’s study, presented through a chart-filled PowerPoint presentation, 
was as thorough and analytical as leaders of London First and BITC expected.  
However, the conclusions drawn from the study – that quality teaching and effective 
school leadership could raise pupil achievement – did not surprise them but were 
“common sense” – but then again, this was in some ways intentional as Kirkpatrick 
indicated.  Kirkpatrick, as a former civil servant, was aware of the complexity of 
social problems and the inherent difficulties of drawing conclusions from various 
educational data using consulting techniques.  But he was also aware that they 
needed conclusions and ones that would to be plausible to business elites.  The 
solutions delivered were exactly that.  O’Brien already linked between the low-status 
profession of teaching to the prevailing view that “many of our schools suffered from 
pretty low-quality leadership and low-quality teaching” [Interview, 31/05/2012].  
Because of this sentiment, none of the interviewees doubted the conclusion that 
McKinsey’s analysis produced.  This served to focus their attention on teaching and 
leadership, rather than other factors.  
However, while McKinsey’s study and conclusions resonated with the 
experience and views of BITC and London First leaders, it did not convince them of 
the feasibility of Wigdortz’s recommendation for a graduate scheme.  Kirkpatrick 
(and likely others) said he initially questioned if such a scheme would interest top 
graduates, while May suspected such a scheme would not likely produce effective 
teachers due to its limited training and high needs of disadvantaged pupils.  As the 
only former teacher and school leader, May would have likely dampened any future 
prospects for Wigdortz’s proposal had Kiley not enthusiastically compared the 
scheme to TFA.  In fact, the scheme Wigdortz proposed did not capture the group’s 
imagination until Kiley likened it to TFA, raising the potential credibility of the idea.   
 
 
5.3.2 Learning from the Experienced:  Accessing TFA through Social 
Networks 
 
Social networks were a critical resource that directed and shaped the group’s 
awareness, understanding, and opinion of TFA.  Both Kiley and O’Brien already 
developed an awareness of TFA from their own social networks.  O’Brien had 
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“heard” of TFA through his cosmopolitan and trans-Atlantic networks involved in 
CSR while Kiley had a friend, similar in age and in her passion for civil rights 
activism, who was intimately involved with TFA.  Through these social influences, 
the idea of TFA seemed worthwhile and plausible, and Kiley’s personal network 
connection to the programme enabled the group to learn more about TFA.   
Starting with Kiley’s contact, TFA chairman Sue Lehmann, discussions took 
place between the London group and TFA’s leadership and members of their 
network of influential alumni.  Since whom the group spoke with was determined 
initially by Kiley’s personal connection to its chairman and then the leadership of 
TFA itself, the type of knowledge received about the programme was generally 
positive, advisory, and rooted in experience.  The TFA proponents described the 
successes of the programme but also the critical opposition it faced, particularly from 
the teacher unions.  These personal conversations relaying first-hand accounts and 
anecdotal lessons drawn directly from TFA were highly influential in building a 
consensus among the group in support of bringing TFA to the England.   
However, that did not mean that the group in London had the same views.  
Instead, their opinions were also rooted in their background experiences and work-
related roles.  To begin with, Kiley was the most familiar with TFA.  In her view, 
TFA was a success because it engaged talented, young people in a pressing social 
problem.  Through friends who had their children participate in TFA, she knew of 
positive and negative experiences in TFA schools.  In addition, throughout her career 
she had worked in disadvantaged communities and was aware of the complexity of 
challenges facing such communities.  As a result, she was enthusiastic about a TFA-
type programme for the U.K. but also realistic about its varied results.  Thus, Kiley 
viewed the idea favorably but was less confident about its appeal to Britain’s 
graduates, political leadership, and educational establishment.  Kiley credited 
Lehmann’s enthusiasm for TFA with removing her concerns and inspiring them all 
toward launching a similar scheme.  Kiley served as the more knowledgeable and 
credible spokesperson on TFA in the group. 
Similarly, May admitted learning of the success of TFA convinced him of the 
merits of the idea, especially given Kirkpatrick’s argument that such a scheme was 
needed in light of the dire teacher shortages in London.  Because of his personal 
experience in teaching and leading schools, May had been skeptical and initially 
doubted the simplistic solution of training elite graduates to teach.  Though May still 
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doubted the ability of such a scheme’s teachers to be wildly effective without more 
training, he reasoned that those teachers moving into business would be a benefit for 
companies.   
As the two coalitions’ education directors, Kiley and May convinced their 
respective CEOs that a TFA-type scheme was worth backing.  O’Brien was already 
favorable toward the idea of transferring TFA to London because he had learned of 
TFA previously and believed in adapting successful American initiatives to the U.K.  
May also convinced his CEO, Cleverdon, to back the idea.  In this way, O’Brien and 
Kiley became the lead advocates behind Wigdortz’s proposal, which became tagged 
TfL in response to their understanding of it as an adaptation of TFA.   
Meanwhile, TFA had a reassuring impact on Wigdortz, who was already 
convinced of the feasibility and potential of his idea.  Thus, he saw TFA as primarily 
complementing his plan and welcomed the enthusiasm and approval his idea gained 
amongst the clients once it was associated with TFA.  Higher-ranking McKinsey 
consultants involved in the project had also become more enthusiastic about 
Wigdortz’s idea upon learning about TFA and offered their support in getting the 
scheme started.  Yet, the pro-bono study was technically complete, and thus the 
consultants who carried out the study were set to move onto to other projects.  In 
response, Wigdortz was allowed to take a six-month unpaid leave-of-absence from 
his position to be able to work full-time in helping start TfL and given space in 
McKinsey offices to work.  In this manner, Wigdortz became the coordinator of 
McKinsey’s ongoing engagement with starting the scheme, a strategic but not 
leading position.  Kiley was in the lead as she, with O’Brien’s help, began building 
bases of political, corporate, and educational support.   
While the decision to pursue the establishment of TfL was collective, this 
learning process and outcome was also shaped by the power dynamics underpinning 
the group’s dynamics.  London First and BITC were both in the driver’s seat of 
discussions as they were the clients who had commissioned the study.  In addition, 
May was the experienced headteacher, and Kiley was the most familiar with TFA, 
giving them additional insight and clout in discussions.  Wigdortz’s role in these 
critical discussions was somewhat peripheral as his role was mainly a data analyst on 
the McKinsey team, and the analysis was not what was driving the decision to 
support the scheme.  There was no analysis or evidence in the McKinsey report that 
indicated elite graduates would make effective teachers in state schools with little 
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training.  The analysis produced by Wigdortz and colleagues only confirmed the link 
between school achievement and socio-economic inequality and the need for high 
quality teachers and leadership.  It was TFA that provided evidence for the link 
between top university graduates and successful teaching, which became the key to 
unlocking the group’s collective support for creating a similar scheme in London.   
 
 
5.4  The Making of a Policy Entrepreneur:  Wigdortz’s Perspective 
 
5.4.1  Unpacking Wigdortz’s Account and Why It Matters  
 
While learning about TFA convinced leaders of London First, BITC, and 
McKinsey to attempt to transfer TfL to England, Wigdortz was already convinced 
his idea was powerfully logical, would work, and would radically improve schools.  
All interviewees noted the passion with which Wigdortz spoke about and believed in 
his idea for a corporate-type graduate scheme for teaching.  Wigdortz had become 
deeply concerned with the link between poor students and academic failure and 
believed his analysis made a robust case for recruiting elite graduates to become 
teachers.  According to Wigdortz, learning about TFA only confirmed and further 
informed his idea, but it was not the inspiration for it.  Instead, Wigdortz indicated 
his inspiration for a graduate scheme had come from the War for Talent ethos at 
McKinsey and his observations of a “leadership gap” in low-performing schools.  In 
this way, Wigdortz quietly resisted the notion that his idea was based on TFA and 
said it should not have been seen as a model borrowed from the U.S.  How can 
Wigdortz’s perspective be explained, given that it seems to contradict the views of 
others?  The particularities of Wigdortz’s account and experiences at this point in the 
story are critical to understanding why he chose to become a policy entrepreneur (the 
others were already in such lobbying-type positions at London First and BITC) and 
how he reinvents the TfL as Teach First in Phase III, when he is no longer a 
peripheral actor but the programme’s CEO.  
To explain Wigdortz’s perspective, I turn to social and organizational 
theories of learning featured in the sociological study of institutions.  Unlike 
cognitive learning theories, which focus on knowledge as an abstract entity and 
present learning as taking place primarily in the mind of the individual, social and 
organizational theories of learning highlight the ways in which meaning and 
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understanding are shaped by social contexts and interactions with others.  In this 
perspective, Lave and Wenger’s (1991) situated learning theory draws attention to 
the significance of power relations in shaping learning and Weick’s (1993; 1995a) 
concept of sensemaking integrates multiple concepts from social psychology to 
describe how individuals within organizational contexts make sense of situations to 
inform their actions and decisions.  Both approaches emphasize the importance of 
identity (its construction and maintenance) as well as social interaction as the 
medium through which individual processes of learning take place.  
At its core, Weick’s sensemaking directs scholarly attention to seven 
elements in the formation of individuals’ understanding of reality; sensemaking is (1) 
grounded in identity construction, (2) retrospective, meaning understanding if 
formed not as events occur but upon reflection, (3) enactive of sensible environment, 
meaning individuals and context are not inseparable and individuals produce part of 
the environment they face, (4) social, or made through dialogue with a real or 
imagined audience, (5) ongoing, (6) focused on and by extracted cues, and (7)  
driven by plausibility rather than accuracy (Weick 1995a, p.17).  Furthermore, 
sensemaking has been implicated in explaining how emotion can derive from 
experience (Magala 1997), and critical sensemaking, an extended version of Weick’s 
work, calls attention to organizational or societal power dynamics, in terms of 
discourse and privilege, in shaping local sensemaking (Helms-Mills 2003; Mills et 
al. 2010).  Thus, I employ these concepts to provide insights into understanding how 
Wigdortz and others learned and differed in their perspectives.   
Wigdortz’s perspective was shaped fundamentally by the organizational 
context of McKinsey, his own identity, and his disorienting experience when first 
visiting a disadvantaged London school.  To begin unpacking these inter-related 
points, I first discuss how McKinsey structured consultants’ roles, scripts, and 
learning pertaining to the London First/BITC study.  I then examine how and why 
Wigdortz’s work identity was strongly tied to McKinsey’s expectations and power 
structure.  Finally, I suggest that Wigdortz’s learning became personally meaningful 
upon visiting a disadvantaged school and being shocked and disoriented at 
conditions inside.  This experience confounded his expectations and prompted him to 
engage in sensemaking.  As a result, Wigdortz developed an emotional connection to 
his work, became convinced in the merits of his analytical work and solution (before 
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it was likened to TFA), and felt that he had ownership over the idea and was the 
leader of the campaign to launch it.   
 
 
5.4.2  Organizational Context, Power Relations and Learning at McKinsey 
 
McKinsey’s organizational structure and culture determined the power 
relations among consultants and directed their learning on consulting engagements.  
Within McKinsey, client projects were typically carried out by consultant teams who 
were expected to use company techniques and tools to guide learning and produce a 
substantial written analysis on the problem and solutions to present to clients within 
the time specified for the task.  Consulting teams were structured according to 
seniority within McKinsey, based on each consultant’s past experience, expertise, 
and results of ongoing performance reviews.  A consultant’s rank was a particularly 
important indicator of influence because of the greater amount of control each level 
had over work and advancement of those under them.  McKinsey’s structure and 
competitive culture was modeled after those in successful law firms in which new 
members worked toward becoming junior and then senior partners through proving 
their ability to perform on and add value to the firm.  New consultants started out as 
“junior associates” serving on various project teams as data analysts until they were 
promoted to “engagement managers” who supervised teams and interacted with the 
firm’s partners and clients.  Engagement managers had to meet progressively higher 
expectations until, around their fifth year consulting, senior McKinsey partners 
decided whether those managers became junior partners or transitioned out of the 
firm.  The percentage of new consultants reaching the level of junior partner was one 
in five, with only 50 percent of those who became junior partners continuing on to 
become senior partners (O’Shea & Madigan 1997, pp.269–270).   
Salary differentials reinforced McKinsey’s organizational divisions based on 
rank.  Although pay was relatively high at the entry level (Wigdortz earned roughly 
£140,000 annually at the time (Wilby 2012)), senior partners received much higher 
salaries, often one million pounds or more, since they managed the firm’s 
institutional relationships and led on multiple consulting projects.  Yet, because 
partners split their time between these tasks, teams of lower ranked consultants 
carried out most of the day-to-day work on client projects.  As a result, McKinsey 
was an intensively competitive office environment that promoted an “up or out” 
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culture.  Performance reviews were frequent and critical, effective mentoring from 
superiors was crucial for promotion, and the attrition rate of new consultants within 
the first five years was high, approximately 80 percent (O’Shea & Madigan 1997; 
Kipping 1999). 
In this context, Wigdortz was still a relatively new consultant who 
participated in McKinsey’s pro-bono study as a legitimate but peripheral member of 
the consulting team.  He carried out what was considered the least “visible” and 
rather “mundane” role of data analyst (Handley et al. 2007, p.185). Kirkpatrick, as an 
engagement manger, selected Wigdortz onto the team and had significant control 
over the team’s learning outcomes and access to clients.  Wigdortz had to attain 
permission from Kirkpatrick to present his idea at the concluding client meeting, 
which he had never done in previous engagements.  While this hierarchy signaled to 
clients that Kirkpatrick had more experience and expertise, it also exempted him 
from performing first-hand data collection and preliminary analysis.  Instead, he 
coached Wigdortz and other junior associates in gathering data and performing 
analyses.  
The leaders of BITC and London First were aware of the power hierarchy 
within the firm, as Kiley pointed out in her interview that Wigdortz held a rather 
“lowly perch” at McKinsey.  I sensed that this power differential, coupled with 
Wigdortz’s lack of contacts and experience within the U.K., affected how others 
judged Wigdortz’s views, seeing him as a rather naïve apprentice that was still 
learning “rules of the game”.  At the same time, Wigdortz was confident that his 
“intellectually rigorous” analysis pointed to the need and potential for such a 
programme, despite knowing very little about the U.K.  This perspective was the 
result of his McKinsey-linked identity and his unexpected encounter with 
sensemaking.  Next, I discuss each of these aspects in turn. 
 
 
5.4.3  Wigdortz’s Work Identity  
 
Wigdortz’s work identity was strongly shaped by McKinsey’s expectations, 
roles, and culture.  Wigdortz lacked an elite education and had limited work 
experiences prior to joining McKinsey, a career path that he himself described as 
“peripatetic” and “lacking in any obvious structure or plan beyond trying to see as 
much of the world as possible” (Wigdortz 2012, p.32).  Wigdortz had done free-
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lance reporting while traveling in Indonesia after earning his master’s degree but 
then took up menial or temporary jobs in his New Jersey hometown until he applied 
to McKinsey.  Wigdortz took his acceptance into McKinsey as a signal he possessed 
the intellect and analytical skills worthy of joining an elite consulting firm – an 
identity McKinsey actively promoted through their narrow recruitment from elite 
universities and unique methods of screening and selecting new hires (Armbrüster 
2004a). If McKinsey traditionally hired only graduates from “super elite” business 
schools (Armbruster 2006; Rivera 2015), why did it hire Wigdortz?  McKinsey 
consultants’ decision to hire Wigdortz was likely based on the firm’s needs at the 
time.  According to O’Shea and Madigan (1997, p.283-288), by the mid-1990s, 
McKinsey was forced to widen its recruitment pools because of its rapid growth into 
a global practice.  In addition, after the unexpected fall of the U.S.S.R., McKinsey 
had become keenly aware of the need to hire individuals with expertise in economic 
forecasting for whole countries and regions.  Thus, Wigdortz was likely hired for (1) 
his knowledge of and experiences in Indonesia, the country in which McKinsey had 
recently established a new office, and (2) his skill in regional economic analysis, 
which he practiced in both his graduate and undergraduate work.  Once hired, 
Wigdortz became a “junior associate”, a position at the bottom of the McKinsey’s 
organizational hierarchy.  In this structure, junior associates were gradually mentored 
in apprentice-style on how to analyze problems and present their ideas to elite clients 
(Handley et al. 2007).  This was particularly true at McKinsey where they were 
coached in how to dress and behave according to McKinsey’s protocols (O’Shea & 
Madigan 1997, pp.260–261).   
As McKinsey represented Wigdortz’s first permanent and professional job, 
he constructed his occupational identity around the firm’s values and practices in 
order to be successful, a common experience among new young consultants 
(Armbrüster 2004a).  As Handley et al. (2007) point out, new consultants develop the 
foundation of their work-based identity and practice as “good consultants” through 
their work as data analysts.  Handley et al. (2007) found that, because junior 
associates typically worked long hours performing data input and preliminary 
analysis for senior consultants, junior associates often took “considerable pride in 
their intellectual skills and the rigor of their analysis” (2007, p.186).  This theme 
exemplified “identity work” through which an analyst “expressed his identity as 
someone who had this intellectual ability” (p.186, emphasis in the original).  In this 
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light, Wigdortz’s view of his work as “intellectually rigorous” was not an uncommon 
assumption among new consultants and functioned to preserve his work identity and 
to cope with heavy workloads. 
Such occupational pride was also likely a response to being on the bottom of 
the organization’s power hierarchy.  Wigdortz’s pride in his analysis resembled the 
sense of occupational pride – expressed through “heroic” troubleshooting – by 
photocopier technicians in Orr’s (1996) ethnographic study.  Although featuring very 
different types of jobs, both cases represent work roles that were at the bottom of an 
organizational hierarchy, serving to distance workers relationally from managerial 
power and limiting their autonomy through close supervision, heavy workload, and 
lack of control and design over their work.  In response, the marginalized group took 
particular pride in their work and their skills, which contributed to their positive self-
identity and motivation at work.  Thus, Wigdortz was asserting his identity and 
worthiness within the competitive organizational culture and power hierarchy at 
McKinsey by regarding his work as “intellectually rigorous” and insightful despite 
relying on the consulting firm’s analytical templates and pre-selected variables in a 
sectoral context the business analysts were only vaguely familiar with.  In this way, 
Wigdortz attempted to fit in with McKinsey colleagues, which he was finding 
particularly difficult in London – where he recalled peers often deemed him the 
office “muppet” for saying something naïve or idiotic (Wigdortz 2012, p.45).  To 
brush off such teasing, Wigdortz developed particular pride in his analytic work. 
For these reasons, Wigdortz embraced McKinsey’s rational approach to 
problem solving, exhibited confidence and pride in his analysis and ability to solve 
clients’ problems.  However, he lacked the perspective to critically reflect on his 
work and did not typically question McKinsey’s methodology or interests because to 
do so would have been paramount to doubting his constructed work identity.  This 
identity and ability to solve problems was both challenged and relied upon as a 
buffer when Wigdortz stepped into London schools as he was unprepared for the 
apparent irrationality of what he observed.   
 
 
5.4.4  Wigdortz’s Descent into Sensemaking 
 
Before visiting schools, Wigdortz had already found a strong correlation 
between pupil achievement and family income.  But the reason for that connection 
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suddenly became confusing when he visited a chaotic school environment.  The 
experience sent him into what Weick terms an “occasion”, or episode, of 
sensemaking.  Although individuals constantly engage in making sense of the world 
and their own actions, particular episodes of sensemaking can be triggered, often 
dramatically, by an interruption in an individual’s sense of reality.  Examples of 
triggers include when an unexpected disaster occurs or when one starts a new job in 
an unfamiliar organization, causing an individual to reconsider or revise his/her 
understanding of social reality (Louis 1980; Weick 1990; Weick 1993; Gephart 
1993).   
Visiting a disadvantaged London school became an event in which 
Wigdortz’s sense of reality was challenged.  He noted that he found the school 
“didn’t look anything like what I had imagined” (Wigdortz 2012, p.18).  Instead, he 
found the conditions in schools “horrifying” and “eye-opening” (p.41) and likened it 
to a prison – “only worse” (p.17).  The experience did not resemble his childhood 
memories of schooling in a middle class neighborhood or growing up in a family in 
which his mother and other relatives were teachers.  Wigdortz had a rationalized 
image of schooling in his mind and, as the school visit progressed, less and less of 
what he saw made sense:  Teachers and students did not seem to be enacting their 
prescribed roles.  Students expressed negative attitudes toward school and learning.  
School staff seemed unfazed and indifferent to the lack of pupil engagement and 
chaos in the hallways.  It is worth noting that Wigdortz’s confusion stemmed from a 
lack of meaning, not from a lack of information – a common symptom in 
sensemaking (Weick 1995a, p.27).  He had studied Ofsted reports, yet when 
experiencing an environment that contradicted his expectations of what defined a 
school, Wigdortz had difficulty understanding what was going on.  Wigdortz could 
rationally hypothesize how “poverty” would present obstacles to pupils’ academic 
learning – e.g. lack of resources at home, younger siblings to look after, high student 
mobility, etc.  But he had not imagined a scenario in which the roles and routines of 
schooling were not enacted by students and staff.   
This collapse of role structure led him to disregard poverty-related factors 
and consider how to change the routines and culture within schools, which he 
reasoned would inevitably lead to greater pupil learning.  Moreover, with the 
deadline for the study’s completion nearing, Wigdortz needed to hypothesize a 
solution soon.  As Weick pointed out (1993, pp.638–39) “There is good evidence 
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that when people are put under pressure, they regress to their most habituated ways 
of responding.”  As a result, Wigdortz, drew on the War for Talent, which he had 
already applied in previous client engagements, for insight on how to improve the 
performance of schools.  In this way, he overlaid not just a McKinsey strategy onto 
school contexts but an organizational perspective – replete with meanings, values, 
and assumptions – to extrapolate meaning and propose a solution.  The War for 
Talent aided in his construction of an explanation for the chaos he observed in 
schools – staff were simply not talented, committed leaders.  Pupils, Wigdortz (2012) 
reasoned, were “being failed” by adults in their schools (p.40, italics in the original) 
and the “sheer unfairness” (p.41) of the situation disturbed him.  As Wigdortz 
formed a narrative to make meaning of the situation, he noted the poor physical 
conditions of schools and the economically depressed communities they were 
situated in, but disregarded these factors (effectively ignoring the structural 
inequalities producing them) as less important than teachers.  Wider historical, 
sociological, or economic contexts of education or local communities did not factor 
into his analysis nor solution. 
In this way, Wigdortz only focused on the human resource dimension of 
schools that fit his understanding of why organizations perform poorly.  The War for 
Talent provided the template that helped Wigdortz make sense of the environmental 
cues and provided a solution – attract the most talented people to teach in schools.  
Such talented people, he reasoned, could be recruited the same way McKinsey and 
other blue chip companies sought theirs – through recruiting the country’s most 
selective universities.  Using this logic, Wigdortz felt his solution was common 
sense, based on his data, and could powerfully change schools.  
Wigdortz’s struggle to make sense of the school conditions he observed 
affected Wigdortz emotionally, making him first confused and disheartened but then 
hopeful and determined once he felt he understood and had a solution to the 
situation.  Thus, he became enthusiastically motivated and personally committed to 
starting the graduate scheme with little understanding of why others may not share 
his perspective.  Others around Wigdortz, including the clients, did not experience a 
similar disorientation nor engage in sensemaking.  As a result, they did not feel the 
same emotional attachment or level of motivation as Wigdortz.  Other interviewees 
also had broader experiences in disadvantaged communities and were more aware of 
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the effects of structural inequalities and hence, were more realistic about the 
potential impact a TFA-type scheme could have.   
Furthermore, Wigdortz felt he personally came up with the idea for TfL 
because he engaged in sensemaking, a learning process that “is less about discovery 
than it is about invention” because it requires one “to construct, filter, frame, create 
facticity (Turner 1987), and render the subjective into something more tangible” 
(Weick 1995b, pp.13–14).  In Weick’s view, sensemaking requires higher 
engagement than interpretation and is the process of invention that precedes and 
makes possible interpretation.  Thus, others considering TfL in Phase I were not 
involved in the same disorienting learning process Wigdortz went through.  Instead, 
they were simply evaluating Wigdortz’s interpretation of the problem and solution, 
which he had formulated through sensemaking.  For them, TFA was the engaging 
and interactive learning experience that helped convince them of the merits of the 
idea.  This points to the power of experiential learning and helps explain why the 
War for Talent was an inspiration for Wigdortz but not for others.   
One final point about Wigdortz’s learning and perspective relates to 
innovation and his own role in moving TfL forward.  Although McKinsey had 
determined Wigdortz’s role, data sources, and methodology, Wigdortz was able to 
take ownership of his work through sensemaking and arriving at a recommendation 
for clients.  This, again, gave him a sense of pride and intellectual ownership over the 
idea and increased his faith in the scheme.  Unlike others, he held a rather starry-
eyed and unproblematic vision of the scheme and its potential impact, prompting him 
to take unpaid leave from his consulting position to become a policy entrepreneur.  
As a result, he felt he was acting boldly and leading the effort to launch the scheme.  
However, given his position on the team as a junior associate/analyst, the power 
dynamics at play did not deem Wigdortz the group’s leader nor preclude others from 
interpreting it as they saw it – a U.K. version of TFA.   
 
 
5.5  Summary of Discussion 
 
In this chapter, I have drawn upon historical development of London First 
and BITC to locate and illuminate their organizational interests and bring attention to 
the powerful and privileged networks each represented.  It was the intersection of 
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these interests, coupled with external pressures its leaders felt in 2001, which led 
them to team up to propose an intervention through which businesses could support 
challenging schools.  Through a partnership with McKinsey, the leaders London 
First and BITC discussed possible solutions but soon settled on the idea of 
replicating TFA in London after learning of its successes from TFA insiders.  In the 
next phase of the story, this team of policy entrepreneurs must convince others of the 
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CHAPTER 6:  PHASE II:  MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT FOR TFL 
 
  
6.1 The Policy Plot Thickens  
 
The second phase of Teach First’s development, what I term the 
“mobilization” period, took place between December 2001 and July 2002.  Starting 
with the recruitment of supportive business executives, the TfL team worked to 
convince a diverse array of leaders to back TfL, building relationships with those in 
and around government, the educational establishment and unions, as well as 
London’s philanthropic community.  (See the appendix A.3 for a diagram of key 
organizations and leaders that supported TfL from these sectors.)  Thus, the aim of 
this chapter is to reconstruct, from the interview data, the process through which 
Kiley and Wigdortz mobilized support for TfL and how and why leaders came to 
understand and endorse (or oppose) the idea.   
Organized thematically by sector as well as roughly chronologically, I 
recount the meetings that unlocked new pockets of support, with connections 
between people and social networks identified and highlighted.  I also provide brief 
biographies of interviewees as well as organizational histories to better illuminate 
their perspectives and contexts.  Furthermore, I use the term “TfL” during this phase 
to signify the idea for the scheme specifically in this period of time.  TfL was a 
concept which Kiley and Wigdortz had slightly different understandings of and 
which was developed and contested throughout Phase II before being launched as 
Teach First.  Thus, “TfL” represented an evolving idea though the majority saw the 
scheme as modeled on TFA.  
  What emerges from these accounts is a complex process, occurring over 
approximately seven months, of strategic campaigning and network-building.  Led 
by London First and McKinsey, Kiley tapped into the political, educational, and 
socially elite networks of London to recruit allies to her initiative.  Wigdortz worked 
with London’s leading education school to develop and adapt, or reinvent, 
Wigdortz’s original proposal.  However, as networks became central conduits 
through which awareness and support for TfL diffused, the topic of reinvention 
became a major stumbling block for supporters and opponents alike to reconcile.      
 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 166 
6.2 Building Businesses Support through BITC/London First Networks  
 
Among the first supporters recruited to back TfL were members of BITC, 
London First, and McKinsey.  BITC’s John May (Interview, 2/05/2012) recalled, 
“We started with corporate support, so [Kiley and I] both went to our own boards, 
presented, and got some considerable enthusiasm behind it.  In my case, that meant 
talking to Richard Handover, [CEO] at W.H. Smith [and BITC] chairman at that 
time.”  Kiley (Interview, 30/04/2012) also explained that “they got everyone at 
McKinsey excited about this” and said the plan was to find advocates from among 
businesses and universities first since both were members of London First.  The 
supporters around Kiley and Wigdortz represented a diverse team drawn from 
London First, BITC and McKinsey.  The group worked from two different offices – 
London First’s and McKinsey’s – both located near central London’s Trafalgar 
Square. 
The TfL team then began courting other business executives.  Serial 
entrepreneur Jo Owen summarized the strategy as rather straightforward – convince 
“one person at a time, one meeting at a time” of the merits of their idea.  “The 
McKinsey work was very, very important in terms of giving profile to this whole 
challenge and giving credibility to the idea that something needed to be done and 
could be done,” Owen recalled (Interview, 25/06/2012).  O’Brien echoed Owen’s 
point, noting that some leaders were weary of policy ideas imported from the U.S., a 
common occurrence in the 1980s and early 1990s, but said that McKinsey’s report, 
coupled with TFA’s profile, impressed them.  Owen further explained that the team’s 
initial strategy was not funding but legitimizing the idea. 
 
In the early days, we had a simple system where even if they wouldn’t 
give money, we’d just get them to sign the pledge.  And the pledge was no 
more than something along the lines of saying they thought it was a very 
good idea.  But then, of course, we could print brochures and stuff like 
that saying, “here’s the list of our supporters”… And we quite quickly 
[assembled] a list of quite impressive corporates who had taken the pledge 
and that built more confidence that this was an idea that was going to be 
going places.  
– Jo Owen, management consultant/serial entrepreneur 
Interview, 25/06/2012 
 
  While executives were signing up to endorse TfL, the Chief Executive of the 
Canary Wharf Group, George Iacobescu, became the first to offer funding.  
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Iacobescu had left Communist Romania in the 1970s and lived in Canada and the 
U.S. before relocating to London in 1988 to redevelop of the Isle of Dogs, part of the 
Borough of Tower Hamlets in London’s East End.  By 2002, he had overseen the 
construction of more than a dozen office buildings with nine more under 
construction in the area, creating what London newspapers called “a mini-
Manhattan” and “populated by some of the world’s biggest financial occupiers” 
(Judd 2001).  Renamed Canary Wharf, the area became London’s second major 
financial centre after The City, and Iacobescu had become one of the highest paid 
CEOs in London (Clement 2001).   
 Canary Wharf Group was a member of both BITC and London First, with 
Iacobescu serving as a director for the latter at the time.  Thus, when Kiley requested 
to meet with him, he agreed, knowing that she was also the wife of London’s new 
Transport Commissioner.   
 
When I met with Rona [Kiley] the first time, she told me that she’s getting 
very good compliments from everybody for her idea, and her idea was 
Teach For America… and that struck me as a fantastic idea…it’s almost 
like patriotic work.  And when I saw the number of people involved in 
Teach For America, I thought that you could create something very 
similar to it… But they had no funds, so then I said, “Look, it’s a great 
idea, I’d really like to make something like that happen because we’d be 
doing good not only for London but also for Tower Hamlets and it’s a 
way to help the redistribution of teachers and bring a lot more teachers 
into the system”. And that was the reason that I gave them the money.   
–  George Iacobescu, CEO of Canary Wharf Group, 
Interview, 11/01/2013 
 
The head of Tower Hamlets had also recently come to see Iacobescu, distressed that 
“they couldn’t get teachers in Tower Hamlets schools because the area was 
perceived to be so poor and the kids were perceived to be aggressive” (Iacobescu 
Interview, 11/01/2013).  This incident, coupled with Iacobescu’s view that TfL 
aligned with Canary Wharf’s CSR goal to ensure local community benefited from 
the area’s revitalization, convinced him to back the scheme.   
 Iacobescu subsequently met with Wigdortz and gave TfL £25,000, believing 
graduates in the programme would also benefit from seeing “a different aspect of 
life… how the rest of the people live and how difficult it is” (Iacobescu Interview, 
11/01/2013).  He then told his colleagues of the scheme and introduced Kiley and 
Wigdortz to other executives. 
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I made sure that we, as a company, and I as a person, told all the people 
that we were doing business [with] and all the tenants in Canary Wharf, 
which has a high concentration of financial services and companies that 
are able to help, we told them about Teach First.  But Brett [Widgortz] 
and his people [did] a very good job and went and saw all the tenants of 
Canary Wharf with Rona [Kiley]… We got them appointments and Rona 
[Kiley] got her own appointments [at] the level of chief executives or 
people in charge with community affairs. And they made their point. 
– George Iacobescu, CEO of Canary Wharf Group 
Interview, 11/01/2013 
 
Another early supporter who pledged £50,000 in seed funding to TfL through his 
company, Capital & Provident, was retired property trader Cyril Dennis.  Wigdortz 
could not recall how Dennis became a supporter of TfL but suggested Kiley recruited 
him.  Dennis’s sponsorship of the scheme appears to fit with his other charitable 
activities in support of schools at the time.  The Isreali-domiciled entrepreneur, worth 
an estimated £100 million, was already a benefactor to a Jewish primary school and, 
in February 2002, the DfES announced Dennis agreed to sponsor an academy in 
Liverpool (Henry & Thornton 2002).  In addition, another interviewee recalled 
Dennis became a close advisor in helping build TfL organizationally later that year 
and cited his ties to the Jewish community and its philanthropic ethos as among 
Dennis’s motives.  
Still, not all businesses agreed to support TfL.  Interestingly, Wigdortz (2012) 
described the reactions of the business community as primarily unsupportive and 
critical of TfL.  “During the first few months, it was difficult to get traction,” wrote 
Wigdortz (2012, p.59).  “We had meetings with… business leaders who struggled to 
understand how we would be able to attract and develop people that they were 
finding difficult to recruit themselves.”  Yet, Wigdortz’s judgment seemed to be 
based on the fact that few business leaders pledged funding for TfL at the time.  
However, businesses were helping in many other ways.  “Businesses thought this 
was a wonderfully exciting idea,” Kiley recalled, “and so lots of people gave us 
various kinds of help – arrange a meeting with their consultant for us and different 
things, and we wouldn’t have to pay for it” (Interview, 30/04/2012).  In this way, 
several corporate executives came to support TfL, symbolically and in-kind, in those 
first weeks and months.  Meanwhile, Kiley looked for a strategic ally for TfL in 
higher education.   
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6.3. Introducing TfL to Government 
As Kiley and Wigdortz approached businesses for their support, McKinsey 
sent a letter to the Department of Education and Skills (DfES) in an effort to interest 
government in their idea.  The letter subsequently landed on the desk of Graham 
Holley, a senior civil servant at the DfES.  He had joined the DfES in his early 20s 
and he had spent three decades working there, with short stints in various Whitehall 
departments and agencies.  At the time, Holley was the divisional manager generally 
responsible for teacher recruitment, including teacher modernization.  Holley said the 
letter was sent by McKinsey and recalled civil servants were not keen on the idea.  
“Officials were being quite cool about [TfL] because there were already lots of 
teacher education programmes,” he said (Interview, 30/05/2012), “and the thrust in 
the [DfES] at the time was to rationalize programmes rather than add to the number.”  
In response to teacher shortages, the government had created several new routes into 
teaching in recent years.  Civil servants did not see how TfL fit into those efforts.   
   
Inside the [DfES], there was a certain coolness about the idea [because] 
there was a serious teacher recruitment crisis at the time… Some schools 
were thinking and indeed implementing four-day weeks because there 
weren’t enough teachers...  And all of the effort inside a quite lowly 
manned but very busy DfES was in trying to make the existing schemes of 
recruitment work as well as they could rather than add unproven 
programmes to an already quite complicated scene for teacher 
recruitment.  That was it really.  Here we were struggling as to make the 
mainstream work well, at the end of our tether in the middle of a teaching 
recruitment crisis, hanging on by the skin of our teeth, and here comes 
someone wanting to take money away from that programme to create a 
new one that isn’t yet proven.  That was the original skepticism.  
– Graham Holley, Divisional Manager, DfES   
Interview, 30/05/2012 
 
TfL’s resemblance to TFA, which Holley had vaguely heard of, did not convince 
Holley it was necessarily a good idea.  
 
I picked up what [TFA] was mainly all about and saw that there was 
a lot of passion involved, and it clearly had made a contribution in 
America.  But what I wasn’t sure about was whether a slightly 
different scheme that was being proposed for London was likely to 
have the same effect with different people…  The problem we 
always have in education is working out which concepts will 
translate easily from another country to this country.   
– Graham Holley, Divisional Manager, DfES   
Interview, 30/05/2012 
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Holley explained he and his colleagues at the DfES often looked abroad for new 
ideas.  He was a member of European policy networks and frequently gathered 
research evidence from further afield, mainly through UNESCO.  Around 2002, he 
recalled, “New Zealand was particularly interesting [as] they were at the time 
thinking about quite unique ways to train teachers.” 
With the DfES expressing little interest in TfL, Holley passed McKinsey’s 
letter to the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), the executive non-departmental body 
responsible for funding initial teacher training.  The TTA, which was established in 
1994 and, in 2002, was located in the Portland House skyscraper in Westminster, had 
two specific responsibilities:  (1) to recruit prospective teachers to enter initial 
teacher training (ITT) each year from the graduate labour market, and (2) to ensure 
that the quality of ITT provided was at the highest possible level (Tabberer 2003, 
p.2).  To accomplish this, the TTA had the power to purchase ITT provision and thus 
allocate training places to providers, mainly universities and school consortia, based 
on the quality of their programme (as rated by inspection reports).  Although the 
DfES funded the TTA, it remained separate and autonomous with its own board and 
remit.  Holley was the TTA’s departmental “sponsor”, who oversaw the agency’s 
work.  Sponsors acted as middle managers who, while not as senior as the agency’s 
Chief Executive, were “immensely valuable advisors and support [and] make sure 
everything is lined up properly, that the money comes at the right time, that the 
policy doesn’t go in different directions” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).  
Upon receiving the McKinsey letter, the TTA staff agreed to meet with 
Wigdortz in mid-December about TfL.  Wigdortz, with little understanding of 
England’s teacher training, was unprepared for the TTA officer’s reaction to his 
proposal.  Referring to the meeting as the “70 Competencies Speech”, Wigdortz 
(2011) recalled, “I remember sitting with a woman [at the TTA] who had her arms 
crossed and said, ‘OK, it’s an interesting idea but how are you going to [address], 
competency number 3.6 or … 2.1’ and I had no idea, no answer for her.  So I hadn’t 
actually thought through all the implications of this.”   
This was the first of several meetings between the TTA and Wigdortz along 
with some of his supporters, including May, who recalled the adverse reaction of 
TTA officers.  
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We first of all had quite a lot of negotiating to do with the Teacher 
Training Agency, and they just didn’t seem to be biting at all.  They 
were talking about the gold standard of the training that they undertook 
already, that this would be a new route into teaching and one that they 
felt would not properly equip young adults to be working with children.  
That certainly was the initial reaction. 
– John May, Director of Business & Education, BITC  
Interview, 2/05/2012 
 
Lorraine Marriott, who joined the TTA in 2000 after working as an accountant in the 
private sector, confirmed the TTA was uninterested in TfL.  Marriott was a project 
manager in one of the TTA’s “less traditional” units, tasked with managing new 
innovations such as developing online teacher testing programmes.  She recalled 
colleagues responded skeptically to what they called the “McKinsey idea”. 
 
[Initial reactions within the TTA were]  “Who are these guys?  What do 
they think they’re doing?  What do they know about teaching?”  And it 
was very negative at the beginning, quite rightly, because most of the 
people that we came into contact with initially [from TfL were] young, 
American sometimes, people that were loosely within education but were 
not strictly teachers through the channels that all these people in the TTA 
and the Department had come through.  
–  Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA 
Interview, 6/12/2012 
 
However, Marriott pointed out that while some of her colleagues rejected TfL 
instinctively, others had rational concerns.  “The thing about [TfL] was that there was 
no legal basis to have training in the way proposed,” Marriott said.  “It couldn’t go 
through the Fast Track route because… the trainees didn’t have any kind of PGCE 
background [or] teacher training” (Marriott Interview, 6/12/2012). 
Concerns about cost and teacher retention only added to the reluctance of 
TTA staff to consider TfL.  Such vocal skeptics confounded Wigdortz.  “[TTA staff] 
were great people [but] they had a certain role to perform with Brett [Wigdortz], and 
I don’t think Brett was used to dealing with such bureaucracy, and these [TTA] 
people were like dealing with the bureaucratic side of the bureaucracy,” Marriott 
recalled (Interview, 6/12/2012). 
 Many within the TTA had not heard of TFA before but were not impressed 
by its success in the U.S. and similarities to TfL.  For all these reasons, the TTA tried 
to dismiss the idea. 
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[TfL proponents] were really challenging every single concept about 
teaching… The [TTA’s] thoughts were – it’s never going to work, it’s 
never going to happen, just keep these guys quiet for a little while, tell 
them you’ve looked and, you know, just basically push them aside.  So we 
had a look.  We had some meetings really early on with McKinsey guys, 
and eventually things appeared like we couldn’t just push it under the 
table.  We couldn’t just get rid of it.   
– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA 
Interview, 6/06/2012 
 
While Wigdortz met with the TTA, Kiley set up a meeting with Stephen 
Timms, the Minister of State for School Standards.  Timms had graduated from 
Cambridge and then worked in the telecommunications industry for fifteen years 
before becoming a Member of Parliament (MP) in 1994 representing London’s East 
End (Newham Council n.d.).  As a Labour MP, Timms served in ministerial posts at 
the Department of Social Security and the Treasury before being appointed Schools 
Minister in June 2001.  Timms first learned of TfL sometime in December 2001 or 
January 2002. 
 
I’d been approached by London First to promote this idea [TfL] and 
urged that we should run with it.  It was Rona Kiley, and she had some 
very strong business support, including Richard Greenhalgh, the 
chairman of Unilever at the time, [and] somebody from WH Smith.  
There were a number of very senior businesses saying that they thought 
this idea could work…  It was clear… that businesses had two interests 
in [TfL].  One was that this was going to raise the standard of teaching in 
schools and the achievements of young people, and therefore be a 
benefit to the businesses themselves for their recruitment later on… But 
also, they were interested in being able to recruit – into managerial and 
demanding placements within their own organizations – young people 
who had done [TfL] for two years.  
– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards  
Interview, 26/04/2012 
 
Timms said he was interested in the idea because of the potentially positive impact 
such a scheme coud have in his constituency, which he described as “very, very 
inner-city”.  He saw TfL as a way to bring “really enthusiastic, committed, energetic 
young people” into schools “to give a chance to some of the very bright kids growing 
up in my constituency but [who] historically often had not really had the chance to 
fulfill their potential.” 
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While Timms said he looked positively on the scheme, he did not give this 
impression to others at the time.  May, who attended Kiley’s meetings with Timms, 
recalled that it was difficult to discuss the scheme while civil servants were present.   
 
I remember having conversations with the [DfES], and sitting, trying to 
persuade ministers that this was an important programme and recognizing 
that we weren’t really making much of an inroad.  Not, I suspect, because 
the ministers weren’t interested, but certainly the officials were less than 
interested… We sat in a meeting with Stephen Timms, … and he was 
clearly being directed by his officials not to be particularly supportive.  
–  John May, Director of Education, BITC 
Interview, 2/05/2012 
 
Another interviewee also commented that the minister “lacked confidence and lacked 
understanding” of the model, making him reluctant to voice his support for it.   
While Timms maintained he was supportive from the start, he confirmed his 
civil servants were not keen on developing it. 
 
There was some skepticism [within the DfES] – you know, this was an 
American idea.  We had a perfectly good system.  Ok, we weren’t 
getting at the moment the numbers [of teachers] we wanted, but – I think 
there was some official reluctance to do this completely new thing, 
which sort of undermined the traditional structures.  And they were 
focused on getting the traditional structures to work and not being 
distracted from that onto doing this very new thing.  
– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards  
Interview, 26/04/2012 
 
With government not particularly interested in TfL, Kiley looked for a wider net of 
supporters to gain further credibility. 
 
 
6.4 Involving the Institute of Education 
 
TfL needed allies among the educational establishment to improve its 
chances of becoming established.  For this reason, Kiley sought out the Director of 
London’s Institute of Education (IOE), Geoff Whitty.  The IOE was one of three 
education schools associated with the University of London and was located in the 
Bloomsbury district of central London.  The IOE was among the country’s leading 
educational research bodies and trained approximately 900 teachers annually.  It was 
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also a member of London First, which was the network through which Whitty said 
Kiley first contacted him with the idea for TfL.  
As Director of the IOE, Whitty was well-known and widely respected in 
London education circles.  Whitty had come from a family of teachers and had 
wanted to be a teacher in a state school from a young age.  Upon finishing secondary 
school in the mid-1960s, he spent a gap year as an “uncertificated” teacher in an 
inner-city primary school.  Determined to return to teaching, Whitty then attended 
Cambridge University on a scholarship where he earned a bachelor’s degree in 
history and political science (as the university did not yet offer one in Education).  
Next, Whitty attended the IOE and earned a PGCE.  He began teaching in schools 
around Londonn and went on to earn a master’s in the sociology of education from 
the IOE.  Aferward, in 1973, he moved into teacher training at the University of 
Bath.  Whitty then continued his career in higher education with a focus on 
sociological research.  He held posts at King's College London, Bristol Polytechnic, 
and Goldsmiths College before returning to the IOE as a professor in 1992.  He 
became the IOE’s Dean of Research in 1998 and then was appointed its Director in 
2000.  In this role, he represented the IOE in London First and agreed to meet Kiley 
regarding her idea. 
On 28 January 20022 Kiley and Wigdortz met with Whitty and Michael 
Totterdell, the then head of the secondary PGCE programme at the IOE.  They 
discussed McKinsey’s study and the proposal for TfL.  Totterdell described the 
McKinsey report as mainly focused on education in relation to businesses.  “They 
made a very clear connection in terms of inadequate education provision in London 
and therefore, an underachieving workforce,” Totterdell said (Interview, 
23/11/2012).  While Wigdortz’s statistics surprised neither Whitty nor Totterdell, 
they were perplexed by the report’s lack of understanding of the U.K. context and 
underdevelopment of the TfL concept. 
 
[People] seem to be operating on the assumption that Teach First was a 
formed idea [at that point], and it wasn’t.  Both Brett [Wigdortz] and Rona 
[Kiley] were educational, and frankly typical, neophytes.  They didn’t 
have much of a clue as to how the English education system operated.  
What they had was a notion of what they would like to do [and] they knew 
they needed accreditation.  They were asking us to help shape the idea and 
                                                        
2 Exact dates of IOE meetings were gleaned from Whitty’s professional and personal diaries from 
2002, available at the IOE archives. 
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introduce them to the world of teacher education in such a way that that 
idea would have traction and would attract the funding necessary to make 
it realizable.  So there wasn’t a hard formed idea when they first 
approached us… There was an analysis [and] an outline of the idea, which 
was a sort of conversionist notion of bringing Teach For America to the 
U.K. via the City of London… 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
While Totterdell had not heard of TFA before, Whitty had.  When TFA was 
established in 1990, Whitty was on an academic sabbatical at the University of 
Wisconsin in Madison and had friends at the university working on developing the 
TFA training programme for Wendy Kopp. 
  
I was involved because I happened to be there, in some of that training.  
So I knew about Teach For America very early on… I’d particularly liked 
[its] espirit de corps.  So when I was first involved in discussions about 
Teach For London, I came to it with a generally positive view that it was 
something that we should support.  I have to say, I was probably in a 
minority of one within the teacher education establishment in England at 
the time.  
– Geoff Whitty, Director of the IOE 
Interview, 9/07/2012 
 
Whitty also recalled Kiley and Wigdortz clearly did not understand England’s 
educational context. 
 
It was a relatively uninformed analysis [and] very culturally insensitive to 
the English situation and attempted to import Teach For America in a 
manner that I judged would get nowhere.  And I persuaded Rona [Kiley], 
not sure about Brett [Wigdortz], that actually they needed to be more 
culturally sensitive to the London/U.K. situation if it was to get 
anywhere…  One of the big issues was whether the teacher trade unions 
would respond positively to it.  And Brett had a concept that the English 
teaching unions were the same as the American teaching unions, and 
therefore, you had to find a way around them rather than trying to 
embrace them. 
– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE 
 Interview, 9/07/2012 
 
Whitty said these issues concerned him and Totterdell, so they agreed to become 
involved.  “I wanted to help them make it culturally acceptable in the U.K./London 
context,” Whitty said [Interview, 9/07/2012].  Kiley confirmed Whitty’s initial 
enthusiasm for the scheme due to his positive view of TFA.  Totterdell, on the other 
hand, agreed to develop the idea forward to improve teacher training. 
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I was asked basically to do three things.  One, to come up with some sort 
of an analysis as to how we might make [TfL] happen.  Secondly, to 
broker meetings with key players of influence in the world of education 
at the time to basically sell the idea.  And thirdly, to come up with a 
model that would be attractive firstly to the kind of people that they 
wished to recruit, secondly to the schools, and thirdly to the education 
establishment in the sense of those who had a reformist mind-set and 
were trying to look for new angles for teacher education that might 
indeed be more transformative than the more orthodox approaches 
around. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
In the months that followed, Whitty and Totterdell played different roles in 
promoting TfL.  Whitty said he played an “outward-facing” role, helping introduce 
Kiley and Wigdortz to union leaders and his influential contacts in government.  
Meanwhile, Totterdell played an “inward-facing” role, working with Wigdortz to 
develop the programme’s training model and helping to “sell” the idea to new 
audiences.  As supporters of TfL, Whitty and Totterdell helped introduce Kiley and 
Wigdortz to others at the TTA but found similar resistance.  “So we started a 
conversation,” Totterdell recalled, “[but] the TTA were not desperately interested at 
first… they weren’t encouraging.”  However, after deciding to back TfL, Whitty 
contacted other government insiders to help move the idea forward. 
 
Bringing Barber Aboard 
In the days after first meeting Kiley and Wigdortz in late January, Whitty 
phoned Michael Barber, a former colleague and “close friend” of his.  At the time, 
Barber was the Head of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit at 10 Downing Street.  In 
this role, he was responsible for overseeing the implementation of various 
government initiatives and reported directly to Tony Blair.  Barber, who had started 
his career as a teacher after graduating from Oxford, also worked in various positions 
at the NUT before becoming an academic alongside Whitty at the IOE.  Whitty said 
he personally called Barber and encouraged him to consider TfL and meet with Kiley 
and Wigdortz.  This led to a meeting between the four on the 13th of February 2002.   
 Upon learning of the scheme, Barber recalled he was “an enthusiast for [TfL] 
from the start” [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015], noting that he had already 
known of TFA through his dialogues from 1997 onward with U.S. policy-makers and 
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the Clinton administration.  He indicated he “admired” TFA and thus saw the 
potential of TfL to make a similar contribution.  However, he also recalled, “I 
thought it was important to shape [TfL] so it became an element of our wider 
strategy for the reform of the teaching profession, which Ralph Tabberer was leading 
and which built on the [Green] Paper I had led on [entitled] ‘Teachers: Meeting the 
Challenge of Change’” [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015].  That Green Paper, 
published in December 1998, had called for a number of changes in teacher 
recruitment, training, and employment including a number of initiatives aimed at 
attracting, improving, and rewarding high-quality teachers – aims that arguably 
aligned with TfL’s.  Barber also indicated that TfL fit into the London Challenge 
initiative that he and Andrew Adonis, head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit, were 
helping to develop within the DfES.   Thus, believing that “TfL would have more 
impact [as part of a wider strategy] than as separate initiative”, Barber spoke to 
Andrew Adonis, head of the TTA Ralph Tabberer, and others at the DfES about 
supporting the scheme [Personal correspondence, 15/11/2015]. 
Kiley confirmed Barber “thought it was a good idea”, and May credited 
Barber’s endorsement with bringing about more government support for TfL. 
 
Behind the scenes, [we were] persuading Michael Barber that actually 
this really was a good thing and that we needed to do something to help 
London schools that was generally revolutionary rather than simply 
doing more of the same.  And I think that support then trickled through 
to ministers, and the attitude changed, but it was still difficult.   
– John May, Director of Education, BITC 
Interview, 2/05/2012 
 
Barber was also a friend of Totterdell’s and the two subsequently met to discuss TfL.  
Totterdell described Barber as “quite a strong champion” of the scheme who 
“certainly would have influenced not just [Andrew] Adonis, but the Prime Minister, 
who took an interest very early on.”  He also recalled David Miliband3, a Labour MP 
and former head policy advisor to Blair, became interested in the scheme.  
 
 
                                                        
3 David Miliband was the former head of the Blair’s Policy Unit until he was elected as a member of 
Parliament in June 2001.  He remained a backbench MP until he was appointed to replace Timms as 
Schools Minister in June 2002. 
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6.5 Ministers Learn More About TFA 
 
Meanwhile, Kiley attempted to convince Timms of TfL’s merits by arranging 
for him to learn more about TFA during his upcoming trip to Washington, D.C. in 
February 2002.   
 
I think I said that I’d really like to look at this [TFA] when I go to the 
States.  So the trip to the U.S. was already planned, but I was able to 
vary the agenda a bit in order to meet some people from Teach For 
America, which I did and was impressed… I remember very clearly 
visiting a school where there were some Teach For America 
participants...  I thought it was an attractive model. 
– Stephen Timms, Minister of School Standards  
Interview, 26/04/2012 
 
Kiley recalled she planned Timms’s introduction to TFA during his trip abroad, 
which she felt ignited his enthusiasm for the idea.      
 
We had it all arranged for him [Timms] to do this visit with TFA in 
Washington because he was going to Washington for a meeting.  And then 
it happened that while he was there, there was going to be a fundraiser for 
[TFA] in Washington, and we got him to sit at a table with Hillary 
Clinton4 and Laura Bush5.  And so, we really worked it, sort of getting 
him jazzed up about it.  (laughs)  But then he came back and [those at] the 
Department of Education – the people that are on the permanent 
bureaucracy – were very careful.  They saw this as upsetting the system.  
So we’d have a meeting with [Timms] and there would be six people 
standing behind him or sitting around quietly taking notes as if he was the 
“yes” minister, right? (laughs) Well, it did feel like that – [and] that there 
are all these people that are going to say: “You must be careful about this 
and you must be careful about that” – not in front of us – [but] whatever 
enthusiasm he had may have been masked by that.     
–  Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First  
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
While Kiley suspected the civil servants dampened Timms’s enthusiasm for TfL, the 
trip motivated him to bring it to the attention of the Secretary of State for Education, 
Estelle Morris.  Morris had earned a Bachelor’s in Education and taught in Coventry 
comprehensives before joining Parliament in 1992 as a Labour MP from 
                                                        
4 Hillary Clinton, the wife of the previous U.S. president, Bill Clinton, was a U.S. Senator at that time.  
5 Laura Bush, the wife of the then President George W. Bush, had designated TFA as one of five 
education-related programs that would receive her special attention and support (Klein 2003). 
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Birmingham.  She recalled that Timms’s experience triggered her interest in the 
scheme. 
 
Stephen Timms went on a ministerial trip to the States and he saw [TFA] 
in action, and he came back and… said, “I was really impressed by it 
and I think we should look at it, about introducing it here.”… I actually 
think had he not been on that trip and suggested we look at it, we 
certainly would not have introduced it when we did.  
– Estelle Morris, Education Secretary  
Interview, 16/04/2012 
 
Timms’s enthusiasm for TFA convinced Morris to look favourably on TfL.  “I was 
very much in favor of it,” Morris said (Interview, 16/04/2012), “but the thing that 
did worry me [was] the length of training because I do believe in training teachers.”  
She added, “I’m not somebody who thinks that just because you got a first class 
degree you can go and be a teacher.”  Still, while her concerns prompted her to ask 
questions, Morris said her career as a teacher made her believe that a programme 
like TfL was needed.  “I knew we needed to be more innovative…  I taught for 18 
years and think it is increasingly difficult to teach all your life,” Morris said 
(Interview, 16/04/2012), “And I thought… if people will give us five or ten years [in 
teaching], we might need to say that’s the best we can hope for.”  Morris also said 
she saw the scheme as a way to potentially improve the society’s image of teachers.   
Though supportive, Morris was not directly involved in the discussions about 
the scheme.  “We didn’t meet with her at all,” Kiley recalled (Interview, 4/30/2012).  
Nevertheless, through Timms’s visit to the U.S., Kiley showcased TFA’s work and 
high-profile supporters and generated interest in TfL amongst education ministers 
despite the concerns of civil servants. 
 
 
6.6 “Courting” the Unions and Wider Education Establishment 
 
On Whitty’s advice, Kiley and Wigdortz recognized they needed the support of 
the teacher trade unions and hence planned their approach carefully.  “You see, we 
knew what enemies the unions were [to TFA] in the U.S.,” Kiley said (Interview, 
30/04/2012), “and so we really worked at courting the unions.”  Kiley and her 
colleagues first approached the headteacher unions and the teacher unions afterward, 
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reasoning the latter would more difficult to bring on board.  Whitty and Totterdell 
recalled they helped make the first introductions to the headteacher unions. 
The two headteachers unions at the time were the National Association of Head 
Teachers (NAHT) and the Secondary Heads Association (SHA)6.  The NAHT, the 
older and larger of the two, was established in 1897 and had more than 20,000 school 
leaders as members across England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Its General 
Secretary, David Hart, was a solicitor by trade and became head of the NAHT in 
1979.  He was known as an effective negotiator and a highly-respected voice within 
education and government circles (Garner 2005).  The SHA was established much 
later, in 1977, and had more than 10,000 secondary headteachers as members in 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  Its General Secretary, John Dunford, 
estimated the SHA had around 1,000 members in London alone.  Dunford had 
become the General Secretary of the SHA in 1998 after working more than a decade 
as a member of its national council and serving as its president in 1995-96.  Dunford 
had graduated from the University of Nottingham, earned a PGCE, and taught in 
Northeast England secondaries during the 1970s before becoming a headteacher in 
1982.  Later, he gained a Master’s degree and a doctorate from the University of 
Durham. 
When Hart and Dunford met with Kiley and Wigdortz, they both supported the 
idea.  Dunford, who said he saw it as “an idea borrowed from America”, felt the 
scheme was needed. 
 
It seemed to me right from the outset that this was an idea that had merit 
for lot of reasons.  One, it would help us with the teachers supply crisis.  
Secondly, it would attract more graduates with very good degrees into 
teaching and thus help to make teaching a more highly regarded 
profession.  
– John Dunford, General Secretary, SHA,  
Interview, 9/05/2012 
 
Hart was also supportive of TfL.  However, as one interviewee pointed out, TfL was 
aimed at helping secondary schools and thus the support of the SHA was more 
important because its members were secondary heads while the NAHT’s 
membership was mostly primary heads.  Thus, Dunford agreed to become a vocal 
advocate of the scheme amongst the SHA’s London members.  
                                                        
6 In 2006, the SHA was renamed the Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL). 
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There were two things I did at that time.  One was to help gradually in 
bringing the other unions on side to the concept of [TfL].  But much more 
important than that, to sell the idea to the secondary headteachers in 
London who were members of the association that I led… So I went along 
to the early meetings that [TfL] had with London secondary headteachers 
to explain the concept to them and to get them to sign up [to take TfL] 
teachers. 
– John Dunford, General Secretary, SHA 
Interview, 9/05/2012 
 
Dunford noted that SHA members outside London often faced teacher shortages but 
“they all recognized that the difficulties of teacher recruitment in London were much 
worse, and therefore they were either supportive or, at best, agnostic about a 
programme that helped London exclusively” (Interview, 9/05/2012).  As a result, 
Dunford encountered relatively little opposition to TfL from his members. 
Totterdell also attended these meetings with headteachers, often organized as 
social events, to help recruit school leaders that would endorse the scheme. 
 
[Among heads], there was a lot of interest.  [And] what we could 
demonstrate was a significant cadre of headteachers would sign up to 
this, would welcome it and would make the commitment in terms of the 
funding of the posts… And I knew many of those headteachers because 
I’d been into their schools and because they were part of our own 
partnership at the Institute of Education.  So my role was, basically, to 
make them feel that this was something that could help them and could 
bring a new dimension and a new dynamic to their schools that was 
sustainable year on year.  
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
During these events, London headteachers also raised a number of their concerns, 
including what Totterdell referred to as “about helicoptering in and helicoptering out” 
teachers.  This referred to the staff instability that may result from hiring teachers with 
a limited two-year time commitment.  The TfL team addressed this issue by 
referencing evidence from TFA.  “Brett [Wigdortz] was pretty good at doing a 
breakdown analysis of the figures from [TFA], which indicated a substantial 
commitment by a substantial percentage [of their teachers],” Totterdell said 
(Interview, 23/11/2012) adding, “That was enough for [headteachers] to see that the 
residual benefits, as well as the interventionist benefit, could be significant.”  TFA 
had reported that approximately two-thirds of its alumni remained working in 
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education-related fields.  Totterdell also pointed out that once they set those figures 
against the annual turnover in disadvantaged schools, it was “very easy” to make an 
argument that TfL could provide “significant continuity.”  
Totterdell also recalled how Wigdortz used stories of TFA to bolster his 
argument that TfL would be able to recruit high-quality individuals.  “Brett 
[Wigdortz] had done some very good profiling of Teach For America and used to put 
on the table vignettes of the kind of the people who could be attracted,” Totterdell 
said (Interview, 23/11/2012), adding, “He’d also done a very good job of networking 
with the top six [or] ten universities, so he… demonstrate on paper that [TfL] had a 
commitment [from such universities] allowing him to go in and recruit and they 
would be supportive.”  Finally, headteachers were also told that TfL teachers who 
leave the classroom could also become “very powerful advocates for education in the 
business community in London” (Totterdell, Interview 23/11/2012).  While some 
headteachers became enthused by the potential benefits of TfL, Totterdell recalled 
others supported the idea simply because they needed more teachers. 
With the support of leaders from the SHA, NAHT, and IOE, the proponents of 
TfL shifted their attention to the teacher unions – the National Union of Teachers 
(NUT), the National Association of Schoolmasters/Union of Women Teachers 
(NASUWT), and the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL).  The NUT 
operated in only England and Wales but was the largest teacher union with 
approximately 215,000 members in 2001 (BBC 2001b).  In contrast, the NASUWT 
and ATL operated in all parts of the U.K. and had approximately 190,000 and 
150,000 members respectively (BBC 2001b), both which – unlike the NUT –  
included teaching assistants. Kiley recalled approaching all three unions regarding 
TfL. 
 
Having learned from the mistakes that Wendy [Kopp] made, we tried to 
start out on the right foot and pretty early on, sat down with 
representatives of the NUT, the NASUWT, and the ATL.  The NUT 
[wasn’t] really exactly hostile, but they weren’t going to back us.  And the 
NASUWT – they were very negative, or some of them were… [and they 
were] was on the radio denouncing us… Only one, the ATL, they were 
fine with it.  They decided to endorse us right away – they came to our 
first breakfast.   
–  Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012   
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Dunford also recalled the skepticism of the teacher unions.  “Classroom teachers felt 
that Teach Firsters were being pitched into the classroom without any real training 
and they undermined the professionalism of teaching,” Dunford said (Interview, 
9/05/2012). 
 According to John Bangs, one of the policy leaders of the NUT, these practical 
concerns were linked to a much wider frustration felt by the teacher unions at the way 
TfL was being presented. 
 
The promotion of Teach First has never really varied… it’s about getting 
high-flying graduates into teaching and having them in schools in 
socially-deprived areas.  And they were described then, and now, as the 
best teachers on the block.  And response of the [teacher] unions was of 
anger, to be honest, certainly from the NUT at that particular spin – that 
these teachers [were going to be] far better than teachers that went on 
teacher training courses from other universities and colleges. 
– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT 
Interview, 3/10/2012 
 
Bangs, who had been an art teacher in London secondaries for twenty years before 
joining the NUT in 1990, understood his union’s anger but was somewhat 
supportive of the idea.  Still, he remained critical of how it proposed promoting the 
teaching profession to recent graduates. 
 
Its greatest flaw at the time… and one of the things that unions criticized 
them for, was that… to attract high-flying graduates, [TfL] would say to 
them, “you are only expected to teach in school for two years, and then 
you could go off and do… the rest of your career.”  And that kind of 
parachuting into socially-deprived schools was one of the biggest mistakes 
because kids in those schools need consistency and having someone there 
who’s committed to them for the long-term... But [TfL] was an idea [that] 
felt very much like one of those Blairite things about what we need is 
magic solutions [like academies]… It was a top down approach to meeting 
the issues of social deprivation and lack of social mobility. 
– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT 
Interview, 3/10/2012 
 
Although Bangs said he was not familiar with TFA in the U.S., he recalled that TfL 
was very much seen by the unions as an attempt to import TFA.  “For the NUT, 
[TfL] seemed to be of the order of a range of New Labour initiatives that were 
plucked out of the air and were modeled rather insecurely on initiatives that had 
taken place in the U.S.,” he recalled.  Yet, on a personal level, Bangs embraced 
TfL’s broader message. 
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[TfL] sounded very exciting actually because it met, in a sense, the 
Labour government’s agenda, which I agreed with, that actually you 
needed to ensure social mobility, and [not] always assume that the 
people who were [teaching] in tough schools were always going to be 
people who had lower degrees…. [TfL’s] view was –  Why shouldn’t 
anyone be a teacher? Why do we always exclude people who might have 
about a career in banking or finance?  Why do they automatically ignore 
teaching?  Why shouldn’t they come in and have an impact?  It was an 
idealistic view, and I [didn’t] particularly have a problem with that. 
– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT 
Interview, 3/10/2012 
 
Bangs said he ultimately convinced the NUT “to not oppose [TfL] but to stand away 
from it – just to park it, in a way, to have a neutral approach towards it.”  He 
indicated part of this response was pragmatic.  “We, as a union didn’t go in for big 
public criticism of it because all those students in [TfL] were potentially union 
members, and you don’t alienate student teachers by telling them they’re on the 
wrong course,” he recalled. 
As a result, the NUT was less critical of TfL than some had anticipated.  Serial 
entrepreneur Jo Owen, who served as Wigdortz’s mentor in launching TfL, recalled 
that others had told them to expect the unions to be “a nightmare” because “they were 
all very left wing”.  However, Owen (Interview, 12/06/2012) said he was surprised by 
the willingness of the unions to consider the idea, noting “They clearly had the 
interests of their members at heart, and we had to respect that and find a way of 
positioning [TfL] so that… it would actually sit alongside their agendas in a suitable 
way.”  Although not all the teacher unions decided to support TfL at the time, Owen 
gave them credit for not denouncing the scheme.  “They heard our story, heard our 
pitch and asked hard and probing questions,” he said.  May, of BITC, echoed Owen’s 
surprise.  “We spent some considerable time speaking on a one-to-one basis with 
trade union leaders,” May recalled, “and we were quite surprised by the way in which 
they were prepared to look at different ways of moving forward.”   
While unions were discussing TfL, Totterdell promoted the scheme among 
members of the University Council Education and Teachers (UCET).  At the time, 
Totterdell was the Vice-Chair of UCET, a national forum for networking and policy 
formation among teacher educators and researchers.  “I negotiated some support [for 
TfL] from them,” he recalled (Interview, 23/11/2012), “[but] I would have to say 
UCET didn’t like them.”  UCET members and others within higher education 
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opposed TfL in part, according to Totterdell, because they understood it as the same 
as TFA.  “Some English researchers who did the same [as UCET members] just 
lifted stuff straight out of the American critiques [of TFA] in the early days, which 
was unhelpful,” Totterdell recalled (Interview, 23/11/2012).  Thus, while TFA 
impressed some, its shortcomings in the eyes of leading American educationalists fed 
teacher educators’ concerns regarding TfL in the U.K. 
In sum, the two headteacher unions embraced TfL while the teacher unions’ 
response to TfL was varied with the ATL supporting it, the NASUWT rejecting it, 
and the NUT undecided in their position.  At the same time, the teacher education 
establishment was generally opposed to the idea despite the IOE’s endorsement.  
Nevertheless, Kiley and her colleagues continued to promote TfL to new audiences. 
 
 
6.7 Developing the Training Model for TfL 
 
As TfL was pitched to external audiences, Wigdortz had a series of meetings 
with Totterdell to discuss how teacher training for the programme should work.  
They knew the training model needed to appeal to a number of stakeholders, and 
Totterdell was keen to help, believing current teacher education programmes were 
inadequate.  His views were shaped by his experiences in the military where he had 
spent ten years working in various units, including the elite intelligence service.  
Toward the end of his military career in 1980, he became interested in education 
through a mission in post-civil war Zimbabwe during which he designed and 
delivered “a creative educational programme” for former combatants.  Afterwards, 
Totterdell returned to London, earned a bachelor’s degree and then completed a 
PGCE at London’s IOE, purposely avoiding undergraduate programmes in 
Education due to his concerns with its quality and low status.  Totterdell then taught 
in secondary schools while earning a master’s degree at the IOE.  In 1991, he moved 
into the IOE, working in various positions, before being appointed Assistant Dean 
and head of the secondary school PGCE programme in early 2001.  With such 
diverse experiences, Totterdell wanted to craft a radical new teacher training model 
for TfL that would help highly-capable recruits have a significant impact in the 
classroom.   
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To do so, Wigdortz and Totterdell met at least three times between February 
and April of 2002 at McKinsey’s offices where other consultants frequently dropped 
in to help.  During their first meeting, they focused on the question of how 
innovative TfL should be.  They considered whether to develop a new model based 
on current training regulations or an experimental model designed according to what 
they believed would be most effective.  Totterdell had serious doubts about the first 
option believing it would “adulterate” or “domesticate” the vision he and Wigdortz 
shared of TfL as an innovative, high-impact, and radically different scheme.  
However, the second experimental option would make it more difficult to gain 
support and funding from the TTA.  Given these choices, Totterdell and Wigodrtz 
decided to create a new model of teacher training – the second the option.   
 
We didn’t do any of the planning [while] thinking about the TTA at all.  
What we thought about was the Ministry [DfES] and policy and impact, 
and that was refreshing because it would not have been possible for me, 
within a university context, to have thought that way.  I would have been 
suitably obsessed by Ofsted and the TTA. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
Around this time, Totterdell learned more about TFA since it was the 
programme that Kiley and Wigdortz seemed to want to reinvent, presuming 
(incorrectly) that Wigdortz was an alumnus of TFA.  Thus, he visited TFA’s 
headquarters in New York City in late February 2002 where he spoke with TFA 
staff, observed graduate selection processes, and toured two of their placements 
schools.  He also read Kopp’s (2001) account of starting TFA, recent studies of 
TFA’s effectiveness (Laczko-Kerr & Berliner 2002), and Linda Darling-Hammond’s 
scathing critique (1994)7 of TFA, which he felt “was more critical than it should 
have been at the time”.  Totterdell reflected on how elements of the TFA model 
could fit the English context.  
Over the course of their meetings, Totterdell and Wigdortz made a number of 
decisions that formed the basis of the TfL model at that point in time.  As Totterdell 
recalled (Interview, 21/01/2015), they agreed that TfL would:  
                                                        
7 In her 1994 article, Darling-Hammond condemned TFA as harmful to disadvantaged schools and 
their mostly black and Hispanic pupils.  Her conclusions, based on qualitative evidence, highlighted 
the shortcomings of TFA’s limited training and support for their teachers, its lack of transparency and 
resistance to outside evaluations, and concerns about TFA’s philosophy and assumptions about the 
teacher education programmes, the teaching profession, and the needs of low-income communities.  
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(1) be “fundamentally school-based, practice-orientated and would involve 
teams rather than individuals in settings on their own”,  
(2) utilize “the summer as the initiation period, so that we caught 
undergraduates when they were fresh from their studies, highly motivated, 
and had time on their hands and when schools had a downtime whereby 
they… get a taste for the impact these people could make in the next 
academic year”, and  
(3) feature ongoing training and support structured around “a notion of peer 
review [involving] mentors and team mediators that would allow folks to 
learn very, very quickly from experience, from inspection evidence, and 
from… the university fabric that they were engaging with in terms of 
educational theory and perspective and research evidence”.   
 
Although this model resembled TFA’s in that it had a pre-service summer training, 
its features were more rooted in Totterdell’s knowledge and experience gained in the 
military, in schools, and at the IOE.  For example, the peer-mentoring and team 
structure of the programme were concepts Totterdell first gleaned from military 
strategies.  
 
It’s peer support [but] it was more radical than that.  I don’t suppose 
Brett [Wigdortz] realized it at the time because I wouldn’t have said it, 
but fundamentally Teach First – the model they used – [was] based on 
the British special forces “brick” model of teams of four being built up, 
depending upon the circumstances, the situation, the mission, to sixteen, 
twenty, but sharing key ideas.8  In Special Forces, we call it a “head 
shop”.  And rank goes out the window and what you draw on are 
experience, analysis, readings, perspectives.  Put it together and then 
come up with a team plan of action.  And that basically is the essence of 
what I put on paper for the initial Teach First model.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
In the past years, Totterdell said he had advocated such a team-based training 
because he had watched many new teachers fail in challenging schools “against the 
backdrop of the cynicism of the staff room.”  He recalled, “I’d seen [new teachers] 
                                                        
8 The “brick” model of teams was a tactic developed in the early 1970s and used in Northern Ireland 
to patrol urban environments.  The “brick” refers to a four-man team led by a corporal or lance 
corporal.  Sets of these “bricks” usually made up a patrol, commanded by a senior corporal, sergeant 
or junior officer.  In smaller teams of four, the patrols were more mobile and flexible, and they could 
provide more mutual support and defense to other teams (Miller 1993). 
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wallowing, some of them leave, many of them marred in their own perspectives, and 
their ability stymied to some extent.”  As a result, Totterdell was involved in running 
an experimental “area-based” training course at the IOE in the early 1990s, which 
organized schools with beginning teachers in clusters.  While the model was 
ultimately discontinued for logistical reasons, Totterdell felt it had been a beneficial 
arrangement for schools.  Thus, in the TfL model, teachers would be placed in 
schools as four-person teams.  These teams would be grouped regionally so they 
could meet, share experiences, and learn from each other. 
Other elements of the TfL model were based on Totterdell’s previous work 
in reconceptualizing teacher education (Totterdell & Lambert 1998).  Totterdell had 
previously called for a more integrated and balanced relationship between 
universities and schools in training.  He had also proposed an inquiry-based, peer-
supported, and research-grounded training model to develop trainees as reflective, 
intellectual, and professionally competent practitioners.  In his view, such a model 
could be a “middle way” or centrist position in teacher education that sat between 
(1) a “process model” of pre-service teacher training and (2) the managerial 
“outcomes model” of teacher training that promoted “competence-based 
professionalism” and focused “on skills best learned at the chalkface” (Totterdell & 
Lambert 1998, pp.356–7).  In this way, Totterdell conceptualized TfL’s training as 
radically different from current models and one that challenged his own colleagues’ 
assumptions.  “The model we were going to use would not just be an elitist strand of 
the existing models,” Totterdell said (Interview 23/11/2012).  “It would be a 
different model [that] was basically not premised on what teacher education 
orthodoxy was premised on… but was rather premised on a much more practice-
orientated approach to changing culture.”  Thus, he also noted, his perspective 
represented “an ideological clash” with his colleagues in teacher education.  
 Still, Totterdell said, the model did aim to fulfill the competency standards set 
by the TTA, enabling teachers to earn their qualified teacher’s status (QTS), but also 
offer trainees the chance to gain traditional qualifications – a PGCE and potentially a 
master’s degree.  To do this, Totterdell said they envisioned that TfL and the IOE 
would have a “dynamic relationship” in which they would share staff and implement 
the programme collaboratively.  The IOE would be the accredited provider and, 
along with TfL, would manage TfL as a school-based experimental model.  
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 Finally, Totterdell recalled his discussions with Wigdortz regarding 
leadership were more tied to the type of person the scheme would aim to attract into 
teaching and not about designing business-linked leadership development training. 
 
In the beginning, the whole idea was that one would take a caliber of 
person who would normally be entering the boardroom early and would 
certainly be working in a high-profile way and have “prospective senior 
executive” stamped indelibly, albeit in invisible ink, on their file 
somewhere.  But one was taking that driving momentum and that kind of 
framework of references and networking and importing that into 
education.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
  
When interviewed, Wigdortz said he was unable to recall much about the initial 
model he developed with Totterdell.  “I only had a four part meeting with Michael 
Totterdell where we kind of went through how some of the ways the training could 
be,” Wigdortz said (Interview, 30/06/2015), adding, “I only saw them [the IOE 
leaders] as, like, advisors.”  This statement seems to contradict his earlier accounts 
(Wigdortz 2011; 2012) of how he worked with “a senior supporter” from the IOE to 
develop a detailed training model.  Totterdell also insisted he was much more than 
an advisor at the time.  “At the time, the Teach First/IOE proposal was indivisible 
and no clear role had been formulated, let alone articulated, for the IOE,” Totterdell 
stated (personal correspondence, 22/07/2015). 
What is clear though is that throughout the spring of 2002, Totterdell worked 
with Wigdortz to produce a more conceptually mature blueprint for TfL – one that 
was more contextually grounded and educationally informed than Wigdortz’s initial 
plan.  At the same time, Totterdell was helping Wigdortz explain and “sell” TfL as a 
model that was innovative, team-based, and different from traditional teacher 
education.  The question remained though whether the scheme would find enough 
government support to move it forward.  
 
 
6.8 Engaging the Prime Minister’s Office 
 
After gaining the support of the IOE, Barber, and the unions, Kiley 
personally introduced the idea to Andrew Adonis, the Head of the Prime Minister’s 
Policy Unit (PMPU).  This unit consisted of a small team of approximately twenty 
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advisors who were primarily political appointees but also some civil servants.  Prior 
to working in government, Adonis had earned a doctorate from Oxford University, 
worked in academia, and then became a writer for the Financial Times and the 
Observer in the 1990s.  In 1998, Adonis became an education advisor in the PMPU 
(Wintour 2002a), and in June 2001, he became the head of the PMPU.  In his role, 
Adonis focused heavily on education.  Adonis’s aide, Patrick Diamond, a Cambridge 
graduate and a New Labour specialist in his mid-twenties (Passmore 2001), said he 
was present at the first meeting between Kiley and Adonis. 
 
At that point, Rona had herself been in contact with the Department of 
Education and was getting pretty frustrated by the lack of response… [as 
were] other figures in London First.  So they came to No. 10 partly 
because they were trying to get us to unblock the blockage.  So she came 
in two or three times over the course of several months and essentially 
presented the outlines of these ideas to us.  And obviously we were very 
interested in what was being proposed. 
– Patrick Diamond, Policy Aide, PMPU 
Interview, 30/01/2015 
  
Adonis said he was very excited about TfL, believing it could address a number of 
pressing policy concerns.  “I was very enthusiastic from the onset because there had 
been a pre-existing concern… about the quality and quantity of teacher recruitment 
particularly in shortage secondary subjects,” Adonis said (Interview, 20/04/2012).  
He noted the government had set up the Graduate Teaching Programme (GTP), 
bursaries, and the Fast Track scheme9 – all aimed at improving the quality of teacher 
recruitment but “hadn’t done enough”.  Adonis said he wanted to “increase radically 
the number of graduates from top universities who were going into state school 
teaching” and so embraced TfL. 
Adonis’s support for TfL also stemmed from his prior knowledge of TFA.  He 
had previously met Wendy Kopp and believed TFA could work in the U.K.   
 
I knew about [TFA] and had been interested in it for some time, but I had 
no engagement with it directly.  It was Wendy [Kopp] coming to see me 
that made me realize that it could happen here because it dispelled my 
views of how there was something very usual or special about the U.S.  I 
then realized that [TFA] was a very successful social enterprise which was 
pitched into a situation quite similar to the one we were in of two basic 
problems – seriously inadequate teacher recruitment and a serious 
                                                        
9 The Fast Track scheme was designed to enable promising PGCE students to advance into school 
leadership positions early on in their careers. 
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problem of the top graduates not going anywhere near conventional 
mainstream state school teaching… [So] that meeting was absolutely 
crucial… in persuading me that the context was similar, and that you 
weren’t dealing with a radically different context which you couldn’t read 
across. 
– Andrew Adonis, Head of PMPU 
Interview, 20/04/2012 
 
Adonis’s meeting with Kopp was likely set up during New Labour’s first term 
by Peter Lampl, a high-profile British educational philanthropist.  Lampl was a 
former management consultant and entrepreneur who had spent most of his adult life 
in the U.S. where, in the 1980s, he founded and expanded his own private equity 
firm, becoming extremely wealthy in the process.  During this time, in the 1990s, 
Lampl learned of TFA.  He said he then tried to interest the New Labour government 
in TFA after retiring to the U.K. and founding, in 1997, the Sutton Trust, a 
foundation to promote social mobility through education. 
 
I lived full-time in New York for approximately twenty years, so I’m very 
plugged into both the financial [scene] and also the foundations and 
charity stuff that was going on in New York… I was introduced to Wendy 
[Kopp], and I went to visit the Teach For America operation in New York 
well before Teach First was even thought of.  I was very impressed with 
it.  It’s very low budget, which I kind of liked.  I was very impressed with 
the cost-effectiveness of it.  But I got to know Wendy Kopp…  And I 
thought [TFA] was such a great idea that I brought Wendy over to London 
to meet Andrew Adonis and some other people.  
– Peter Lampl, Education Philanthropist/Founder of the Sutton Trust  
Interview, 12/06/2012 
 
While Adonis was equally impressed by TFA, he emphasized that the backing of 
London’s business community also convinced him to support TfL.  
 
Rona Kiley, London First, and Business in the Community were 
absolutely crucial and so important.  What they did was to give me firm, 
firm security that I had really serious organizations that were going to be 
behind this whose own reputation was at stake.  My own view is, if you 
had a series of hugely important organizations headed by London First 
and Business in the Community attached, I couldn’t see how it would 
fail.  And then Brett [Wigdortz] coming along with the McKinsey team, 
this was also crucial because I was certain there was actually a plan that 
works.  
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Diamond (Interview, 30/01/2015) expressed a similar sentiment, recalling that 
although others looked favourably on TFA, it was “the Rona Kiley-McKinsey-
London First axis” that pushed TfL “onto the agenda of the government at that 
point”.  
Adonis was also impressed Kiley and Wigdortz had found endorsements 
amongst the unions.  He had recently struggled to convince the unions to accept the 
concept of academies he was promoting.  “We went to courts and all kinds of other 
hostile action from the NUT in respect to academies,” Adonis said, “[but] none of 
that applied to [TfL] because, at the outset, the key trade unions decided to support 
the scheme.”   
For all these reasons – TFA’s success, a business-backed plan, and union 
supporters (and likely Barber’s endorsement) – Adonis was convinced that TfL 
could succeed.  With support from the Prime Minister, Adonis encouraged the DfES 
and TTA to re-examine the scheme.  “The key thing after those initial meetings was 
persuading the Department to go for it,” Adonis said (Interview, 20/04/2012), adding 
“I spoke to lots of people individually about it and made it clear that I and the 
Government were very strongly supportive… anything to help to solidify support 
behind it.”  Throughout these “extensive discussions” with the DfES, Adonis also 
continued to have “parallel discussions” with TfL supporters.   
On the topic of Adonis, it is worth noting that Wigdortz (2012, p.61) recalled 
his first contact with Adonis was through cold-calling the Prime Minister’s office.  
This call probably occurred after Adonis initially met with Kiley as Adonis indicated 
that, “The leading figure for me at the beginning, in terms of the person who made 
the approaches, was Rona Kiley” (Interview, 20/04/2012).  In light of Adonis’s 
account, Wigdortz’s call to Adonis was likely not the ground-breaking contact 
Wigdortz believed it was since discussions between Adonis and Kiley had already 
taken place.    
Regardless, TfL gained the backing of the Prime Minister and his closest 
advisors.  Although Barber had become an influential supporter of the scheme first, 
Adonis became its most visible advocate.  By speaking out on behalf of TfL, Adonis 
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6.9 “Pump-priming” the DfES: Funding from Foundations 
 
While Kiley had quickly found supporters in the business community, she 
and the head of London First, Stephen O’Brien, had been searching for support 
among London’s philanthropic community as well.  They soon found four charitable 
foundations willing to fund TfL early on.   
The Esmée Fairbairn Foundation was among the first charitable organizations 
to pledge funding for the scheme.  Set up in 1961 by a leading City figure, Ian 
Fairbairn, the foundation was one of the largest independent grant-making bodies in 
the U.K., awarding some £30 to £35 million to U.K. programmes each year in areas 
of education, the environment, the arts, and social change (Anon 2014b).  In 2002, 
the foundation was led by Margaret Hyde who was overseeing the organization’s 
transition, between 2000 and 2003, from “being a generalist, reactive funder to a 
specialist proactive one” (Anon 2014a).  Hilary Hodgson was Esmée Fairbairn’s 
Director of Education in charge of its grant policy and strategy.  Hodgson recalled 
Stephen O’Brien approached her and Hyde about TfL.  They were already familiar 
with O’Brien since Esmée Fairbairn had supported a number of initiatives promoted 
by BITC in the past.  Hodgson, an Oxford graduate who taught in London 
comprehensive for two years before entering the charitable sector, recalled that she 
liked the idea but had concerns. 
 
It was clear to us that there was a problem with the status of teaching at 
the time [and] with teacher training in recruiting able youngsters to go 
into state schools.  [But] there were concerns, largely around whether the 
idea would be supported by the establishment, whether the DfE would 
allow it…and whether the trade unions would make a fuss and how many 
of [its teachers] would stay in [teaching].  
– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn  
Interview, 2/02/2015  
 
Hodgson said she was aware of TFA through reading about it but “didn’t have any 
connections with them”.  Thus, for Hodgson, TFA did not have a significant impact 
on her view of the proposal.  In addition to concerns about the political feasibility of 
TfL, Hodgson said her foundation was reluctant to provide funding due to the nature 
of its work. 
 
We debated it, actually.  I took a paper to trustees and outlined some of 
the pros and cons of doing it, including whether this was really funding 
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for a statutory cause because Esmée Fairbairn [doesn’t] fund work that 
should be done by the statutory sector, and of course, teacher training is 
normally the role and remit of the DfES.  So I spent quite a lot of time 
with trustees debating whether it was legitimate to fund [TfL]… and then 
brought Stephen [O’Brien] in to talk [about] it.  And then we took a 
proposal to the board, which they endorsed and funded. 
– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn  
Interview, 2/02/2015  
 
In the end, the Esmée Fairbairn’s board pledged approximately £120,000 over two 
years to the scheme.  According to Hodgson, the trustees funded TfL despite being 
an area under the government’s remit in large part because of Hodgson’s rationale. 
 
I persuaded them that it didn’t matter, that sometimes government didn’t 
know what it was doing and that this might make a difference, and bring 
some new blood into the profession and the issue mattered more than  – 
and also, perhaps, we could get the DfES onboard and use our money to 
pump-prime a larger investment from DfES.  
– Hilary Hodgson, Director of Education, Esmée Fairbairn 
Interview, 2/02/2015  
 
Hodgson subsequently encouraged another foundation, Paul Hamlyn, to support TfL.  
The Paul Hamlyn Foundation, founded by publisher and philanthropist Paul 
Hamlyn in 1987, was also one of the U.K.’s largest independent grant-making bodies.   
The trust focused on combating disadvantage among young people and marginalized 
groups through projects related to education, the arts, social justice, and India.  Due to 
the founder’s common phrase “there must be a better way”, the foundation was 
committed to supporting work “which others may find hard to fund, perhaps because 
it breaks new ground, is too risky or is unpopular” (Anon 2014c).  The Foundation’s 
Director in 2002 was Lady Patricia Lankester, who had taught in London 
comprehensive schools for eight years before entering the third sector.  She recalled 
Kiley introduced her to TfL. 
 
I knew about Teach For America, and I met Rona Kiley and that was 
what she was trying to do – bring Teach For America to the U.K., and it 
really started quite informally in conversations with her… She was 
having difficulty with the Department of Education… The whole issue of 
how many young people might be involved was a very hot one because 
the teaching unions were not happy.  
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Lankester said she and her colleagues decided to become a founding supporter of 
TfL.  “We felt that it would make their case much stronger if there was some early 
support from an independent foundation,” Lankester said, “and I was very interested 
because of my background in teaching.”  In addition, Lankester said TfL was the 
type of experimental initiative that her foundation generally liked to support.  “The 
Paul Hamlyn Foundation was, to some extent, very good at taking a chance on 
something and seeing what happens,” Lankester recalled, “and because the situation 
in London schools was in need of new approaches and experimentation, it seemed a 
good thing to back.” Thus, Lankester submitted a formal grant application for TfL to 
her board, where it gained approval for £25,000 for the scheme’s first year. 
Two other charitable organizations – SHINE and the Sutton Trust – also 
pledged £50,000 each to TfL during the spring of 2002.  SHINE became involved 
when its founder, Jim O’Neill, agreed to become one of TfL’s “first individual 
donors” (Wigdortz 2012, p.83).  O’Neill grew up in a working class family in 
Manchester before becoming a leading economist and partner at Goldman Sachs.  He 
founded SHINE, an acronym for Support and Help In Education, in 1999 and 
described it as “like venture capital in educational charity” (Midgley 2011).  The 
charity financed initiatives aimed at helping the most disadvantaged kids access to 
quality educational opportunities.  O’Neill explained, “We only give money to 
projects where we think we can measure their performance because we believe in 
monitoring and evolution” (Blackhurst 2009).  TfL likely fit into O’Neill’s charitable 
priorities by aiming to improve education for disadvantaged pupils in a measurable 
way – recruit significant numbers of top graduates into teaching.   
The Sutton Trust also pledged funding for TfL prior to its launch.  Its 
founder, Peter Lampl, had created the foundation in 1997 to promote social mobility 
through education.  By commissioning research and funding new initiatives, the 
Sutton Trust soon “shaped and guided the debate on social mobility in the U.K.” 
(Cook 2013), collaborating with government to expand or replicate successful ideas 
(Bunting 2000).  Lampl was motivated to found the Sutton Trust because he 
considered himself as someone who had benefitted from social mobility (Wilby 
2007).  He said he grew up with little money but, after attending local academically 
selective state schools, he earned a place at Cambridge in 1966.  He credited the 
opportunity to attend elite schools as enabling him to gain a quality education and 
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pursue a successful career in consulting and private equity.  In this field, he became a 
multi-millionaire while working in the U.S. during the 1980s and 1990s.   
While working in New York City in the 1990s, Lampl had learned of TFA 
and was very impressed by the organization’s entrepreneurial spirit.  Thus, he 
previously introduced Kopp to Adonis in hopes of interesting the Blair government 
in the scheme.  “If it works in America, why can’t it work in Britain?  So that’s why 
I backed it,” Lampl said (Interview, 12/06/2012), adding, “Teach First is not the new 
idea…  It’s taking [TFA] and introducing it into the U.K.”  Lampl’s support for TfL 
was particularly significant because he had become an active and high-profile 
advocate for the social mobility agenda.  “I do recall him [Lampl] being a sounding 
board [for] Rona [Kiley] and Brett [Wigdortz] not least because he’s a big name and 
he can add a bit of weight to it,” recalled Paul Davies, Wigdortz’s McKinsey 
colleague who later became Teach First’s Chief Operating Officer (Interview, 
21/09/2012). 
The early support from these foundations and individuals, as well as Adonis, 
provided Kiley and Wigdortz more financial and symbolic support for their idea.  
With this development, discussions at the DfES regarding TfL continued and 
coalitions of support and opposition formed.  (See the Appendix A.5 for a complete 




6.10 Discussions Renewed at the DfES  
 
While support for TfL was growing outside the DfES, some officials within 
the DfES began backing the idea.  Many in the DfES who had expressed a lack of 
enthusiasm for TfL began to consider it as a chance to “test out different ideas… to 
see if some of those ideas could then be translated across into the mainstream 
programmes in some way”, according to Holley (Interview, 30/05/2012).  As more 
DfES officials learned of the scheme, Kiley recalled that several were supportive. 
 
There were a few people that… were really interested and saw promise 
in [TfL].  Jon Coles10 was certainly one and… Peter Housden, [the 
                                                        
10 Jon Coles was a Deputy Director in the DfES and the head of a five-person policy team tasked with 
developing and implementing a new school-improvement initiative called the London Challenge. 
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Director General for Schools]… He really got [TfL],… thought it was a 
great idea [and] was an advocate.  People were scared early on to be too 
much of an advocate…[because] the idea that you could train people in 
six weeks was controversial.  
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
 Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Upon speaking with DfES officials, Adonis’s aide Patrick Diamond said he found 
many had considered TfL a distraction and were not hostile toward the idea.  Thus, 
he recalled,  “Our goal was to try to persuade the Department that actually [TfL] 
would be a good way of broadening the recruitment stream into the teaching 
profession” (Interview, 30/01/2015).  Diamond acknowledged that Adonis was an 
influential, and often controversial, figure within education policy-making at the time 
but pointed out that TfL was not a high-profile policy issue and the DfES itself was 
internally divided on the idea.  
 
To represent [the situation] as kind of “the Department versus No. 10” 
[would be incorrect] – that dispute would happen occasionally but often 
it was much more subtle and complex than that… There would have 
been a coalition [of] officials who were more senior and responsive to 
ministerial and Number 10 persuasion [and] would have been both 
positive and would have been trying to make things happen [for TfL].  
But there are layers of officials below them who certainly were not as 
positively disposed.  So within the Department, there would have been 
different coalitions of support or opposition.  So in that sense, there was 
[not] one Departmental view on [TfL]… People tend to see [government 
departments] as being quite monolithic in terms of their views – that 
they represent a particular ideological stance or whatever.  But the 
Education Department isn’t like that…  The views are much more 
pluralistic, and the coalitions are much more flexible and change around 
a lot.   
– Patrick Diamond, Aid, PMPU 
Interview, 30/01/2015 
 
In parallel to Adonis and Diamond’s talks with individuals at the DfES, 
Kiley and her colleagues continued to meet with civil servants.  BITC’s John May 
(Interview, 2/05/2012) recalled that their “strongest relationship” within the DfES 
“was with a department within the Department whose job it was to have, or build, 
relationships with corporates.”  Lynn Fabes was the director of that eight-person 
team, called the new Business Development Unit, which had been formed by the 
DfES in 2000 (Fabes 2002).  She confirmed hearing of TfL through the office of the 
Schools Minister and attending a meeting between Timms, O’Brien, and Wigdortz.  
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 198 
“Basically they were seeking funding from the Department to start up [TfL],” Fabes 
recalled.  “They presented a paper, evidence-based research from Teach For 
America, and their perception of the impact [TfL] could potentially have in 
England” (Fabes Interview, 23/01/2015).  Afterwards, she advised Timms to support 
the programme.  “My advice was to go ahead with it, match funding to a certain 
level,” Fabes said although she emphasized that Timms sought input from other 
officers as well.   
The existence of Fabes’s unit also indicated that the DfES was already eager 
to engage the corporate sector in new education initiatives, which Holley confirmed.  
Furthermore, the proposal that TfL be set up as an independent charity – and not a 
government programme – made it appealing to many.  “Ministers were much more 
enthusiastic [about TfL] straight away [because] it was different and separate,” 
Holley recalled. “They wanted to test different means of recruiting good teachers, 
and this was another way” (Holley Interview, 03/05/2012).   
Adonis was also a particularly strong proponent of new educational 
initiatives having independence from government authority.  His idea for academies 
was inspired by City Technical Colleges (CTCs)11 which he considered successful 
because they were run “free of the shifting sands of local and national education 
bureaucracies” (Adonis 2012, p.56) and were able to appoint strong headteachers 
with help from governing sponsors.  Likewise, he also linked TFA’s success to its 
independence as a non-profit organization and hence, wanted TfL to have the same 
autonomy.   
Discussions regarding TfL continued to take place at the various levels of the 
DfES, and an internal coalition in support of the scheme grew in the DfES.  Still, 
others opposed the scheme, arguing it would drain money from other projects and 
become a distraction from current initiatives and challenges.  While talks continued, 
the head of the TTA became involved in considering the idea.   
 
 
                                                        
11 These state secondary schools, set up between 1988 and 1993, were managed and primarily funded 
directly by the Department of Education, instead of local authorities, with additional capital coming 
from the private sponsors. 
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6.11 TTA Head Considers TfL 
 
Though many at the TTA had hoped to push aside the TfL proposal, vocal 
support from the PMPU and some at the DfES forced the TTA to consider the 
scheme.  At this point, Marriott was asked to assess the potential of the scheme. 
 
Slowly, slowly the idea started to gain a bit of support in the higher 
ranks of the TTA and the Department.  So I was given the task, along 
with a couple of [my colleagues], to meet with these guys [those 
purposing TfL], to review what they’d done, to write a paper on it, [and] 
to put a proposal to the board of the TTA.  And eventually, we got to the 
point where there was a really serious question to be asked… What is it 
going to take to make this initiative even legal?   
– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA 
Interview, 6/12/2012 
 
Marriott recalled there were several meetings regarding TfL between TTA members 
and  “two streams” of individuals – (1) educational leaders, including Dunford was 
“quite well respected within the TTA” and (2) business proponents of TfL, who 
Marriott recalled were “not really confidants of the [DfES].”  The two sets of people, 
according to Marriott, “eventually became closer and closer and worked together”.   
During these meetings, the design and experience of TFA in the U.S. were 
common topics of discussion. 
  
[TFA was often discussed] because that was the only reference that 
people had at that time.  So it was very much looking at Teach For 
America, looking at the differences in that programme, figuring out 
whether Teach For America could work in the U.K., and there were lots 
of changes needed.  It wasn’t possible just to transpose that programme 
into the U.K. and make it work.  
– Lorraine Marriott, project manager, TTA 
Interview, 6/12/2012 
 
A top concern of the TTA continued to be how TfL could fit into the TTA’s 
regulatory frameworks, a point Adonis argued against. 
 
There were certainly discussions, which I was a party to, with the TTA 
[who] wanted to make Teach First much more like conventional training.  
And my view very strongly was that we should go with the Teach First 
[TfL] plan as it had been submitted because we needed it to be managed 
and run independently. 
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Unsurprisingly, the TTA’s Chief Executive, Tabberer became involved in 
considering the scheme.  Tabberer, a Cambridge graduate, had earned a PGCE and 
taught a few years in London before moving into various posts in research and local 
government.  In 1994, Tabberer became Deputy Director at the National Foundation 
for Education Research [NFER], where he first became aware of TFA’s success and 
its critics.  Subsequently, in 1997, Tabberer became a senior advisor within the 
DfES’s School Standards and Effectiveness Unit, a unit with a staff of 275 headed 
by Barber.  Tabberer recalled, “I had worked with Michael [Barber] for three years 
[from] 1997 to 2000 in the [DfES], and we were pretty inseparable.”  While at the 
DfES, Tabberer also worked with Adonis in launching a new schools initiative in 
1999 called Excellence in Cities.  Shortly thereafter, in February 2000, Tabberer was 
appointed Chief Executive of the TTA.  Tabberer emphasized that, as head of the 
TTA, he remained close with his former colleagues.  
Tabberer recalled Holley had made him aware that TfL was being proposed 
to Timms.  “At that stage, we had a conversation about it, looked at the paperwork, 
talked about Number 10’s interest, picked up there was an Institute of Education 
connection, and started to talk about what was going on,” Tabberer said (Interview, 
22/05/2012).  He added that, in the beginning, he relayed his initial reactions through 
Graham, a fairly common practice.  
 
My first impression of the paperwork I saw from McKinsey was that the 
paper was flawed.  It had got the wrong analysis of the teacher 
recruitment problem in the U.K.  It was much more of a paper about the 
American problem… [and] didn’t take account lots of reforms and 
measures that we’d been taking in the U.K for a while… [For] example, 
[we] had already introduced subtle, very large initiatives [that] were 
moving away from the conventional one-year postgraduate course or the 
three-year undergraduate course...  So we [had] serious money and 
serious scales of initiatives [that] were already doing the sorts of things 
[TfL] seemed to be talking about. 
–  Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA  
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
In addition, although Tabberer knew about TFA, he said he “wasn’t wonderfully 
impressed with the idea of [TfL].”  He insisted England did not need a TFA-type 
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The U.K. and the U.S. models are very different, and the U.S. model is 
essentially something like 1,700 teaching colleges, which are largely 
accredited by the universities in which they are in and by the states in 
which they work, and largely, they are driven by the academics and 
professionals in those organizations.  It’s a provider-oriented system, 
really – the providers and producers are in charge.  In the U.K. it’s 
different.  The TTA has the funding to buy training from registered 
trainers and they might be in the universities, they might be in schools, 
[and] they have to satisfy the Training Agency that they are good enough 
quality.  If they are not very good then the TTA will take money away 
from them… [or] close them down.  I think in the whole history of the 
U.S, nobody has ever closed a training college for being unsatisfactory 
in quality.  
–  Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA  
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
Because of the lack of regulatory quality controls on teacher training in the U.S., 
Tabberer viewed TFA as a “disruptive innovation” that was needed in the U.S.  
 
It felt, from a distance, that Teach For America was trying to do 
something really important and disrupt a rather complacent system.  The 
system was fighting back, [and] the establishment of teachers and 
academics was trying to stop them thriving, but they kept going.  And 
my instincts were Teach For America was a very good thing and it’s the 
kind of innovation that America needed.  So again, when [TfL] came 
with that background, even though I didn’t think the U.K. needed 
something similar, I was similarly very well disposed to listen to them 
and talk to them. 
–  Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA  
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
Since Tabberer viewed TFA as challenging the status quo in the U.S., he had 
dismissed the criticisms, particularly those raised by Darling-Hammond (1994), as 
interest-driven.  
 
The way I read the American situation was, actually how very sad the 
politics of that were, and I consider Linda Darling-Hammond to be a 
great researcher.  But I think there were political glitches on the 
researchers who were working on TFA, and it may be they were 
provoked by [TFA’s] initial model, but when I read those papers I didn’t 
think I was reading objective, critical research.  I thought I was reading 
an impassionate defense of the professional status quo in the U.S., which 
frankly isn’t tackling the problems that they’ve got. 
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Because of his admiration of TFA, Tabberer was open to hearing more about TfL.  
He was confident in the TTA’s model of quality management and its ability to 
accommodate a diversity of providers regardless of politics. 
 
The TTA essentially had control of the number of places, the unit 
resource, [and] quality levers, so therefore it could make sure that every 
year the amount of quality training was better than the year before.  It 
was the best-organized teacher training system in the world…  Nobody 
had managed the market like the TTA had and that does give you this 
respect.  So it’s never an issue of governments.  As long as it’s legal, run 
by people who know what they’re doing, you can allow [providers] to do 
what they plan because you can check them.  It’s a great system. 
–  Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA  
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
Tabberer was also willing to consider TfL because the TTA, under his leadership, 
had brought the numbers of teacher recruits up significantly in recent years.  “This 
[was] a time when the TTA was in a very strong position because we had started to 
turn around teacher recruitment,” Tabberer said.  “There was a lot of confidence 
amongst ministers [and] Number 10 about the way we were approaching the 
problem” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).    
 As a result, he indicated that the TTA was not “in crisis” and did not need “to 
grab a solution from somewhere else.”  Instead, they were going about their jobs and 
looking for more good ideas.  “If it hadn’t been designed right, we didn’t need to 
pick it up and do it just for the political noise or further disruption,” Tabberer said 
(Interview, 22/05/2012).  Finally, Tabberer gave his attention to TfL also because 
“McKinsey and some senior business people” were backing it.  “That doesn’t happen 
by accident,” Tabberer said, “so I was very interested in meeting them and hearing 
what they had to say, but also had loads of questions about the way they had 
analyzed it and… how it might work” (Interview, 22/05/2012).   
Thus, after reviewing the paperwork and feeding back initial criticisms to 
Holley, Tabberer accompanied Timms to a meeting at the DfES with Wigdortz and 
Kiley in late April 2002.  Although the purpose and details of this meeting remain 
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6.12  TfL Fails to Earn Approval  
 
In late April 2002, when Timms and Tabberer met with Kiley and Wigdortz 
at the DfES, Wigdortz (2012, p.64) indicated he was under the impression that this 
was a meeting arranged for a “formal sign-off” of the scheme due to the “support 
from Downing Street” and “interest at ministerial level”.  However, he indicated 
they had not yet secured solid support of the DfES and TTA, so they brought a 
handful of high-profile business supporters to the meeting to “convince the minister 
how serious we were”.  According to Tabberer, however, the meeting was his first 
direct interaction with TfL proponents during which he wanted to discuss and ask 
questions of their proposal.   
Tabberer and Wigdortz also had somewhat different recollections of the 
meeting.  According to Wigdortz (2012, p.65), at the start of the meeting, Timms 
“looked glumly at his notes and shook his head” and announced his rejection of TfL, 
then left.  Then, Wigdortz recalled, the civil servants explained the reasons for 
rejecting the scheme – essentially, TfL would be too costly and draw graduates away 
from other routes through which they would be better trained.  Wigdortz (2012, 
p.65) indicated that he “briefly… tried to make a case for changing the decision, but 
was stopped short.  The decision was final.” 
Meanwhile, Tabberer’s recollection of that meeting was somewhat different. 
   
 [Timms] shared my interest in getting something going... But the 
meeting… didn’t go very easily because, of course, I and others were 
asking questions about exactly what was going to go on, exactly what the 
costs were, precisely how it was going to work and these areas where 
people didn’t know how things worked already.  There were awkward 
parts of the conversation because people didn’t have answers.  So by the 
end of that meeting there was some sense of “okay, this is difficult, this 
isn’t just going to be ‘let’s go ahead and do it’.”  In fact, probably by the 
end of it, the [TfL] people were wondering whether actually they should 
[go ahead]... whether they could satisfy people and it would make a 
contribution.  
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
From Tabberer’s account, Timms did not reject TfL outright.  Timms liked the idea 
and involved Tabberer in discussions. 
 
I’ve yet to meet a politician who hadn’t been completely charmed by 
Rona [Kiley] or Brett [Wigdortz].  They seem to be stunning in the way 
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they could charm politicians…  But [while] a politician might want 
something because it’s attractive, it’s got business links, it looks good as 
an announcement, it will help what we are doing... the guys like me and 
Graham [Holley] working on the civil service side have to ask the 
questions of – Is it going to work?  Is it in step with all the legislation so 
far, the regulations?  Is it going to be value for money?  We have to do 
all that work because ministers rely on us.  
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 22/05/2012 
 
Thus, instead of a hostile lecture by the civil servants, Tabberer recalled the meeting 
as a question-directed dialogue during which it became clear to everyone present that 
TfL was not (yet) a workable scheme.  Kiley, Wigdortz, and their handful of 
corporate supporters were simply unable to address Tabberer’s questions.  Still, 
Wigdortz doubted Tabberer’s concerns with the scheme.  
 
Part of the challenge was to understand what the real objection was.  I 
didn’t believe that the problems were the officials’ stated ones – “it’s 
costly” or “it won’t work” – since the amount of money and support we 
were asking for was so small.  Instead the problems were unstated – “it’s 
not under our control”, “it might embarrass some of the efforts we’ve 
already made” or “we don’t trust you”…  If we had gone back showing 
PowerPoint presentations of how brilliantly it would work, it would have 
scared them even more.   
– Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.69), McKinsey consultant  
 
While Wigdortz’s narrative suggests that money was not the “real” objection because 
they were requesting “only” £500,000 to get started, this was not entirely accurate.  
In addition to the £500,000 needed from the DfES to launch TfL, the scheme needed 
an additional funding stream from the TTA, likely to run into a few million pounds, 
to finance the training of its proposed 200+ recruits.  Those training costs, Tabberer 
insisted, were unclear since the training model and training provider had not been 
officially agreed upon.  As a result, he could not assess the scheme’s value-for-
money.  Furthermore, these costs would ultimately come from the DfES since it 
funded the TTA. 
Thus, both the training and operational costs of TfL were a real concern for 
the DfES because it was unclear from where such funding would ultimately come.  
Although Tabberer and other interviewees recalled extra funding was available since 
the Blair government started to increase spending in its second term, Holley insisted 
there was not extra funding for TfL.  “The money was the main issue because the 
money had to come from somewhere,” Holley said (Interview, 30/05/2012), “[and] 
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there wasn’t much new money around at the time, so the money had to come from 
other existing programmes.”  Holley did concede, however, that the amount TfL 
needed was “a drop in the bucket” compared to the government’s roughly “250 
million pound programme for increasing teachers”. 
Holley also disputed Wigdortz’s assertion that the DfES saw TfL and its 
potential success as a threat or embarrassment to their current work.  “[TfL] wasn’t 
seen as a rival because it was too small,” Holley said.  “It [would be] recruiting a few 
hundred – a very small amount of teachers, whereas the Department was looking for 
40,000 teachers every single year.  So it was never a serious rival to mainstream 
recruitment.”  Still, issues of distrust likely existed as officials emphasized they 
themselves would be ultimately responsible if the programme failed. 
 
It’s also about accountability because [if] there is taxpayer money 
going into the programme, it appears in [TTA] accounts for which 
ministers are responsible.   So if Parliament were to ask if this 
expenditure is value for money, it wouldn’t be [TfL] answering, it 
would be ministers and therefore, both the [TTA] and Department 
[DfES] have a duty to make sure that throughout the money is being 
spent well. 
 – Graham Holley, Division Manager, DfES 
Interview, 30/05/2012 
 
Meanwhile, Kiley felt that officials were critical of TfL because they “didn’t get it”, 
were risk averse, and/or focused on their own career advancement.  She also noted 
department ministers and officials changed frequently with some likely aiming to 
work in more prestigious departments like the Treasury.   
Yet, Totterdell, who was not invited to the late April ministerial meeting 
(though he subsequently learned of its results), felt that Kiley had overestimated the 
influence of the private sector in government decision-making in the U.K.  
 
At the time neither Brett [Wigdortz] nor Rona [Kiley] really understood 
the dynamics of teacher education and training nor the underlying 
tensions around ideology, inspection, and impact.  Rona in particular 
was highly reliant on a form of corporate clout that pervades American 
lobbying, including social service initiatives, but has more limited reach 
in the U.K. particularly in the context of the reforming zeal of the early 
Blairite era.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Personal correspondence, 16/01/2015 
 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 206 
Thus, Totterdell suspected he was not included in the late April meeting with Timms 
since he was an educationalist and not part of Kiley’s corporate-based “camp”.  
 
My sense was there two sets of camps – Rona’s [Kiley’s] people and 
Brett’s [Wigdortz’s] people.  And they did intermingle, but they didn’t 
necessarily always deploy at the same time in the same way.  And 
Rona’s view of how you got things was basically her husband’s… and it 
was through political influence and meetings involving notable persons.  
It’s very much a New York-style, business methodology…  [So] she 
probably set up that meeting, but I certainly wasn’t a party to it… But 
somehow I got to know that it had not gone well.    
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 24/01/2015 
 
Since becoming involved in promoting TfL, Totterdell also attended meetings 
regarding the scheme with Whitty in April that did not include Kiley or Wigdortz.  
Whitty recalled (Interview, 9/12/2012) that one meeting, likely set up through Barber 
(though he did not attend), brought together “various of the greatest and good of 
education” to discuss TfL with Timms.  This meeting took place at 
Westminster/DfES on 15 April, apparently just prior to the ministerial meeting 
involving Tabberer, Kiley, Wigdortz and corporate supporters.  In attendance, 
according to Whitty, were a number of TfL supporters involved in education 
including Lampl and May.  Another meeting took place between Whitty, Timms, and 
Tabberer on 29 April – around the time, and more likely just after, Tabberer’s 
“difficult” meeting with Kiley and Wigdortz.   
Whitty described these meetings as the means through which his institution 
helped bring about government support for TfL and recalled Tabberer’s involvement 
in discussions signaled a change.  “Originally, the idea was that TfL would be 
outside the mainstream,” Whitty said (Interview, 9/07/2012), “[and] as a result of the 
meeting with Timms, Ralph Tabberer I think was tasked with getting this into the 
mainstream [meaning under the auspices of the TTA].”  Whitty had not directly 
lobbied Tabberer previously, despite being on friendly terms, due to the roles each 
played – Tabberer was the head of the agency awarding contracts to training 
providers such as the IOE.   
 
[Whitty and Totterdell] were right in lobbying Number 10 and the 
Department ministers rather than necessarily trying to come and persuade 
me.  It’s sometimes arcane but… there are always rules of behavior.  
There’s right ways and wrong ways of doing these things, and it is about 
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being open to each other but also trying always to make sure that you’re 
not favoring somebody just because it’s sort of a fashionable idea or pet 
love. 
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
Immediately after the meeting with Tabberer in late April 2002, Wigdortz 
and Kiley held an “emergency strategy meeting” with McKinsey consultants in 
which they “planned out whom we needed to influence and how” (Wigdortz 2012, 
p.67).  To remedy their precarious position, they planned a “two-pronged approach” 
with some of their supporters “contacting Downing Street to ask them to approach 
the [DfES] to give us another look” while Wigdortz would “get in touch with Ralph 
Tabberer” to see how to gain his approval (Wigdortz 2012, p.68).   The TfL 
“backers” whom they tapped to contact the Prime Minster’s office were likely 
Whitty and/or Barber.  As a result, another critical meeting was set up with Adonis 
at 10 Downing Street.  That meeting, Totterdell said, was “a rescue operation” aimed 




6.13  A “Rescue” Meeting at 10 Downing Street 
 
In early May 2002, a meeting took place at 10 Downing Street between (1) 
Wigdortz and Totterdell12, (2) Timms and an official from the DfES, and (3) Adonis 
and Diamond.  Totterdell recalled Adonis and Diamond were the “key recipients” of 
their presentation while Timms and another were “passive partners on the 
‘government side’”.  He felt the goal of this meeting was to convince Timms and the 
DfES that TfL should be backed and funded.  Notably, Tabberer was not present nor 
were any other TTA officials in attendance.  During the meeting, Totterdell and 
Wigdortz presented their PowerPoint explaining the need and their design for the 
programme. 
 
We had about an hour, and we did the presentation, we had an exchange.  
My role there was really to first of all, do the introductions… but also to 
sell it as a teacher education model that could add value, potentially 
transformative, and something that really was worth a try, that couldn’t 
just be subsumed under current methodologies and models, which the 
                                                        
12 Another McKinsey consultant was also present, but Totterdell was unable to recall his name. 
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TTA at the time were very keen to do… He [Adonis] was very open… 
[and] asked some penetrating questions.  The meeting actually went 
from a neutral tenor where we were being given a hearing to a rather 
enthusiastic one in which we felt we had resonated with Adonis and his 
own advisor. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
Totterdell believed this meeting had a decisive impact on Timms as well, a judgment 
that he based on his later encounters and subsequent friendship with Timms. 
 
[Timms] had very, very little sense in his own right of education, though 
a good deal of sense about technology and its potential in education and 
was locked into a complete minder syndrome with the DfE … He is 
someone whom I respect for his wider set of beliefs, but he was not his 
own person and he certainly would not have been able to make any pro-
Teach First decision under pressure from financiers and City 
heavyweights in London and would’ve been definitely protected from 
doing so by those around him, which makes me believe the meeting in 
Number 10 was actually really cathartic and quite decisive [for him].  It 
was the turning point. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 25/01/2015 
 
The subsequent outcomes of that meeting were enthusiastic ministerial support and, 
critically, assurances of a funding stream for the programme from the DfES – both 
which Totterdell attributed to the influence of Adonis. 
 
Adonis, after that meeting, clearly got the Department to free up funds… 
and exerted a major influence there that turned around the schools 
minister… Adonis was able to get his hands on a budget and that’s 
where the Number 10 was so significant because without that budget, 
Teach First would’ve been stifled by the TTA.  I mean [Teach First] 
would’ve been a miniscule little group that [the TTA] would have 
controlled quite dramatically in the early years and probably – if it 
weren’t snuffed out – it certainly would have conformed much more to 
the standard operating models. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 25/01/2015 
 
Diamond confirmed that he and Adonis helped find DfES funding for the scheme but 
insisted that Adonis “never said at any point to the Department, ‘You have to do this 
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There were obviously some to-ing and fro-ing between us and the 
Department [DfES] and what became Teach First over the funding 
issues, particularly, obviously the funding was quite contentious, and we 
had to resolve some of those issues.  We were not getting involved in 
any of the very detailed, mechanical discussions about the 
implementation.  
– Patrick Diamond, Aide, PMPU 
Interview, 30/01/2015 
 
Some civil servants, however, were irked by the sudden push to fund TfL without 
being involved in meetings.  
 
It was a bit frustrating for people in the Department to see [TfL] 
almost going around their backs to talk to ministers because civil 
servants who would have been responsible for implementing the 
programme had to play catch up to find out what was being 
discussed and what had been agreed… they didn’t get the chance to 
offer their own view.  It was coming down from ministers.  You 
know, “I met Brett Wigdortz last night and this is what he said and 
this is what we’re going to do” whether or not that was basically a 
good idea or one that had the money allocated to it already.   
– Graham Holley, Division Manager, DfES 
Interview, 30/05/2012 
 
Despite the frustrations of some, the DfES put together roughly £500,000 to help 
launch TfL.  Though Timms could not recall specific meetings with Adonis, he said 
the two did collaborate to launch TfL.  “Certainly, I’ve talked to Andrew since [then] 
about the fact that we got Teach First going at that time,” Timms said, adding, “I 
think Andrew claims credit for it.  I’m sure he did play some part in it, but it was me 
that was the Minister” (Interview, 26/04/2012).  Timms was, in fact, the minister and 
who (along with the Education Secretary) ultimately had the power to authorize 
departmental funding for the scheme.  Still, Tabberer warned, “Don’t underestimate 
Andrew’s [Adonis’s] influence on these kinds of initiatives.  It’s what Andrew is 
really good at.  He talks to all parties and explains what he’s doing and he’s very 
highly trusted by all parts of the political, you know…” (Interview, 22/05/2012). 
While Timms and Adonis went about securing DfES funding for TfL, 
Wigdortz sought out Tabberer to discuss TfL’s training model.  Technically, TfL 
needed the approval and funding from the TTA in order to train teachers.  However, 
one interviewee suggested that TfL could have existed outside the TTA’s 
accreditation system and simply had its recruits work as unqualified teachers.  If TfL 
did that – chose to operate outside and independent of the TTA regulatory system – 
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then, as Whitty pointed out, “the programme would have needed to be funded by the 
private sector and by the Peter Lampls of this world to a vastly greater extent than it 
was” (Interview, 9/07/2012).  Given that Kiley and Wigdortz were having some 
trouble raising £500,000 privately, it looked unlikely that TfL would ever be fully or 
primarily funded by the business community and/or philanthropic sector. 
 
 
6.14  Revising TfL:  Wigdortz and Tabberer Meet 
 
To discuss how the TfL model could be adapted to satisfy the TTA, Wigdortz 
emailed Tabberer for a meeting as planned in the McKinsey emergency strategy 
meeting.  Tabberer responded promptly by calling Wigdortz to set up a meeting 
because Timms had urged him to help resolve the impasse. 
 
[After the ministerial meeting in late April] there was pretty quickly a 
reaction, which probably came out of Stephen Timms and Andrew 
[Adonis] talking and saying, “Is there something we can do with 
this?”… I can remember a conversation where [Timms] turned to me 
and asked if I would do some work on it.  That really pointed me back at 
it…  It was pretty important to me that I had a minister turn to me and 
say, “Ralph, could you see them and see if you can give them some 
help?”  That was the critical thing, the personal motivation, because 
Timms is a very impressive minister and when somebody turns to you 
like that, and he’s getting some encouragement or he sees something in 
it, you take a second and a very careful look.  So I wanted to find out if 
we could make it work for him… that’s when I invited Brett [Wigdortz] 
over to the Agency to talk.  
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
In addition to Timms’s personal request, Tabberer had another concern motivating 
him.  “I very much wanted any scheme like this to fall under the aegis of the TTA,” 
Tabberer said.  “The last thing you want, as an agency, is for part of your work to be 
governed by someone else, and I didn’t want this overseen by the Department.  If it 
was to go ahead, it had to come through us” (Tabberer Interview, 20/01/2015) 
Thus, when Tabberer and Wigdortz sat down together, Tabberer made it clear 
that, unlike TFA, TfL had to work according to TTA frameworks and not detract 
from the work of other existing routes.  It also needed a different name. 
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There were two leaps to make.  One of them was to drop the idea that we 
could copy something like Teach For America... they tended to see 
things through that lens… We needed some of the features of [TFA], but 
we didn’t need a copy-cat, and we didn’t need something which 
completely sat outside the system… And “Teach For London” just 
didn’t really sound like a campaign that would work here – the U.K. not 
being that same sort of nationalist orientation.  The second leap was to 
look at [TfL] in the context of all the other things we were doing in order 
to improve teacher recruitment, most particularly the GTP programme 
which had been radically redesigned the year before… to get people into 
schools and trained by schools and accredited through an on-the-job 
approach.  So there wasn’t much point in [TfL] replicating that model.   
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
Tabberer proposed that TfL recruitment target a segment of the labour market that 
the TTA did not already cater to – individuals TTA referred to as the “wont’s” and 
who were individuals not interested in the teaching profession.  Tabberer explained 
the TTA had diverse training routes for those who wanted to become teachers (the 
“wills”) and those who were considering teaching (“the maybe’s”).  In this way, 
Tabberer envisioned TfL would recruit a new group rather than drawing them away 
from already established routes.  This thinking helped him accept that, according to 
Wigdortz’s estimates based on TFA’s experience, only 50 or 60 percent of TfL’s 
graduates may teach after two years. 
They also discussed issues of teacher accreditation.  Tabberer rejected the 
IOE-designed model and insisted teachers on the scheme be required to meet the 
TTA’s criteria for QTS.   
 
The original proposal wanted to accredit people on the basis of the 
preparation.  [But TfL needed to] be constructed in such a way that these 
people did not automatically get QTS just by the preparation plus the 
time in schools.  They had to satisfy the QTS requirements both teacher 
outcome-rated standards – the 42 standards that we created – and there 
had to be an assessment... and that was critical to us. 
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
Tabberer also discussed alternatives to the proposed IOE-TfL partnership envisioned 
in Totterdell’s model. 
 
In order to be a provider of [training] places, [TfL] needed to be a 
credible teacher trainer, and there were three ways to do that.  One of 
them was to stay with the [IOE] and be part of the Institute.  Second way 
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was to build their own capacity, but they’d have to go through the 
accreditation process which would take them about a year [and] would 
slow everybody down...  Or third was to go to an open procurement 
whereby they set out what they wanted and we would help them in 
picking the best provider in an open competition.  And they chose that 
third route, and we preferred that third route because [we could] turn 
with total honestly and transparency to the whole market and say, you 
know, government isn’t just favoring the Institute because it’s down the 
road or because people like Michael [Totterdell] that they like – this is a 
genuine opportunity open to everybody. 
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
Although Tabberer acknowledged the IOE’s role in helping the TfL idea reach this 
stage, Tabberer said, “Our prime interest was in funding teacher training places.  
That’s what we had money for.  We weren’t terribly interested in giving new 
organizations money based on their ideas.  That’s not the kind of agency we were” 
(Interview, 20/01/2015).   
Emphasizing that he himself was “not political in the slightest”, Tabberer 
further explained that his insistence on QTS and a procurement process was mandated 
by legislation. 
 
The agency is rule-bound [and] very well organized… It’s basically the 
market management, or procurement, system.  And [with] opportunities 
like Teach First, it’s amazing how often that system and that legislation 
dictated how we would respond.  And it was questered – here’s another 
route into teaching, so let’s make sure whoever does it is accredited, 
everybody on it is heading toward [QTS], and there is competition in this 
market between people to provide it, it will be inspected and if it does well 
it can grow and if it doesn’t it will fade.  We were applying those rules 
again.  
– Ralph Tabberer, Chief Executive, TTA 
Interview, 20/01/2015 
 
Tabberer and Wigdortz’s discussion turned into a handful of meetings that took 
place over the span of a week or so, and eventually included Kiley and other private 
sector supporters.  The changes Tabberer proposed – the targeted pool for 
recruitment, the training’s adherence to QTS, an open tender to select a training 
provider, and a change of name – were agreed upon by all.   
Wigdortz (2012, p.69) described the TTA’s changes as tweaks to the 
programme.  Kiley accepted the changes but considered some a bit strict.  “Tabberer 
definitely said we had to be an additionality, [meaning] we had to recruit people who 
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would not otherwise teach,” she said (Kiley Interview, 30/04/2012).  She recalled if 
an applicant said he/she had applied to or were considering undertaking another 
teacher training route or wanted to be career teachers, then those applicants were not 
to be selected for TfL.  Meanwhile, Tabberer spoke highly of Wigdortz and Kiley, 
saying they “really listened to us and didn’t hear what we said as blockage – they 
heard it as challenges” (Tabberer Interview, 22/05/2012).  
With the TTA’s changes to the scheme agreed upon, Tabberer presented TfL to 
the TTA board as a scheme that represented an acceptable value-for-money 
programme.  “Because of the way [TfL] was set up – [with] a lot of the costs of the 
employment being covered by schools – it wasn’t difficult for us to make sure that 
the training costs to the Training Agency were economic compared to other options,” 
Tabberer recalled (Interview, 22/04/2012).  The board agreed and approved TfL. 
Totterdell subsequently learned of Wigdortz’s discussions with Tabberer and 
believed he was intentionally excluded from the meetings so the TTA could help 
determine TfL’s training model and provider. 
 
There is no way we [the IOE] should have been ruled out of that 
meeting.  In holding that meeting, Brett [Wigdortz], with a lack of 
experience and the sort of packaged projector head that he had at that 
time, would have been putty in Tabberer’s hands.  He’s a master 
negotiator.  But that’s exactly what that meeting was about.  And at that 
meeting, ground was given away that led to a very, very poor initial 
tender [the TTA’s model specifications for the tender in December 
2002]. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 24/01/2015 
 
Totterdell also suspected that Tabberer framed his insistence on QTS as the way in 
which TfL could become a more independent and high-profile organization. 
 
My sense is that probably the tradeoff that took place between Tabberer 
and Brett [Wigdortz] that if they confined themselves to QTS, they 
would be allowed to be as high-profile as they wanted to be.  If they 
involved themselves in a PGCE or master’s programme, they would not.  
They would be tied much more closely to the tails of the provider 
involved.  I would be very surprised if that conversation didn’t take 
place because Tabberer thinks in quite similar ways to Adonis though 
not so radically.  So my sense is from the beginning they were 
independent and independent-minded.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 24/01/2015  
 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 214 
Totterdell also said he was not immediately aware that Wigdortz agreed to have an 
open competition managed by the TTA to select TfL’s training provider.  Thus, 
Totterdell continued to advocate for TfL amongst his teacher educators and others 
until later that fall when the TTA announced there would be a bidding process.   
With agreed modifications to the scheme made and funding from the TTA and 
DfES approved, Timms held a meeting with the proponents of the scheme in mid-
May.  There, Timms officially announced his support for TfL.  
 
 
6.15  Preparing for the Launch of “Teach First” 
 
The launch date for the scheme was set for 15 July 2002 and was publicly 
announced in five London newspapers.  Headlines and details emphasized the 
scheme’s purpose to recruit “top” graduates for “poor” schools, highlighting its 
connections to “blue-chip” business sponsors.  Headlines read: 
 
• “Graduates to teach before joining City”– Evening Standard, 22 May (Miles 
2002) 
• “Campus volunteers urged to teach” –The Guardian 23 May (Wintour 2002b) 
• “Blue-chip talent to help poor schools” – The Times, 23 May (Baldwin 2002) 
• “Top graduates for ‘sink’ schools” – The Telegraph, 24 May (Sylvester 2002) 
• “Top students to be roped in to teach tough kids” – Straits Times/the Sunday 
Times, 24 May (Anon 2002) 
 
Notably, all of the newspaper articles (1) referred to the scheme as “Teach For 
London”, (2) stated it was modeled on TFA, and (3) described TFA as a successful 
programme that top graduates in America were applying to in significant numbers.  
While all articles stated the London business community had proposed and backed 
TfL, only one referred McKinsey’s supporting role (Wintour 2002b).  The articles 
relied primarily on quotes from Kiley in which she described various benefits the 
new programme would provide.  Wigdortz’s name was never mentioned although the 
IOE was cited in one article for helping develop the scheme’s training.   
Soon after the public announcement, Timms was rotated out of the DfES.  
His replacement – David Miliband – was also supportive of TfL.  However, the MP 
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assigned to TfL was Stephen Twigg, the newly-appointed Minister of London 
Schools.  This was a ministerial role a level under the Schools Minister created in 
May 2002 in preparation for the launch of the London Challenge, an upcoming 
initiative the DfES planned to launch in July (Kidson & Norris 2014).  Twigg, an 
Oxford graduate and former London borough councilman, represented North 
London’s Enfield-Southgate area and first learned of TfL through a brief submitted 
to him.  “My immediate reaction was very, very positive,” Twigg said (Interview, 
24/04/02012), adding,  “Clearly, it was rooted in the Teach For America programme, 
so I was presented with analysis of how that programme worked and that was very 
encouraging.”  He recalled he saw TfL as complementary to the goals the DfES was 
developing for the London Challenge. 
 
The task of London Challenge was to raise quality of education but also 
to challenge some of those misconceptions that existed about the quality 
of education in London…  As it happened, Teach First coincided with 
the launch of the London Challenge and we absolutely, in the narrative 
of London Challenge, included Teach First as a positive programme to 
help improve the quality of teaching and learning in London schools.  So 
I saw it as integral.   
– Stephen Twigg, London Schools Minister 
Interview, 24/04/2012 
 
For these reasons, Twigg endorsed and coordinated the DfES’s commitment to TfL. 
 With government’s support for TfL secured, Kiley’s group renewed their 
search for business supporters to finance TfL and join the advisory board being set 
up for the scheme.  From among London First’s members, Kiley targeted Citigroup 
and pitched the TfL idea to Jennifer Scardino, Citigroup’s Director of Corporate 
Affairs for Europe, Middle East and Africa.  Scardino was an American graduate of 
Columbia University who had worked in the Clinton Administration before joining 
Citigroup in 2000.  In her new position, Scardino [Interview, 18/05/15] said she was 
responsible at the time for creating “a feeling of cohesion” across the company, 
which was a recent amalgamation of three organizations: two U.S.-based companies 
– Citibank and the Traveler’s Group (an insurance company) and a division of the 
U.K.-based asset-management company Schroders.  With around 50,000 employees 
in her region, she was looking for “a few flagship programmes to help give the 
business some CSR strategy and some things our people could get involved in… to 
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help integrate [our] diverse cultures”.  Thus, when Kiley asked for her support for “a 
Teach For America in London”, Scardino said the decision was easy. 
 
I was already exploring what we were going to be doing in the CSR space 
for the bank.  [And] I was very aware of the work of TFA…  My husband 
had been working at AmeriCorp, the Clinton Administration’s domestic 
Peace Corps [which provided funding for TFA], and we lived in D.C., 
and so through that community of people I had met Wendy [Kopp] or met 
somebody who worked there…  It’s a really good idea that people can 
really get their heads around, makes a lot of sense, and a lot of us, myself 
included, have thought, “Wow, I wish they had been around when I was a 
graduate”, because, you know, I went straight into an industry and never 
stopped. 
– Jennifer Scardino, Director of Corporate Affairs, Citigroup 
Interview, 18/05/15 
 
Scardino also pointed out that “in attempting to design a CSR programme for what 
was at the time the world’s biggest bank, you are not going take a huge risk”.  Thus, 
Scardino and Citigroup’s Chairman in Europe, Winfried Bischoff, agreed to back 
TfL because it was based on an already proven model, TFA.  Scardino then gained 
approval of the company’s board and requested money from the Citi Foundation in 
New York City, which allocated the company’s charitable funds globally.  Scardino 
said her “American colleagues at the Citi Foundation… knew exactly what it was 
because they had been financing TFA for years” and thus promptly approved 
£50,000 for TfL.  Scardino also joined TfL’s advisory board. 
 Another executive that joined the advisory board and sponsored TfL was Rob 
Habgood, Managing Director of Capital One in the U.K.  Habgood, an American, 
had set up the British arm of the U.S. credit card company from scratch starting in 
1996.  By 2002, Capital One was well established in the country, and Habgood said 
its senior executives were being encouraged to “get involved in one or two non-profit 
activities”, thus prompting him to look around. 
 
One of the things we tried to do at Capital One was find local non-profit 
activity that we could get involved in, that we were passionate about, 
[and] thought was well-aligned with what Capital One was trying to focus 
on in the non-profit space [which was] kids at risk.  [And] one of the key 
things that we looked for in getting involved were places where it wasn’t 
just sitting through a board meeting and giving money, but places where 
we could be actively involved in adding value, with sharing our 
experience and advice, and Teach First ended up being a great match on 
that side of things. 
 – Rob Habgood, Managing Director, Capital One 
 




Habgood recalled he was already “aware and inspired” by TFA when he met 
Wigdortz and learned of the upcoming launch of TfL. 
 
I immediately hit it off with Brett [Wigdortz] and loved the fact that he 
was facing very similar challenges in the non-profit space to what I had 
faced in the for-profit space in building out Capital One… [and] [Teach 
First] is such a compelling concept because [it’s a] Peace Corps-type of 
opportunity at home with the benefit of getting a teaching certificate that 
people can use later in life. 
– Rob Habgood, Managing Director, Capital One 
Interview, 28/04/2015 
 
Thus, Habgood became an advisor to Wigdortz and secured Capital One’s £50,000 
donation to the scheme.  
During this time, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their colleagues also discussed what to 
rename TfL.  Tabberer had insisted the name TfL would not work and Kopp had not 
wanted TFA to be so closely associated with the London scheme.  Thus, when Kiley 
suggested Teach London First due to its association with London First, it was 
decided to drop “London” and go with simply “Teach First” (Wigdortz 2012, p.84).   
In preparation for the official launch, Teach First was set up as a charity that 
was owned and jointly managed by a board of five trustees from London First and 
BITC.13  The advisory board ultimately included business executives, leaders of the 
headteacher unions, and other supporters.14  Moreover, Wigdortz requested to 
continue on as Teach First’s Chief Executive, to which the trustees agreed. 
 
In the early days [Wigdortz] wasn’t what you’d say was a leader.  But he 
was the only person on that team that really, really internalized the 
mission and by the time we came to look for a Chief Executive, he was 
the only one who really wanted to do it… We were all very nervous, but 
we definitely wanted to move forward with this.  There were many 
reasons why Brett was a terrible idea. (laughs)… [But] he really had fire 
in his belly about wanting to do it.  So that was very attractive, but we 
had a lot of growing pains at the beginning.    
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
 Interview, 30/04/2012 
                                                        
13 The trustees were Kiley, May, and Cleverdon, as well as O’Brien and Iacobescu (the only 
independent trustee) who acted as co-chairs. 
14 Advisory board members included O’Neill (Goldman Sachs and SHINE), Lovegrove (McKinsey), 
Dunford (SHA), Hart (NAHT), Hodgson (Paul Hamlyn Foundation), Scardino (Citigroup), Habgood 
(Capital One), and Fabes as an “observer” (DfES).   
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The trustees then helped Wigdortz hire a staff, though he first offered positions 
to his colleagues at McKinsey who had been supporting the scheme.  Two of his 
McKinsey colleagues, Nat Wei and Paul Davies, decided to join the organization as 
Director of Graduate Recruitment and Chief Operating Officer respectively.  To help 
with graduate recruitment, he then hired Nicole Sherrin, a TFA alumni and award-
winning teacher referred to him by Kopp.  Wigdortz and colleagues then put an 
advertisement in the Times and interviewed individuals for graduate recruitment 
positions.  Just prior to the launch date, final staff members were hired, and Kopp 
came to visit Wigdortz and Kiley.   
Finally, the launch event was held in Canary Wharf on 15 July 2002 and was 
led by Twigg and other educational leaders.  As speeches continued, Wigdortz 
(2012, p.88), recalled, “At the last minute, I was told that it did not make sense for 
me to be one of the main speakers… since I wasn’t of the same stature as the rest of 
the guests.”  Instead, Wigdortz answered questions at the close of the event.  He later 
regretted this as he recalled the speeches at the launch focused on the problems in 
education and the importance of good teachers and “lacked the energy and 
specificity” he envisioned.  Nevertheless, the idea for TfL had become a reality with 
a new name, hired staff, and secured government funding. 
The launch marked the end of the mobilization phase of Teach First.  Although 
fundraising and the recruitment of supporters for the scheme continued into the next 
phase, the primary goal was no longer seeking the approval and establishment of the 
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CHAPTER 7:  PHASE II:  ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, and Reinvention   
 
In Phase II, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams became policy entrepreneurs 
and built an influential network of supporters in favour of the transfer of TfL.  They 
eventually succeeded in officially launching the scheme as Teach First by July 2002.  
The mobilization phase of Teach First’s emergence was a complex process of 
political maneuvering, tapping the right networks to bring together the symbolic 
support and resources across London’s many sectors.  In this period, networks were 
critically important and debates over how TfL should be reinvented were key 
themes.  Thus, my guiding research questions in this process were:  How did policy 
entrepreneurs utilize networks to effectively diffuse the idea of TfL and ultimately 
bring about its transfer?  And, How was TfL perceived and its reinvention viewed by 
others in the process of mobilizing support for TfL?    
 In addition to these two research questions, which focus on the issues of 
agency and processes, I also consider:  How did institutional contexts shape actors’ 
interpretations, as well as the actions and outcomes, of the mobilization phase?  This 
question directly relates to the concept of reinvention and how various influential 
actors judged TfL should be adapted in relation to the contextual peculiarities of the 
two countries.  Thus, I first ground this chapter in a comparative analysis of (1) the 
institutional contexts which TfL advocates were navigating and (2) the institutional 
contexts of the U.S., and (3) the history of TFA and the contexts in which it 
developed.  Institutional contexts, particularly the educational and political settings, 
were markedly different in the U.S. and U.K. and comparing them serves to highlight 
how transferring the TFA model to England was not a simple task but involved 
judgments in how it should be reinvented.  This reinvention debate was central to 
overcoming opposition to TfL during this phase.      
 To be clear, this chapter is organized as follows.  In the first half, I compare 
and analyze the American and British institutional contexts as they related to TFA 
and TfL respectively.  This enables me to highlight the conditions that facilitated 
TFA’s development in the U.S. and how contexts and actors’ subjective 
interpretations put the question of TfL’s transferability into question.  In the second 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 220 
half of the chapter, I proceed to examine the processes of policy development during 
Phase II through identifying four stages of activity: base-building, pressuring, 
negotiating, and legitimizing.  In each stage, I identify the strategies employed by the 
policy entrepreneurs advocating for TfL and discuss how these efforts ultimately led 
to a negotiated reinvention of TfL, enabling it to be launched as “Teach First”.  
 
 
7.2 The Complexity of Contexts and Difficulty of Drawing Lessons  
 
As Kiley and Wigdortz began their efforts to launch TfL, they stepped into a 
realm of policy that had been radically transformed since the mid-1980s.  The issue 
of how teachers were trained and who trained them had been highly contested and an 
area over which government exercised considerable control.  As Americans, Kiley 
and Wigdortz had little understanding of this institutional context and history, and 
hence, were not familiar with political struggles and power dynamics that were 
created by it.  This lack of knowledge of policy contexts would be both an asset and 
a weakness – an asset in the sense that it allowed Wigdortz and Kiley to advocate for 
TfL as seemingly neutral and objective outsiders, but also a weakness that limited 
their awareness of New Labour’s priorities, the TTA’s role in teacher training, and 
universities’ stake in ITT.  However, Kiley and Wigdortz – as well as other 
interviewees – had limited understanding of TFA and its development and role in the 
context of education in the U.S.  This prompted individuals in Phase II – including 
Tabberer, Barber, and Adonis – to draw contrasting lessons from the American 
programme.  These contrasting lessons were shaped by several factors: (1) their 
personal background, (2) interpretations of contexts, (3) the views of close contacts 
within their own networks, and (4) the extent of their knowledge of TFA and its 
history. 
I begin unraveling the complexity of contexts, and actors’ situated 
understandings of TFA/TfL, by discussing TFA.  I briefly trace the circumstances, 
founding contexts, and development of TFA.  Next, I compare and highlight the 
ways in which TFA’s contexts differed from the landscapes TfL was entering. I then 
discuss two other key contextual differences between the U.S. and England that 
caused TfL to evolve differently than TFA before proceeding to analyze the process 
through which the scheme became officially established.  
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7.2.1  Understanding the Development of TFA in the U.S. Context 
 
While the U.S and England had similar problems meeting teacher demand 
and addressing low pupil achievement in high-poverty schools, the countries had 
very different approaches to managing the quality and supply of teachers.  While the 
British government had pro-actively inserted itself into teacher education and largely 
determined its structure and design by 2002, the federal government in the U.S. had 
no such role.  Federal involvement in teacher education in the U.S. remained 
relatively weak compared to England.  Education policy and teacher certification 
remained issues determined predominately at the state and school district level.  As a 
result, state standards for teacher certification varied along with the unconventional 
routes available to become a teacher although university schools of education still 
provided the vast majority of the country’s teachers (Feistritzer & Chester 2000).   
Still, efforts had been made to promote national standards and greater accountability 
in teacher education (Roth & Swail 2000) with two national bodies in the U.S. 
offering accreditation to teacher education programmes on a voluntary basis. 
Because institutional accreditation was also available through state and regional 
bodies, only a third of the more than 1,300 institutions providing teacher education 
held accreditation on the national level. 
TFA first developed in this fragmented and decentralized context as a 
privately funded national progamme that operated independently but partnered with 
school district authorities to place its recruits into schools in states that had existing 
alternative certification routes and teacher shortages.  For TFA’s first summer 
institute in 1990, Kopp recruited teacher educators specializing in multi-cultural 
education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to deliver teacher training (which 
was how Whitty encountered TFA as he was on sabbatical there).  Soon, however, 
TFA evolved in response to (1) national debates around teacher training, (2) its need 
for private funding, and (3) its concern with safeguarding its brand and image.  
After its first summer institute training, Kopp dissolved TFA’s association 
with university-based teacher educators, in part due to complaints from private 
funders, including wealthy conservative Texas businessman Ross Perot (Boyle-Baise 
Interview, 20/01/2012).  Instead, Kopp switched to using TFA alumni and a more 
practical-based curriculum for its summer training.  This not only reflected Kopp’s 
perceptions of weaknesses in universities’ approach to teacher training but also her 
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concern with the low-status of schools of education and the preferences of funders on 
which TFA relied.  Despite facing funding shortfalls in its first years, Kopp 
succeeded in keeping TFA afloat and in marketing it as the new domestic Peace 
Corps that carried on the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement by working to end 
education inequity.  Meanwhile, TFA successfully recruited top university graduates 
and placed them in some of America’s neediest schools.   
However, with this success, Kopp and TFA soon developed a contentious 
relationship with teacher educators and profession-led bodies by further wading into 
the highly politicized national debate about how teachers should be trained.  
Throughout the 1990s, there were two camps in the U.S. vying for influence over 
policy related to school teachers: (1) the proponents for professionalization of 
teaching (e.g. Darling-Hammond 2000; Darling-Hammond et al. 1999), led by the 
teacher educators and professional bodies, and (2) the advocates of deregulation (e.g. 
Ballou & Podgursky 2000; Kanstoroom & Finn 1999), led by New Right 
intellectuals, economists, business leaders, and conservative think tanks.  
Professionalization advocates called for national standards and assessments for 
teacher certification while the deregulators proposed abolishing state certification 
requirements and allowing schools to hire individuals from the open market, 
including those with no teaching experience or training (for more detailes on the 
national debate, see Cochran-Smith & Fries 2001).   
In this highly politicized debate, Kopp publicly championed the side of 
deregulation early on by publishing arguments calling on state policy-makers to 
bypass teacher education and certification altogether and directly fund school 
districts to recruit, hire, and train their own teachers (with the help of a new company 
she was planning to launch to help districts do such) (Kopp 1992; 1994).  As a result, 
a leading education academic at Columbia University, Linda Darling-Hammond, 
published a scathing critique of the shortcomings of Kopp and her TFA programme.  
Darling-Hammond (1994) drew attention to Kopp’s lack of knowledge about teacher 
education and highlighted evidence of the dismal performance of TFA recruits in 
classrooms across New York City.  While Kopp expressed shock and outrage at 
Darling-Hammond’s claims (Kopp 2001), the negative assessment of TFA posed a 
potential threat to TFA’s credibility and funding. However, as discovered in the 
course of my study, Darling-Hammond’s criticism also had the effect of galvanizing 
support for the struggling non-profit.    
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From this experience, Kopp learned her views could negatively impact TFA’s 
work.  As a result, she learned to disengage from public debate and purport that TFA 
was apolitical.  Doing so allowed Kopp to protect TFA’s reputation, enabling the 
organization to continue to recruit bi-partisan support and appeal to elite graduates of 
all backgrounds.   Yet, in more private settings and among funders, Kopp continued 
to position TFA as a viable and effective alternative to schools of education 
(Schneider 2011; 2014), mirroring the New Right attacks on university-based teacher 
education espoused in the U.K based on provider-capture arguments.   
While carefully managing its image, TFA continued to grow as a well-
connected but politically controversial programme.  Critics were dismayed by TFA’s 
substantial corporate funding and its limited teacher training.  In addition, critics 
questioned claims that TFA was producing more effective teachers than schools of 
education while the scheme simultaneously shielded itself from outside scrutiny and 
accountability.  Meanwhile, TFA was starting to demonstrate to its supporters how it 
empowered a new breed of education reformers who were establishing charter 
schools (e.g. KIPP) and other educational innovations, including a company to help 
school districts develop alternative teacher training routes (The New Teacher 
Project).  In 2000, the leaders of TFA set ambitious expansion goals which prompted 
them to engage in lobbying the federal government at the same time as the 
monumental No Child Left Behind Act was being formulated (Russo 2012).  Thus, 
TFA’s size and political influence at the federal level was just beginning to expand 
as Kiley and Wigdortz were championing TfL in the U.K.   However, at that time, 
TFA also had its opponents in Congress, notably among them the influential Senator 
Ted Kennedy, who sided with the teacher unions that certification mattered and, 
thus, was essentially against the expansion of TFA (Russo 2012). 
The point here is not to defend or attack TFA but highlight that TFA was an 
evolving innovation with a complex history shaped by political and educational 
contexts of the U.S.  While TFA did not have to seek permission from government 
nor regulatory bodies such as the TTA, finding funding was nevertheless a main 
challenge for TFA in its first five years.  As a result, Kopp had to navigate politically 
charged debates that were constantly reshaping the teacher training field in both 
practice and policy.  Still, as a national programme, TFA had the flexibility of 
building relationships with different states and districts that favoured TFA’s 
approach while avoiding localities whose leaders and policies were less 
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accommodating.  This contributed to TFA’s independence and ability to survive 
despite criticism and attacks on its effectiveness.    
Because Kiley and Wigdortz did not fully understand the differences between 
the U.S. and England’s teacher education context nor appreciate how TFA was an 
innovation moulded by American political structure and contexts, they made biased 
assumptions about how such a scheme could be launched in England and in what 
form.  Drawing lessons from TFA’s experience, they assumed the wider education 
establishment, especially the unions, would automatically be hostile toward TfL.  
They also conceptualized TfL as a programme that would essentially operate 
independently and presumably outside the normal teacher training frameworks, not 
foreseeing this as a particularly problematic stance.   
Still, they were aware of Blair’s focus on “education, education, education” 
yet only vaguely knowledgeable of the policies New Labour was enacting and the 
rationale behind them.  Adopting a pro-active “let’s-do-it” attitude, they likely did 
not feel the need to learn more about contextual differences as they saw their idea as 
rooted in common sense and backed by the McKinsey study.  They linked the idea to 
TFA to indicate it was already “tried-and-tested” in the U.S. and hence clearly 
effective in addressing an urgent problem.  However, knowledge of New Labour’s 
education agenda was misleading as they lacked an understanding of teacher training 
in the U.K.  Without a deeper knowledge of such background contexts, Kiley and 
Wigdortz initially dismissed those critical of TfL without considering how TfL may 
be adapted to appeal to bureaucratic “sceptics”.  Fortunately for them, Totterdell and 
(eventually) Tabberer provided the expertise to help adapt TfL, but both men had 
opposing visions of what the ideal adaptations were. 
 
 
7.2.2  Problems with Drawing Lessons from TFA for Transfer & Reinvention 
 
Kiley and Wigdortz drew lessons from TFA to inform their efforts to launch 
TfL.  Meanwhile, members of New Labour – including Barber, Adonis, and 
Tabberer – knew about TFA and judged it based on their understanding of TFA and 
the American context.  They drew somewhat different, and even contradictory 
lessons, which highlights the problem of a-historical lesson-drawing (Rose 1993) to 
inform policy transfer.  A key factor that led to differences among the lessons drawn 
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from TFA was the varying levels of knowledge of TFA, its development, and the 
educational and political contexts of both countries.  On this point, I offer a brief 
look at actors’ knowledge, the lessons each drew, and the consequences of 
presumption. 
Kiley and Wigdortz both had limited (and arguably biased) knowledge of 
TFA and its history but differing knowledge of education and political context in the 
U.S.  Prior to December 2001, Kiley had known of TFA only through her social 
contacts in New York, and Wigdortz had never heard of TFA.  They both sought 
instrumental knowledge of TFA through conference calls with Kopp and TFA 
alumni.  In this way, Kiley and Wigdortz both gained more knowledge but still only 
a limited understanding of TFA.  Yet, some interviewees (e.g., O’Brien, Totterdell), 
who had some or no previous awareness of TFA, perceived Kiley and/or Wigdortz as 
rather knowledgeable of TFA and hence afforded them more authority on the 
subject, perhaps due in part to their American nationality and personal contact with 
TFA leaders.  At the same time, Kiley, as a former social worker and education 
advocate, was more knowledgeable of American political and educational contexts 
than Wigdortz, who was younger and worked primarily outside the continental U.S. 
after finishing university in 1996.  However, both Kiley and Wigdortz had little more 
than a basic understanding of the English context.  This mix contributed to their 
positive and uncritical views of TFA and their attempt to design and navigate 
political contexts in a similar way that TFA had, both lessons which proved 
problematic. 
Meanwhile, as former educational researchers, both Tabberer and Barber had 
generally positive views of TFA.  Both were highly knowledgeable of England’s 
educational and political context and understood to some degree the differences 
between the countries’ regulatory contexts.  They also both considered England’s 
more structured and centralized government controls over ITT as superior to the 
Americans’ decentralized and relatively autonomous teacher education system 
(Barber 1995; Tabberer 2012).  Perhaps because of these obvious differences, 
transferring the TFA idea to the U.K. had not been seriously considered before.  Still, 
Tabberer and Barber differed in their view of TFA’s transferability to the U.K. 
because they chose different dimensions of context on which to base their analysis.  
Tabberer was aware of the roots of controversy surrounding TFA and had come to 
view TFA as a “disruptive innovation” that challenged the dominance of schools of 
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education in teacher training.  Since the TTA tightly regulated ITT providers in 
England, Tabberer felt TFA was not needed in the U.K.  He also understood that 
TFA had a nationalistic and missionary appeal to graduates that would likely be 
unsuccessful in the U.K. given the differences in the national cultures of the two 
countries.  In other words, he contended that graduates in the U.K. would not likely 
join a TFA-type programme as promoted in the U.S.  In this way, he looked at the 
regulatory context to understand the merit and appeal of TFA as an American-
specific innovation and one not needed in England.  
In contrast, Barber saw TFA as transferable and needed in the U.K.  He 
indicated TFA had the potential to address similar problems both countries faced in 
attracting top graduates into teaching, recruiting enough teachers to satisfy demand, 
and improving pupil achievement in disadvantaged schools.  He admired TFA’s 
success in addressing these areas and believed such a TFA-type scheme in London 
could address the policy goals of the Green Paper.  In this way, Barber based his 
assessment and lessons on the “contexts of policy problems” of both countries and 
considered TFA a transferrable and desirable policy solution given New Labour’s 
agenda.  By looking only at  “contexts of policy problems”, he minimized the 
importance of other differences in national contexts, leaving adaptation up to the 
DfES and TTA. 
Adonis, unlike Tabberer and Barber, had limited knowledge of the 
educational contexts of the U.S. (though was probably well-informed of its national 
politics), but he was highly knowledgeable in the political and educational contexts 
of the U.K.   He had heard about TFA in the years prior, but not until personally 
meeting Kopp (sometime in the late 1990s or early 2000) did he learn more details 
about the scheme.  As a result, he came to view TFA as transferrable because it 
addressed problems common to both the American and English, namely teacher 
quality, teacher shortages, and underachievement in disadvantaged schools.  Thus, 
like Barber, he saw TFA as a needed and transferrable policy solution based on his 
analysis of the policy-problem context.  Unlike Tabberer and Barber, however, 
Adonis felt TFA’s success stemmed from its autonomy from government control, 
much like Thomas Telford School, a successful CTC in Shropshire (Adonis 2012). 
Thus, he had already championed policy ideas that circumvented bureaucracy, such 
as academies and Fast Track, both of which were directly managed by the DfES.  
Because of this, he considered the differences in the two regulatory contexts of the 
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two nations as irrelevant.  He wanted TfL to operate as TFA did, independently of 
government bureaucracy, including the TTA.   
Thus, Adonis, Tabberer, and Barber as well as Kiley and Wigdortz learned 
different lessons from TFA and thus had differing rationales mainly for (but also 
against) TfL and how the scheme might work in the U.K.  Individuals’ own depth of 
knowledge of TFA and how they made sense of contexts shaped the lesson they drew 
from TFA to inform their view of TfL.  Individuals’ views were also affected and 
empowered by their organizational positions, most notably with Tabberer as head of 
the TTA.  Barber and Adonis, on the other hand, had worked in the DfES and thus 
were less tied to a particular institutional script than Tabberer and free to associate 
and favour the TfL training model proposed by the IOE.     
 
 
7.2.3  Other Contextual Differences Affecting TfL’s Transfer & Reinvention  
 
Two other notable differences between the national contexts of the U.S. and 
U.K. that affected the transfer and reinvention of TfL were: (1) the levels of 
philanthropic giving among individuals and corporations and (2) business 
involvement in education policy. I briefly explain these contextual differences and 
how they shaped TFA as well as the TfL concept and efforts to launch it.  
Philanthropic Sector  Although TFA had successfully launched with 
financial resources from wealthy business leaders, corporations, and philanthropic 
foundations, such high levels of private sector support was not possible for TfL.  
Kiley and Wigdortz learned that levels of charitable giving among individuals and 
the corporate sector in the U.K. were far below those in the U.S. (despite increased 
levels of giving through the work of BITC) (Campbell et al. 2002).  In the U.S., 
levels of corporate philanthropy were much higher and more institutionalized in part 
because the government tax incentives that encouraged giving.  Other reasons for 
this difference stem from contrasting cultural attitudes of Americans and Britons 
toward money, class, and government responsibility as well as differences in the 
historical and economic contexts of the two countries (Wright 2002; Grant 2011).   
Given this difference in philanthropic giving between contexts, it is perhaps 
no surprise that TfL found financial support from those in the corporate world who 
were either: 
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(1) Americans working for American-based multinational corporations in the 
U.K., such as Jennifer Scardino (Citibank) and Rob Habgood (Capital One);  
(2) Britons who had worked for American-based multinational corporations 
such as Jim O’Neill (SHINE/Goldman Sachs), or 
(3) Britons who had lived/worked in the U.S., such as George Iacobescue 
(Canary Wharf), Patricia Lankester (Paul Hamlyn Foundation), Peter Lampl 
(Sutton Trust). 
 
 Most of these individuals, in addition to already having a familiarity with 
TFA, also likely modelled U.S. philanthropy practices. In fact, Lampl cited 
Americans’ expectations of philanthropic giving by the financially successful as 
among the inspirations that led him to become a philanthropist in the U.K.  Notably, 
Lampl and O’Neill have been viewed as examples of what has been termed the “new 
philanthropy” in the U.K. through which a more American view of self-interested 
altruism has been promoted and whose impact in the education sectors has grown 
(Stephen J Ball 2008; Ball & Junemann 2011; Henley 2012).   
Businesses’ Involvement in Education and Policy-making   While Kiley and 
Wigdortz could not rely eclusively on private funding to launch TfL (unlike TFA), 
they also discovered that business influence on education policy was more limited in 
the U.K. than in the U.S.  While the conservative governments of both the U.S. and 
U.K. encouraged the private sector to take a more active role in society in the 1980s, 
the decentralized nature of U.S. governance historically afforded businesses more 
influence and participation in education policy at all levels. Consequently, American 
corporate leaders became increasingly involved in formulating and lobbying for 
school reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (David 1991; Cradle 2007).  
In contrast, the U.K.’s more centralized government engaged in more 
prescriptive policy-making in education and teacher training in particular (David 
1991).  As a result, despite the influential and privileged role London First had in the 
governance of London throughout the 1990s and after the formation of the GLA in 
2000 (Thornley et al. 2005b), that influence did not translate into significant clout in 
education policy-making.    Still, as discussed in previous chapters, London First was 
aiming to become involved with London schools because it was an important CSR 
priority and borough authorities – not the GLA – managed the city’s schools.   Thus, 
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although individual businesses had been involved with schools locally, TfL 
represented London First’s first collective venture into the education policy and 
collaboration with the DfES.   
However, TfL was different from the type of business-education partnership 
initiative that BITC had commonly facilitated.  TfL was an idea that represented an 
alternative model for teacher recruitment and training, an area of policy that was 
managed nationally by the TTA.  Thus, the proposal for TfL challenged a highly 
regulated (and contested) policy area where business influence was non-existent.  
Consequently, Kiley’s strategy of amassing business clout to influence policy 
eventually had limited success.  Instead, the fight for TfL’s future played out more 
behind the scenes.   Because leaders on education matters – notably Adonis, Barber, 
Tabberer, and Totterdell – held differing interpretations of TFA, their conflict of 
views initially stalled the progress of TfL and left the Schools Minister indecisive.  
Thus, interpretations shaped the process of the scheme’s emergence and later 
determined in what form it was eventually approved.  
 
 
7.2.4  New Labour’s Education Agenda  (1997-2002) 
 
Stepping away from comparing national contexts, I return to the local 
contexts of England to address how New Labour’s education agenda set the stage for 
both support and opposition to TfL amongst those in No. 10 and the DfES.   Since 
Blair’s New Labour government came to power in 1997, improving education had 
been among its top priorities.  While accepting most of the reforms enacted by the 
Conservative, New Labour aimed to increase the prestige of teaching by declaring 
teaching would be an all-graduate profession and setting out its agenda for improving 
the profession in the 1998 Green Paper, Teachers: Meeting the Challenge of Change 
(DfEE 1998).  Co-written primarily by Adonis and Barber, the paper proposed “a 
new vision” for the profession in which excellent teaching practice and school 
leadership was both developed and rewarded.    
To accomplish this, the Blair government called for the “modernisation of the 
teaching profession” (DfEE 1998, p.6). This “new” professional was contrasted with 
other notions of professionalism among teachers who the paper described as 
“isolated, unaccountable professionals” who “made curriculum and pedagogical 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 230 
decisions alone, without reference to the outside world” (DfEE 1998, p.14).  Instead, 
teachers now needed: 
 
• to have high expectations of themselves and of all pupils;  
• to accept accountability;  
• to take personal and collective responsibility for improving their 
skills and subject knowledge;  
• to seek to base decisions on evidence of what works in schools 
in this country and internationally;  
• to work in partnership with other staff in schools;  
• to welcome the contribution that parents, business and others 
outside a school can make to its success; and  
• to anticipate change and promote innovation.  
(DfEE 1998, p.14) 
 
With this outline, the government directed teachers to focus on developing 
the practical skills to transmit knowledge prescribed by the national curriculum, 
accept imposed accountability measures, and be responsive to policy change.  For 
teachers in disadvantaged schools, New Labour promised interventions to provide 
additional support, and hence the development of the Education Action Zones, 
Excellence in Cities, and the London Challenge.  Through these targeted 
interventions, New Labour advocated for improving social mobility through 
education, a focus which created an alignment between government and Lampl’s 
work through the Sutton Trust and made Barber and Adonis particularly receptive to 
TFA.   
In addition, New Labour’s policies on teachers exalted teachers as “agents of 
change” who were vitally important (Johnson & Hallgarten 2002).  This sentiment 
mirrored the views of both TFA and TfL as the schemes aimed to change children’s 
futures through transforming top graduates into leaders in the classroom.  Still, 
Johnson and Hallgarten (2002, p.16) suggested that New Labour “viewed [teachers] 
as passive tools to be used in its centralized push on standards” which differed from 
previous Conservative governments that treated teachers “as an obstruction to be 
overcome in the implementation of the [1988] Education Reform Act”.  Totterdell 
sought to circumvent this limited view of teachers as technicians by creating a new 
model of training to empower teachers.  However, New Labour’s reliance on the 
TTA to maintain control and improve the quality of ITT and increase the teacher 
supply precluded others from accepting Totterdell’s experimental model.     
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Interestingly, the government’s Green Paper hardly mentioned universities.  
That was because, according to Furlong (2005), New Labour no longer saw teacher 
education as a key policy concern or prime site in the formation of teachers’ 
professionalism (unlike past Conservative governments).  Instead, government 
shifted its focus to school-level initiatives and related policies such as structured 
induction, merit pay, and professional development – all issues promoted in the 1998 
Green Paper.  This shift in focus from schools of education to schools and teachers 
themselves as sites of reform likely prevented Totterdell’s training model from 
gaining more support within the DfES and may have contributed to Wigdortz’s 
presumption that university training providers were more “advisors” and deliverers 
of training than autonomous professionals and key partners. 
Finally, the Green Paper also emphasized the need to recruit and retain the 
best teachers for the full potential of the education system to be realized.  Thus, 
“attracting good teachers” was a policy priority indentified in the Green Paper, which 
asserted, “The profession as a whole does not attract enough ambitious young 
people” (p.15).  To attract high quality graduates and raise the appeal and status of 
teaching, the Blair government proposed greater flexibility in ITT programmes, more 
consistent and rigorous assessments for QTS, and performance-related pay for 
teachers and heads.  The government also proposed a national Fast Track scheme to 
identify and rapidly advance the careers of promising teachers.  Attracting high-
quality teachers and leaders was another New Labour priority that caused Barber and 
Adonis to look favorably on TfL although others in the DfES wanted to focus on 
making the floundering Fast Track initiative work rather than consider TfL.  
After public consultation, the government began implementing the reforms of 
the Green Paper in mid-1999, and by 2002, many were up and running and in the 
process of being reviewed and improved following New Labour’s re-election in mid-
2001.  Still, there were chronic shortages of teachers in certain subjects and in 
disadvantaged schools, particularly in London.  Resolving this problem became a 
constant priority for the DfES and TTA in New Labour’s first and second terms, 
leading to the development of numerous new routes into teaching.  These included 
the GTP, Overseas Trained Teacher scheme, and the flexible PGCE.  This policy 
priority prompted both support and opposition to TfL with some wanting to focus on 
teacher training routes already created and others wanting to continue to develop new 
pathways into the profession. 
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In sum, New Labour’s portrayal of teachers as “agents of change”, its 
promotion of education as a vehicle for social mobility, and its emphasis on raising 
the status of teachers and attracting ambitious graduates into teaching led many 
within government to favour TfL.  Meanwhile, constant teacher shortages increased 
collaboration between the TTA and DfES as they sought to remedy the situation, 
leading some within the DfES to side with the TTA in initially rejecting TfL.  In 
these ways, New Labour’s policy agenda and work shaped the reactions and 
interpretations of individuals in government.  In this context, Kiley and Wigdortz 
were disadvantaged with only a cursory knowledge of the party’s policy agenda in 
education and current teacher training regulations.  Still, their embeddedness in 
influential networks and their ability to tap the expertise and resources of other 
networks in education, business, and the philanthropic community made up for their 
outsider status.  Their persistent advocacy for TfL as modeled on TFA caught the 
attention of key individuals already familiar with the American programme.   
 
7.2.5  Awareness of TFA among New Labour leaders 
 
It is worth considering how “new” was the idea of TFA in the British context.  
TfL clearly came into a policy context in which key policy-makers were already 
somewhat familiar with TFA.  Both Adonis and Barber indicated they knew of TFA 
prior to hearing about TfL while Tabberer had learned about the controversy 
surrounding TFA in the mid-1990s.  Moreover, with TFA in existence since 1990 
and many Britons looking to the U.S. for policy ideas, awareness of TFA among 
civil servants and New Labour may have been more common than my interviews 
suggest.  Interestingly, the earliest indication that the New Labour had an awareness 
and admiration for TFA was in 1996.  At that time, the Guardian reported that 
Labour proposed “giving incentives to headteachers to take up posts in deprived 
areas”, an idea “modelled on the Teach for America corps of outstanding graduates 
who make a two-year commitment to teach in deprived US urban schools” 
(MacLeod & Smithers 1996).  Clearly, TFA had caught the attention of some in 
England through various channels.  Barber had learned of TFA by staying informed 
of the policies favoured by the Clinton administration.  Adonis had learned of TFA 
through Lampl’s enthusiasm for the scheme and introduction to Kopp.  Tabberer had 
learned of TFA through research that had highlighted the controversy around it.   
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In sum, all these contexts – ranging from education policy and debates to 
philanthropy practices and business involvement in education to New Labour’s 
agenda – helped set the stage for the emergence of TfL.  I now turn to analyzing how 




7.3  The Process of Establishing TfL – Agency through Networks 
 
 In a roughly seven-month period, TfL was successfully launched in London 
through a process of relationship- and network-building led by Kiley, Wigdorz, and 
their colleagues.  Their efforts, which drove the mobilization process, were persistent 
and strategic.  Unlike social activists, the team of policy entrepreneurs did not run a 
public campaign aiming to drum up popular support for TfL by “going door-to-door” 
but instead strategically knocked on doors which they knew could open other doors 
closer to the centers of power.  Throughout the campaign to bring about the transfer 
of TFA, the primary activity of the entrepreneurial team shifted as the concept of TfL 
evolved and support for it grew.  I identify four distinct modes of activity: base-
building, pressuring, negotiating, and legitimizing.  Initially, TfL proponents 
engaged in base-building, searching for influential supporters from December 2001.  
Once key advocates for TfL were recruited by February 2002, the strategy became 
one of pressuring government to approve TfL through repeated meetings with key 
decision-makers and the recruitment of additional supporters from mid-February to 
mid-April.   
By late April, pressure had built up among coalitions of supporters and 
opposition within government, raising the profile of the scheme.  This pressure came 
to a head in late-April when the future of TfL looked dim after a meeting between 
Tabberer, Wigdortz, and Kiley.  This prompted a flurry of negotiating amongst the 
actors involved in the weeks between late April and mid-May.  After negotiations 
settled contested aspects of TfL among key individuals, the scheme gained official 
government approval and funding in late May.  This decision signaled the beginning 
of activity to formally and publicly legitimize TfL during which steps were taken to 
officially recognize and legalize its existence, funding, and method of teacher 
training.  These stages represent shifts in activity as well as the progress and 
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accumulation of influence the policy entrepreneurs were achieving.  Below, I 
examine each stage of activity in more detail and consider how personal biographies, 
organizational interests, and institutional histories shaped network structures and 
outcomes. 
 
7.3.1  Base-Building (mid-December 2001 – mid-February 2002)   
 
The Government’s Dismissal  
 In their initial approach to the DfES, Kiley and Wigdortz banked on the 
power of their idea, the backing of McKinsey’s study, the success of TFA, and the 
clout of their corporate supporters to convince officials that TfL was worth backing.  
This, to their dismay, did not happen.  DfES civil servants were unenthusiastic about 
TfL and passed the proposal to TTA officers to consider.  The TTA officers who met 
with Wigdortz were unimpressed with the proposal as it did not align with its 
regulatory frameworks.  For DfES and TTA officials, the McKinsey study did not 
provide compelling insights or justification for TfL, and TFA was a model few cared 
to learn more about.  With DfES officials overworked and focused on making the 
many New Labour policies work, civil servants advised the Schools Minister against 
considering TfL despite its notable business supporters. 
While Kiley and Wigdortz felt the McKinsey report and the success of TFA 
gave credence to their idea, their failure to grasp the very policy contexts in which 
the DfES and TTA were working gave away their status as somewhat clueless 
interlopers.  McKinsey’s justification for TfL was rooted in already known 
educational data, and thus, its analysis and solution was unconvincing.  Meanwhile, 
Kiley and Wigdortz seemed unaware of the weaknesses of their approach, and thus 
they attributed the lack of interest among civil servants as symptomatic of their 
bureaucratic, risk-adverse perspective and evidence of the “radical” nature of their 
idea.  From civil servants’ perspective, however, the underdeveloped TfL proposal 
was seen as a distraction because it was so utterly disconnected from the realities of 
the system.  Additionally, Kiley and Wigdortz underestimated the relatively high 
esteem with which civil servants are generally viewed in the U.K., in which they are 
seen as professionals and public servants.  Kiley’s cultural miscalculation became 
more evident in the negotiating stage.  
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Wisely, Kiley and Wigdortz sought out other potential supporters while these 
early attempts to interest government in the idea floundered.  Because government 
officials were not interested in TfL, it became critically important for TfL to recruit a 
diverse coalition of supportive and influential leaders.  Business executives and 
university leaders provided that early support although these two groups had distict 
motives and played different advocacy roles. 
 
Businesses Back TfL – Motives and Symbolic Support 
Although Kiley and Wigdortz were newly arrived Americans, this seemed 
not to be a disadvantage but rather an advantage among the cosmopolitan network of 
London’s corporate leaders.  In these networks, interviewees indicated that American 
ingenuity and capitalism were admired, and many business leaders were familiar 
with American culture and policies from having lived in or frequently visited the 
U.S.  As a result, Kiley and Wigdortz were “outsiders” by nationality but seen as part 
of and accepted among the elite social networks of the rather cosmopolite corporate 
sector; they were similar to George Simmel’s “strangers” (Simmel 1950) – 
individuals who were members of a system but were not strongly attached to that 
system (Rogers 1999) – which afforded them the ability to more easily deviate from 
the norms of the system and be perceived as innovative (at least among fellow 
corporate friends). 
As newcomers, Kiley and Wigdortz accessed influential social networks 
through London First, McKinsey, and BITC.  Kiley was a skilled networker and 
knew they needed well-connected, local opinion leaders to become “early adopters”, 
or rather “early advocates”, for the scheme.  By tapping into the member networks of 
London First and BITC, Kiley and Wigdortz successfully recruited business leaders 
to support TfL and advocate on its behalf.  These were large companies that had a 
specific interest already in helping London (hence were members of London First) 
and/or raising their CSR profiles (hence were members of BITC).  These priorities 
made them receptive targets for new ideas.   
Consequently, business leaders supported TfL, believing it provided practical 
advantages for graduates and local schools and aligned with their companies’ CSR 
goals.  To them, TfL seemed like a common-sense solution to teacher shortages in 
London and was based on an already-tested model, TFA.  This practical reasoning, 
coupled with the fact the proposal for TfL was endorsed by McKinsey research, drew 
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corporate leaders to support the idea.  But business executives were limited to 
supporting TfL through endorsements and funding as most were essentially 
“outsiders” to the education sector and the DfES.  Instead, another member of 




IOE Helps Advance TfL:  Motives and Strategic Support  
When Kiley and Wigdortz first discussed TfL with IOE leaders, they were 
not simply “strangers” to the education sector – they were, as Totterdell stated, 
“neophytes”.  Kiley had only developed a limited number of connections to the 
education sector.  Moreover, she and Wigdortz did not understand the politics of 
England’s teacher education sector, the regulations governing it, nor the personalities 
and power dynamics shaping it.  Thus, they asked Whitty, Director of the IOE, to 
help them with their idea.  As a result, Whitty and Totterdell became involved 
despite considering McKinsey’s analysis flawed, the idea for TfL underdeveloped, 
and their strategy for promoting TfL as contextually and culturally insensitive. 
So why did the IOE leaders back TfL?  They did so for personal, 
professional, and institutional reasons.  First, both Whitty and Totterdell felt obliged 
to help as leaders and experts in their field.  Kiley had personally approached Whitty 
as a fellow colleague in London First, and Whitty likely felt obligated to advise her.  
But, they also saw TfL as a potentially exciting new initiative with which they 
personally, and the IOE institutionally, could be involved.  On a personal level, 
Whitty looked favourably on TfL due to his own observation of TFA years earlier 
and his admiration for the espirit de corps fostered among TFA trainees.  
Meanwhile, Totterdell saw TfL as a potential opportunity to innovate in and improve 
teacher training.  This is because both he and Whitty understood the vision for TfL to 
operate independently of conventional ITT routes just as TFA did.   
The IOE leaders’ decision to support and advocate for TfL was bold as they 
were set to challenge not only the TTA’s frameworks but fellow teacher educators 
who (as Whitty and Totterdell anticipated) came to view and oppose TfL as 
somewhat elitist.  Still, Whitty and Totterdell believed TfL could replicate TFA’s 
success in recruiting top graduates and training them to be highly effective teachers 
with disadvantaged pupils.  Their boldness reflected the IOE’s culture in which 
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government policies were often challenged, new ideas developed, and independence 
valued. 
The IOE’s position of leadership within the field of education locally, 
nationally, and even globally boosted the profile and potential of TfL.  With 
extensive professional and inter-organizational networks and a role in coordinating 
policy among boroughs since the dissolution of the ILEA in 1990, the IOE was 
positioned at or near the top of the status hierarchy within its organizational field.  
The IOE’s status as an independent body, its willingness to criticize government in 
support of the common good, and its reputation as a guardian of the public good 
made it an incredibly influential ally for TfL (see Aldrich 2002).   
While business executives provided symbolic and financial support for TfL, 
the IOE provided critical help in fourth other ways.  First, Whitty and Totterdell 
provided TfL with a symbolic endorsement from the IOE, which gave more weight 
and credibility to the scheme among those working in schools, teacher training, and 
education policy.  Secondly, Whitty and Totterdell provided insight into a more 
contextually-appropriate strategy for mobilizing education-based support, advising 
Kiley to approach the unions collaboratively rather than avoid them as TFA’s 
experience had suggested.  Thirdly, they offered their time and expertise in 
conceptually adapting and developing the TfL proposal, particularly its training 
model designed to operate on a trial-basis outside national regulatory frameworks.  
Fourthly, Whitty and Totterdell introduced Kiley and Wigdortz to government 
insiders (Barber in particular) and union leaders through their established social and 
professional networks.  In these ways, the IOE’s early support for TfL jumpstarted 
the idea in the education field and began to counter the resistance of the DfES and 
TTA that corporate support had not yet weakened in two months of discussions.    
What is also important to consider is how Totterdell became somewhat of a 
policy entrepreneur on the TfL team early on.  He personally sought out TFA while 
visiting the U.S. to learn more about the initiative and was personally motivated to 
develop TfL’s training model.  Although Wigdortz later insisted Totterdell was only 
an advisor, the strategic help the IOE provided Kiley and Wigdortz suggests that the 
two groups were forming a partnership that, although undefined, was based on trust, 
shared views, and mutual interests.   
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7.3.2  Pressuring Government through Networks (mid-Feb. 2002 – April 
2002) 
 
Once the IOE leaders partnered with TfL’s advocates, the idea had two strong 
bases of support – the business community and a leading higher education body – 
from which to challenge the government’s initial dismissal of the idea.  Through the 
opinion leaders and social networks of London First and the IOE, Kiley and 
Wigdortz recruited a diversity of high-profile supporters for TfL.  These supporters 
provided TfL with endorsements and resources that enabled them to effectively 
pressure the schools minister, DfES civil servants, and the TTA to reconsider TfL.  
During the process of recruiting a network of supporters, TFA was repeatedly cited 
as evidence that such a scheme could work and prompted strong reactions from key 
decision-makers. 
Pressuring the government to formally back and fund TfL took place 
between mid-February to mid-April 2002.  In this two month time period, Kiley and 
Wigdortz (1) continued to build a network of influential supporters in favour of 
transfer, (2) continued to meet with government officials about TfL, and (3) 
developed TfL conceptually.  I first discuss how Kiley and Wigdortz developed 
strong targeted messages and narratives in support of TfL that were more 
contextually relevant than their early attempts.  These strategies reflected social 
marketing techniques and served to strategically diffuse TfL among selected 
networks.  Not only did this help Kiley and Wigdortz establish relationships with 
new supporters but also created a buzz about the programme that made it hard for 
government insiders to ignore.  In this way, the TfL team was able to increase the 
pressure on government to accept TfL.  Next, I detail how the IOE and London First 
served as the gateway to tapping educational and philanthropic networks respectively 
while both pressuring government officials to embrace TfL.  Finally, I argue that the 
form of TfL’s training model, as developed by Totterdell, became the main point of 
contention among government leaders. 
 
Kiley & Wigdortz Use Social Marketing to Strategically Diffuse TfL 
After gaining the IOE’s support, Kiley and Wigdortz stepped up their efforts 
to build the momentum to launch TfL.  With advice from their growing network of 
local supporters, Kiley and Wigdortz developed more effective strategies to 
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communicate and convince London elites that TfL was a worthwhile idea.  These 
strategies mirrored well-known social marketing strategies often employed by 
companies to launch new consumer services or products (Kotler & Zaltman 1971).   
In the marketing world, campaigns introducing new products are designed to both 
change the audience’s perceptions of what is possible or desirable and to change the 
audience’s social behavior to use the new idea, product, or service (Fox & Kotler 
1980).  TfL needed to inspire a range of audiences to do both – to believe that TfL 
was a plausible way to improve disadvantaged schools and to provide their support 
for scheme.  
To induce such a change in perceptions and behavior, the marketing strand of 
diffusion literature identifies five strategies on which companies rely (Rogers 2003, 
pp.85–86).  The first strategy is audience segmentation, through which the target 
audience for the social innovation is identified.  Secondly, with the target market 
identified, formal research is usually carried out to understand the values and 
orientation of that audience.  Thirdly, the innovation is positioned, or presented, in 
such a way as to emphasize particular characteristics of the innovation that will 
appeal to a targeted audience.  Fourthly, the cost of the innovation is purposely kept 
very low to encourage adoption, and finally, communication channels are 
strategically used to reach the targeted audience.   
Kiley and her early supporters utilized these strategies to promote TfL with 
the exception of formal research.  There was neither time nor the need for studying 
targeted audiences as supportive local opinion leaders such as Whitty, O’Brien, and 
others provided contextual knowledge that helped determine how to position TfL to 
each group.  Kiley and Wigdortz targeted key groups and opinion leaders (audience 
segmentation) based on the strategy of convincing a subset of individuals to adopt 
the idea with the goal of triggering a larger cascade of further adoptions among other 
key leaders.  
For each targeted audience, different messages and aspects of TfL were 
stressed to shape the perceptions of the innovation and appeal to their interests.  TFA 
served to provided “observability”, or a chance to see how the programme worked.  
Moreover, TfL had the attractive quality of being voluntary in the sense that 
headteachers could choose whether or not to hire TfL teachers and determine how 
many.  The projected cost of TfL or commitment needed to support TfL was also 
kept low to appeal to different audiences.  (Note: Wigdortz (2012) mentioned he had 
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let McKinsey colleagues reduce TfL’s initial projected budget which were later 
proved to be too low).  Finally, personal communication channels (rather than media) 
were always used to share information, ensuring that the process of learning about 
TfL and TFA was always interactive.  
This approach was particularly successful in softening the reactions of the 
unions – with the headteacher unions courted first and with their support, bringing 
headteachers aboard.  Meanwhile the teacher unions were approached later on after 
the coalition of support for TfL was larger.  Thus, as policy entrepreneurs, Kiley and 
Wigdortz, along with their leading local supporters, essentially planned what could 
be called a strategic “divide, convince, and conquer” strategy for winning the support 
of opinion leaders, or at least persuading them not to oppose TfL.  In this way, Kiley 
and her colleagues began cultivating more acceptance and wider support for TfL 
through social networks. 
 
Understanding the Reactions of the Teacher Unions   
With the support of the headteacher unions and the IOE, TfL proponents then 
approached the three major teacher unions, positioning TfL as a way to fill chronic 
vacancies in schools and bring high quality graduates into the profession.  The fact 
that the IOE was involved in introducing the scheme to the teacher unions likely had 
a significant impact in softening resistance to the idea among union leadership.  This 
was because the IOE was generally seen as the voice and protector of the public 
good since the central government abolished the ILEA in 1990 and became 
increasingly involved in directing education policy in the capital.  To what extent the 
IOE’s involvement shaped reactions is unclear because other factors were at play as 
well. 
On a practical level, the unions could not ignore the scheme’s perceived 
relative advantage of increasing teacher supply since the teacher unions had recently 
criticized New Labour for failing to alleviate the teacher shortages (BBC 2001a).  
Yet, TfL’s claim that top graduates with little training would be highly effective 
teachers was perceived as somewhat elitist and as positioning itself to be superior to 
other training routes.  Bangs, of the NUT, and likely the NASUWT both saw this as 
incompatible with their values and those of the profession.  Still, overall, the teacher 
unions seemed to have more questions than criticisms.  Their questions focused 
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mainly on pay and training, which were issues that had not yet been determined and 
so were openly discussed. 
Yet, ultimately, the teacher unions differed in their positions toward TfL 
likely due to their internal orientations and context in which they operated.  Upon 
learning of TfL, the ATL supported it, the NASUWT condemned it, and the NUT 
ignored it.  The unions’ positions appear rooted their differing philosophical 
orientations.  While the prevailing public assumption was that the NUT was the most 
militant (Redman & Snape 2006), Barber – a former NUT officer himself who wrote 
a history of the development of teacher unions (Barber 1992) – suggested that that 
perception stemmed from the NUT’s vocal left-wing teachers who dominated 
conferences but were in the minority of members.   Instead, he argued the NASUWT 
had a more militant philosophy than the NUT, the latter which attempted to balance 
its militancy with a professional stance, a view echoed by others (e.g., Woodward 
2001).  Meanwhile, the ATL, which originated in the grammar school sector and had 
more members in the private school sector than the other unions, was considered 
“moderate in the extreme” and “presenting itself as the voice of the ordinary teacher” 
(Barber 1996, p.213).   
Interestingly, each union’s reaction to TfL seemed to reflect its general 
orientation.  The most moderate union, the ATL, supported TfL, and the most left-
wing union, NASUWT, denounced it, while the NUT took a skeptically neutral 
stance toward it.  These different stances were also likely a product of the intensively 
competitive environment in which each recruited members.  According to Barber 
(1996), the intense rivalry and competition for members caused the unions to 
accentuate their political differences, which at times produced contrasting positions 
on policies.  Thus, the ATL’s leadership decision to support TfL may have prompted 
the NASUWT to condemn it, leaving the NUT to strategically decide to wait to and 
see if, when, and how the scheme would develop.  So while TfL’s supporters 
expressed their shock of the unions’ mixed reactions and willingness to consider 
TfL, such division and pragmatic positioning was perhaps unsurprising given their 
different political orientations and highly competitive nature.  
Although the teaching unions were not fully supportive of TfL, their lack of a 
unified stance against it made TfL more attractive to government, especially Adonis 
who had had his academies initially challenged both vocally and legally by them.  
Two other points are worth noting in regard to the lack of opposition toward TfL 
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among the unions.  First, TfL was pitched, as its name suggested, as a programme for 
London, which suffered from chronic and acute shortages.  As a result, the scheme 
likely seemed irrelevant to union members outside the capital, especially for union 
representatives in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland where education policy 
decisions were determined locally.  As a London-based scheme, TfL was also likely 
seen as a rather small and relatively insignificant programme in the larger policy 
arena.   
Finally, it is possible that the stance of the NUT toward TfL, which was 
largely orchestrated by Bangs, may have been moderated by knowledge of Barber’s 
support for the scheme.  Barber had worked for the NUT from 1989 to 1993, and 
when Barber left his senior post, Bangs filled it.  With this personal and 
organizational connection between Barber and the NUT, knowledge of Barber’s 
support for TfL – if voiced in private discussions – may have directly or indirectly 
softened the NUT’s stance toward it as well.  However, this comment is more based 
on conjecture than evidence.  Regardless, the possibility exists and serves to 
highlight the inter-connected nature of London’s educational leadership.  Certainly, 
the IOE’s vocal support for TfL muted opposition to the scheme in some leadership 
corridors as the IOE was seen as a voice of the public good against overzealous 
government reforms.  With headteacher unions supporting TfL and teacher unions 
divided, pressure was mounting for the TTA to reconsider the scheme.  
 
Networks & Social Influence: “New” Philanthropists Provide More Than 
Money 
Four foundations gave TfL funding in the spring of 2002, three of which I 
confirmed had been recruited by Kiley or London First’s CEO, Stephen O’Brien.  
(Lampl could not recall how he first became aware of TfL.)  The four philanthropic 
foundations that offered funding to TfL during the spring 2002 were of two different 
types: traditional and entrepreneurial.  These two types differed in terms of their 
orientation, funding criteria, and their relationship with the government.  More 
significantly, the founders of the two entrepreneurial foundations had, at that time, a 
close relationship with New Labour leaders and thus a greater degree of influence 
among government policy-makers.   
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The Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Esmée Fairbairn were examples of the 
traditional foundations that fit the typical mode of giving characteristic of the sector.  
Both foundations had a governing board ensuring grants were allocated to a selected 
range of policy areas based around the foundation’s mission.  Hodgson, Director of 
Esmée Fairbairn, decided to fund TfL for its potential to recruit high quality 
graduates into teaching.  However, she first had to convince her board to become 
involved in this policy area – teacher training – which was largely government’s 
responsibility.  She succeeded and saw the purpose of the funding as pressuring, or 
“pump-priming”, the government to also fund TfL.  Meanwhile, Lankester of the 
Paul Hamlyn Foundation was aware of TFA and met Kiley socially.  Kiley expressed 
her frustration with her efforts to import the model, so Lankester decided to help 
secure TfL a grant from her board.  While both traditional foundations were well-
established, respected, and involved with BITC in the past, their influence on New 
Labour was less than the newer, more entrepreneurial foundations whose practices 
and priorities closely reflected those of the government.  
The Sutton Trust and SHINE were examples of the entrepreneurial 
foundations established in 1997 and 1999 by wealthy businessmen O’Neill and 
Lampl respectively.  Their approach to educational improvement and ability to act as 
boundary-spanning networkers made them more influential among New Labour’s 
leadership.  In regards to reform approach, both Lampl and O’Neill ensured grants 
were given to projects that (1) fit the single focus of improving educational 
opportunities for disadvantaged pupils and (2) whose impact was measurable and 
potentially scalable.   
By funding research and initiatives that had measureable impact and potential 
for expansion, Lampl and O’Neill sought to apply venture capital practices to 
philanthropy.  Lampl referred to this brand of giving as “strategic philanthropy” 
although others in the U.S. called it “venture philanthropy”.  Ball (2008) refers to 
such giving as the “new philanthropy” because, unlike previous modes of charitable 
giving, the “new” philanthropists involve themselves in policy communities, directly 
give to “policy” ideas, and take a more “hands-on” approach to projects they fund 
(Ball 2008, p.759).  Lampl had become particularly influential in government circles 
as his work had appealed to New Labour’s goal of promoting social mobility as well 
as promoting social entrepreneurship, a relatively new concept supported by Demos 
and an idea of which Blair was a fan (Hunt 2000).  Since the later 1990s, Lampl had 
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“become the confidant of cabinet ministers and one of the most influential figures in 
British education” (Wilby 2007).  Thus, it is not surprising that Lampl had been the 
one to set up a meeting between Adonis and the head of TFA, Wendy Kopp, in years 
prior. 
Lampl’s particular enthusiasm for the idea of TfL was notable.  He had 
already advocated for the transfer of TFA in the past, thus spreading awareness of 
the idea prior to TfL.  He was taken by the idea for TfL because he saw it as a 
proposal for the direct transfer of TFA, and hence not a “new” or “untested” idea.  
Lampl supported TfL because, like TFA, it represented an innovative social 
enterprise that sought to recruit elite graduates into state school teaching.  In the 
high-flying corporate world, hiring the “best and brightest” graduates was “common 
sense”, and thus the application of this mindset to education was appealing to Lampl 
and other business leaders.  Looking at TFA, Lampl also saw TfL as both a 
sustainable and potentially expandable programme promoting change in a 
measurable way.  Lampl had been particularly impressed with TFA because of its 
efficient use of minimal resources and measurable results (in terms of number of 
elite graduates recruited) and believed replicating the model in the U.K. would 
achieve the same.   
In sum, the support of the Sutton Trust and SHINE was critical.  Each charity 
represented an influential government advisor and an intermediary between multiple 
networks across the business sector, philanthropic community, and the government.  
In this way, the support of Lampl and O’Neill provided not only financial help but 
also social influence and networks through which to pressure government to approve 
TfL.  Lampl’s personal involvement was noted by Whitty who recalled Lampl as 
among the most influential voices present in a key meeting with the Schools Minister 
regarding TfL.  Thus, while Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Esmée Fairbairn provided 
TfL funding in hopes of indirectly inducing a larger government commitment 
(“pump-priming”), education philanthropists provided TfL with more than funding – 
they provided a channel of direct influence on government.  The “new” 
philanthropists threw their weight behind Kiley and Wigdortz’s idea, and Lampl 
engaged and encouraged the Schools Minister and New Labour leaders to embrace 
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Coalitions form within Government based on Interests and Social Networks 
The formation of network supporting TfL within government suggests that 
Kiley and her colleagues were achieving some success as “policy entrepreneurs” by 
Kingdon’s original definition.  Kingdon saw policy entrepreneurs as individuals who 
help link up policy problems, solutions, and politics to open a window for a new 
policy.  Still, this was a complex process.  While the support for TfL was growing 
outside of government, Kiley and her associates continued to meet with various 
government officials, including Adonis who became the most vocally supportive of 
TfL.  As Barber and then Adonis became advocates for the scheme, coalitions of 
support or opposition to TfL developed, each with a different angle and rationale for 
TfL.  Within the DfES, the business innovation unit headed by Lynn Fabes supported 
TfL based on their purpose of building links between education and the private 
sector.  Meanwhile, another influential unit working on developing the London 
Challenge looked favorably on TfL as an additional intervention that the government 
could include in their plans for boosting achievement in the capital.  However, those 
responsible for coordinating the funding for the department’s programmes and 
policies were unwelcoming of TfL as it looked to drain money from other initiatives.   
Meanwhile, TTA officers re-examined TfL and learned more about TFA that 
its advocates seemed to want to replicate.  However, they continued to reject TfL 
based on the conclusion that there was no legal precedent for funding teacher 
training in such way.  Thus, the TTA opposed TfL because its institutional script did 
not allow for such a possibility and few were interested in bending its rules.  In 
addition to seeing TfL as unfeasible, many also considered it an undesirable 
programme to import based on the “gold-standard” of training they had already 
established (May Interview, 2/05/2012).  Tabberer, from what he was hearing 
second-hand, was also convinced that TfL was not acceptable, especially not the way 
in which the IOE had developed it.   
This window into deliberations of the DfES and the TTA offers a view of 
fragmented policy learning among different groups of civil servants and officials 
with niche priorities.  In this environment, it is perhaps easy to see how policy 
suggestions originating from outside government may easily be abandoned and 
forgotten in the deadlock among coalitions.  But concerns of TTA staff and niche 
priorities departments within the DfES were not the only factor dividing opinion on 
TfL.  Networks of social influence also swayed minds in one direction or the other.  
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This made the pressure exerted by the IOE, unions leaders, and business executives 
critically important and the support of Adonis and Barber even more so.  Barber and 
Adonis’s vocal support for TfL created a climate within the DfES that made 
supporting the scheme acceptable and even forward-thinking.  As Diamond 
(Adonis’s aide) pointed out, there “were more senior” people within the DfES who 
were more “responsive to ministerial and Number 10 persuasion”, suggesting those 
closer to the New Labour leadership were more apt to support TfL.  
Thus, through using their own social networks to advocate for TfL, Adonis 
and Barber helped create support for TfL but, it’s possible that their own contrasting 
views of how TfL should work, or be “reinvented” in England, only contributed to 
the fragmented debate within the DfES.  Adonis and Barber had formed their own 
beliefs about how TfL should work in practice.  Barber saw TfL as a future element 
of the DfES’s and TTA’s work while Adonis saw TfL as an innovative scheme that, 
like TFA, needed independence from government scripts and frameworks.  With 
Tabberer categorically opposed to accepting such a programme, Timms, the Schools 
Minister – who had been central in all these discussions – was unsure of how to 
proceed.  Thus, due to these conflicting views of TfL, Kiley and Wigdortz were 
having trouble moving their idea forward.  In Kingdon’s (1984) view, these two 
policy entrepreneurs were struggling to align the “politics” stream with the 
“problem” and “solution” stream in their limited window of opportunity to achieve 
their policy goal.  However, Kiley’s and Wigdortz’s persistent pressure on 
government and their ability to build a supportive network for TfL finally led to 
negotiations in April. 
  
 
Disputed Reinvention: The Polarizing Effect of IOE-TfL’s Training Model 
As TfL won more supporters, the details of the TfL proposal became more 
important and a common point of contention.  While those outside of government did 
not often question the details of the TfL proposal, those within government had 
particularly strong concerns and views about how it should be reinvented.  This made 
the topic of reinvention a key stumbling point in the campaign to launch the 
programme.  It did not help the situation that many within the TTA and some within 
the DfES had limited or no knowledge of the original model, TFA.  Thus, debates 
regarding how to reinvent TfL were likely more affected by personal interpretations 
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and affinities than by facts and evidence.  This made TfL alliance with the IOE and 
proposed model a key point of contention.  
By mid-April, enthusiasm for the scheme was at a high point and Timms held 
at least two meeting with educationalists, including Whitty, about the scheme.  While 
the involvement of the IOE and the training model developed by Totterdell and 
Wigdortz likely gave Timms confidence in the scheme, it prompted opposition from 
Tabberer who did not accept the model’s experimental design or the presumption 
that IOE would deliver it without an open bid.  Tabberer had already opposed TfL on 
the grounds that it was based on an American model that was not needed or feasible 
in the U.K.  However, the IOE’s partnership with TfL and development of an 
innovative model hardened his stance against the scheme.  Meanwhile, Adonis was 
supportive of a training design for TfL that was experimental and outside 
bureaucratic controls.   
To counter Adonis’s position, Tabberer became directly involved in 
discussions through Timms, who then introduced the TTA head to meet his main TfL 
contact – Kiley – in a meeting in late April.  Kiley sensed that this was the chance to 
convince the TTA to back them and so invited a group of business executives to 
demonstrate their influence, a sign Wigdortz took to mean TfL was on the verge of 
being approved.  This was an inflated expectation and misreading of the situation.  
As Totterdell astutely noted, Kiley seemed to be relying on the use of corporate clout 
to push her agenda, but this was not common custom in London: 
 
Distinct political customs are evident too [between the U.S. and U.K.]: ... 
The British public servant and company director are from a similar 
“social catchment” and thus speak the same language, while the diverse 
origins of the American federal administrator and corporate managers 
place them at arms length.  A “frank exchange of views” is the prescribed 
form of business contact with senior civil servants in London; aggressive 
“lobbying” of federal officials is normative corporate practice in 
Washington (Useem 2014, p.8). 
 
In effect, Kiley was relying on the wrong people and approach to overcome resistance 
to TfL.  They were themselves entrepreneurial professionals that seemed to advocate 
an equally entrepreneurial type of teacher professionalism that other civil servants 
may have considered incompatible with their efforts to restore the professional stance 
of teachers as fellow public-sector professionals.  
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Because Kiley and her corporate supporters were unable to answer Tabberer’s 
questions, Tabberer was able to better demonstrate his point that TfL was flawed and 
ill-adapted for context.  However, the persistence of TfL supporters and influential 
support behind them prompted him to “find a way forward” or, in other words, 
negotiate.   
 
 
7.3.3  Negotiating the Reinvention of TfL  (late-April to mid-May) 
 
By mid-April, the question of reinvention was holding up TfL’s approval in 
the backstages of government.  Whether TFA was transferrable or even necessary in 
England was being debated – in the Schools Minister’s office and DfES – by leading 
personalities that had rather strong and conflicting views on TfL.  As previously 
discussed, Adonis and Barber had slightly different notions of how TfL should relate 
to government.  Barber wanted it incorporated into the London Challenge and fit into 
the government’s broader agenda for education.  Meanwhile, Adonis preferred TfL 
be free from government bureaucracy.  Barber seemed more inclined to have TfL fit 
into the TTA frameworks yet also possibly favored the IOE’s involvement with the 
scheme.  With Tabberer still resisting the scheme altogether, discussions regarding 
TfL suddenly intensified in the few weeks after Kiley and Wigdortz’s awkward 
meeting with Tabberer.  These discussions culminated in two key meetings – one in 
Adonis’s office at 10 Downing Street and the other at the TTA.  In these two 
meetings, very different versions of TfL were discussed.  They triggered negotiating 
among actors, though TfL proponents seemed less aware of the underlying nature of 
the government’s gridlock on the matter. 
 
Difficulty in Establishing Sequence and Cause-and-Effects  
From this point, the sequence of meetings and agreements became especially 
significant but more difficult to confirm, and thus the causal chains among them 
remains unclear.  Throughout Phase II, sequencing of meeting and their effects was 
often vague due to the fact that so many individuals were in separate discussions 
without fully understanding or coordinating with others.  However, as events played 
out slowly, I was able to develop a timeline of events based on comments in 
interviews.  Still, the links between causes and effects during this time were nearly 
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impossible to determine with certainty given that negotiating TfL (1) played out in 
only a few weeks, (2) occurred a decade ago, and (3) was a sensitive topic given that 
certain interests were at stake. 
 On this point, Totterdell’s perception of different “camps” among TfL 
supporters was insightful.  Wigdortz and Kiley were obviously not always in sync 
with each other in regard to their knowledge, actions, or perceptions of the situation 
– one of the clearest example perhaps being Wigdortz’s story of first contacting 
Adonis through cold calling his office while Adonis described being first approached 
by Kiley.  While neither had deep knowledge of the U.K., Kiley was highly 
perceptive of others in the elite political and social circles of which she was apart.  
She usually made the first contact with individuals, established mutual rapport and 
trust, and remained the primary contact for supporters.  Kiley, thus, initiated and 
cultivated most of the relationships with TfL supporters, putting her essentially in the 
driver seat of events and receiver of more insider information.   
Wigdortz, on the other hand, was more of the enthusiastic salesman of the 
idea and a representative of McKinsey.  He had been given the task of developing his 
business plan for TfL, which included: (1) working with his McKinsey colleagues on 
cost projections, marketing research (i.e. TFA statistics, contacting U.K. 
universities), promotional materials, and (2) collaborating with Totterdell on the 
training model while also (3) presenting TfL in external meetings.  As a result, 
Wigdortz’s camp was much more limited and internal to the campaign than Kiley’s 
work in expansive, external networks among London’s political and social elite.  
(Here it is worth remembering that Kiley is also the wife of the Transport 
Commission, a highly public and influential position in London.)  Thus, when 
Kiley’s best efforts failed to secure TfL the minister’s approval, she stepped back 
and enabled others to try a different approach.   
 
The Case for TfL, as an “Experimental Reinvention” of TFA, at No. 10    
Because Kiley and Wigdortz feared their efforts to establish scheme were 
failing, they asked their supporters – most likely Whitty or Barber – to approach 
Adonis about how the DfES and Schools Minister may be convinced to approve the 
scheme.  This led to the meeting at 10 Downing Street in early May during which 
Totterdell and Wigdortz presented TfL and their training model to Adonis and 
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Timms.  This was a significant meeting but not simply because Totterdell reported 
that DfES funding for TfL was secured soon afterward.  It was significant because 
Adonis and Timms, along with an unidentified DfES official, listened to Totterdell’s 
proposed training model.  Up until this point, Adonis and Timms had not heard 
details of the training model from Totterdell as most of their contact with TfL was 
through Kiley.  However, with the TTA insisting TfL’s model as unworkable, they 
sat down to listen carefully to the plan developed by Totterdell and Wigdortz.   
Totterdell said his role in the meeting was to “sell [TfL] as a teacher 
education model that could add value, potentially transformative, and something that 
really was worth a try, that couldn’t just be subsumed under current methodologies 
and models” [Interview, 23/11/2012].  Totterdell recalled Adonis asked 
“penetrating” questions and, by the end, others seemed enthusiastic about the plan.  
With no one from the TTA present, this meeting was likely the first step toward 
approving TfL and potentially funding it directly through the DfES without the 
TTA’s involvement.  This was not completely unprecedented as this was how the 
Fast Track and Adonis’s academies programme were run.   
Most interestingly, Wigdortz indicated in his interview (30/06/2015) that he 
did not recall attending a meeting at 10 Downing Street with Totterdell.  This seems 
curious given that he vividly remembered successfully cold calling Adonis’s office, a 
momentous triumph he described in his memoir.  Meanwhile, Totterdell vividly 
remembered details of the meeting, from how he arrived (by taxi) to the set-up of 
Adonis’s office suite, and recalled Wigdortz was present.  I attempted to confirm the 
meeting with others.  However, I was unable to receive a response from Adonis on 
the matter, and Diamond did not have clear recollections of subsequent meetings.   
I have deferred to Totterdell’s account over Wigdortz’s for two reasons.  
First, after interviewing both twice, I found Totterdell’s recollections were more 
consistent and detailed than Wigdortz’s, which were at times inconsistent, vague, and 
on some points inaccurate.  Wigdortz’s memory seemed limited to a set narrative 
from which he found difficult or was unprepared to deviate.  Thus, Totterdell’s 
account was most likely more accurate because (1) he had greater knowledge of the 
political/educational contexts and officials shaping them at the time, which informed 
his memory, and (2) he indicated that, as part of his military intelligence work, he 
had been trained in observational strategies to recall events and environments 
accurately at a later time.   
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The second reason I deferred to Totterdell’s account was because he had little 
to gain or lose from the interview as he no longer worked for the IOE or was 
involved with Teach First.  Wigdortz, on the other hand, had constructed in his mind 
an understanding of events in that period and institutionalized that narrative through 
multiple retellings over the years and in his 2012 memoir.  In these narratives, the 
IOE played a very minor role in events while he, his idea, and his business 
colleagues were the catalysts of change.  More importantly though, Wigdortz may 
have conveniently forgotten the meeting at No. 10 because he also met with the 
Tabberer, on his own, to discuss how TfL may be changed to please the TTA, which 
represented a kind of betrayal of his collaboration with Totterdell and the IOE.  
 
Collaborative or Coercive Reinvention?  Wigdortz at the TTA 
Around the time of the meeting at No. 10, Tabberer and Wigdortz also met 
one-on-one to discuss ways in which TfL may be modified, or reinvented, to gain the 
TTA’s approval.  The outcomes of this meeting, which led to a series of others, were 
clear:  Wigdortz and Kiley agreed they would (1) recruit a distinctly new pool of 
graduates into teaching, (2) accept an open bidding process to select a training 
provider, and (3) require trainees to follow the TTA’s regulations for QTS.  As these 
agreements had significant implications for TfL’s form and implementation, how 
these agreements were reached and why becomes an important question.  While 
Wigdortz portrayed these agreements as minor, technical issues that were 
collaboratively overcome, Totterdell suggested those one-on-one meetings (from 
which he was excluded) constituted savvy politicking on behalf of Tabberer aimed at 
decoupling the IOE from the scheme and ensuring that TfL was reinvented in a 
manner that followed the TTA’s rules.  Tabberer, meanwhile, confirmed these 
intentions but explained his priorities reflected his role and remit as head of the TTA.  
Thus, Tabberer expressed pride in the fact that, although he was bound by rules, he 
and Wigdortz found a creative way to satisfy.   
Still, the question arises:  Were the agreed modifications between the TTA 
and TfL proponents an instance of mutual collaboration or essentially, forced 
compliance?  I argue differences among participants’ knowledge, power, and goals 
suggest adaptations were essentially coerced despite Tabberer and Wigdortz’s 
account of collaborative problem-solving.  Wigdortz and Kiley’s perceptions were 
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limited by their lack of understanding of educational contexts and were driven by the 
singular goal of launching TfL.  They were, at that point, prepared to make 
compromises.  In the months prior, Wigdortz (2012, p.60) had resisted suggestions 
made by others to alter the basic idea of TfL, such as having graduates be teaching 
assistants or recruiting a smaller cohort.  While he was not willing to consider those 
types of changes, he was now willing to accept the TTA’s regulations because he 
believed that compromise was the only way forward after the April ministerial 
meeting. 
However, what Kiley and Wigdortz did not realize was that it had become in 
Tabberer’s interest to help TfL gain approval.  Tabberer knew of Timms and 
Adonis’s enthusiasm for the scheme and did not want TfL to go ahead under the 
control of the DfES.  Therefore, his goal became to have TfL comply with TTA 
regulations.  Thus, the ministerial meeting in late April was set up for Tabberer to 
gauge the thinking of the scheme’s proponents.  It may also have been orchestrated 
to put Kiley and Wigdortz on the defensive, making them more willing to 
compromise afterwards.  This would help explain why only corporate supporters 
were invited to the meeting and why Timms, despite his enthusiasm for the scheme, 
may have theatrically rejected it at the start of the meeting.  Such political 
maneuvering by high-level TTA officials was apparently not uncommon.  Hextall 
and Mahony (2000, p.130) reported that a “very experienced” TTA officer who 
possessed “wide political, negotiating and administrative experience” recounted: 
 
… there is a lot of subterranean to-ing and fro-ing [with the DfES] so that 
you know what will work and what won’t and where you’re going to have 
to push, to get a Minister to change his or her mind. And if you don’t do 
that you’re just not competent. I mean it’s not a question of morals, it’s a 
question of competence. If you want something to happen you’ve got to 
know whether it will happen and if it won’t happen you’ve got to go 
around creating the climate where it will happen and you’ve got to do 
that in Ministerial Aides’ and in Ministerial minds…  (TTA officer 
quoted by Hextall & Mahony 2000, p.130, emphasis added) 
 
The above comment illustrates the skill set of high-level TTA officials and attests to 
Totterdell’s view of Tabberer as a “master negotiator”.  Hence, it is very possible 
that Tabberer’s ministerial meeting with Kiley and Wigdortz was held to 
intentionally pave the way for his one-on-one meeting with Wigdortz, enabling him 
to succeed in convincing Wigdortz to see the situation his way.  As Hextall and 
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Mahony point out, this type of climate- and policy-manipulation by individual TTA 
officers often makes tracing policy origins and evolution problematic.  
Meanwhile, during the April ministerial meeting, Tabberer found Kiley and 
Wigdortz had little understanding of the problems he had with their model, making 
them potentially easy adversaries with which to negotiate directly.  Thus, afterwards, 
when Timms indicated to Tabberer that he and Adonis were still keen on starting TfL 
(perhaps after discussing the model with Totterdell at No. 10), Tabberer knew he 
needed to (and likely could) win concessions from Wigdortz.  Wanting to avoid the 
chance of TfL becoming a DfES-controlled initiative, Tabberer was pleased when 
Wigdortz was eager to talk.   
In contrast, Wigdortz was desperate as the scheme looked like it would not be 
approved and his six-month leave from McKinsey was ending in another month.  
This highlights the temporal constraints that face policy entrepreneurs in their 
attempts to enact policies or, in this case, bring about a policy transfer.  
Consequently, he sought out Tabberer’s help.  In their one-on-one meetings, 
Wigdortz was in the less knowledgeable and less powerful position, with gaining 
approval for the scheme his only priority.  Still, while Wigdortz and Kiley felt 
compelled to comply with TTA rules, they likely did not see a significant problem 
with such compliance as they assumed the IOE would win any bidding contest (as 
evident in Phase III).  Hence, they assumed their model would not be radically 
changed, though it is possible Wigdortz had little appreciation or attachment to 
Totterdell’s particular model in the first place.  
Years later, Wigdortz described his discussions with Tabberer as how he 
personally (and rather heroically) turned the government’s “no” into a “yes” while 
downplaying changes made to TfL as relatively minor (Wigdortz 2011; 2012).  
Hence, Wigdortz’s inability to recall attending a meeting at No. 10 with Totterdell 
may possibly be explained by his desire to obscure conflicts among key individuals 
that he eventually allied with and to preserve his narrative of Teach First in which he, 
not the IOE, played a leading role in discussions.  Again, whether Wigdortz was 
aware of the possibility of the scheme moving forward under the aegis of the DfES 
(as opposed to the TTA) is unclear.  However, it is unlikely given his limited local 
knowledge and misreading of the political and educational contexts up to that point. 
Like Wigdortz, Tabberer’s account suggests that adaptations to TfL were 
made in a non-political, collaborative, and even “creative” manner, yet he clearly 
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held his cards close to his chest to pursue personal and organizational interests.  By 
suggesting to Wigdortz that TfL could either “be part of the Institute [IOE]”, pursue 
its own accreditation (which would be difficult and time-consuming), or hold an 
open procurement, Tabberer fed into Wigdortz’s original interest of being an 
independent body and in charge of its own training like TFA (though this was not to 
be, as evident in Phase III).  By agreeing to an open procurement, Wigdortz saw a 
chance to establish Teach First’s authority over a training provider, which would 
work for his organization.  While Tabberer and Wigdortz had their own agendas that 
soon fused, Kiley expressed annoyance on bureaucratic stipulations put on the 
programme, evidence of her curtailed agency.  Still, she also felt forced to be 
pragmatic and simply agreed so the scheme could be approved.    
Stepping back, the exact dates and sequences, causal chains in these few 
weeks of negotiating remain elusive, making analysis important but ultimately 
limited.  But we do know that in the few weeks following Kiley and Wigdortz’s 
meeting with Tabberer and Timms, key meetings occurred at the TTA and at No. 10 
that led to approval of the scheme and funding from both the TTA and DfES.  These 
events may have been triggered by McKinsey’s “emergency” strategy but were 
ultimately effective because Adonis and Timms wanted to move forward with TfL, 
with or possibly without the TTA. 
 
 
7.3.4  Launching TfL as “Teach First”   
 
With the proposal for TfL approved, the fourth stage of activity, legitimizing, 
took place in which TfL was set up as a state-approved and supported organization.  
Within these final two months of Phase II, from mid-May to mid-July, additional 
support for TfL was recruited, resources and advocates institutionally consolidated, 
and the new organization publically announced with London First taking the lead 
role in such developments.   
 
A Transfer Network Revised:  Business Leaders Regain Influence, Wigdortz 
Gains a Central Position, and the IOE Loses a Role 
With the central government’s approval of the scheme, as reinvented by the 
TTA and renamed “Teach First”, the dynamics of the network built to support TfL 
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changed.  In these final two months of Phase II, the business community re-emerged 
as the leaders in organizing TfL while educationalists were sidelined.  When “Teach 
First” was incorporated as a charity, it belonged to London First and BITC and four 
of the five trustees were the leaders involved in the McKinsey study in Phase I.  In 
addition, TfL’s advisory board was primarily comprised of business leaders who 
were especially keen to offer their expertise in managing a new enterprise.  In 
contrast, the IOE leaders receded into the background, taking on a supportive 
advisory role but no longer strategically involved in TfL’s affairs.  Meanwhile, 
Timms was rotated out of the DfES, and Twigg became the junior minister 
supporting TfL.  Twigg was busy developing his own London-wide initiative, and 
thus gave Kiley and Wigdortz the space and trust to develop according to their own 
plans.    
Yet, the most significant development signaling the re-emergence of TfL’s 
business orientation was the appointment of Wigdortz as the CEO of the new Teach 
First.  Though inexperienced himself, trustees agreed to his appointment with the 
older and more experienced entrepreneur Jo Owen serving as his personal mentor in 
managing the scheme.  While awaiting the TTA’s bidding process to select an 
official training partner, Wigdortz was finally in the position to pursue his own War-
for-Talent-inspired vision of the scheme.  Thus, he began moving away from the 
TFA model, wanting to create a distinctly different brand.  Notably, he hired two of 
his friends at McKinsey to help implement his vision of Teach First.  Still, 
Wigdortz’s credibility within the education sphere was limited and thus, he was not a 
prominent speaker at the launch of his own programme, illustrating the significant 
role educationalists played in helping establish the scheme. 
Meanwhile, despite the name change, Teach First continued to benefit from 
its links with TFA.  The first press releases called the scheme “Teach For London” 
and described TFA as the model for it.  The scheme’s link to TFA attracted 
additional corporate supporters, including both Scardino of Citigroup and Habgood 
of Capital One, both Americans impressed with TFA.  Kopp also visited with Kiley 
and Wigdortz in London to signal her support for the endeavor.  Finally, on Kopp’s 
recommendation, Wigdortz hired a recent TFA alumna and, through this link, the 
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7.4  Summary of Discussion 
 
In this chapter, I first explored the contextual differences between the U.S. 
and U.K. that forced TfL down a different course of development.  In this discussion, 
I also highlighted the manner TFA first developed and its place in the U.S. 
educational landscape.  Through this comparative analysis, I discussed: (1) the extent 
interviewees knew about and understood TFA, (2) the ways in which TFA was a 
unique product of the American context, and (3) how TfL, as a idea modeled on 
TFA, had different contextual challenges to overcome, and (4) why drawing lessons 
from TFA with limited knowledge of both contexts was haphazard and unhelpful.  
These issues affected how TfL was perceived as it diffused and why the type of 
reinvention of TFA/TfL became a thorny problem to overcome.     
I then moved on to discussing the twists and turns of the policy story, 
marking the way in which the efforts of policy entrepreneurs slowly accumulated and 
changed the type of action they engaged in.  Ultimately, Kiley and Wigdortz and 
their team tapped influential leaders and built alliances through which they 
strategically diffused, inspired support for, and reinvented TfL.  Networks played a 
central role in enabling this process, enabling access to elites and quickly diffusing 
information about TfL.  Kiley and Wigdortz were also building what Evans and 
Davies (1999) term a policy transfer network – supporters linked by their desire and 
efforts to bring about the transfer of TFA to England.  Kiley and her colleagues’ 
success in forming this policy transfer network, made up of influential business 
leaders, educationalists, and philanthropists, challenged the rules and authority of the 
TTA.  In the end, the TTA negotiated the scheme’s first permanent reinvention, 
distancing it from TFA in order to gain ministerial approval.  This reinvention shifted 
the power dynamics within the policy transfer network, according the most influence 
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CHAPTER 8:  PHASE III:  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TEACH FIRST 
 
 
8.1 Goals of First-Year Implementation 
  
After officially launching in July 2002, Wigdortz and colleagues set about 
implementing the scheme.  Teach First had one year before its first summer institute 
was set to run in 2003.  In that time, the organization needed to accomplish five 
goals: 
  
1. Set up the Teach First organization  
2. Recruit some 200 top graduates to join Teach First  
3. Select an accredited teacher training partner  
4. Recruit eligible London schools for teacher placements  
5. Continue to raise funds and support for the scheme  
 
Reaching these goals fell primarily on the Teach First staff, though supporters 
provided additional help and resources.  Teach First initially set up their offices near 
Aldgate East in the borough of Tower Hamlets before moving into a high-rise office 
in Canary Wharf, donated by co-chair trustee George Iacobescu, in February 2003. 
With staff hired prior to launching, Teach First was structured into three 
components: upper management, graduate recruitment, and placement school 
recruitment/training support.  Upper management comprised of Wigdortz and two of 
his colleagues from McKinsey, Paul Davies and Nat Wei with Jo Owen advising the 
trio.  While Davies assumed the role of Chief Operating Officer, responsible for the 
finances and running of the organization, Wei led graduate recruitment with another 
director, Lindsay Salmon-Davies.  They together managed four, sometimes five, 
graduate recruiters.  Meanwhile, ex-TTA member Lorraine Marriott and TFA 
alumna Nicole Sherrin were hired to recruit schools to the scheme and help plan its 
summer training.  Despite these divisions in organizational roles, interviewees 
reported they all helped each other and fulfilled various roles, especially when it 
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8.2 Recruiting Graduates from Top Universities 
 
Teach First aimed to recruit 200 graduates from top universities to join the 
scheme in 2002-2003.  To achieve this, the Teach First staff set to work crafting 
recruitment messages and strategies as well as a selection criteria and assessment 
processes to attract those talented graduates.  Nat Wei and Lyndsey Salmon-Davies 
together headed graduate recruitment.  Wei was a 25-year-old Oxford graduate who 
had worked for McKinsey for three years before deciding to help set up Teach First.  
Wei was confident he could recruit talent for schools.  “We saw ourselves as needing 
to build a team [of] expertise…” Wei said (Interview, 28/08/2012), “but ultimately, it 
was a talent job.  It was all about talent and that’s very transferable.  You may not 
know everything about education, but you know how to get great people.”   
 Wei had no experience in graduate recruiting, but Salmon-Davies, a woman 
in her late twenties, did.  Salmon-Davies had graduated from Portsmouth University 
and worked in the corporate sector, first for Lockheed Martin as a business analyst 
and then for Arthur Anderson as a graduate recruiter.  At the time, Arthur Anderson 
was one of the top five accountancy firms in the world and recruited more than 400 
graduates annually to fill their positions in the London-area alone.  However, in 
2002, Arthur Anderson was facing criminal charges in its handling of the accounting 
for Enron, prompting a disillusioned Salmon-Davies to reconsider the direction of 
her career and look into teaching. 
 
I actually took voluntary redundancy from Andersen... and then an email 
was sent to me from the director of recruitment for McKinsey, who was 
friends with my director at Arthur Andersen, saying would I be interested 
in interviewing for the graduate recruitment team for Teach First…  I was 
just applying to do a PGCE and decided, actually 200 graduates as 
opposed to just one going into London schools sounds pretty good.  I’m 
also from London [and] went to an inner-city school, so to me, I thought 
it was just amazing to be able to get involved with a city that I love and 
really make a difference.  
– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First 
Interview, 11/12/2012 
 
As Salmon-Davies and Wei began to plan for the recruitment drive, Salmon-Davies 
recalled they had the “tiniest budget”, equal to what Arthur Anderson typically spent 
for one university.  Still, they planned to recruit 200 graduates and target the same 
top twenty U.K. universities other corporate graduate programmes did.   
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There was many a late night spent in McKinsey offices with Nat [Wei] 
and Brett [Wigdortz], with basically me drawing upon all of my 
recruitment experience because they didn’t have any, and building a 
programme together of how we tackle milkrounds, how our recruitment 
would look, certainly with regards to the assessment days. 
– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Head of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First 
Interview, 11/12/2012 
 
Although Wei [Interview, 28/08/2012] said, “we knew from McKinsey how to go 
about attracting top graduates”, Salmon-Davies said she drew instead on advice from 
John Kirkpatrick, the McKinsey manager of the 2001 study.  “[Kirkpatrick] was a 
good sounding board for when I needed to talk to somebody about what I was 
doing,” Salmon-Davies recalled, “because Brett [Wigdortz] and Nat [Wei] had 
absolutely no idea.”  Kirkpatrick recalled helping the team, particularly in setting up 
candidate selection criteria and assessment exercises. 
 
I had been involved in some reshaping of our recruitment processes at 
McKinsey, and the recruitment model that we built for Teach First was 
unashamedly modeled, or at least in part, on that [although] there were 
different… [applicant] characteristics we were looking for which we tried 
to use different components of the recruitment process to test.  If you 
think about it, we were a startup with no reputation and essentially almost 
no substance.  A [small] staff operating on a shoestring budget working 
out of a borrowed office space, and yet we constructed a recruitment 
process that looked itself quite like the ones that were being run… by the 
elite, the blue chip banks [and] consultancies because we knew we were 
competing with them in the market for these right people.   
– John Kirkpatrick, McKinsey consultant 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
Although corporate models were used to create Teach First’s recruitment strategy, 
Salmon-Davies said that she understood Teach First as a U.K. version of TFA.  Thus, 
to inform their recruitment approach, Salmon-Davies read Kopp’s 2001 book on 
TFA and drew upon the expertise of Nicole Sherrin, an alumna of TFA who joined 
the staff.  However, she recalled, “We didn’t have someone to draw upon and say – 
hey, look, can you give us a blueprint of what you did?  We were doing it ourselves.”  
Still, Wigdortz, Wei, and Davies saw their organization’s connection to TFA 
somewhat differently. 
 
We thought we had a more developed idea than TFA.  So we thought 
what we did [was] took TFA and improved it, and put into the English 
context.  And I think there was a certain amount of arrogance on our 
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part… we were very, very pleased with ourselves and we might not have 
acknowledge and honored the history of TFA and how it was so 
influential for us.  
– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First 
Interview, 21/09/2012 
 
Despite these differing views, the directors agreed that they needed to tailor their 
approach to top U.K. graduates who indicated that a purely altruistic or patriotic 
message would be unsuccessful.   
 
In our marketing campaign, we didn’t really focus on teaching as the 
prime hook because our focus groups… were saying one thing about 
teaching, which is exciting, is that we think we would learn a lot about 
leadership and managing people, through being dropped in the deep end, 
which you don’t get if you’re in a bank doing a spreadsheet, or in the civil 
service writing a memo for a minister.  You don’t learn leadership in that 
way.  
– Nat Wei, Director Graduate Recruitment, Teach First 
Interview, 28/08/2012 
 
As a result, the directors hired two independent marketers who they felt understood 
the vision of Teach First rather than use the TTA’s advertising firm.  The marketers 
subsequently created a leadership-themed promotional campaign for the scheme.   
 
[They] came up with… a revolutionary campaign that...  used the tag line 
“Leaders of the Future, Unite!” with a focus on what the world would 
look like in 2023… but amidst the science fiction overtones was a 
powerful message – the best leaders in 2023 would all be graduates who 
had taught in schools in challenging circumstances through Teach First in 
2003.    
– Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.135), CEO, Teach First 
 
With this messaging, Teach First created marketing materials and set up their 
website and online application.  According to Hutchings et al. (2006), the website 
stated: “By joining Teach First … you will mark yourself out as a cut above the rest” 
and called on graduates to teach in challenging schools and be “dedicated to 
addressing the imbalances and injustices that cause poverty”.  Marketing materials 
also emphasized Teach First was a programme through which participants would 
“gain leadership, communication and influencing skills that are often difficult to 
build as a junior or graduate recruit in a large organization” (quoted by Hutchings et 
al. 2006). 
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 As messaging around Teach First was finalized, Salmon-Davies prepared 
their four young graduate recruiters for the milkrounds – a term used in the U.K. to 
refer to the on-campus recruiting of graduates by companies.  (For a complete list of 
the universities and dates of Teach First’s milkround events in fall of 2002, see 
Appendix A.6)  Although none of the recruiters had prior experience recruiting, all 
were recent graduates from Russell group universities:  Helen Arney (2002 Imperial 
graduate), Vivienne Mann (2002 Cambridge graduate), Will Sampson (2002 Oxford 
graduate), and Paul Siaens (1999 Newcastle graduate).  Wei recalled these 
individuals were selected specifically for their particular social networks.  “Brett had 
a very good idea, which was to recruit the elite leaders on campuses to be our 
champions,” Wei said [Interview 28/08/2012], “and so the people we recruited to be 
the recruiters were generally well networked into the very societies and places where 
you could find top graduates.”   
Recruiter Vivienne Mann, who had attended a London comprehensive and was 
attracted to the social mission of Teach First, recalled she and her fellow graduate 
recruiters received a crash-course in how to do their jobs with minimal resources.   
 
We were essentially told to do – they called it guerrilla marketing.  So 
some of it was around flyering, seeing how much we could get done for 
free, how much we could do through word of mouth…  It wasn’t that 
professional of an organization, but then it was run by extremely 
inexperienced people.  Nat [Wei] was my manager.  He’d never managed 
anyone in his life before… Lyndsay [Salmon-Davies]… was the only one 
in the organization who knew what we were doing, and so she planned 
the overall strategy.  Essentially we were told to book a presentation, get 
as many people along as possible, and support people through the 
application process… We were given our own version of a boot camp on 
how to be a graduate recruiter and left to it. 
– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First 
Interview, 30/11/2012 
 
Each recruiter was assigned a set of universities, including their own, from which to 
recruit.  The recruiters distributed brochures, posted adverts on bulletin boards, and 
sent out emails to advertise for Teach First.  One email in particular that described a 
cold, dimly lit classroom and its pupils, like victims, looking for “guidance and 
hope” was cited by many selected participants as particularly powerful in attracting 
them to Teach First, according Hutchings et al. (2006).   
Still, Mann confirmed she and the other recruiters targeted and tapped social 
networks, noting “were literally fresh out of university, so we still had networks and 
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we still knew people.”  She felt this was the key to convincing graduates to apply to 
Teach First.  
 
The type of places we’d studied, it was easy to get the word out there if 
you know the right person.  [So] our job was really to make people aware 
of this concept called Teach First, and we pulled it off.  It was amazing 
because there was a lot of goodwill, we had the existing networks, and I 
think the reason that we were recruited [onto staff] was we were seen as 
the type of people who would join the scheme, not necessarily people 
who were any good at graduate recruitment...  We were just seen as bright 
individuals who would be able to attract similar people. 
– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First 
Interview, 30/11/2012 
 
Media coverage also spread awareness of Teach First although mainstream news 
articles expressed mixed views of the scheme.  Articles in the Guardian (Wegg-
Prosser 2002; Crace 2002)  and the BBC (Wheeler 2003) pointed out the scheme’s 
strengths but also related the concerns of its critics.  Meanwhile, two articles in the 
Sunday Times (Gold 2002) and the Times (Wyke 2003) emphasized the scheme’s 
connections to the business community and the advantages its recruits would enjoy 
by teaching in the programme.  Another January 2003 article in the Times 
Educational Supplement (Thornton 2003) profiled an enthusiastic soon-to-be Oxford 
graduate, who was one of ninety selected onto the scheme thus far.  Notably, all 
articles referenced TFA as the model or inspiration on which Teach First was based, 
often quoting TFA’s recruitment statistics and alumni retention rates in teaching.  
Kiley also wrote a short promotional piece for the Evening Standard (Kiley 2003) in 
January, encouraging graduates to consider its benefits. 
 While raising awareness of Teach First on campuses, recruiters also 
encouraged students to attend an informational presentation to learn more about the 
scheme.  These presentations were given at top universities from early October to 
mid-November and consisted of a three-part talk devised to “inspire” graduates to 
apply.  In each presentation, a recruiter introduced the scheme and then Sherrin 
described her experience teaching in disadvantaged Arizona schools for TFA.  
Occasionally, May spoke about becoming a London headteacher in his late twenties, 
illustrating how this experience led to his role at BITC.   
 Finally, Wigdortz discussed the scheme’s leadership training, emphasizing 
the personal and professional benefits participants would gain by participating in the 
scheme.  As McKinsey’s War for Talent advocated crafting irresistible “employee 
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value propositions” to attract talent, Wigdortz recalled presenting Teach First’s 
“value proposition” as a three-pronged approach to developing one’s leadership 
abilities through teaching.  Applicants were told they could (1) “Make a difference”, 
(2) “Gain distinctive recognized skills” and  (3) “Access the inside track” (Wigdortz 
2012, p.132).  In this way, Wigdortz stated they aimed to appeal to an applicant’s 
“heart” as well as “head”.  One recruiter recalled, “We wanted inspirational 
graduates, [and] what they would get out of it was a [teaching] qualification, some 
business leadership training – sort of the best training in some of their lives” (Mann 
Interview, 30/11/2012).   
As the Teach First staff wrapped up their campus presentations in mid-
November, they began reviewing applications and inviting promising applicants to 
assessment centers at the offices of its corporate supporters.  Kirkpatrick recalled the 
challenges of coming up with assessment and selection criteria. 
 
One, we knew the entire programme would stand on the quality of the 
first cohort… Second, although we had in theory the profile of the 
characteristics we thought people would need, a bunch of these things 
were really difficult to write down and characterize, like “humility”.  
Thirdly, even once we had written them down and agreed what we meant 
by them, finding a recruitment process that could actually identify them 
and distinguish people, was not very easy either.  
– John Kirkpatrick, former McKinsey consultant 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
 
Teach First’s directors ultimately settled on eleven characteristics, or 
“competencies”15, they looked for in applicants to build their first cohort.  They then 
designed a day-long assessment centre through which they tested batches of short-
listed applicants for these characteristics in various ways.    
 
We did a number of things that were probably quite unusual [but that] we 
thought was essential to be able to get people who were not just 
brilliant… but were also communicators of the kind that could deal with a 
class of secondary school pupils.  We built some education-related case 
studies… so that interviewers could get a sense for how far [applicants] 
had thought through the sorts of challenges that they might face… We 
asked them to deliver a ten-minute lesson to the interview panel… 
[assessments that] required quite a high degree of organization and 
                                                        
15 These eleven competencies, which were somewhat revised the following year were: positive 
outlook, personal responsibility, commitment to equity, understanding of programme, self 
evaluation/critique, leadership, teamwork, initiative, critical thinking, communication skills, and 
humility respect and empathy (Hutchings et al. 2006, p.16). 
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investment to make it work.  Lots of other [corporate] recruitment 
processes do similar things – use role-play exercises, case studies, 
psychometric testing [but] they all do that with substantial HR 
departments, internal resources and/or recruitment consultants.  We had 
[none] of those.  We just had to put it together by ourselves.   
– John Kirkpatrick, former McKinsey consultant 
Interview, 13/05/2015 
  
After each applicant completed an interview, demo-lesson, and education-related 
case study in which they had to resolve a problem, the Teach First staff then met to 
discuss the results of each candidate and make selection decisions.  Teach First ran 
assessment centres from January to March, with final selections made by late spring.   
By June, Teach First had selected 186 participants from roughly 1,300 
applicants.  Eighty-three percent of those selected had degrees from Russell Group 
universities, and a third came from Oxford and Cambridge alone (Hutchings et al. 
2006).  A large number of selected participantes were also from Imperial College 
London (Blandford 2004).  In addition, 87 percent of the cohort had earned first or 
upper second-class degrees, and 43 percent had degrees in maths or science.  
According to a survey of selected participants, the top three aspects of the 
programme that influenced them to join Teach First were: “keeping your career 
options open”, “the chance to make a contribution in areas of disadvantage” and “the 
ethos of the programme” (Hutchings et al. 2006).  With these results, Teach First was 




8.3 The Internal Organizational Struggles of Teach First 
 
Although the recruitment drive proved successful, the Teach First staff often 
struggled with a number of challenges internally, primarily conflicts around how the 
organization was being managed.  Nearly all staff interviewees referred to 
Wigdortz’s inexperience as a leader as a common cause for friction.  Others noted 
the importation of McKinsey-style management as another.  However, all staff 
members interviewed recalled being inspired by the idea behind Teach First rather 
than those leading it. 
 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 265 
In the first year, the primacy was the idea – a very strong collective belief, 
I remember a writing on the wall – that this [was] an idea whose time had 
come, and our job is not to screw it up.  And we were all in service in 
getting this off the ground and self-interest was very low around all...  
[which was] why we worked the stupid hours, all that kind of stuff.  So it 
wasn’t like everyone was following Brett [Wigdortz] – everyone’s 
following this idea that we are now stewards of… which is in no way to 
denigrate Brett.  He was absolutely dedicated and… played a really 
proper CEO role [as] the face of Teach First externally, going and 
networking, and meeting people and the like.  So we had fantastic 
external profile, but it was all pretty much around Brett rather than the 
organization…  So Brett was seen as the hero and visionary, [but] it was 
the idea [that] had primacy and we all had a responsibility to that.  
– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First 
Interview, 21/09/2012 
 
It was an appallingly run organization.  Most people weren’t particularly 
well qualified for the jobs that they were doing.  Brett [was] a terrible 
leader...  But we had blind faith, and that’s probably what kept us going… 
I think we were just [a staff] made up by this strange amalgamation of 
people who only united [because of] one cause.  There [was] a lot of 
politics and there are a lot of questions to why Brett was leading this 
organization… So some of us, I think, left a bit bitter from the experience. 
– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First 
Interview, 30/11/2012 
 
Mann also recalled TFA was used to bolster recruiters’ confidence in the new 
scheme. 
 
We were told that Teach First is loosely based on Teach For America, and 
the main message was that TFA worked and it was successful, therefore it 
could work in the U.K.  Bear in mind, when we first started the 
milkround, it was still unproven.  We didn’t really have any schools on 
board.  We didn’t have a training partner.  We were winging it really, 
mostly, 90 percent of the time. 
– Vivienne Mann, Graduate Recruiter, Teach First 
Interview, 30/11/2012 
  
All three graduate recruiters interviewed said they had joined the scheme because 
they believed the programme would help disadvantaged pupils.  Salmon-Davies 
recalled how the young recruiters’ commitment to the idea of Teach First helped 
them.  
 
[Because] we were selling a brand new product and going up against 
consultancy firms, accountancy firms, marketing, all the rest of it – the 
team needed to believe in Teach First and that was one of the major 
things that we were able to do… which was pretty tricky to do with the 
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style of management that was sometimes put upon the team.  [The 
recruiters] didn’t always quite get what was going on, and I was very 
much a buffer, the diplomat, within the management team.  
– Lyndsey Salmon-Davies, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First 
Interview, 11/12/2012 
  
As a middle manager like Salmon-Davies, Marriott also voiced concerns about 
the way Teach First was run, which in her view was essentially “the old boys’ club”.  
She felt she did not fit “within the ethos of the upper echelons of the Teach First 
directors” due to her background – she had not been to a top university, nor “to a 
posh school”, and had come directly from the public sector.  She felt her perspective 
differed markedly from the corporate culture that the former consultants brought into 
the organization and recalled one meeting where those orientations clashed. 
 
There was a point in time [when] we were really struggling for money.  
We had a directors meeting, and there was a choice of like, “What do we 
do?  We haven’t got enough money to pay everyone.”  And there was a 
whole conversation about who to get rid of.  And I raised a point to say, 
“Let’s forego our bonuses because we get a decent salary.  The bonuses 
are nice, but it’s just an extra couple of thousand compared to somebody 
being laid off.  That would be my choice.”  And there was this silence all 
the way around the room, and it was absolutely rejected out of hand, like, 
“we will not forego our bonuses.  These are really important.”  So I think 
that was something that I found quite shocking actually.   
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First 
Interview, 06/12/2012 
 
Wigdortz (2012) admitted bonuses became an issue that frustrated other staff 
members.  He recalled he set up the bonuses tied to performance targets to motivate 
staff, but a staff member soon reminded him “money isn’t what is driving us” (p.105).  
In this way, Wigdortz (2012) explained how he often “took the ideas [he] had learned 
as a management consultant and often used the wrong lessons from it” (p.105), which 
led to several near mutinies within his staff.   
 In regard to money, it is worth noting that Teach First was set up with a salary 
hierarchy differentiated by roles, with the CEO earning the most (£60,000) while the 
COO and directors/managers earning 75 percent (£45,000) and 58 percent (£35,000) 
of the CEO’s salary respectively.  The graduate recruiters and other support staff 
received roughly 37 percent (£22,500) of the CEO’s pay.  Sherrin, the TFA alumna, 
was paid only slightly more than graduates recruiters (£25,000) – a point she felt was 
somewhat unfair given her years of teaching experience, useful knowledge of TFA, 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 267 
and Teach First’s messaging regarding the high value and transferrable skills of 
successful teachers.  The salary hierarchy, along with the bonus structure, further 
frustrated some staff due to the reality that upper management lacked experience and 
all staff members recalled sharing roles.  
Despite these internal divisions, the altruistic goals of Teach First pulled the 
staff together to work successfully toward their goals.  However, the business culture 
and managerial approach of Teach First would soon clash with another perspective – 




8.4 Selecting an Accredited Teacher Training Provider 
 
While recruiting graduates, Teach First needed to partner with an accredited 
training provider to prepare its participants for teaching in schools.  Since January 
2002, the IOE had worked closely with the leaders behind the scheme to develop a 
training model and convince a variety of stakeholders to back the programme.  In the 
months after Teach First’s launch, the relationship between Teach First and the IOE 
continued with Totterdell corresponding with the TTA to further develop an 
acceptable training model for the scheme.  However, he said he found it difficult to 
move forward on this front.  As he liaised with the TTA, he was unaware of the 
TTA’s intent to put the training contract out to tender. 
 
The TTA wanted to get the training package to conform as tightly 
packaged to the existing ones… So it was an extremely difficult dialogue, 
and we were dialoguing with middle managers who were quite set in their 
ways and some of whom were quite conservative.  So that was the role I 
found myself playing much of the summer and autumn into the winter of 
that year.  
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
In the fall, communication between the IOE and Teach First ended when the 
TTA announced a bidding process would take place in December 2002 and issued 
the specific criteria for proposed training models to meet.  While the IOE was invited 
to apply for the contract, the TTA also encouraged bids from other providers and 
Tabberer discussed the range of potential partners with Wigdortz.  The TTA’s 
selection committee was set up to include Wigdortz and representatives from the 
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TTA and DfES.  Still, Wigdortz continued to feel disrespected by TTA officers he 
met with during the fall and sensed “petty bureaucratic games” were being played 
(Wigdortz 2012, p.178).   
Nevertheless, the bidding process proceeded and in late December, the TTA 
received one bid – from the IOE.  However, the bid was rather different from the 
TTA’s requirements.  “The IOE put in a bid, but it was sort of framed on their terms 
saying this is what we will do rather than what Teach First and the spec was 
specifically asking for,” said one interviewee, who asked not to be named due to the 
confidential nature of the bidding process.   
Totterdell felt “there was a misunderstanding between ourselves and the TTA 
as to what we were doing” [Interview, 23/11/2012], referring to his belief that the 
first year of Teach First would be an experimental pilot.  He also said that the 
proposal he put forth was not ideal but the only arrangement he could feasibly work 
out given the internal situation at the IOE in late 2002. 
 
That was the same time that we [at the IOE] were identifying a major 
shortfall in funding in teacher education.  So I was in a very tricky 
position internally and externally and basically could not pull together the 
resources to make it work from January and the coming summer with the 
[IOE’s] other commitments without bringing in some additionality.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
By “additionality” Totterdell meant he needed to partner with an outside education 
consultancy16 to provide short-term but experienced staff.  He conceded that using 
temporary staff from outside was not “great” and  “raised the price” of the training 
but insisted it was necessary due to the research pressures facing his staff at the time. 
 
[The IOE] had just come through the second research assessment exercise 
and had not done as well as anticipated [mainly because of] the “long tail” 
of teacher training, i.e. my staff.  So my people were utterly determined to 
get research time so that they could hold their own.  And what the Teach 
First implied was a very intensive summer institute and I would have to 
deploy the very people who were desperate to be doing research.  So there 
were real tensions within the Institute as well as within the TTA [as] to 
whether we had [or] could create the capacity.   
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 24/01/2015 
                                                        
16 The two education consultancies Totterdell considered partnering with were Cambridge Education 
and CfBT though he could not recall which one he ultimately chose in the planned model of the bid.  
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Totterdell also recalled his staff had significant coursework assessment marking to 
carry out in the summer.  Overall, the situation frustrated him. 
 
On the one hand, Teach First I thought was an extremely promising 
programme that would expose us to some very good ideas, some 
outstanding people, and make a real impact on London.  But [on] the 
other side, it was going to be resource expensive and came at a time when 
we were having to remodel our own teacher training and finally do 
something about the research status within that particular part of the 
Institute’s work. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
The TTA, nevertheless, rejected Totterdell’s proposal.  Wigdortz (2012, pp.179–180) 
was also unhappy with the bid, suggesting it proposed training only a hundred 
graduates, relied extensively on video lectures due to summer staff being largely 
unavailable, and planned for graduates to start as mentees in schools before 
becoming full-time teachers.  As a result, the TTA set up a second round of bidding 
for January.  
During the first bidding round, the IOE had been the only bidder.  Totterdell 
suggested this was because the TTA’s specifications were “utterly unrealistic” for 
providers to meet.  Another interviewee, however, suggested London providers had a 
different motive for not bidding. 
 
Some of the London providers at that point decided they would have 
nothing to do with [the bidding] whatsoever, working on the principle that 
maybe if Teach First didn’t have a provider to work with, this strange 
new thing would go away.   
– Jacquie Nunn, former head of ITE, Roehampton University 
Interview, 24/08/2012 
 
Thus, in preparation for the second round of bidding, the TTA contacted Sonia 
Blandford, Dean of Education at Canterbury Christ Church University College 
(CCCUC or “Canterbury”).  CCCUC was a higher education institution with three 
campuses across Kent, although its original and primary campus remained in the 
historic town of Canterbury, sixty miles southeast of London.  Founded in 1962 by 
the Church of England as a teacher training college, CCCUC had expanded over the 
decades into a larger institution offering courses in a number of fields.  In 1995, the 
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college was granted the power to award its own degrees for taught courses and 
became known as CCCUC17.    
Blandford had assumed the role of Dean of the College of Education in May 
2002, though had been working in that role unofficially from January 2002.  She had 
been headhunted for the position, which allowed her to continue her record of 
achievement that she said was unlikely given her background.  Raised by parents 
who had left school at age fourteen unable to read, Blandford said she was 
determined to succeed at an early age to avoid a fate of working in factories.  A 
music teacher at her London comprehensive inspired Blandford to become a music 
teacher herself.  She subsequently earned a Bachelor of Education from the 
University of Leeds.  After becoming a teacher, Blandford went on to earn a Masters 
and Doctorate in Education.  She then worked in university teacher education, 
becoming assistant dean and then a professor at Oxford Brookes University.  In her 
new position at Canterbury, Blandford was tasked with expanding and improving the 
college. 
 
When I arrived at Canterbury, it had an absolutely superb primary 
provision, and it had a developing secondary provision.  It was also in a 
period of growth – it had become a university college, and it was destined 
to become a university… So there were three aims: one was an 
overarching aim of growth with the number of programmes, the second 
was [raising] the quality of programmes, and the third aim was to develop 
the structure to include separate departments within the faculty of 
education from cradle to grave provision, so early years through to 
primary, secondary, post-16 and adult education.  
– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC 
Interview, 20/03/2015 
 
With these goals, Blandford had worked closely with the TTA in recent years to 
develop the GTP, Fast Track, and other employment-based programmes at Oxford 
Brooks and then Canterbury.  Blandford said, likely due in part to this close prior 
collaboration with the TTA, she received a call from a senior TTA official in late 
December asking if Canterbury would be interested in being involved with Teach 
First.  Blandford said she also talked with Tabberer regarding “the nature of the 
programme because clearly there was a reputational risk to Canterbury” (Interview, 
                                                        
17 Subsequently, in 2005, the institution dropped “college” from its name when it was granted the title 
of “university” by the Privy Council.  However, at the time, the university college was known as 
CCCUC. 
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20/03/2015).  Despite the risk, Blandford said she prided herself on being able to 
build successful new partnerships and thus was interested in Teach First.   
 In the interview, though, Blandford emphasized she was being invited to bid 
for a programme that was not yet created.  “[The TTA] didn’t describe the 
programme because it didn’t become a programme until we made it a programme – 
Ok?” she said. “It was an idea and Teach First was an organization, [and] there 
wasn’t anybody on the Teach First staff that was qualified to devise a programme” 
[Blandford Interview, 20/03/2015].  Thus, Blandford saw an opportunity to assume 
a central role in creating what she viewed as a new type of teacher training 
programme.  Subsequently, Blandford agreed to put together a training proposal and 
bid for the contract.  Although expanding CCCUC’s secondary programmes was a 
priority for her, Blandford said she wanted to work with Teach First to improve 
London’s teaching force. 
 
The reason I said “yes” to it was because – besides coming from London, 
I taught in London – I knew there’s an acute shortage of qualified 
teachers...  I also knew that the quality and knowledge-base of the 
teachers, particularly in science, maths and English, was poor not because 
the existing staff were in any way poor but because they were there for 
short term – by [which] I mean less than two years.   
– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC 
Interview, 20/03/2015 
 
Although some of her staff at CCCUC initially rejected the idea for Teach First, 
Blandford worked with colleagues to put together a training model that was a 
“hybrid” of three programmes already operating at CCCUC: (1) the GTP and other 
employment-based programmes, (2) elements of the secondary provision, and (3) 
the work of James Learmonth, an academic and former London headteacher who 
was founding a centre on educational leadership at Canterbury. 
Although Blandford was aware of the IOE’s previous collaboration with 
Teach First, she did not have any contact with the IOE regarding the programme.  
However, like Totterdell, she had hoped to design a training programme that offered 
trainees a PGCE but quickly realized this would not be possible. 
 
I wanted it to be a PGCE...  It couldn’t be because there had to be a 
certain amount of attendance at university and clearly that wasn’t going to 
be happening.  So both the university college and the leadership of the 
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TTA would not allow it... It didn’t fit the system, so therefore the system 
wasn’t going to flex in order for it to be a PGCE. 
– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC 
Interview, 20/03/2015 
 
In designing Teach First’s training, Blandford also said she did not base any of her 
model on TFA.  “I’d never heard of Teach For America,” Blandford said [Interview, 
20/03/2015], “[and] we didn’t at any point use TFA as a reference.  I had no idea 
what they did in their summer institute.” 
In January, Blandford and Totterdell submitted and pitched their respective 
proposals to the TTA.  Although Totterdell had refined his proposal, aiming to fulfill 
the TTA’s revised requirements, he lost the bid to Blandford.  Marriott, who was on 
the selection panel, said she was surprised the IOE bid failed again.  “The thinking at 
Teach First was, ‘well, there’s no way that the Institute could ever lose this bid 
because they helped us design the programme,’” Marriott said [Interview, 
06/12/2012].  
Totterdell was disappointed in the outcome of the bid and the TTA’s 
unwillingness to experiment with a new form of teacher training.  
 
By singling out QTS, [the TTA] guaranteed compliance and that’s what 
they were interested in having.  What we were really interested – and I 
honestly believe Brett [Wigdortz] in his heart of hearts was as well – was 
a new cadre of leaders of teaching who would not be “yes” people, who 
would ask the difficult questions, experiment, take risks, pull down 
international-level research and employ it in highly effective teams in 
London.  I mean, my own background in the military was an elite, and 
when I got involved in this model, I was trying to put together a model 
that would allow an elite volunteer to make a radically significant 
difference, and my sense is that to do that, they needed exposure to the 
international narratives, the bigger picture, and… they sure as heck 
[weren’t going to] get that from Canterbury. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
Totterdell also pointed out the differences between CCCUC and the IOE as well as 
between Blandford and himself in regard to resources and professional perspective. 
 
What [Canterbury] had was spare staff, capacity, an ability to hire part-
timers as if budget was no expense, and my counter-part there 
[Blandford], frankly was much more in tune with the TTA’s thinking than 
I was.  I mean, my thinking was more radical, more differentiated.  I had 
good relations with the TTA, but I didn’t see them as the beginning and 
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the end of what is involved in teacher professional preparation and 
formation. 
– Michael Totterdell, Head of the Secondary PGCE Programme, IOE  
Interview, 23/11/2012 
 
Marriott confirmed that the bid from CCCUC won not only due to its design, but also 
because of Blandford’s strong relationship with the TTA. 
 
[CCCUC] already had the confidence of the TTA and the Department 
because of Sonia Blandford.  She had a lot of respect from the TTA and 
the Department, and she and her team put forward this amazing bid within 
a great budget, thinking quite long term, like “we believe this [Teach 
First] is going to run and run and run so let’s see what we can do with it”.  
And they overwhelmingly won this tender process.  
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First 
Interview, 06/12/2012 
 
In contrast, Marriott observed some at the TTA and DfES expressing a negative 
attitude toward the IOE.  
 
I don’t know what happened in the past, but [the IOE] had so little respect 
from the TTA and the DfES.  They were really seen almost to be, like, the 
people that they would not want involved in Teach First… I seem to 
remember there was a lack of trust in the Institute of Education, either 
because they’d messed up some contracts or some funding, or they were 
left vulnerable in some way.  But there was something institutional that 
the TTA absolutely despised them for.   
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First 
Interview, 06/12/2012 
 
Totterdell and Whitty both acknowledged the “vulnerability” of the IOE and its 
somewhat rocky relationship with the DfES and TTA under the former head of IOE, 
Peter Mortimer.  However, since Whitty and Tabberer assumed leadership positions 
at the IOE in 2000 and TTA in 2001 respectively, both said they felt those conflicts 
had faded into irrelevance by 2002.  “The Institute was very close to New Labour 
government at that point – it hadn’t been earlier,” Whitty recalled [Interview 
09/07/2012], “[and] part of my job as Director was to rebuild that relationship 
through Michael Barber.”  Regardless of the effects of institutional politics or 
personal allegiances, Blandford’s proposal satisfied the selection committee and 
won. 
When the IOE lost the bid, the staff of Teach First was initially apprehensive 
about partnering with CCCUC. 
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At the beginning it was like, “oh no, all that travel to Canterbury, they 
don’t really get London schools, they don’t really get what we’re talking 
about, they’re far away, it’s not an inner-city”… but then we quickly 
came to realize that there’s going to be no London university that has a 
campus big enough to fit 200 trainees without splitting them up into 
separate residences, and yet Canterbury had this amazing place where it 
was green and everyone could stay together.  So that was a big draw in 
the end. 
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First  
Interview, 06/12/2012 
 
CCCUC’s partnership with Teach First was announced in late January 2003, 
and Blandford, with Wigdortz, met with other London training providers in March 
2003 to explain their programme.  While CCCUC had not been involved in London 
secondary schools, it had a record of placing trainees in primary schools through its 
own centre in Tower Hamlets.  Still, London’s university providers were not 
welcoming of the news.  
 
At that stage, [Teach First] was seen as being something that was being 
imported, untested.  And when Canterbury… was awarded the contract, it 
caused shock waves in London [and] consternation really, partly because 
Canterbury was seen as encroaching on the territory of the London 
providers.  I mean, it’s enormously difficult to get your trainees into 
decent schools, and one of the anxieties about Teach First was this idea 
that it would be taking away places from regular PGCE.  So there was 
anxiety about all of that, about destabilizing existing partnerships, and 
people were slightly unnerved with Canterbury stepping into that space.  
– Jacquie Nunn, former head of ITE, Roehampton University 
Interview, 24/08/2012  
 
While news spread of the partnership between Teach First and CCCUC, the IOE 
quickly lost any association with Teach First, ending the year-long association 
between the two. 
 
What Teach First did was, politically, to disaffiliate from the Institute and 
to re-affiliate with Canterbury…  Looking back on it, I think it was 
disingenuous of them, but I suspect it was driven by political alignments 
and a sense of wanting to get on with enacting the model rather than to 
look back at how the model was constructed, propagated, argued for and 
made persuasive.  
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Rona [Kiley] and I got on well, but there was a period after Canterbury 
got the [contract] where it was difficult because the Institute had no role 
at all.  Michael Totterdell was gobsmacked that there was a bid that met 
the criteria, and was quite rightly accepted by the Teacher Training 
Agency...  I have no quarrel at all with [CCCUC] who saw a business 
opportunity and took it.  And that’s absolutely fine.  What I do have 
problems with is that I think the Institute lost intellectual property that it 
had contributed to Teach First’s proposal… and I also strongly resent the 
way the Institute was subsequently written out of the history… I think it 
[was] Michael Totterdell, however he may has misjudged the bidding 
process, made Teach First possible in terms of writing documents and … 
making the proposal culturally sensitive to the U.K. context. 
– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE 
Interview, 12/07/2012 
 
After winning the bid, CCCUC began to prepare the training programme for 
Teach First.  However, when the leaders of the CCCUC and Teach First met, 
Blandford quickly noted a difference in perspective between the two parties. 
 
In February [2003] the Teach First team – Rona Kiley, Brett [Wigdortz], 
Nat [Wei], and Lyndsey [Salmon-Davies] – came and met with our senior 
leadership at what was quite a difficult meeting [because of] the approach 
taken by the Teach First team… We very much wanted it to be a 
partnership... [and] Teach First were not really positive about creating a 
partnership… [For them] it was their idea.  We respected that, and we 
would’ve, at the start, really appreciated more of a respect for what 
Canterbury, not just myself, but where Canterbury were as leaders of 
change within teacher education because they were… [but] they wanted 
to tell Canterbury how to devise a teacher training programme, and there 
was nobody within Teach First that had that level of expertise.  
– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC 
Interview, 20/03/2015 
  
Wigdortz’s (2012) account alluded to the managerial positioning first taken by Teach 
First, which produced a strained relationship between Teach First and CCCUC. 
 
One of my non-negotiable points [with the TTA] was that the university 
should feel accountable to us and not just the government.  After all, this 
was the Teach First programme and we needed to be in charge of the 
messaging, recruiting, training and all elements of the programme.  We 
should choose our university training partner since, in essence, they 
would be working for us.  
  – Brett Wigdortz (2012, p.177), CEO, Teach First 
 
Furthermore, John Moss, head of the secondary PGCE programme at CCCUC, 
recalled that the relationship between the TTA, Teach First, and CCCUC was never 
clearly defined and that Wigdortz wanted more control over the training aspect than 
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he and his colleagues at CCCUC anticipated (Moss Interview, 17/09/2012).  The 
expectations of Wigdortz and some of his colleagues stemmed from their admiration 
for McKinsey’s training as well as their understanding of TFA’s training.    
 
We would [have] loved the teacher training to be done directly… rather 
than outsourced… Coming from a background where McKinsey does all 
its training – it works with the practitioners and knows how to develop 
training that really works – [doing that] just wasn’t politically or 
logistically possible [for Teach First].  TFA was very heavily involved in 
the designing of the training programme – on the educational pedagogy 
side.  And in the U.K. that just wasn’t possible because of the time scales 
and it’s quite regulated here. 
– Nat Wei, Director of Graduate Recruitment, Teach First 
Interview, 28/08/2012 
 
Control over branding, the messages, and content of Teach First’s training remained 
a point of contention throughout the early years of the partnership with CCCUC. 
Nevertheless, during the spring of 2003, CCCUC proceeded to organize the 
training programme.  Blandford also selected the training staff, which was a mixture 
of three groups: existing CCCUC staff, newly recruited staff, and two TFA alumni 
that agreed to present workshops in the summer.  Finally, CCCUC also became 
involved with recruiting placement schools in London as the Teach First staff had 




8.5 Recruiting Placement Schools 
 
The recruitment of placement schools for Teach First teachers began in fall 
2002 and lasted throughout the academic year.  Lorraine Marriott led the effort to 
recruit schools with the help of TFA alumna Nicole Sherrin and Rona Kiley.  To 
start, Marriott recalled they compiled a list of London schools to target, which had 
more than 30 percent of pupils on free school meals and/or considerably low GCSE 
results. They were not allowed to consider schools in “special measures”, or deemed 
failing by Ofsted.  With a list made, Marriott’s team began contacting schools.  “We 
made phone calls to the heads, faxed information over, tried to get the TTA to 
support us,” Marriott recalled [Interview, 6/12/2012].  “In the beginning it was 
incredibly difficult.  We couldn’t even get the headteachers to answer the phone to 
us, nevermind meet with us.”   
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When they did finally manage to meet with some headteachers, Marriott said 
they found “huge resistance, huge skepticism”.  Despite such resistance, the Teach 
First staff continued to approach schools.  “Most private schools in the U.K. recruit 
directly from Oxbridge or wherever, so there was precedence,” Wei said, “and the 
[schools] that were totally against it or too disorganized to jump on it, just very 
quickly stopped talking [so] we went to the ones that were interested” [Interview, 
28/08/2012].  One of those interested heads was Elizabeth Phillips. 
Phillips was one of the first headteachers to sign up for Teach First although, 
Marriott recalled, her school “really didn’t need Teach First”.  She had been the 
headteacher of St. Marylebone, a multi-cultural girls’ comprehensive in Westminster 
since 1994.  Under her leadership, the school was deemed by the DfES as the most 
improved school in the country in 2000.  That year 89 percent of the school’s pupils 
earned five GCSEs at grade A*–C, up from only 39 percent in 1997.  The school’s 
intake drew mainly from council estates where 60 percent of the pupils spoke 
English as their second language, and 42 percent were eligible for free schools 
meals.  In explaining her success, Phillips said “the single biggest factor in 
improving a school is the staff” and advised that headteachers “need to be single-
minded and determined in finding and keeping the best teachers” (BBC 2000).  With 
this view, Phillips, who graduated from Kings College London and had a previous 
career in management at Unilever, embraced the ethos of Teach First, signed up, and 
became a vocal advocate for it. 
 
Elizabeth [Phillips] gathered together quite a big meeting of headteachers 
from the people that she knew and around the borough, and that was the 
first time we actually got people to sit down and listen to us.  So that was 
quite a break through moment, when we had this headteacher, saying, 
“we should listen to these people.  Don’t dismiss them.”  She was older 
lady [and] really quite instrumental in helping [my] team get to some of 
the headteachers who perhaps we wouldn’t have normally got in touch 
with.  
– Lorraine Marriott, Director of Teacher Placement, Teach First 
Interview, 06/12/2012 
 
Blandford also recalled Phillips being very helpful because she “was incredibly well 
networked” within the education establishment as well as in the business world 
through her husband, the company secretary at Wimbledon.   
Phillips also became part of a headteachers group that advised and supported 
Teach First. “[They] were wonderful,” Kiley said [Interview, 30/04/2012], “because 
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they told us what they thought would work, like how much we could charge each 
school.”   The charge Kiley referred to was the fee – £3,500 per teacher to be paid in 
installments – Teach First required of schools involved in the programme.  Often 
called a “recruitment fee”, the payment served two purposes: to confirm a school’s 
commitment to take a teacher and to provide additional funds to run Teach First. 
 As school recruitment continued, Marriott’s team received additional help 
when CCCUC came aboard.  Blandford met with approximately a dozen 
headteachers to convince them to take part in the scheme.   
  
They were obviously thinking about what the credibility of Canterbury to 
deliver programmes to support training in London, and we just got our 
Ofsted report for both the GTP, secondary, and also the primary provision 
which referenced what we did in London.  And I actually took those 
Ofsted reports to the meeting with the headteachers to persuade them. 
– Sonia Blandford, Dean of Education, CCCUC 
Interview, 20/03/2015 
 
In addition, CCCUC’s James Learmonth became a vocal supporter of Teach First.  
Learmonth had started teaching in urban schools in 1964, later becoming a 
headteacher in Tower Hamlets, a school inspector, an academic, and an advisor to 
CCCUC.  Learmonth encouraged headteachers to sign up for Teach First, including 
Jill Coughlan, the headteacher at Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School since 1994. 
 
James Learmonth had done some work in Islington local authority and at 
[our] school… and he had credibility with heads who were working in 
challenging areas.  So we already knew him and valued his work, and 
when he said that Canterbury had won the contract for Teach First, he 
sold us the idea.  So it [was] really done through networking…  James 
Learmonth approached me, and really, unless there hadn’t been the 
personal professional connection, we probably wouldn’t have looked at it. 
– Jill Coughlan, Headteacher, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School 
Interview, 04/12/2012 
 
Coughlan said her school, a girls’ comprehensive in north London, did meet Teach 
First’s criteria as a “challenging” school with 50 percent of its students on free 
school meals, 66 percent bilingual learners, and 20 percent refugee and asylum 
seekers.  Still, the school was performing relatively well on exam results and did not 
have difficulty recruiting teachers.  Thus, Learmonth’s encouragement was critical in 
her decision to participate in Teach First as Coughlan and her staff had concerns 
about the scheme. 
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I discussed [Teach First] with [my] senior leadership team… because a lot 
of the staff were questioning of it, as I was.  I mean, there was a part of 
me that thought, “Don’t they think good graduates are already in London 
education?” and it was marginally insulting… and really I only accepted 
to be involved because it was James [Learmonth] and we trusted him, 
knew his values, and we wanted to be helpful. 
– Jill Coughlan, Headteacher, Elizabeth Garrett Anderson School 
Interview, 04/12/2012 
 
Although a Cambridge graduate herself, Coughlan remained somewhat skeptical but 
agreed to take one Teach First teacher in the coming year. 
While Learmonth convinced several headteachers to work with Teach First, 
Sally Coates, headteacher of Sacred Heart Roman Catholic School in south inner-
London, learned of the scheme through the media.  
 
On one Friday, the front-page story of the Times Educational Supplement  
was about the launch of this new scheme called Teach First.  It had a big 
picture of a young man, a math graduate from Oxford, and there was a 
story about him and how Teach First recruited him and would be sending 
hundreds of [such] students into schools.  So I saw this story, and I 
thought “gosh, I’d like that young man to work in my school because he 
looks dynamic and just obviously very academic and well-qualified”, and 
reading about his life and why he wants to be a teacher I thought “I’ve got 
to get involved with this.”  So that’s when I contacted Teach First and 
said I’d like Sacred Heart to be involved. 
 – Sally Coates, headteacher, Sacred Heart 
Interview, 11/01/2013 
 
The TES article Coates read, entitled “Lured from the City to capital’s schools” 
(Thornton 2003), ran on the 31 of January 2003 and mentioned that 90 graduates had 
already been selected onto Teach First.  The Oxford recruit featured in the article 
was a London native who was interested in education after brief teaching stints in 
South Africa and Hong Kong.  Set to graduate from Oxford after studying 
geography, he wanted to inspire London pupils who had traditionally been “excluded 
and alienated” while keeping his career options open.   
Coates said she saw Teach First as “solving their recruitment problems”, a 
struggle she was familiar with as head of a challenging school.  More than half of the 
635 pupils at Sacred Heart qualified for free school meals, according to the school’s 
2002 Ofsted report, and more than 90 percent were from black and other minority 
backgrounds.  Although a challenging environment, Scared Heart was “very 
functional and organized” Coates said.  The school had significantly improved since 
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its inspection in 1996 and was rated by Ofsted in 2002 as “highly effective”.  Still, 
recruiting teachers was a challenge, so Coates hired two maths and one language 
teacher from Teach First.  Although the TES article had referenced TFA as the 
model for Teach First, Coates recalled she only heard about TFA from Kiley after 
signing up for the scheme.  “Obviously, I was reassured about hearing it worked 
perfectly in the States, but the States is a very different context to England,” Coates 
said “and so I was a bit nervous about it” [Interview, 11/01/2013]. 
 Another headteacher who hired eight Teach First teachers in 2003 was Tom 
Widdows, principal of Bexley Business Academy in southeast London.  The school 
was among the first academies set up in 2002 and replaced Thamesmead Community 
College, a comprehensive in which only 20 percent of its pupils achieved five A*–C 
grades.  The enterprise-themed school sponsored by Sir David Garrard, a millionaire 
property developer, was set to move into its new £31 million building, complete with 
its own mini-stock exchange.  Widdows, who had worked in schools for more than 
two decades, said he initially learned of Teach First through Rona Kiley.  He was 
interested in the idea because he was finding it difficult to recruit teachers for the 
academy because of its location in “a very, very tough area – violence, drugs, lots of 
different nationalities” [Interview, 7/01/2013].  Hence, he was still looking for more 
staff who would embrace the new ethos of the academy. 
 
We needed people who would come in and challenge the accepted 
orthodox and challenge what these children from very deprived 
backgrounds could achieve.  And it was better maybe to have more 
innocent people that had a very open mind and young staff tended to have 
this… I mean, we were trying to run these [academy] schools, playing on 
the idea of leadership, emotion, getting people very heavily involved in it, 
getting the children to buy into education, and education could change 
their lives, and we could help change their lives by working together, and 
this was something that the young teachers in Teach First [offered].  
– Tom Widdows, Principal, Bexley Business Academy 
Interview, 7/01/2013 
 
Widdows said he was optimistic about Teach First because he had seen positive 
results from setting up the GTP at his previous school in Norfolk.  Yet, ultimately, he 
was willing to accept Teach First because of the dire situation at the school.  “We 
were ready to try anything on an experimental basis because we were so worried 
about getting results up,” Widdows recalled. “So it wasn’t the case of having 
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confidence in Teach First.  It was there, and… we went in with the attitude of – It 
looks good, we’ll make it work for us” [Interview, 7/01/2013]. 
Thus, like Coats at Sacred Heart, Widdows needed additional highly-
educated and motivated teachers.  Marriott confirmed that this was their primary 
pitch to schools, especially in terms of teachers in shortage subjects.  “Initially, the 
way we sold it was, ‘you’re never going to find the quality and caliber of maths and 
science graduates that you will through Teach First,’ and that really made 
headteachers sit up and listen,” Marriott said [Interview, 7/12/2012]. 
By the summer of 2003, a number of schools had been recruited but more 
placements were still needed, according to Blandford.  As a result, Blandford said 
she and her staff recruited additional schools during the summer.  “It was literally us 
phoning up, blanket phoning up the schools that were eligible,” Blandford said, “and 
using any contacts and networks that we had, including me going back to my own 
school [Longford Community High School in Feltham].”  In all, 44 London schools 
signed up to take on one or more of the 186 graduates recruited by Teach First.  
Although the focus had been on inner-London, a number of Teach First schools were 
located in the outer boroughs of the capital.   
In sum, schools were recruited in a number of ways – through CCCUC, well-
connected and supportive headteachers, and awareness raised by media stories.  SHA 
leader, John Dunford, also said he continued to encouraged headteachers to sign up 
for Teach First.  The motives of headteachers taking part also varied.  Some 
headteachers saw Teach First as a way to fill chronic vacancies in their schools, 
while others signed up due to social connections and/or professional beliefs.  Finally, 
some headteachers reported to becoming involved in Teach First partly due to the 
possibility of forming links with businesses (Hutchings et al. 2006). 
 
 
8.6 Consolidating Support for Teach First 
 
During the year, while Teach First recruited top graduates and officially 
partnered with CCCUC, its leaders continued to build support for the organization in 
both the business and education communities.  From the business community, Teach 
First’s COO, Paul Davies, recalled they recruited a number of large corporations to 
sign up to sponsor and/or participate in Teach First.  However, he noted their reasons 
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for doing so were different than the first set of business supporters who backed the 
scheme before its launch. 
  
The early tranche – people like Canary Wharf and Capital & Provident, 
[thought] “this is a good thing”… to improve education in London.  The 
next tranche, people like PwC in particular, came on [because] they 
were after good graduates.  I remember a [leader] from PwC said, “Aw, 
this [Teach First] is fantastic.  Basically, we at PwC either recruit 
graduates who know nothing… or we recruit professionals [from 
various fields]… and they all come in feeling quite clever and basically 
don’t do what we tell them.  So if you can do something in between, 
where you take graduates, [tie] them up a little bit for two years to get 
how the world works, then hand them to us, that’s almost the perfect 
thing we could ever have.”  So that second tranche [was] the businesses 
[that] recruited a lot.  So the value proposition that was attractive to the 
sponsors evolved… it started with ending disadvantage and … some 
people came on early over that, and the next tranche came in a much 
more self-interested way around “yes, we’d like these graduates, 
please”.  
– Paul Davies, COO, Teach First 
Interview, 21/09/2012 
 
As more businesses signed up to sponsor the scheme, Teach First also began to 
build a positive relationship with the teacher unions.  Although the headteacher 
unions endorsed Teach First early on, the teacher unions had not.  However, after 
CCCUC became Teach First’s training provider, Blandford brokered an agreement 
with the unions. 
 
Sonia Blandford was friendly with the head of policy at the NUT [John 
Bangs].  She got us a meeting with him, and he came up with a deal that, 
if we allowed the NUT to address our teachers during the training session 
in the summer, explaining the benefits of being a member of the union, 
they would give our teachers six months free membership.  And we said 
fine.  So that took the thunder out of the other unions that didn’t want 
support and wanted to denounce us.  
– Rona Kiley, Director of Business and Education, London First 
Interview, 30/04/2012 
 
Blandford said the same agreement was subsequently made with the NASUWT and 
the ATL, though the latter had already supported TfL early on.  Bangs said the NUT 
agreed to the arrangement after realizing “the importance of Teach First.” 
 
When we realized how big Teach First was going to be, we established a 
good relationship [and] had a number of meetings with the students at 
Teach First about the benefits of joining the [NUT]…  My personal view 
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is that we should have been far faster off the block [and initially] 
embraced it and made our criticisms from the inside…  [Subsequently] 
the Union took a strategic position, which was to basically say Teach 
First would settle down like any other initiative and we had to relate to 
it…. and be critical friends… But [internally] rather large numbers of 
[our members] didn’t like it, about 30% I think, and we had to deal with 
that.  So it’s a balancing act that you constantly have to do with 
initiatives that [some] don’t particularly like but are going to be there for 
the long-term. 
– John Bangs, Head of Education, NUT 
Interview, 3/10/2012 
 
Although Bangs convinced the NUT to accept Teach First, his support for the 
programme was mixed with a frustration at its consistent branding as an elite 
provider.  Thus, while the teacher unions accepted Teach First, criticisms remained 
but were voiced privately rather than publicly.   
Meanwhile, the creation of Teach First impacted some London training 
providers differently than others. 
 
The issue of Teach First taking places in the schools that traditional 
providers held… didn’t affect us at Institute as strongly as it affected 
some other providers because, before Teach First, we and King’s College 
London were the elite teacher training providers in London.  And 
therefore, schools were less likely to give up working with us...  We did 
lose some places but weren’t hit as much as some other places, which 
were very resentful of it...  It was quite lucky that there was a teacher 
shortage at the time, so that London could accommodate other providers.  
If that hadn’t been the case, I think there would have been a lot more 
blood on the carpet. 
–  Geoff Whitty, Director, the IOE 
Interview, 9/07/2012 
 
While the IOE may not have lost many trainee places in schools, it may have lost 
future students.  There was some speculation as to what extent trainees recruited onto 
Teach First were actually a new pool of graduates that would have not tried teaching 
in state schools otherwise, which was one of the ways the TTA had rationalized 
Teach First and “sold it” to the teacher training establishment. 
 
I was very amused at the beginning of Teach First when [in spring 2003] I 
was invited to a launch party they were having with Tony Blair [who 
subsequently] didn’t turn up, so it was a bit of a damp squid because all 
these trainees who were about to go off into schools were left talking over 
the canapés.  And I had this group [of participants] and I said “Oh well, 
what would you have done if you hadn’t gone to Teach First?’”… They 
said, “Oh well, we were going to apply to your institution to become 
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PGCE students.” … That did raise a legitimate fear in my mind – have I 
just been taken for a ride by saying this is a new group of people? … If 
these two I was talking to were typical, I really had let a cuckoo into the 
nest. 
– Geoff Whitty, Director, IOE 
Interview, 9/07/2012 
 
Nevertheless, with the teacher unions placated and more businesses pledging 
support for Teach First, the scheme officially started with 186 trainees in June of 
2003.  Notably, the recruits started their training despite the fact that Teach First was 
still not a legalized route into teaching.  The programme did not become an official 
teacher training route until August of 2003 when Parliament approved a secondary 
legislation change.  Marriott recalled that process was tedious, involving meetings 
with the TTA, DfES and ministers for over a year.  Ultimately, Parliament authorized 
Teach First by altering the national regulations for the GTP that required trainees to 
be aged 24 or older.  Since most Teach First participants were 21 or 22, “a sub-clause 
put in, to change [that]”, recalled Blandford, thus removing the specified age limit.  
In this way, Teach First became sanctioned as a new pathway into secondary school 
teaching.  The organization had successfully carved out a unique space in London’s 
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CHAPTER 9:  PHASE III: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
9.1 Policy Entrepreneurs, Networks, & Reinvention For Implementation 
 
Notable policy transfer scholars have argued that it is necessary to examine 
the implementation of a transferred policy in its new context to determine (1) how it 
is further reinvented and (2) whether it is ultimately “successful” in its new context 
or not.  As Evan and Davies’ (1999) declare, “The study of policy transfer is 
incomplete without an implementation perspective” (p.379).  As the last chapter 
illustrated, this could not be more true as Teach First continued to reinvent the TFA 
idea in particular ways during Phase III.  
Teach First’s implementation between August 2002 and June 2003 began 
initially with the formation of Teach First as an organization.  While this 
organization began promoting its mission and recruiting graduates, it slowly 
developed further as an inter-organizational programme – delivering teacher training 
and leadership development – between itself and CCCUC.  In this chapter, I consider 
the following questions related to policy entrepreneurs, networks, and reinvention 
during Phase III:   
 
• How did the role of TfL’s policy entrepreneurs and networks change as the 
process of transfer shifted into its implementation phase?  
 
• In what ways was Teach First reinvented further in the process of its 
implementation?   
 
•  How did institutional contexts shape significance and reinvention of Teach 
First in the education sector?   
 
To address these questions, I discuss ways in which Wigdortz and his colleagues 
became bicoleurs in the process of learning and constructing something new.  I 
further suggest this insight may extend our understanding of policy entrepreneurs 
and why and how reinvention occurs.  Next, I analyze the ways in which Wigdortz 
and his staff purposely reinvented aspects of TFA again in their construction of 
Teach First’s internal norms and the development to the scheme’s graduate 
recruitment model.   
The exploration of the third question requires a consideration of how, starting 
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in Phase II, Teach First epitomized the wider power struggle – between government 
and education professionals – over the form and content of teacher training.  Thus, in 
the final sections of this chapter, I take a look at the development of teacher training 
in England.  This institutional history provides insight into the third and final 
reinvention of the TFA transfer and highlights the way in which contextual factors 
constrain some ideas and actors while empowering others.  As a result, London 
schools, local teacher training providers, and teacher unions came to accept Teach 
First and prepare for the impact the scheme would have on the existing context. 
 
 
9.2  The Continuation and Evolution of TfL’s Policy Transfer Network  
  
In Phase II, Kiley and Wigdortz and their team pulled together an extensive 
network of supporters to advocate for the transfer of TFA/TfL to England.  After the 
scheme was approved, this core group of policy entrepreneurs (Kiley, Wigdortz, 
O’Brien, Cleverdon) became the managers and overseers of Teach First and its 
implementation.  Although Evans and Davies (1999) theorize that policy transfer 
networks are networks of advocates formed only to bring about a policy transfer after 
which they dissipate, this clearly did not happen in the case of Teach First.  The 
diverse and influential network whose members were bound in their support of TfL 
persisted and continued to grow.  However, the purpose and activities of the network 
seemed to shift after Teach First was launched.  At that point, the purpose of the 
network changed from one of political advocacy to one of providing resources and 
visible public support for the scheme.   
With this shift in purpose, some supporters, namely businesses, became more 
active than others for several reasons.  First, businesses had the time, relevant 
expertise, and a variety of resources with which they could help the new organization 
and staff.  In addition, business executives had closer ties with Teach First leaders as 
all originated from the corporate sector.  Furthermore, businesses had become 
involved with transferring scheme as a CSR initiative and hence planned to directly 
participate in it for the long-term.  A prime example of this commitment and 
involvement was Rob Habgood of Capital One who became a mentor for Wigdortz.  
An American expat himself, he was happy to share his experience in setting up 
Capital One’s services in the U.K. from scratch.  Other examples include: (1) Owens 
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who became the close mentor of the newly appointed CEO, Wigdortz, (2) 
Kirkpatrick who drew on his McKinsey experience to help Teach First plan 
recruitment strategies, and (3) May of BITC who spoke at universities during 
informational meetings to share his experiences of how one can transfer their school 
leadership into a career in the private sector.  All these individuals donated their time 
and expertise to help implement Teach First.  Such business leaders also volunteered 
to serve on Teach First’s advisory board. 
Meanwhile, other supporters remained enthusiastic supporters of the new 
scheme but were not involved in its day-to-day implementation.  Government leaders 
such as Adonis and Barber continued on with their jobs as did the philanthropists and 
union heads.  While remaining part of the network, these types of supporters did not 
play a large role in actually implementing Teach First.  The leading educationalists 
involved with TfL, Whitty and Totterdell, were also unofficially sidelined from 
participating in Teach First’s implementation.  Totterdell said he was not fully 
informed of developments between Teach First and the TTA and hence did not know 
until late fall 2002 that the TTA was holding an open bidding process to select Teach 
First’s teacher training partner.  His lack of awareness indicates how he was left in a 
somewhat peripheral position within Teach First’s network after its approval and 
launch in the summer.  Of course, the absence of the IOE’s involvement with Teach 
First stemmed from Wigdortz’s compromise with the TTA and temporarily distanced 
the new scheme from London’s teacher educators more generally.  With the loss of 
these networks, though, came the strategic advice and support from the TTA and 
DfES, both whom now had a stake in the new programme’s success.   
As the implementation of Teach First continued through Phase III, the 
network continued to grow and include leaders and organizations from across the 
capital.  Teach First staff and its board members continued to successfully recruit 
new business sponsors, placement schools, and philanthropic foundations into its 
evolving network of supporters.  In addition, Teach First’s selection of a university 
training partner brought a new set of professional networks into the fold of the 
growing, yet still exclusive, Teach First family.   
 In sum, the network of supporters brought together in Phase II to advocate for 
TfL did not dissolve after Teach First’s launch but continued to provide symbolic 
and material support to the new scheme.  The most supportive and involved was the 
corporate-based section of the policy transfer network.  This group supplied the 
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expertise, personnel, and other resources to help Teach First establish itself.  This 
affected the approaches Teach First took toward graduate recruitment as well as the 
models and practices that Wigdortz drew upon to internally manage the organization. 
 
 
9.3  Policy Entrepreneurs as the Bricoleurs of Implementation  
 
Teach First, as policy transfer proposed and ultimately implemented by policy 
entrepreneurs, appears to have a rather unconventional pattern and style of 
implementation compared with those that are government-led.  Policies brought 
about and implemented by governments usually involve experienced civil servants, 
established procedures, and coordination between center peripheral decision-makers 
and authorities.  However, the implementation of Teach First by policy entrepreneurs 
was a more improvisational process of creating and managing something new.  In 
Phase III, the role of Kiley and Wigdortz and their close allies shifted away from 
policy advocacy to creating and managing a new enterprise.  As a result, I propose 
the role of policy entrepreneurs shifts in the implementation phase of transfer from 
policy brokers to that of policy bricoleurs, or those who engage in bricolage.  
Defined by the Oxford dictionary as “construction or creation from a diverse range 
of available things”, the concept of bricolage captures the process of reinvention that 
Wigdortz engaged in with others to create Teach First and manage its graduate 
recruitment drive in the fall of 2002.    
Anthropologists have traditionally defined bricolage as making do with current 
resources and creating new forms and order from tools and materials at hand (Levi-
Strauss, 1966).  Scholars have then applied this term in different concepts.  Freeman 
(2007) proposed “epistemological bricolage” to explain how policy-makers (in his 
case public health officials) draw on various types of learning and domains of 
knowledge rooted in differing epistemologies to piece together coherent policies.  He 
highlights the social and situational elements of learning, stating: 
 
Knowledge is negotiated not only between actors and interests but 
between ways of thinking; more precisely, because it is debated between 
differently situated actors, with different interests and traditions, it is also 
built from their respective styles of thought.  Policy makers do this 
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The concept of epistemological bricolage is useful in describing how Teach First was 
not only argued for in Phase II by Kiley and Wigdortz but also implemented in Phase 
III.  Through these phases, actors were making decisions about TfL and Teach First 
through discussing and drawing on different types and sources of knowledge.  These 
forms and sources varied from Phase II to Phase III but included the McKinsey 
study, academic studies (i.e. Darling-Hammond 1994), TFA-produced statistics, 
first-hand accounts of TFA, personal hunches or affinities based on past experience, 
and the subjective evaluations of trusted peers.  However, I primarily focus on how 
Wigdortz managed the process of implementation and highlight that his policy-
oriented learning never ceased but drew upon and combined elements from his 
private sector experiences and others.  His learning could be seen as an ongoing 
episode of sensemaking as he and his colleagues continued to fashion new things 
from various resources and test the limits of what others thought was possible.   
 This last point helps me shift away from bricolage rooted in forms of learning 
and knowledge to bricolage as an ongoing process of constructing something new 
from that type of knowing.  Using the metaphor of bricolage helps capture just how 
Wigdortz and his supporters actually implemented Teach First with ideas, resources, 
and staff expertise drawn upon in an ad-hoc fashion from various sources.  This 
should not be surprising considering that the concepts of bricolage and 
entrepreneurship are already closely linked.  After all, entrepreneurs are considered 
pioneers, innovators, and inventors because they create or launch something new.  In 
adapting the term bricolage for the study of entrepreneurship, Baker and Nelson 
(2005) extended Levi-Strauss’s definition of “making do” to include the tendency for 
bricoleurs to “consciously and consistently” test “conventional limitations” (2005, 
pp.335–6).   Thus, one engaged in “entrepreneurial bricolage”… “creates something 
from nothing by rendering novel services that arise from their ability and willingness 
to refuse to enact commonly accepted limitations” (Baker & Nelson 2005, p.354).   
The emphasis here is on not only risk and potential gain, which are concepts usually 
with entrepreneur and entrepreneurship, but on starting “from nothing” and trying the 
unthinkable and being different.  Bricoleur and bricolage help deepen the concept of 
policy entrepreneurs who are not simply agents of policy transfer but may also be 
involved, or even leading, the reinvention of those ideas during implementation. 
 Again, drawing on observations from the story of Teach First, I am 
suggesting the policy entrepreneur’s role in the implementation of a transfer shifts 
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away from political advocacy.  Instead, the policy entrepreneur becomes involved in 
creating something new from nothing by combining elements from various sources 
in a process of bricolage.  Bricolage is involved in both learning and constructing.  
For instance, Perkmann and Spicer (2014) offer the concept of organizational 
bricolage, which they define as “a process whereby a new organization is shaped by 
drawing on organizational forms that are to hand in a particular environment” 
(p.1786).  The idea captures how Widortz and his colleagues engaged in constructing 
a new type of organization to carry out their programme.  Like TFA, they created 
Teach First as a social enterprise, a hybrid type of organization that pursued a 
charitable social mission through the use and application of business-inspired norms 
and practices.   
The main point here is that Wigdortz and his supporters brought Teach First 
into existence, not through the established ways and means that governments 
typically do, but by muddling through and making sense of what TFA was, what 
Teach First should be, and what others’ experiences can teach them about how to go 
about reaching their desired outcomes.  To manage implementation, Wigdortz and 
his staff creatively drew upon the resources available in their networks to pursue 
their goals.  They improvised their strategies and activities in response to cultural 
cues, regulatory pressures, and material constraints.  Within a very limited time 
scale, Teach First leaders blended and applied their knowledge, experiences, and 
resources in creative and effective ways.  Thus, the implementation of transferred 
ideas by policy entrepreneurs appears to be a messy process of bricolage, in both 
learning and constructing.   
Acting as a bricoleur also spurs reinvention during the implementation phase 
of the transfer process.  While Teach First was a transfer of TFA as essentially a two-
year programme that recruited top graduates to improve teaching in state schools, 
Wigdortz’s combined that model with ethos and strategies drawn from McKinsey.  
As discussed in Phase I, Wigdortz did not really consider TFA a complete model 
from which to build Teach First.  He indicated from the start that he saw his idea as 
an adaptation of McKinsey’s War for Talent philosophy which he had utilized during 
his previous consulting projects in Southeast Asia.  One interviewee expressed how 
Wigdortz and his McKinsey colleagues believed they were improving and expanding 
on the TFA through their use of McKinsey strategies.  Thus, Teach First was shaped 
by the views, choices, and experiences of Widgortz, the lead policy entrepreneur 
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managing the process of bricolage through which parts of TFA were transferred and 
other parts reinvented.  However, as he was still highly inexperienced and a relative 
newcomer to the U.K., Wigdortz relied heavily on those in the networks around him 
to advise and guide Teach First’s development, leading to the distinctly corporate 




9.4  Teach First Undergoes Further Reinvention Under Wigdortz 
 
9.4.1  Teach First’s Internal Management Emulated Corporate Norms 
  
In Phase III, the internal management of Teach First resembled private sector 
practices and rationales as Wigdortz and his former McKinsey colleagues structured 
and managed Teach First in ways they had experienced at McKinsey.  This was 
similar to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism 
through mimetic processes.  As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out, “Uncertainty 
is also a powerful force that encourages imitation” (p. 191).  With Teach First’s form 
and future uncertain, its inexperienced leaders emulated McKinsey practices and 
corporate models of organizing which were more accessible and familiar than TFA.  
As evident from accounts of staff members, a number of corporate-like structures 
and practices were put in place to manage the new organization. 
First, Wigdortz organized the staff in a tiered hierarchy based on roles and 
salaries with performance-related bonuses.  This structure was designed to reflect 
corporate norms more than effectively divide work as individuals’ job-related skills 
and experiences rarely coincided with these defined roles and staff reported sharing 
roles.  Of the dozen employees, only Salmon-Davies had relevant expertise and 
experience, gained at Arthur Anderson, for her position as co-director of graduate 
recruitment.  Additionally, the bonus-pay scheme tied to performance targets did 
little to motivate a staff that shared roles and were already committed to the 
organization for ideological reasons rather than financial ones.  Still, it is worth 
noting that Wigdortz retained the bonus-pay scheme in subsequent years, evidence 
that corporate emulation persisted despite a lack of evidence of its role in improving 
organizational performance or morale.  In other words, bonus-pay was another 
practice adopted to make Teach First appear more in the mold of corporate 
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organizations rather than public or charitable ones.   
At times, Teach First’s emulation of corporate sector norms had a somewhat 
negative effect on the staff.  Wigdortz and Wei’s McKinsey-esque management style 
confused and frustrated other staff members who were unfamiliar with those 
practices and often saw them as unnecessary or inappropriate.  It was especially, at 
times, off-putting to the mid-level managers of the staff – Marriott, Salmon-Davies, 
and Sherrin – who found Wigdortz’s management style unhelpful and divisive.  In 
contrast to upper management, these middle managers were all women, two of which 
had left their careers in the private sector out of disillusionment (Salmon-Davies and 
Marriott) and a third (Sherrin) who had come from the education sector after serving 
in TFA.  This stark contrast between the values, skills, and orientation of upper 
management and middle management, the latter with more job relevant experience 
than the former, led to some frustration and conflict within the staff.  Although 
Wigdortz and Wei were the leaders, the young inexperienced graduate recruiters 
relied on Salmon-Davies for direction.  Meanwhile, Sherrin and Marriott drew on 
their experiences at the TFA and the TTA respectively to recruit graduates and 
headteachers to participate in Teach First.  The practical experience and expertise of 
these women often complemented, but also at times clashed, with the overtly 
corporate-orientated values and exclusivity of Teach First.  
Another way in which Teach First demonstrated and emphasized its status 
and closeness to the corporate world and its elites was through its workspaces.  Like 
values and behavior, the buildings and spaces and even geographical locations in 
which an organization works communicate status and legitimacy (Vaujany & Vaast 
2014).  Teach First symbolically used prestigious corporate venues to launch its 
programme, to carry out graduate assessment centers, and to hold informational 
meetings with key stakeholders.  In one instance, Teach First held a meeting with 
headteachers and SHA union leaders to discuss the programme at Freshfields’ 
corporate law offices.  In addition, while Teach First staff initially worked in a 
temporary office in East Aldgate, within months they moved into a donated office 
space in a Canary Wharf skyscraper.  These locations not only signaled Teach First’s 
connections with the corporate sector but also relayed the impression of a well-
funded, prestigious, and influential outfit. 
In sum, Wigdortz and Wei’s admiration of the private sector and their 
familiarity with McKinsey significantly shaped the emergent organizational design 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 293 
of Teach First.  As leaders of the organization, the former McKinsey consultants 
imported structure, practices, and values derived from corporate consulting norms 
irrespective of the benefits or appropriateness of those logics for the operation and 
purpose of Teach First.  
 
9.4.2  Graduate Recruitment: Copying and Competing with Corporate Models 
 
During the fall of 2002, Wigdortz and his fellow managers planned Teach 
First’s graduate recruitment drive and modeled it on corporate sector practices.  They 
did so for several reasons: (1) to differentiate and distance Teach First from other 
teacher training routes, (2) to create an aura of selectivity and prestige around the 
new scheme, and (3) to compete with other corporate recruiters in attracting the 
“best” graduates.  At the same time, Teach First differentiated itself from other 
corporate graduates schemes by emphasizing the importance of its social mission.  
Notably, Teach First established its status and appeal among elite university 
graduates, not through likening itself to TFA (which probably few, if any, U.K. 
graduates had heard of), but primarily through its association and links with the 
corporate sector.  Thus, while TFA was often referenced as the successful example 
on which TfL was modeled on in Phase II, this was not the case during 
implementation.  In Phase III, references to TFA in marketing the programme to 
graduates were used sparingly and mainly for the purposes of demonstrating the 
inspirational success of such a scheme.  Instead, Teach First’s messages during 
graduate recruitment emphasized its corporate affiliations and its practices in order to 
establish itself as a prestigious programme.   
How exactly did Teach First reinvent its graduate recruitment to attract 
graduates from top universities onto its scheme?  First, Teach First emulated 
corporate practices of aggressively recruiting graduates to draw in a large pool of 
applicants.  Persuading a sizable pool of graduates to apply was especially important 
as low selection ratios raised institutions’ claims to be highly selective.  Furthermore, 
because Teach First needed to appeal to specifically top graduates who would not 
have otherwise considered teaching (as required by the TTA), the views and values 
of that demographic became the focal point around which Teach First’s messaging 
was crafted.  Teach First was positioned to target those who were considering a 
career in the corporate sector – or the field of professional service firms in such areas 
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as finance, consulting, and accounting.  This led Teach First to deliberately avoid 
using teaching as a “hook” to attract the attention of graduates to its programme (as 
Wei pointed out) and, instead, positioned the scheme as a leadership programme for 
career-oriented high fliers in its marketing materials.  Teach First aimed to convince 
graduates it was a not a route into teaching but a route through teaching and a 
programme through which they could build upon their experiences and develop new 
skills while leaving their choice of career still very much open.  
Once graduates were interested and in attendance at a Teach First 
informational meeting, the staff presented Teach First as a compelling and more 
detailed proposition that addressed top graduates’ needs for career advancement 
along with their desire to help others.  This strategy again reflected McKinsey’s War 
for Talent philosophy Wigdortz had initially cited as inspiration in coming up with 
the idea for the scheme.  This McKinsey-espoused “mind-set” urged companies to 
seek out the most talented managers and lure such leaders to one’s company through 
a “winning employee-value proposition”.  Wigdortz saw this as the primary purpose 
of Teach First and the way in which graduates would be lured to help disadvantaged 
schools.   
In reality, recruiting the best talent was especially critical not just to help 
schools but for Teach First because, as Kirkpatrick pointed out, Teach First was a 
new organization with no reputation and its success or failure would be based on the 
quality of graduates recruited in its first year.  Kirkpatrick’s point was touching upon 
the fact that Teach First had only provisional legitimacy, supplied initially by the 
backing of government and the business community, to establish itself.  To fully 
establish and sustain itself, Teach First needed to succeed in recruiting what was 
considered the “high quality” graduates, widely understood to mean those with a first 
or 2:1 from one of the U.K.’s most selective universities.  Whether Teach First could 
attract such exceptional individuals, as it had promised participating schools, would 
determine the ultimate fate of the scheme.  Thus, Teach First’s graduate recruitment 
was significantly important in establishing the programme’s legitimacy, conditioning 
the expectations of its participants, and shaping its public image.   
While Teach First highlighted its partnership with elite blue chip companies 
in their marketing, they also emulated corporate practices in the way they assessed 
candidates.  Salmon-Davies and Kirkpatrick, drawing on their expertise from Arthur 
Anderson and McKinsey respectively, designed its selection criteria and assessment 
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model that resembled corporate models of graduate recruitment.  The model did this 
by assessing applicants in batches at one-day “assessment centers” during which 
applicants complete multiple tasks.  Through these mechanisms, Teach First signaled 
its claim to be highly selective and seeking only the most talented graduate leaders. 
Although aiming to emulate and compete with other corporate recruiters, 
Teach First had a comparatively small budget.  This prompted Wigdortz to hire 
recent graduates of elite universities to minimize salaries while also taking advantage 
of their social networking to spread awareness of the scheme.  Teach First also 
utilized venues of corporate sponsors for official events.  Thus, in many ways, Teach 
First’s limited resources shaped the process of recruitment, prompting the staff to 
come up with creative and symbolic ways to enhance its image among elite 
graduates.  
The absence of an official university training partner for most of the graduate 
recruitment season also encouraged Teach First to emulate and reference the 
corporate sector.  With no university set to deliver the programme’s training until 
late January 2003, Teach First’s recruiting messages remained silent and/or vague on 
the topic, which had the result of effectively disconnecting and distancing of Teach 
First from traditional ITT.  Had an accredited provider already been selected for the 
scheme, a representative from that institution would likely have participated in Teach 
First informational meetings on campuses to detail how the teacher training aspect of 
the scheme would work.  In absence of such a representative, Teach First was 
perceived as a very different type of programme from convention ITT routes and a 
scheme in which learning to teach was only one element.  The lack of a university 
training partner also contributed to graduates’ and Wigdortz’s view of Teach First as 
its own programme and brand, irrespective of the accredited training provider.  This 
foreshadowed and later created conflicts between Teach First and CCCUC as both 
competed to control the programme’s messages and training elements. 
 
 
9.5  Teach First and Teacher Education in England 
 
As Teach First recruited graduates, Wigdortz also participated in the TTA’s 
bidding process to select an accredited training partner.  To understand the 
significance of the bidding process, I turn my focus to the context into which Teach 
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First was set to operate – that of initial teacher training (ITT).  In this section, I 
review the radically changing field of teacher training over the two decades prior to 
Teach First’s emergence.  The changing patterns of power, policy, and practices 
within this sector provide both the context and insight into why it was challenging 
for Teach First to select its own teacher training partner and model and what that 
choice represented. I then proceed to analyze how this context shaped the meaning 
and outcomes of the bidding. 
 
 
9.5.1  A History of Radical Change in Teacher Education in England   
 
Teacher Education Before Thatcher   
In England, in the decades prior to the 1980s, teachers and teacher educators 
were widely considered “experts” and enjoyed relative independence and autonomy 
in their professional work (Furlong et al. 2000).  During this time, individuals were 
prepared to become teachers through either a three- or four-year Bachelor of 
Education degree or a one-year PGCE programme offered by higher education 
institutions.  The content of these programmes was diverse and grounded in theory 
from sociology, history, psychology, and philosophy.  However, criticism of the 
education establishment’s perceived progressive ideals and espousal of child-centred 
pedagogy grew in late 1960s and 1970s and teachers and schooling became the 
centre of national debates following Prime Minister Callaghan’s Ruskin speech in 
1976 (Ball 1990).  Upon election of the Conservatives in 1979, the Thatcher 
government gradually took the lead in enacting policy to change initial teacher 
education (ITE) to curtail the autonomy of the teaching profession and make its 
training more practical and accountable.   
 
Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE)  
The first significant reform to teacher education was the creation of the 
Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (CATE) in 1984.  CATE 
oversaw the new mandatory accreditation of ITE programmes and was ground-
breaking because it established the right of the Education Secretary to be directly 
involved shaping teacher education programmes.  In creating the QTS award, which 
was separate from an academic degree, CATE became the gatekeeper of entry into 
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the teaching profession.  Through CATE, the government acquired the “capacity to 
control directly the nature of teacher education by scrutinizing courses of initial 
teacher training… and deciding up on their appropriateness in terms of criteria 
defined by central government” (Barton et al. 1993, p.306).  Thus, the establishment 
of CATE marked the end of higher education’s autonomy in the provision of ITE 
(Furlong et al. 2000).  From 1984 to 1994, the criteria set by the government for 
CATE accreditation drastically reshaped ITE by requiring half of a student’s training 
be school-based and requiring “ITT” to focus on subject-specific and practical 
courses (Furlong 1994).  
 
Introduction of “Non-Conventional” Routes into Teaching   
During the mid-1980s, while government regulations for ITT became more 
prescriptive, advocates for the deregulation of teacher education in England gained 
considerable influence over policy (Furlong 2002, p.23).  From this privileged 
position, they challenged what they perceived as “producer capture” in teacher 
education, claiming that institutions providing ITE served and protected their own 
interests and spread a progressive and anti-intellectual ideology that undermined 
student achievement (Furlong 2002; Ball 1990).  As a result, the government enacted 
two new experimental teacher training schemes in the early 1990s: (1) the articled 
teacher scheme (ATS), which limited the involvement of higher education 
institutions in teacher training, and (2) the licensed teacher scheme (LTS), which 
potentially eliminated their role altogether.  Recruitment for these school-based 
schemes also targeted new populations for teacher recruitment while testing out new 
approaches to training.   
The ATS was a new two-year PGCE programme jointly managed by local 
education authorities (LEAs) and higher education institutions through which 
trainees spent 80 percent of their time in schools.  The route began in 1990 with 410 
trainees and was well funded by government.  Later, evaluations revealed the ATS 
neither attracted a new pool of graduates nor produced better teachers than the 
conventional PGCE.   Yet the ATS cost twice as much as a PGCE to run, and so the 
scheme was discontinued after 1994.   
The LTS, meanwhile, allowed schools to directly hire unqualified but 
“mature” individuals (over age 24) with a minimum of two years in higher education 
to be full-time teachers while receiving training on-the-job.  How that training was 
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provided – either through the school, LEA, or higher education – was decided by 
LEAs or governors of grant-maintained schools.  After two years, licensed teachers 
were then assessed for readiness for QTS.  Initially, LEAs supported LTS as a way to 
deal with teacher shortages although teacher unions opposed it on the grounds that it 
allowed non-graduates into the profession (Galvin 1994).  Nevertheless, the LTS was 
set up in 1990, and within two years the government had issued approximately 1,000 
licences to teachers hired by roughly 60 LEAs.  However, because the type of 
training provided varied widely as did its quality, the LTS was largely discontinued 
after 1994 and did not challenge the universities’ role in teacher training (Furlong et 
al. 2000).   
 
More Radical Regulatory Reforms 
Lessons from these experimental routes led the Conservative government to 
enact another wave of radical and more confrontational reforms from 1992-1995. 
During this time, government increased trainees’ required time in schools to at least 
66 percent, gave schools the right to be involved in designing the training, and 
defined the terms on which schools and universities were to collaborate.  In addition, 
lessons drawn from the LTS and ATS led to the development of School-Centred 
Initial Teacher Training (SCITT) in 1993 through which consortia of schools 
received direct funding from government to run employment-based teacher training.  
School consortium either became accredited themselves or hired higher education 
faculty to train their supernumerary trainee teachers.  During this period, government 
symbolically shifted to using the term “initial teacher training” (ITT) to describe 
ITE.  While reforms bred some resistance among many teacher educators, 1994 
brought another major reform to manage the sector – the TTA. 
 
The Establishment of TTA  
The most radical development in ITT came in 1994 when the Conservative 
government abolished CATE and established the Teacher Training Agency (TTA), 
arguing that because SCITTs existed outside existing funding frameworks, a new 
agency was needed to manage the funding and evaluation of all ITT programmes. 
Thus, the TTA was given the responsibility for managing the recruitment and supply 
of new teachers as well as the funding and accreditation of all ITT programmes.  
Still, the TTA was a highly controversial agency as it formally separated the funding 
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of ITT in England from the funding of other forms of higher education, introduced 
market competition, and labelled universities and colleges offering ITE programmes 
as “service providers”.   
From its inception, the TTA was charged with promoting SCITTs (though 
evaluations indicated they were not particularly effective).  In addition, the TTA 
soon linked its judgments of ITT programmes (and hence the allocating of trainees 
and funding to providers) to Ofsted inspection data.  With the appointment of Chris 
Woodhead as head of Ofsted in 1994, the relationship between ITT providers on one 
and Ofsted and TTA on the other became quite confrontational.  Inspections were 
carried out frequently, and inspection frameworks gradually became more detailed, 
prescriptive, and atomistic.  Teacher educators complained Ofsted’s inspections were 
“heavy handed”, “invasive”, and held them accountable for the quality of training in 
schools over which they often had very little control (Furlong et al. 2000, p.148).  
Thus, the TTA/Ofsted criteria for appraisal and funding remained contested but ITT 
providers had little choice but to comply.   
 
The TTA Under New Labour 
With continued support from New Labour, the TTA continued its dual pursuit 
of increasing the teacher supply while raising the quality of training.  To do so, the 
TTA developed employment-based initial teacher training (EBITT), which most 
notably included the Graduate Teacher Programme (GTP).  Through the GTP, 
graduates were paid to train on-the-job while supervised by qualified teachers in a 
specific school, although in many cases higher education institutions also oversaw 
the training.  First introduced in 1997, the GTP was largely seen as successful and 
expanded to 3,000 places in 2002 (Tabberer 2003, p.5).  The TTA also introduced 
the Registered Teacher Programme through which non-graduates with two years of 
higher education agreed to complete a degree while working and training in schools. 
With the appointment of Tabberer as head of the TTA in 2000, such invasive 
controls were gradually relaxed and, in 2002, government scrapped its prescriptive 
1997 ITT curriculum in favour of more general guidelines (Furlong et al. 2000).  It is 
important to note that the TTA also promoted the idea, espoused by government and 
certain academics such as David Hargreaves, that classroom practice needed to be 
based upon research of “what works”, much like the American model of medical 
research (Hulme 2006).  Thus, the TTA began funding classroom-based research 
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projects for a select number of teachers to back its goal of having teaching standards 
and practices that were “evidence-based” unlike university research which was 
considered more critical than reconstructive (Young 1998, p.56).  
Overall, the TTA represented a “transformation in the mode of governance of 
teacher education” (Mahony & Hextall 1997a, p.269) and reflected the market-based 
orientation and neo-liberal thinking behind new public management reforms 
occurring across other sectors during the 1990s (Bevir et al. 2003).  While the market 
for teacher training was being opened to new providers and new types of courses 
promoted, the TTA acted as the gatekeeper into the profession by determining the 
performance-based competencies, or “standards”, for the award of QTS.  The TTA 
enforced its QTS standards through funding frameworks linked to Ofsted 
inspections.  In this way, the TTA promoted competition among providers while 
attempting to standardize the content, structure, and outcomes of ITT programmes.   
Thus, by 2002, the TTA was a powerful agency that affected nearly every 
aspect of teaching and represented a very different view of teaching when compared 
to the profession as it existed in the 1960s and 1970s.  As Hextall and Mahoney 
(1997a) noted, the TTA was “potentially so powerful” that many teacher educators 
“were not ‘inclined to make waves’” when asked to consult for it and described the 
agency’s power as “both ‘seductive’ and ‘threatening’ at one and the same time” 
(p.273).  Hextall and Mahoney (1997a; 1997b; 2000) also argued that the TTA’s 
work often lacked transparency, skirted democratic accountability, and ignored 
issues of social justice.  Nevertheless, the agency was supported by New Labour and 
considered largely successful for increasing teacher supply and driving up quality 
among training providers.  With this understanding of the realities of England’s 
teacher training context, I now return to examining the case of Teach First and the 
scheme’s need for an accredited teacher training partner and a training model. 
 
 
9.5.2 The Politics of Innovation in Teacher Training 
 
 By 2002, innovation within ITT had become a tricky business for teacher 
educators.  Policy-makers and the TTA were the only ones allowed to experiment 
with new policies to serve their particular goals and agenda.  Such innovation in ITT 
during New Labour’s first term included the Fast Track Scheme and the National 
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College and School Leadership.  In 1997, the TTA also created a national ITT 
curriculum by holding a consultation process with professionals in the field whose 
input helped construct and validate it.  Thus, most innovation was essentially 
government-led, either handed down from above or directly sponsored by those in 
authority.  
  In contrast, attempts by teacher educators to exercise agency and some 
autonomy in their work to innovate were stifled.  As Furlong (2002, p.24) noted, the 
chance for educationalists to experiment was limited due to the frequency and 
dominance of new regulations: 
 
During the 1990s, most teacher educators found practical course reform a 
constant and all-consuming activity.  Given that change was imposed, 
there was little time for – or even point in – debate.  However, they also 
saw course design as an important arena of agency… In reality though… 
such agency has been progressively curtailed.  In recent years, the form 
and content of many courses has become increasingly bureaucratic and 
the opportunities for influencing the detail of what goes on in school – 
where student teachers now spend so much of their time – is limited. 
 
Thus, independent innovation led by educationalists had largely been curtained and 
discouraged through the highly prescriptive regulations of the TTA and enforced 
through Ofsted inspections.  The government’s increasing control over the content, 
structure, and funding of teaching education also made university training providers 
constantly aware and more responsive to new policy. 
 Meanwhile, those education professionals who engaged with the TTA were 
rewarded.  Education leaders and heads of ITT programmes who partnered with the 
TTA in government-led innovations – such as building new training routes or 
programmes (i.e., GTP, Fast Track) – discovered there were benefits in doing so.  
Such education leaders could gain more funding, additional visibility and influence, 
and access to wider professional networks through the TTA.   Still, such guided 
innovation rarely provided the autonomy many teacher educators desired and had 
enjoyed before the creation of the TTA or CATE.  In this way, the TTA represented 
a powerful body that constrained their agency.  Yet, for those willing to embrace its 
policies, the TTA provided advancement for institutions and, in some cases, career 
empowerment for individuals.  
Teach First represented an attempt to independently innovate in the ITT 
sector.  It clearly met with staunch resistance from the TTA in Phase II because 
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Wigdortz’s original plan, and later Totterdell’s model, challenged the rules and 
authority of the TTA.  While Whitty had voiced his support for the idea, Totterdell 
took the professional risk by creating something new.  The TTA, meanwhile, had 
built its power and authority for the past eight years on raising the quality of training 
and fostering competition in ITT through ensuring compliance with its imposed 
standards.   
Thus, the underlying tension in the field between educators wanting to have 
autonomy and innovate and the TTA wanting regulatory control and conformity was 
inescapably present in Phase II and III negotiations over TfL’s training model.  The 
TTA became determined to “get compliance” while Totterdell was set on not 
creating an elite model of other training routes but in offering a new paradigm and 
model of training.  Meanwhile, Wigdortz and Kiley were apparently unaware of 
those underlying tensions and power dynamics, which were only heightened by the 
high level of status and influence the IOE enjoyed.  Unlike other training providers, 
the IOE did not always embrace the government’s ideas or work enthusiastically 
with the TTA, although they still complied with regulations.  Rather, the IOE was 
seen as acting as the vanguard of the public’s trust, fighting for teachers’ and 
students’ interests against potentially harmful, politically-driven policy reform.  To 
help shape policy, its leadership generally (and Whitty in particular) fostered a closer 
relationship with the government of the day through policy insiders.  Thus the IOE 
represented, in some ways, competition with the TTA for influence over government 
policy.   
Teach First was clearly an example of this competition for government 
influence between the IOE and TTA.  Although the TTA was an independent, non-
governmental agency with its own internal board, and thus did not simply rely on the 
DfES or ministers for their policy or implementation decisions, the Education 
Secretary retained ultimate ministerial authority for the agency and its funding.  
Thus, in their studies of the TTA, Hextall and Mahoney (2000, p.130) found the 
relationship between “the Minister, Chair, Chief Executive, senior Civil Servants and 
TTA officers” rather “opaque”.  They reported TTA officers having conflicting 
loyalties between the agency and the DfES and using considerable discretion in their 
decision-making.  At times, direct influence from the DfES and/or minister in TTA 
policy decisions was evident and vice versa.  However, with Barber as one of New 
Labour education policy architects, the IOE’s influence potentially loomed large. 
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With leading government officials enamoured with the TfL/IOE proposal as a 
transfer of TFA, the TTA was forced to respond by co-opting the initiative and 
making it a government-TTA sponsored innovation.  Thus, the IOE’s position 
regarding Teach First had been weakened late in Phase II when Wigdortz made 
compromises on the model with Tabberer, agreeing to comply with QTS frameworks 
and hold an open bidding process to select a training provider.  In doing so, Tabberer 
invoked the rationale of market models and appeals to fairness among training 
providers.   
The issue of intellectual property rights, specifically in regard to Totterdell’s 
work on the training model, was not considered.  This was likely because (1) the 
TTA planned to set the criteria for the model and (2) Wigdortz clearly felt ownership 
of the idea for the scheme, and (3) he and Kiley envisioned the IOE still partnering 
with the scheme in the future.  However, the fact remained that Totterdell’s trainng 
model appealed to Timms and Adonis and helped secure DfES approval and funding 
for the scheme.  In addition, Wigdortz retained a number of elements of Totterdell’s 
training framework, such as the “brick” model of teams.  Yet, Totterdell found 
himself and the IOE ostracized from TfL after the spring, and his efforts and ideas 
went largely unacknowleged.   
This is illustrative of how difficult it was to innovate in ITT with the TTA 
and government closely regulating the field.  While Totterdell understood 
Wigdortz’s compromises enabled the scheme to launch by gaining the TTA’s 
approval, he had hoped to have more freedom to experiment with a new model.  
There was still a possibility of doing so in the upcoming bidding process for Teach 
First’s training partner.  Hence, Wigdortz and Tabberer’s negotiations over the 
design and control of Teach First’s teacher training model were only temporarily 
alleviated in Phase II.  Disagreements over the scheme’s training model came back to 
haunt the TTA and Teach First in Phase III as the bidding process got under way.   
 
 
9.5.3  First Round of Bidding:  IOE Bid Fails, Other London Providers Abstain 
 
In the initial bidding round, Totterdell again aimed to follow his original plan 
as much as possible while satisfying the bidding criteria of the TTA. His unique 
perspective on how elite graduates should be trained from the classroom was derived 
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from his untraditional background as a former soldier and his highly philosophic 
orientation toward his work.  As a seasoned educator who had witnessed the changes 
in the field over the past two decades, Totterdell saw the TTA’s rules as potentially 
bendable.  He had participated in government-led innovation before, such as Fast 
Track, and did not see the TTA’s authority as indisputable.   
However, Totterdell faced unanticipated challenges in coming up with a 
training model for the TTA’s bidding process.  In the fall of 2002, the IOE found 
itself facing internal institutional challenges that forced Totterdell to modify his 
original idea.   First, the IOE identified a shortfall in its funding, a limitation that 
shaped decisions on personnel and project allocations in the foreseeable future.  
Secondly, Totterdell’s staff felt pressure to carry out more research to prove “they 
could hold their own” (Totterdell Interview, 24/01/2015).  This pressure stemmed 
from the release of the result of the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)18, 
which gave the IOE a strong rating but indicated that teacher educators had not 
contributed significantly to the result.  Consequently, Totterdell’s staff of teacher 
educators was not able or willing to commit their summer to working with Teach 
First as they felt the pressure to produce more research.  This all meant that 
Totterdell’s internal resources and authority were limited as his department had to 
address wider institutional pressures related to research and funding rather than 
pursue risky and potentially costly innovations.  With these constraints, Totterdell’s 
bid for Teach First morphed into an unrecognizable model that both the TTA and 
Teach First found unsatisfactory. 
However, when none of the other training providers in London bid for the 
Teach First contract, the TTA found itself in a bind as to how to implement the 
scheme with no training provider and only seven months before it was set to start.  
Why the nine other London training providers did not bid for the contract is 
interesting and seems to reflect the ongoing tensions between university providers 
and the TTA at the time.  While Totterdell suggested the model specifications set by 
the TTA were unrealistic, the former head of ITE at Roehampton mentioned there 
                                                        
18 The RAE, first set up in 1986 under a different name, had become an intense competition, 
particularly among the research-intensive Russell Group universities, and occurred roughly every five 
years.  RAE ratings were based primarily on the strength, or quality (and not quantity), of published 
academic papers, and had wide ranging effects on universities (Bence & Oppenheim 2005).  Scores 
largely determined institutions’ future funding levels and prestige rankings and shaped universities’ 
internal priorities, hiring practices, and academic careers (MacLeod & Major 2000). 
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was a quiet collective agreement between the heads of local training providers that 
none would bid in hopes that the Teach First programme would then not be 
implemented.  Considering Teach First represented 200 extra training places for 
providers, a sizable amount for any programme, the decision not to apply for the 
contract indicates how disapproving lead teacher educators were of Teach First and 
their disinterest in implementing its model as specified by the TTA.  Perhaps other 
training providers also felt the need, like the IOE, to prioritize other organizational 
needs in response to external environmental pressures and limited resources.   
Regardless, it is clear that the TTA’s bidding process was less about enacting 
quasi-markets to encourage competition and efficiency and more about ensuring 
conformity through regulation.  The fact that bidding was confidential only added to 
the difficulty of deciphering which goals were being furthered and how judging was 
taking place.   Overall, what became evident in the outcome of the first bid was that 
the highly-regulated field of teacher training was still not particularly conducive to 
innovation or rewarding of such professional experimentation.   
At the heart of the bidding process was also a struggle over what teachers 
should know and be able to do.  The TTA had arguably promoted a technicist view 
of teachers through its prescriptive regulations on how and what to teach in ITT and 
by making ITT a primarily school-based affair.  This had promoted a view of 
teachers as skilled practitioners that were expected to implement in their classroom 
“what works” (Hextall & Mahony 2000).  Meanwhile, most teacher educators 
favoured a professional view of teaching that involved more reflective forms of 
practice based. Such reflective professionalism relied on a diversity of theoretical 
perspectives for teachers to understand the contexts affecting their classrooms and 
adapt practices to the needs of a range of pupils and situations.  In response to past 
criticism that its standards enforced a technicist view of teachers, the TTA took the 
position that its regulations ensured the “mastery of one’s craft” which “releases 
creativity and potential … not stifle it” (Hextall & Mahony 2000, p.336).   
The tension between these two conceptions of teachers was at the core of 
Totterdell’s struggle with the TTA.  He not only wanted to have the autonomy to 
experiment but also believed that teachers needed diverse research and theoretical 
perspectives to make informed professional judgements and have a significant 
impact in the classroom.  Hence, he wanted trainees to be exposed to the IOE’s rich 
research tradition.  He believed they should understand competing perspectives 
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within the field and complete academic work for a PGCE or a master’s degree.  His 
view was influenced by his own experience as a teacher trainee at the IOE in the 
early 1980s, before government intervention in the field, which he credited with 
training teachers to be “a mini-scholar in your own right in the classroom” 
(Interview, 23/11/2012).  Totterdell’s insistence on the importance of knowing and 
utilizing theory to empower teachers was reminiscent of Ball’s (1995) impassioned 
argument for theory to be reintroduced into the ITT curriculum.   
 
Theory is a vehicle for “thinking otherwise”; it is a platform for 
“outrageous hypotheses” and for “unleashing criticism” … It offers a 
language for challenge, and modes of thought, other than those articulated 
for us by dominant others.  It provides a language of rigour and irony 
rather than contingency.  The purpose of such theory is to de-familiarise 
present practices and categories, to make them seem less self-evident and 
necessary, and to open up spaces for the invention of new forms of 
experience.  
(Ball 1995, p.226) 
 
Thus, for Totterdell, a model that offered trainees exposure to research and theory 
provided them more perspectives with which to make more reflective professional 
judgments.  Such training would also enable them to reconsider and challenge 
current policies and practices as well as experiment and innovate. 
However, the TTA and government both had publicly expressed their view 
that theoretical research was of little practical value to the training of new teachers.  
Thus, Teach First’s collaboration with the TTA led to a bidding specification that 
had an overtly technicist approach to training and did not promote the academic, 
multi-disciplinary study of education.  Ironically, Teach First’s minimal pre-service 
training already represented and promoted teachers as technicians.  The fact that 
Teach First recruits would only be provided a six-week training course before 
becoming full-time classroom teachers would inevitably lead them to prioritize 
technical knowledge and practical advice over academic perspectives and theoretical 
reflection.  Relatedly, as trainees took up full-time teaching posts after the summer, 
the role of the university and academic study of education was more limited than 
most other schemes such as the GTP whose trainees were supernumerary.  
In addition to having limited time for university-based training (a summer), 
Teach First represented rather technicist views of teaching because its leaders 
believed leadership and management training along with practical on-the-job 
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experience and mentoring in schools was sufficient for transforming graduates into 
effective teachers.  This is evident by Wei’s comment that “would have loved the 
teacher training to be done directly… rather than out-sourced” [Interview, 12/08/12].  
Thus, Wei would have preferred to train participants in-house using “practitioners” 
as many private companies (including McKinsey) and TFA did, but Wei admitted 
this could not happen because of TTA regulations.  Here, the example of TFA is 
notable as Kopp ceased to use teacher educators in its summer training after its first 
year.  Kopp had come to the conclusion that beginning teachers needed practical 
training, not theory, to begin teaching (Kopp 1992; 1994; 2001).  Thus, TFA 
developed a highly practice-oriented training institute mostly staffed by TFA alumni 
who typically had only a few years of training in the classroom.  TFA thus designed 
and controlled all of its initial training and was able to promote its mission-oriented, 
data-driven, rather technicist views of teaching and learning.  In this sense, TFA’s 
training was a model Wigdortz and Wei wished they could have emulated. 
Additional evidence of the teacher-as-technicist orientation of Teach First’s 
leadership, again as expressed by Wei, was the notion that graduates with elite 
degrees needed no traditional teacher training as exemplified by the hiring practices 
of the private schools, which often recruited teachers directly from Oxbridge.  
Hence, while Teach First’s leaders certainly valued academic learning and selected 
high achieving graduates for the programme, Teach First viewed learning to teach 
more about delivery of curriculum in digestible form for pupils than a complex 
process of long-term professional development.  This was an understandable view 
given Teach First’s premise that it recruited participants who were not planning to 
become career teachers.  However, it should be noted that technicist models are 
typically viewed as disempowering, taking away teachers’ autonomy and own 
professional judgment (Dadds 1997).  Yet, Teach First’s leaders sought to empower 
trainees professionally by promoting an exclusive espirit de corps among its cohorts.  
This espirit de corps was expected to boost Teach First teachers’ morale and set them 
apart from traditional teachers.  Later on, Teach First’s technicist views of teaching 
along with its managerial notions of leadership in the classroom clashed with some 
of the messages and views underpinning CCCUC’s training, leading to tension and 
mixed messages within the programme’s summer institute. 
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9.5.4  Second Round of Bidding:  A Final Reinvention  
 
When no accredited training partner was selected after the initial bidding 
process, the TTA decided to put the Teach First contract up for a second round of 
bidding.  To help ensure that outcomes differed this time, the TTA took the extra 
step of calling CCCUC to invite Blandford to bid.  Whether the TTA called other 
providers as well is unknown, but what was evident at the time was that Blandford 
had good standing with the TTA, due to her previous collaborations with the agency.  
In contrast to Totterdell, who was willing to challenge the TTA, Blandford had a 
record of setting up new partnerships with the TTA and outwardly respecting both its 
policies and its authority.   
As Dean of CCCUC, Blandford lacked the influential London networks and 
high status of the IOE’s leaders, and so she was more pragmatic in her approach to 
the TTA’s invitation to bid.  She saw the scheme as an opportunity to expand the 
work and status of CCCUC while continuing to advance her own career.  She also 
viewed Teach First as an opportunity to help London’s disadvantaged pupils, which 
she herself had been.  She recognized the TTA needed a reliable training provider 
and that Wigdortz’s organization had already recruited nearly 100 top graduates but 
had no experience or expertise in training teachers.  To Blandford, this was a 
worthwhile opportunity.  Consequently, she decided to put forth a training bid, which 
she produced in a matter of a few weeks.  As a result, her training model closely 
resembled a hybrid of existing models with supplemental training in educational 
leadership.  While she, like Totterdell, had wanted to offer trainees a PGCE, she 
accepted this was simply not a possibility the TTA would consider and moved on.  
Blandford’s thinking reflected her priorities as a dean of CCCUC.  She was 
willing to make such compromises and conform to regulatory stipulations to ensure 
she raised the profile of CCCUC.  The university college was a relatively small but 
expanding institution 60 miles outside of London.  Unlike the IOE/University 
College London, CCCUC was not a member of the elite research-led Russell Group 
of universities.  CCCUC’s work was rooted more deeply in teacher training than 
research, leading it to receive a mid-level ranking of 3a from RAE in 2001.  Because 
CCCUC did not compete, in research terms, with more elite universities, Blandford 
was able to focus more on building new routes and improving the ITT provision at 
CCCUC.   
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It is worth noting though that Blandford and Totterdell both became teachers 
in the 1980s and as university educators and researchers in the 1990s, they 
experienced the transformation of the ITE first-hand.  The models of teacher training 
they oversaw were very different training than they themselves had experienced.  
Their personal responses and beliefs about that change clearly differed, and 
Totterdell seemed to become somewhat of a maverick within the field.  He was less 
concerned with the pragmatics of policy-making, restoring past ITE models, or 
institution-building.  His professional interest was in reconceptualising ITT for the 
greater good of the field (Totterdell & Lambert 1998).  Blandford, meanwhile, was 
more focused on pursing organizational goals and innovating within the current 
norms and regulations of the sector. 
In the end, CCCUC’s bid aligned with the TTA’s specifications, and 
Blandford won the Teach First contract in round two.  Wigdortz and his staff were 
initially disappointed with having an institution with a weaker reputation (or 
“brand”) and moving the training to Canterbury.  Their concerns regarding status and 
logistics are further evidence of their lack of awareness of the battles raging in ITT.  
They were seemingly unaware of the ongoing institutional tensions and political 
conflicts over the nature of teaching, the role of the university and research in 
training, and the authority of the TTA.  Marriott had only vaguely understood the 
deep-rooted struggle and recalled that the TTA and DfES viewed the IOE as the most 
undesirable choice of partners for Teach First.  It was  “something institutional”, she 
recalled, and rooted in the past.  Meanwhile, the whole bidding process demonstrated 
that these were tensions that were not going away despite the dominant power of 
government’s regulation in steering ITT in England.  Histories – both institutional 
and organizational – mattered and shaped how the training model of Teach First was 
reinvented in the process of implementation.  The scheme’s training model was not 
based on neither TFA nor Totterdell’s theories but improvised by Blandford from 
parts of other existing programmes at CCCUC.   
 
 
9.5.5  The Responses of Schools to Teach First 
 
 Throughout Teach First’s graduate recruitment drive and the TTA bidding 
process, headteachers of disadvantaged London schools were reluctant to become 
involved in Teach First.  Despite the concerted efforts of Marriott, Kiley, and 
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Sherrin, Teach First was not able to sign up many placement schools for its trainees.  
Although many schools clearly needed more teachers, the untested, American-
inspired, corporate-backed scheme did not elicit confidence among school leaders.  
This attitude began to change, however, when two critical things occurred around the 
same time – (1) Teach First indicated it successfully recruited at least 100 top 
graduates into its programme and (2) Teach First officially gained an accredited 
university training partner, CCCUC.  With a glimpse of the types of trainees the 
programme offered, coupled with assurances that professional teacher educators 
would be training them, opinion leaders within the social networks of headteachers 
embraced the scheme and were able to convince others to join.  Current and former 
heads such as Elizabeth Phillips of St. Marylebone and CCCUC’s James Learmonth 
reached through their extensive professional networks and successfully led the 
campaign to bring dozens of schools on board the scheme.   
The need for teachers, particularly in shortage subjects, propelled some 
schools to take more Teach First teachers than others, with at least one new academy 
taking on an unusually large number of eight trainees.  The subsequent relationship 
between Teach First and academies has been profiled by Ball and colleagues (Ball 
2008; 2012; Ball & Junemann 2012) but remains another important area for future 
research.  Such research would be especially relevant given the strong relationship 
that developed between TFA and the charter school movement in the U.S. (Sondel 
2015; Kretchmar 2014; Kretchmar et al. 2014; Strauss 2012b). 
 
9.5.6  Transfer Completed:  Normalizing Teach First 
 
 Late in spring 2003, as Teach First was wrapping up graduate recruitment, 
CCCUC was busy hiring and assembling its summer institute plans, and a significant 
numbers of London schools had signed on to take the new trainees, the inevitable 
was clear.  Teach First would go ahead, as approved nearly a year earlier, and the 
teacher unions had little reason to resist its establishment publicly.  As a result, the 
NUT, through a meeting set up by Bangs and Blandford, was the first union to agree 
to a deal offering a six-month free membership to Teach First trainees.  In exchange, 
the union was invited to address and explain their union and benefits to the cohort 
during the summer training.  The ATL and NASUWT reportedly agreed to the same 
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deal and, in this cordial manner, the critical position some teacher union leaders had 
publicly taken in regard to Teach First was overcome.   
The timing of this deal suggests that the mutually accommodating 
arrangement was a pragmatic decision taken by the unions in response to the 
prevailing environmental pressure to accept the new scheme.   These pressures, 
rather than social influence of Blandford in particular, brought about the teacher 
unions’ official acceptance of Teach First despite significant opposition, scepticism, 
and even hostility shown toward the scheme by a significant portion of its members.  
Even some supportive leaders had their own private criticisms of the programme, as 
Bangs’ comments regarding its elite positioning indicated.  However, teacher 
educators and union leaders realized that resistance to Teach First had become futile 
given scheme’s government support, regulatory approval, and their own limited 
influence in policy.    
With 200 Teach First teachers set to join schools across London that fall, the 
teacher unions previously opposed or neutral toward TfL chose to accommodate the 
new addition to the institutional environment.  The ATL and NASUWT acted 
pragmatically and bargained with Teach First’s stakeholders to serve their own 
organizational interests although there remained critics within its ranks.  With the 
dissipation of official resistance from the unions, other training providers in London 
were forced to accept the establishment of Teach First and faced increased 
competition for school placement and other resources as a result.  With the transfer 
and reinvention of TFA to England finally complete, there was little doubt that the 
context of teacher training in London had been changed.  As more than one 
interviewee noted, there was now “a new-kid-on-the-block”.   
 
 
9.6  Summary of Discussion 
 
 In Phase III, the policy entrepreneurs and business networks that first 
conceptualized and backed Teach First became the organizations’ leaders and 
overseers.  With expertise and personnel drawn primarily from the corporate sector, 
Teach First underwent two further reinventions that made it increasingly different 
from TFA.  First, the Teach First organization was implemented in ways that made it 
resemble the corporate sector generally, and McKinsey in particular.  Wigdortz and 
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Wei managed the new Teach First staff by using jargon and practices imported from 
McKinsey.  At the same time, the staff developed a graduate recruitment drive that 
emulated the models used by elite corporate recruiters in the way they targeted and 
assessed top graduates.  Lastly, Teach First was advertised to graduates as a 
leadership development programme that was closely allied with the private sector 
and could enable its participants to both help students while advancing their careers. 
The second reinvention of Teach First during this phase occurred when 
CCCUC was selected as Teach First’s teacher training provider.  This event ensured 
that the scheme trained its teachers in ways that reflected already established TTA 
routes such as GTP.  This made Teach First noticeably different from TFA as the 
latter ran its own summer training without university educators and with no oversight 
from a national regulatory body.  The selection of CCCUC as Teach First’s training 
partner also officially severed the link the scheme had originally formed with the 
IOE.  The decision also ensured that Totterdell’s plans for an innovative model of 
training was laid to rest.   
This last point is significant because, in the context of the ITT sector, it 
represented another battle teacher educators lost in seeking greater professional 
autonomy.  Much of the past two decades had seen university teacher educators 
forced to cede both their control and influence over the content and structure of 
initial teacher preparation to policy-makers and bureaucrats.  The shift from the term 
“teacher education” to simple “teacher training” was emblematic of the technicist 
views of teaching that successive governments had imposed on the sector.  In the 
1990s, the TTA and Ofsted gained further control over teacher preparation.  With a 
system of regulatory controls and monitoring mechanisms, the TTA had made 
professional innovation virtually impossible for teacher educators.  As a result, 
Totterdell had originally found TfL inspiring and exciting as an opportunity to apply 
his expertise to develop an experimental model of training that sat outside the 
mainstream.  However, the dominance of the TTA ensured that such a model did not 
come into existence.  In this way, the final twist in the tale of Teach First’s 
emergence epitomized and reinforced the radical direction of change within the ITT 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSION 
 
 
10.1  Reflections on the Emergence of Teach First 
 
Welcome to the denouement, or the final resolution, of the Teach First tale.  
We have arrived at the end of the policy story (and the analysis of its progression) 
and may now consider how strands of the plot came together to produce the outcome 
of a policy transfer process that began with an idea – to bring TFA to London.  In the 
course of this chapter, I argue that the story’s outcome, Teach First, represented both 
a transfer and a unique reinvention of the concept of TFA.  Yet, the final version of 
Teach First was not engineered through the agency of policy entrepreneurs alone, but 
reached – with the help of influential networks – by navigating the highly politicized 
terrain of initial teacher training and negotiating a settlement with incumbents in the 
field.  In this way, the policy story of Teach First illuminates how policy 
entrepreneurs and networks play pivotal roles in initiating and bringing about policy 
transfer and how institutional contexts shape and are reshaped by networks.  Thus, 
Teach First offers a number of conceptual insights that both challenge and extend our 
current understanding of policy entrepreneurs and networks as well as the process of 
transfer, reinvention, and diffusion.   
While Teach First’s narrative helps bring into focus the role of actors and 
networks in policy transfer and reinvention, I also suggest this story has another, less 
obvious but nevertheless significant outcome: a more slow-moving process, set in 
motion during this story, through which a powerful emergent network was forming, 
both “between” the interstices and “around the edges” of existing ones.  This 
expanding and influential network began in an ad hoc manner and for the explicit 
purpose of policy transfer but did not simply dissipate once the transfer was 
achieved. Instead, its membership continued to selectively expand and its members 
remained informed, involved, and even inspired to continue engaging in policy 
entrepreneurship, particularly in education.  The potential of this network to bring 
about change in England’s educational landscape is discussed further below. 
Finally, I also propose policy transfer scholars can benefit in many ways from 
utilizing a “narrative reconstruction” approach to study cases of transfer.  This 
methodology, involving attention to temporal sequences and reconstructive narrative 
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 314 
analysis, can enable researchers to effectively synthesize multiple levels of analysis, 
make sense of relevant contexts, and account for the role of subjectivities and power 
dynamics in decision-making.  However, there are challenges and limitations to this 
approach, like any other.  I elaborate on these issues and possible ways forward. 
 
 
10.2 Teach First as an Outcome of Policy Transfer 
 
10.2.1 Three Critical Points of Reinvention 
 
In the course of this study, I have identified three moments of reinvention in 
which the idea for Teach First underwent significant change.  At these points, Teach 
First was adapted, voluntarily or involuntarily, in ways that made it significantly 
different from TFA.  It is important to note that each reinvention had an effect on the 
next, directing Teach First to develop in a particularly idiosyncratic way that was not 
always anticipated by its advocates.  Here, I summarize the three moments of 
reinvention in order to facilitate a discussion on how Teach First qualifies as a 
transfer of the TFA model to England.   
  The first point of reinvention was in the negotiation moment of Phase II.  
During these meetings at the TTA in April/May 2002, Ralph Tabberer and Brett 
Wigdortz agreed to move the initiative forward by requiring it to (1) recruit only elite 
graduates who were not considering entering other teacher training routes, (2) ensure 
it’s the programme’s training focused on achieving QTS, and (3) allow the TTA to 
hold an open bidding process to select its teacher training provider.  Tabberer also 
suggested that the scheme not be called “Teach for London” and instead distance 
itself from trying to replicate TFA.  This agreement had a profound effect on the 
course of Teach First’s development.  In effect, the agreement permanently yoked 
the policy idea to the TTA and prevented its autonomous development in ways that 
may have led it to reflective of TFA.  Had the agreement not taken place, it is 
possible there would not have been a Teach First.  However, it is also possible that 
TfL could have eventually gained ministerial approval as a DfES-funded experiment 
much like Adonis’ academies.  Thus, the negotiation set TfL on a particular course of 
develop as “Teach First”.  I have not included Totterdell’s innovative TfL model in 
amongst the moments of reinvention in the story of Teach First because this version 
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was subsequently rejected though certain features of it persisted (i.e., placing 
programme participants in groups within schools).  Thus, Totterdell’s model became 
rather inconsequential for the development of Teach First’s training model despite 
the fact that it gained the admiration of Adonis and Timms, and hence helped trigger 
the TTA to compromise with TfL proponents.   
The second reinvention occurred in the fall of 2002 during the first months of 
Teach First’s implementation (Phase III).  In this period of time, Wigdortz and his 
staff drew on models from McKinsey and other elite corporate firms to construct and 
manage Teach First as an organization and to develop its particular brand of graduate 
recruitment.  This use of corporate branding helped establish Teach First as a 
selective and prestigious programme but also assisted Teach First in fulfilling its 
promise to the TTA to “not poach” graduates intending to enroll in other ITT routes.  
Using these corporate models caused some disaffection among lower staff members, 
but ultimately proved effective in luring elite graduates onto the scheme. 
The third and final moment of reinvention in the emergence of Teach First 
came in the winter of 2002 when CCCUC won the TTA’s contract to provide teacher 
training for Teach First (also in Phase III).  This was a pivotal moment of reinvention 
that ensured the teacher training model for Teach First was devoid of any significant 
influence from TFA.  Teach First staff member and TFA alumna Nicole Sherrin 
offered her views on TFA and advice on training to CCCUC.  However, Blandford 
developed the training model without reference to TFA.  As a result, the curriculum 
and messaging of Teach First’s training model reflected other mainstream ITT routes 
and focused participants on achieving QTS.  The only influence TFA apparently had 
on Teach First’s summer institute was in the form of extra-curricular workshops 
planned around lectures by two TFA alumni hired for the summer.   
These three moments of reinvention were, in some ways, triggered by the 
necessity to adapt a foreign idea to context as often suggested in the policy transfer 
literature.  However, Teach First’s story also illustrates how reinventions are more 
social processes in which actors negotiate meaning.  Rules, as institutionalized, can 
be changed or exceptions can be made.  Researchers need to be aware of how 
seemingly obvious “contextual factors” that shape the reinvention of policy during 
transfer only became such when invoked by the actors that see their relevance (e.g. 
benefit from them).  For example, to enable Teach First to legally operate, 
Parliament quietly changed the rule that stipulated graduates must be over age 26 to 
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join an on-the-job ITT route.  This rule was quickly amended after Teach First’s 
summer training and just before its teachers reached the classroom, illustrating that 
the fact that Teach First was technically illegal before this point was of no 
consequence.  Hypothetically speaking, the TTA could have enforced the “26-year-
old age stipulation” and thus made it a factor that forced further reinvention upon 
TfL.  Thus, reinvention is not simply an adaptation or adjustment made to a policy 
idea based on a fixed context.  Rather, reinvention is a social process through which 
actors’ with different interests negotiate the meaning of policy ideas and contexts. In 
the process of reinvention, both the policy idea and the local context can be amended 
to accommodate each other.   
These three moments of reinvention combined to give Teach First a distinctly 
different form than TFA.  As a result, Wigdortz has expressed his disagreement with 
the suggestion that his idea was a transfer of TFA to England.  However, the fact 
remains that TFA was the model that initially inspired London First and BITC to 
advocate for its transfer, as uncovered in this study.  Furthermore, TFA set the 
precedent for Teach First and enabled potential supporters to link the two and 
emerge with confidence that such a programme could be successful.  For these 
reasons, I argue Teach First remains a case of policy transfer through which TFA 
came to England.  To more fully expand on this point, I reflect on the ways in which 
Teach First emerged as a programme similar to TFA and yet very different.  
 
 
10.2.2  Similarities between Teach First and TFA 
 
Despite undergoing three significant moments of reinventions, Teach First, in 
many ways, remains a transfer of TFA as both shared several basic features.  First, 
the general premise behind TFA and Teach First (or its “theory of change” as the 
TFA calls it), remained identical.  That premise was that high-achieving graduates, if 
recruited to be teachers in challenging schools for two years, could improve 
educational outcomes for even the most disadvantaged pupils.  Thus, both TFA and 
Teach First originally aimed to recruit only graduates from the most elite universities 
and place them in challenging schools as teachers for two years.  To accomplish this, 
both programmes (1) boasted high selectivity, (2) promised to embed members in 
resource-rich social networks, and (3) offered increased access for its alumni to 
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connect to non-teaching career ladders (Maier 2012).  Both also lowered the cost (in 
terms of money, social status, and time) of entering and exploring the teaching 
profession for elite graduates, making it appealing to idealistic individuals who were 
unwilling or undecided about their career path.   
In addition, both schemes enabled graduates to escape being characterized as 
teacher by default – “that is, one who becomes a teacher because they are not 
talented enough for more prestigious occupations” (Maier 2012, p.16).  Instead of 
being seen as taking up a regular job, recruits of Teach First, like those of TFA, were 
positioned as those who were “giving up” more lucrative, private sector positions 
available to them and instead acting altruistically by giving their services to 
education.  As a result, alumni of the programme were promised to be highly 
marketable in the private sector as experienced and ambitious risk-taking leaders of 
their generation, a status not bestowed on non-Teach First teachers.  Thus, for 
graduates of prestigious universities, Teach First and TFA both offered the chance to 
teach without the risk of downward social mobility and an alumni network through 
which to climb professionally.  Although Teach First tried to avoid “poaching” 
graduates from other ITT programmes (as stipulated by the TTA), TFA and Teach 
First were offering more prestige and benefits than any other route.  As a result, both 
likely drew some graduates away from considering other teacher training 
programmes at elite universities, as Whitty’s recollection of conversation with Teach 
First participants suggests. 
 On an organizational and field level, Teach First and TFA are alike as both 
took the form of a “social enterprise”, combining the logics and structural elements 
drawn from the private and charitable sectors.  While the concept of a social 
enterprise is fluid and varies widely in research and in policy contexts (Teasdale 
2012), Ball and Exley (2010, p.162) describe such organizations as those that 
combine a “strong public service ethos” with business acumen.  Similarly, others 
define social enterprises as hybrid forms of organization that pursue “the dual 
mission of financial sustainability and social purpose” (Doherty et al. 2014, p.417).  
Social enterprises are seen as different from other forms of entrepreneurship in that 
they give priority to promoting and creating social value rather than economic value 
or profits (Mair & Marti 2006). As such, both were well-positioned in the non-profit 
sector and built strategic links across the public and private domains.   
As social enterprises, both TFA and Teach First reflected the trend of 
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charitable organizations becoming more professionalized (Hwang & Powell 2009) 
and business-like (Maier et al. 2014) and concerned with developing and managing 
their organization’s particular “brand” (Philippa Hankinson 2004).  For both TFA 
and Teach First, their “branding” was of the upmost importance as it shaped what 
type of graduate they could recruit.  Both schemes depended upon their lofty rhetoric 
of addressing a societal injustice and cultivating leaders who “make a difference” 
while coming across as selective and high-status as possible.   
Thus, this posed a dilemma when both schemes needed to partner with a 
university school of education to provide teacher training for its initial cohort.  To 
maintain an aura of selectivity and prestige, both Teach First and TFA played up 
their brand and downplayed their links within university schools of education.  In 
practice, the influence of teacher educators on recruits was limited and 
overshadowed by those leading Teach First and TFA.  This was mainly because 
Teach First and TFA maintained control of graduate recruitment and the 
programmes’ messaging.  Thus, Teach First and TFA marketed and branded their 
programme as a unique and worthwhile challenge for the “best and brightest”.  This 
branding shaped participants’ understanding and expectations of the type of scheme, 
schools, and profession they were entering.  However, while the two organizations 
were founded on similar solutions to turning around failing schools – TFA and Teach 
First differed in significant ways. 
 
 
10.2.3  Teach First’s “Corporate” Identity vs. TFA’s “Service” Identity 
 
While sharing many similarities with TFA, Teach First’s emulation of the 
corporate sector in its branding and training programme represented a significant 
break with the TFA model.  While both schemes relied on funds and resources from 
the private sector to launch, Teach First was much more corporate-oriented in its 
character, recruitment messages, and training than TFA.  From its inception, TFA’s 
identity and rhetoric utilized messages of social justice, education inequity, and 
national service, and likened itself to the Peace Corps to appeal to elite graduates 
(Chira 1990; Kopp 2001).  In a study of TFA’s early years, Popkewitz (1998) 
described how TFA encouraged its “corps members” to see themselves as 
missionaries whose duty it was to rescue their poor and minority pupils from the 
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social and cultural environments of disadvantage.  TFA’s marketing messages relied 
on a patriotic sense of civic service that was uniquely American and rooted in 
individualism and community values that avoided, or mistrusted, government 
solutions to social problems. 
As Widortz set to lure graduates to Teach First, others (particularly Tabberer) 
warned Wigdortz that borrowing TFA’s recruitment messaging was unfeasible in the 
U.K. given the differences in national culture.  Initially, Wigdortz tested TFA’s 
approach by holding focus groups with Oxbridge students.  The groups rejected 
patriotic and missionary appeals to “combat poverty” but valued leadership 
opportunities and transferable skills (Wigdortz 2012).  Consequently, Teach First 
crafted a dual message to graduates that explicitly constructed its identity as an 
organization created by and in continuing association with the corporate sector.  
Teach First’s messages emphasized companies’ involvement in its two-year training 
programme and promised recruits business management training, corporate summer 
internships, and preferential hiring amongst its private sector sponsors.   
TFA had not used its corporate sponsors in this way despite being primarily 
funded by corporate and private donations since its inception.  Such a corporate 
theme was alien to the service ethos of the TFA programme.  Offering management 
training, corporate internships, or networking events with companies simply did not 
make sense for TFA amongst its themes of civic activism and social justice.  
Ironically, although American philanthropy was based on the idea of “enlightened 
self-interest”, this was not true of the Peace Corps or TFA.  Although the selectivity 
and prestige of these programmes certainly attracted talented graduates, the public 
suggestion that one did such service, in part, for career-advancement was not socially 
acceptable (though did exist).  In contrast, Teach First urged selected graduates to 
see themselves as “a cut above the rest” and future elites, declaring: “Teach First 
unashamedly expects many of its participants to become future Ministers, CEOs, and 
serial entrepreneurs of our times” (Hutchings et al. 2006, p.10).  TFA did not use 
such messages in targeting graduates between 1990 and 2002. 
Thus, while both schemes encouraged graduates to take on teaching as a 
social mission, Teach First was different in that it marketed itself as a way 
participants could help others while also advancing themselves.  Teach First 
promised recruits the chance to develop leadership, transferrable skills, and social 
networks in preparation for another career.  Unlike TFA, Teach First crafted 
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messages that directly appealed to graduates’ sense of ambition as well as altruism to 
convince them to teach.  To be very clear though, Kopp and TFA did initially build 
and develop, over the years, close and significant ties to the private sector since its 
founding.  It probably is debatable today which organization is actually more 
corporate-oriented given their respective funding sources, political actions and 
agenda, and operation over the past decade.  My point here is not to paint TFA as a 
purely idealistic, anti-corporate, or altruistic social enterprise.  Instead, I simply 
emphasize that TFA’s founding identity and recruiting messages up until 2002 were 
not based upon its private sector sponsors nor were corporate internships or 
management training ever part of the TFA programme.  Teach First, however, did 
utilize its close ties with the corporate sector in these ways. 
Why did TFA and Teach First initially development and crystallize in these 
contrasting ways?  Teach First emulated the corporate sector more than TFA for 
three inter-related reasons.  First, simply, the schemes were founded in different 
national, cultural, and sectoral contexts.  As already discussed, the scheme emerged 
from London’s corporate community and its establishment led by London First and 
McKinsey.  TFA, on the other hand, had its origins in the senior thesis of a Princeton 
undergraduate, Kopp, who modeled her idea on the Peace Corps and the former 
Nations Teacher Corps, both launched in the 1960s.  Thus, she launched TFA on her 
own as a non-profit through utilizing Princeton’s social and professional networks 
and courting business executives who were already interested in education reform. 
Secondly, Teach First and TFA differed due to their respective leaders’ 
visions and skills.  While both Kopp and Wigdortz were passionate about helping 
disadvantaged pupils, they differed in the founding inspirations and ethos on which 
they built their respective organizations.  Wigdortz based his ideas on the War for 
Talent and recruited a staff with private sector experience to manage and implement 
Teach First.  Being unfamiliar with English contexts as an American, he 
conceptualized Teach First as a practical solution to an immoral but ultimately 
solvable problem in education.  In contrast, Kopp founded TFA as a 21-year-old 
Princeton graduate who became aware of differences in educational opportunities 
among communities and became convinced that young, idealist graduates like herself 
would jump at the chance to address this problem.   
Wigdortz and Kopp also differed in their professional skills.  On the one 
hand, Wigdortz had advanced analytic skills in quantitative data and economic 
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forecasting among other things.  As discussed in Phase I, he was a data analyst being 
trained to solve organizational problems and interact with clients.  With limited 
management skills, Wigdortz relied on business leaders as mentors and hired a 
management staff drawn from the private sector.  Kopp, on other hand, had 
developed confidence and professional skills at Princeton through the Foundation for 
Student Communication, a student organization through which she regularly met 
with business executives (Cradle 2007).  By her senior year in 1989, Kopp had also 
become the manager of the organization’s national, student-run business magazine 
with a staff of 60 and a budget of $1.5 million (Chira 1990).  With this experience, 
she pursued her idea for TFA with aura of both confidence and idealism that 
resonated with business executives looking for education reform.  However, her 
ability to fundraise did not affect her idealistic social vision of TFA, and she 
recruited a staff that reflected this.  Her first-year staff members were fellow recent 
graduates from elite universities who had been involved in teaching, non-profits, 
and/or the Peace Corps prior to being hired.   
Differences between TFA and Teach First’s staff also had a significant 
impact on the identity and the management of each organization.  With three former 
McKinsey consultants leading Teach First, Wigdortz’s management resembled 
professional firms with a power and pay hierarchy based on roles, performance-
related pay, and language and concepts borrowed from McKinsey.  This differed 
markedly from the practices of TFA when it was first set up in 1989-90.  Kopp 
managed her staff in a democratic and egalitarian manner, putting organizational 
decisions to a vote and paying all staff members (including herself) the same salary 
set at the level of a new teacher ($25,000 at the time) (Kopp 2001, p.65; Chira 1990).  
Kopp kept this horizontal structure and democratic ethos for roughly the first five 
years of TFA’s existence until it became unmanageable and unproductive.  She then 
adopted a more decentralized and hierarchical governance model on the advice of an 
experienced management expert (Kopp 2001).  Hence, while TFA had become more 
business-like in structure by the time Wigdortz learned of it, the programme had 
initially been managed in a manner that reflected the Kopp’s youthful idealism and 
her service-oriented and patriotic view of TFA’s mission.  With that said, however, 
the founding staff of both organizations were inspired by and committed to fulfilling 
the social cause of the programme.  Thus, ideals were among the driving forces of 
both staffs. 
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Finally, Teach First became more corporate-oriented in response to 
regulatory pressures from the TTA.  Essentially, the scheme emphasized its business 
training and social benefits to appeal to the subset of top graduates that, as the TTA 
required, were “not likely” or “not” considering teaching as a career.  While TFA 
had the freedom to widely target idealistic elite graduates at 100 highly selective 
U.S. universities, the TTA pressured Teach First to bring a new demographic into the 
teacher labour market and not simply “poach” potential trainees from other routes on 
the campus of the 16 or so U.K. universities from which it recruited.  Thus, the 
TTA’s stipulation further pushed Teach First to play up its corporate ethos and 
professional career benefits. 
In sum, Teach First became a rather different version of TFA due to (1) their 
founding in contrasting cultural contexts, (2) the background and experience of its 
leaders and first staff, and (3) regulatory stipulations.  In short, the former 
incorporated its extensive ties to the private sector into its values, identity, and 
training.  In this way, Teach First became a charitable organization focused on a 
social mission but one that was heavily infused with corporate values, structures, and 
identity.  In contrast, TFA built its prestige and appeal among elite graduates using 
the patriotic, service-oriented and nationalistic messaging.  This made Teach First 
very different from TFA while both continued to share many similarities. 
 
 
10.3  Policy Entrepreneurs in Policy Transfer 
 
This study of Teach First’s emergence has shed considerable light on the role 
and activities of policy entrepreneurs and how they may bring about policy transfer.  
This is part of the study’s contribution to knowledge in the field.  The role of the 
policy entrepreneurs has been largely neglected as researchers have tended to focus 
on more established and stable networks of experts or coalitions of advocates who 
regularly engage in policy processes.  These approaches, most notably Haas’ 
epistemic communities and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s advocacy coalition 
framework, cannot account for the spontaneous appearance of groups of policy 
entrepreneurs that lobby government to achieve their policy goals.  In contrast, Evans 
and Davies (1999) offer the concept of a policy transfer network that does arise for 
the occasion and purpose of a single transfer.  However, their approach still 
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privileges policy-makers or government bureaucrats as the agents directing the 
process of transfer.  As a result, they offer little insight into the political motivation 
of policy entrepreneurs themselves or how policy entrepreneurs may differ from 
government agents in going about constructing such networks.  Still, Evans and 
Davies’ concept of a policy transfer network is helpful as a starting point for 
considering how policy entrepreneurs may use networks.  This was certainly the 
main means through which Kiley and Wigdortz brought about the transfer of TFA, a 
point to which I will soon return.    
But first, how is our understanding of policy entrepreneurs extended and 
challenge by evidence from Teach First?  Within the literature, there is a general 
consensus that policy entrepreneurs are often those located outside government and 
may be knowledgeable experts, activists, or other types of professionals from the 
civil society.  I suggest that this study offers the following insights into who policy 
entrepreneurs may be, where they may come from, and why they may appear: 
First, policy entrepreneurs can emerge from privileged and resource-rich 
networks, which empower them to act and engage with others in the policy domain 
despite their position outside of government.  Because of their origin in such elite 
networks, policy entrepreneurs may merge together and work as a team.  However, 
on an individual level, they may have different motivations and interpretations of the 
policy they for which are advocating.  
Second, policy entrepreneurs may be more common, or more likely to appear, 
in institutionally fragmented contexts where central, coordinating authorities are 
weak or do not exist.  In such a context, modes of network governance may develop 
and give particular networks power to formulate collective policy goals and 
coordinate action.  This was the case in London for more than a decade in the 1990s, 
which gave rise to London First and furthered the development of BITC.  
Meanwhile, an example on the opposite side of the spectrum was the teacher training 
sector.  England’s teacher training sector was highly regulated with a strong central 
authority – the TTA.  Hence, one would not expect policy entrepreneurs touting new 
policy innovations to emerge in this context. 
Third, policy entrepreneurs may be more likely to become involved in 
bringing about policy transfer if the networks from which they emerge are somewhat 
cosmopolitan in nature and composition.  London First and BITC were local and 
national network-based business organizations, and thus they included global 
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individuals from the corporate sector.  Partnering with McKinsey brought a further 
mix of cosmopolitan and well-connected individuals with varied experiences in both 
local and international contexts.   
Fourth, policy entrepreneurs may be located in the local environment but may 
also be, in Simmel’s sense, “strangers” to it, meaning the policy entrepreneur may be 
part of a social group but still not considered by others as one of that group.  Such 
individuals differ from others in that they are (1) exposed to new ideas outside the 
local social system, (2) not held to the same norms as others, and hence are (3) more 
apt to be the sources of innovation or new practices introduced to the social system.  
Both Kiley and Wigdortz were, in this sense, “strangers” in London as both were 
Americans who had recently moved to the country.  As such, they had limited 
knowledge of local contexts although they were very well embedded in the social 
elite networks of London through their position at London First and McKinsey.  This 
is important to highlight because Kingdon’s (1984) oftened-cited description of a 
policy entrepreneur refers to individuals who “lie in wait” and use their knowledge 
of the policy process to exploit, or bring about, windows of opportunity to further 
their own policy goals (p.164-5).  Although Kingdon’s definition was subsequently 
expanded by other scholars, there is still little acknowledgement that policy 
entrepreneurs can be foreigners who are not from the local context.  In contrast, this 
is a foundational concept in the innovation-diffusion literature.   
Moving onto what policy entrepreneurs actually do, the existing literature on 
policy entrepreneurs offers a comprehensive list of their various strategies.  In 
general, policy entrepreneurs “introduce, translate, and help implement new ideas” 
(Roberts & King 1991, p.147).  Their role is multi-faceted and includes (1) idea 
generating and problem-framing, (2) cultivating networks among a wide variety of 
stakeholders, (3) attracting media support, and (4) carrying out administrative duties 
and evaluative activities related to implementation.  Only, Oborn et al. (2011) argue 
that policy entrepreneurs can do more than open a policy window – a policy 
entrepreneur can also build a network through which policy agendas can be enacted.  
To do this, the policy entrepreneur in their study, Professor Sir Ara Darzi engaged in 
“re-defining problems, forging alliances across interest groups (and mediating 
between them), and developing (or refining) policy proposals” (Oborn et al. 2011, 
p.342).  In these ways, Darzi was active in shaping the context, content, and process 
of the policy development.   
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My study builds on Oborn et al. (2011) by providing further evidence on how 
policy entrepreneurs can also effectively build influential networks to bring about a 
policy transfer.  Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams were effective in (1) locating 
influential contacts and networks for diffusion, (2) recruiting key allies and building 
consensual knowledge of the innovation, (3) enlisting expertise of strong allies and 
(4) repeatedly lobbying policy-makers and bureaucrats to consider their idea.  More 
specifically, they drew strategically on information from TFA to make a case for 
TfL.  The policy transfer network they built brought together individual sponsors and 
often their organizational, professional, and/or personal contacts as well.  In this way, 
while Kiley and Wigdortz’s diffused the idea of TfL, their network of supporters 
grew and put pressures on the government and the TTA to re-examine and approve 
the idea.   
 In the process of building support for a policy transfer, policy entrepreneurs 
can find themselves constrained by time or by resources.  For example, Wigdortz 
only had limited time to enact TfL as his leave from his job at McKisney was only 
six months.  Thus, as time went by, he became more open to compromising his 
vision for the programme in order to bring it into existence.  Totterdell, on the other 
hand, was prepared and able to wait and see if TfL could be approved by the minister 
without modifications made by the TTA.   However, Totterdell found himself 
constrained by resources as his organization’s funding and staff availability was 
limited. 
Another insight into the work of policy entrepreneurs may be how effectively 
they can work behind the scenes, a finding also noted by Beeson and Stone (2013).  
In Phase II, the process of recruiting supporters and lobbying government and 
bureaucrats took place relatively quietly and behind closed doors.  No media articles 
regarding the possibility of transferring TFA to the U.K. appeared prior to May 2002.  
Instead, Kiley, Wigdortz, and their teams knocked only on certain doors and held 
meetings targeting influential groups of leaders, such as the representatives of the 
headteachers unions, to quietly spread the idea and garner support for TfL.  This 
time-consuming method of going person-to-person through social networks likely 
made the policy transfer network particularly strong as its members were directly 
tied to the leaders of the initiative, namely Kiley, O’Brien, and Wigdortz. 
As the transfer of TfL moved into the implementation stage, the roles of 
Kiley and Wigdortz changed to overseer and manager of Teach First respectively.  
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 326 
This role entailed a process of piecing together – much like a bricoleur – the 
knowledge, advice, and resources offered by the policy transfer network and creating 
the policy programme from scratch.  Meanwhile, the policy transfer network formed 
to bring about the transfer did not dissolve, as Evans and Davies (1999) suggest, but 
continued on to publicly support the new initiative and offer resources such as 
funding, expertise, and personnel.  Before moving on to examining the role of 
networks, I offer one last reflection on policy entrepreneurs in the story of Teach 
First.  Kiley and Wigdortz were at the centre of Teach First’s story.  However, their 
agency was really only enabled by the powerful networks in which they were 
embedded through London First and McKinsey.  Had they not been in those 
organizations and networks, they would not have been asked to puzzle over how to 
address London’s educational problems nor would they have been empowered to act 
upon their idea.  Thus, while the policy entrepreneurs in this story were exceptional 
in their abilities and effort to launch and implement Teach First, their actions cannot 
be wholly separated from the context and the networks in which they were 
embedded.  Hence, researchers must be careful not to accord all credit and agency to 
leading individuals which tends to happen when studying individual cases of policy 
entrepreneurship that are actor-centric.  As Hardy and McGuire (2008) highlight, a 
process-centric approach to studying entrepreneurship can help avoid this pitfall by 
widening the analytical scope of the research.    
 
   
10.4  The Role of Networks in Bringing about Policy Transfer & Beyond 
 
Networks played a central role in shaping both contexts and action within the 
story of Teach First.  As part of the structural context, networks enabled and 
empowered actors to initiate transfer and diffuse the idea of the TfL among elites.  
Such networks had been part of the changing governance structures of London that 
had given business an influential role in policy in the capital.  Networks were also 
the means through which policy entrepreneurs accomplished their goals.  By using 
London First’s networks as well as continuing to network on its behalf, Kiley and 
O’Brien recruited the types of individuals that were likely to have contacts and/or 
influence in government (i.e. Lampl, Whitty, Iacobescu).  They also tapped their 
business networks to recruit those who could provide resources – both material and 
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symbolic – to support the transfer of TfL as well as the implementation of Teach 
First.   
During the process, it was clear that local individuals and networks 
influenced government and brought about the policy transfer.  Although Kiley and 
Wigdortz were central players, they were not able to convince the TTA and minister 
to approve the scheme in the beginning (without local networks and opinion leaders 
sponsoring them).  Thus, this study provides qualitative support for Mintrom and 
Vergari’s (1998) finding that policy entrepreneurs’ utilization of policy networks, 
particularly local ones (Mintrom 1997), increases the likelihood of achieving their 
innovative policy goals. 
Networks also provided policy entrepreneurs with the means to direct and 
shape policy learning.  The most vivid example of this is when Kiley arranged for the 
schools minister, Timms, to attend a TFA fundraiser while he was in Washington 
D.C. early on in Phase II.  Timms was unsure of the idea for TfL.  His civil servants 
as well as the TTA were advising him against it.  However, by attending the 
fundraiser in Washington D.C., he was able to learn more about TFA.  He was also 
impressed by TFA’s high-profile supporters, notably Senator Hillary Clinton and 
First Lady Laura Bush.  This learning opportunity, arranged by Kiley, had ensured 
that Timms saw TFA in a positive light and witnessed an influential politician – who 
held a structurally equivalent position – supporting the idea.   
As network theory highlights, actors can be influenced by either their direct 
contacts or by taking cues from others in the same structurally equivalent positions 
as themselves.  Timms now had an opportunity to be influenced by both and came 
back to the U.K. much more enthusiastic about the idea.  However, had he been in 
contact with other networks in Washington, he could have discovered TFA had 
powerful adversaries as well.  At that time, the survival of TFA was in question 
because No Child Left Behind proposed every child have a “highly qualified 
teacher”.  While some supported the provision that TFA teachers fit that description, 
other prominent Democratic Senators, such as Ted Kennedy and Joseph Lieberman, 
had opposed such a notion and insisted “highly qualified” meant certified.  The point 
here is that there was opposition to TFA on Capitol Hill.  However, the networks 
forming around TfL to support its transfer had biases against critical perspectives and 
negative inputs and thus avoided them (Evans and Davis 1999).  Kiley made sure to 
direct others to only TFA allies and sources of information that were positive and 
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uncritical of TFA.  This, in turn, had an echo chamber effect and further influenced 
the opinions of others in the network considering TfL. 
As Kiley and her colleagues recruited more supporters to her idea, the TfL 
network they built did reflect the traits of a policy transfer network as conceptualized 
by Evans and Davies (1999).  The network was ad-hoc, action-oriented, and set up 
with the specific intention of engineering policy transfer.  In addition, it had (1) a 
limited membership, (2) contact among members that was high-quality during Phase 
II and related to transfer, and (3) all members possessed some type of resources to 
provide in support of the transfer.  Once the TfL was approved and implemented, 
however, the network persisted as I discussed in Chapter 9.  There, I detailed how the 
policy transfer network evolved into a support network for the implementation of 
Teach First.  Its members vouched for the scheme publicly as well as provided 
resources (i.e., funds, expertise, personnel, status by association, etc.).  Although the 
IOE was sidelined within this network and business supporters exercised greater 
influence over the implementation, the network by and large persisted and grew 
throughout Phase III.  After the IOE was replaced by the CCCUC, Teach First 
support network grew in the education sector as it prepared to place its teachers in 
schools that fall.  Although Evans and Davies (1999) describe a policy transfer 
network as one that dissolves after the transfer is achieved, they do suggest that 
“there must be a positive-sum game if the network is to persist” (p.374).   
This point highlights perhaps the main reason why the influential network 
around Teach First crystallized to bring about the transfer and then persisted.  In 
different ways, the scheme offered its supporters something of value.  For example, it 
offered business supporters the chance to be involved with and later hire its recruits.  
Policy-makers and bureaucrats were able to highlight their support for a programme 
that successfully recruited talented graduates to help failing schools.  Philanthropists 
and foundation heads were able to learn from the programme and chart its progress, 
and so on.  Perhaps one of the highlights for all supporters was the opportunity to be 
a member and participant in the newly formed network that spanned sectors and 
brought together somewhat individuals.  These members can frequently socialize and 
network together as well as meet the enthusiastic and talented participants of the 
programme during the many Teach First events held throughout the year.   
For these reasons, the policy transfer network persisted and became stable 
and enduring as Teach First continued to succeed and expand.  I suspect that Teach 
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First’s network grew from this time to become of an influential part of a wider 
coalition of new actors bringing about change in the education sector, a topic most 
recently explored by Ball (2007) and Ball and Junemann (2011).  In other words, I 
am suggesting that the policy entrepreneurs in the case of Teach First, in the process 
of building a network to facilitate a policy transfer, brought about a subtle but 
significant reconfiguration of networks that represented an influential new voice in 
the field of teacher training specifically, and in education policy more generally. 
 
 
10.5  Using Narrative Reconstruction in the Study of Policy Transfer 
 
What policy transfer studies, in both political science and education, often 
fail to capture and account for is the way in which actors’ past experiences, 
subjective interpretations, and social connections affect the decisions that are made 
and the actions that are taken.  Reconstructing a policy story – with its diverse cast of 
characters, complex settings, and plot twists – helps bring a researcher’s analytical 
gaze close to the human side of “rational” and “voluntary” modes of policy transfer.  
Thus, among the contributions of this study is the illustration of the value of using 
stories, or narrative reconstructions, in the study of policy transfer.  Using this 
approach helps to integrate multiple perspectives to uncover the intersecting 
influence of several factors on multiple levels – individuals, networks, organizations, 
institutions – to understand what is happening.  The key to achieving this, however, 
is to interview a wide range of individuals involved in the transfer process and seek 
out their subjective interpretations of the policy idea, events, and wider contexts.  
In reconstructing a case of policy transfer, the focus on histories is important.  
The history of people, organizations, and sectors is critical to understanding the 
context informing and shaping the action.  Knowing such history sheds light on 
individuals’ personal networks as well as inter-organizational networks and the 
position of individuals and organizations in wider contexts.  Biographies are 
especially helpful in illuminating how actors interpret their experiences, with whom 
they associated with, and which networks they were part of.  Any narrative account 
of policy transfer needs an understanding of the individuals’ views, past experiences, 
and positioning related to other actors in the process.  This enables one to understand 
the dynamics of the account being recalled.  Such a perspective can help unravel the 
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contradictions inherent in interviewees’ accounts and bring previously unknown 
factors that shaped the story to light.  I also suggest that by asking about one’s life 
story during an interview, interviewees may be more inclined to discussing their 
decision-making process, providing high-quality data.  Hence, using reconstructive 
narrative analysis offers an innovative way to uncover policy entrepreneurs actions 
and networks and helps researchers chart a more process-oriented account of a policy 
transfer.   
 
 
10.6  Limitations of Study 
  
In reflection, there are at least two ways my results are limited due to the 
method of data collection and knowledge gaps of my own.  First, the snow-balling 
method for identifying interviewees, while effective, somewhat limited the range of 
perspectives and actors involved in the emergence of Teach First.  Although I 
interviewed the central actors who were visibly influential in bringing about Teach 
First, their narratives often differed from those interviewees who had less visible 
roles.  Hence, between the two accounts, I sensed a more balanced picture emerged 
from certain episodes.  However, I often was unable to find the less prominent, or 
visible, actors that were present.  Often times, interviewees could not recall the 
names of officials at the TTA or within the DfES.  In addition, a few interviewees 
seemed able or unwilling to offer the names of individuals who had been critical of 
the TfL/Teach First.  This highlighted a related challenge I encountered during data 
collection – it was hard to locate “the skeptics”.  Thus, I sensed there were 
perspectives missing from the narrative.  However, remedying this limitation was 
difficult as no official documents, notable speeches, or debates existed on this case of 
policy development.  
 My perspective as the researcher conducting this study was also somewhat 
biased given that I, as an American studying in the U.K., was not as familiar with the 
British political culture and history as perhaps a native would have been.  Through 
the process of interviewing, I subsequently cultivated a wider and more nuanced 
understanding of political cultures and norms among London elites.  However, as 
this was my first study interviewing elites, I felt disadvantaged during some 
interviews when I was unable to effectively probe, with enough background 
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knowledge, some of their perspectives or views.  Though I did try to remedy this 
blind spot later on by interviewing a handful of key respondents again, I would 
encourage other researchers working in unfamiliar settings to be vigilant in learning 
as much background context as possible before and between interviews and in the 
process of carefully analyzing the data.   
 
 
10.7  Avenues for Further Research  
 
This study into the emergence of Teach First demonstrated how Teach First 
was a transfer of TFA yet was also shaped by the policy entrepreneurs who founded 
it and the netxtworks that molded the idea to fit conflicted contexts.  In terms of 
future research, there is a need to pursue further research into the subsequent 
transfers of Teach First worldwide as well as the evolution of Teach First itself.  In 
both these areas, policy entrepreneurs and networks are shaping and implementing 
education policy in novel ways.   
First, I recommend researchers investigate the policy entrepreneurs and 
networks involved in starting Teach First-inspired programmes abroad.  Of the 38 
Teach for All affiliated programmes across the world, all launched within the past 10 
years, there are four that incorporate “Teach First” into their programme names: 
Teach First Deutschland (2009), Teach First Israel (2010), Teach First New Zealand 
(2013), Teach First Denmark (2016).  All the other programmes have “Teach For” 
names or different variations of this theme.  What types of programmes are these and 
how are they related to Teach First and TFA?  As discussed in Chapter 1, research 
into the spread of the TFA and Teach First models is just beginning.  We have little 
empirical research on what elements of these models are being transferred, why, and 
how they are being adapted, interpreted, and negotiated at the local levels.  How 
Teach First and TFA came together to establish the organization that supports 
transfer of their model is also vaguely known.  These are all avenues into further 
research that could be pursued and compared to my findings on the emergence of 
Teach First.  The role of McKinsey in these activities also calls for a closer 
examination as the firm helped launch Teach for All in 2007. 
In addition, while it has been my view throughout this study that the founding 
stage of TFA and Teach First is essential for understanding the different but related 
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logics and values underpinning them, more study is needed on Teach First to 
understand how its founders and network of supporters continued to influence 
education policy and subsequent transfers.  My study ends in June 2003 but Teach 
First has certainly evolved, expanded, and changed considerably since then.  How 
has Teach First developed over time and how has its relationship with TFA evolved?  
I suspect that after Teach First was established and successful in delivering its 
programme, it began to collaborate and learn more with TFA and on a more collegial 
basis.  I saw this from my experience at Teach First in 2007 and working under the 
TFA alumna hired to expand Teach First outside of London.  Such a trend is the 
reverse of Phillips and Ochs (2003) model of policy borrowing that suggests, over 
time, policies become internalized and less like the original transfers.   
To confirm or dispel my prediction, I suggest Teach First, and for that matter 
TFA, both organizations need to have their history crtically researched and written.  
While the memoirs written by Wigdortz and Kopp offer an insider perspective on 
their respective organizations, their accounts are naturally limited and actor-centric.  
Hence, such accounts are not necessarily complete, objective, or fully informed (as I 
discovered).  Yet, the organizational narrative told by these CEOs seems to have 
taken on the status of “social facts” as their story has been repeatedly told and 
mythologized.  To correct this, it is important for researchers to capture the process 
through which these programmes came into existence and chart how develop and 
evolve within local contexts.  Why does such history matter?  The historical 
development of Teach First is important because, as this study reveals, policy 
entrepreneurs can make and influence policy through networks in ways that are not 
always transparent or accountable.  If the power and influence of TFA is anything to 
go by, then researchers would be wise to take Teach First and other similarly-
inspired programmes into account, for both TFA and Teach First enjoy unusually 
high levels of political support and influence.  Furthermore, as Stephen Ball’s recent 
work is beginning to demonstrate, Teach First may be one node of many in new 
policy networks changing the English educational landscape.  Fully understanding 
the policy entrepreneuers and networks shaping domestic policy and international 
transfers is critical for political scientists and educational researchers alike.  
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A.1 TFA Interview List 
 
Table 2:  TFA Interviewees 
 





1. Rick Belding 
Sat on first TFA advisory board, 
also Head of Recruiting New 
Teachers, involved in private 
education and teacher supply 
agency, set up account for TFA 
donations through Princeton  
3/2/12 92:11 (1hr32m) Advisor 
2. Tom Payzant 
Sat on first TFA advisory board, 
then superintendent of San Diego 
schools 




Staff member of TFA during its 
first year 12/3/12 65:15 TFA Staff 
4. Susan Sutton 
Staff member of TFA during its 
first year, former Peace Corps 
volunteer 
11/5/12 59:08 TFA Staff 
5. Tim Knowles 
Staff member of TFA and 
Founding NYC TFA Director, 
found jobs for TFA recruits in 
NYC  
13/3/12 53:01 TFA Staff 
6. Pearl Kane 
Professor at Columbia 
University’s Teacher’s College, 





7. Carl Grant 
Professor of Multi-culturalism, 
Univ of Wisconsin – Madison, 








Teacher Instructor at first TFA 




9. Tony Wagner Academic and Instructor at the first TFA Summer Training 
19/12/1






Researcher on a team evaluating 
the first summer institute and year 
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A.2 Teach First Interview List 
 









McKinsey consultant who 
helped found and became 










2. Jo Owen 
Called ‘cofounder’ of Teach 
First, mentored Brett 
Wigdortz, background is 
Management consultant and 
‘leadership guru’ 
25/6/12 68:54 (1hr8m) NA 
3. Rona 
Kiley 
Director of Education 
Initiatives for London First, 
wife of newly appointed 
Transport for London 




Manager of the 2002 
McKinsey Study 13/05/15 62:49 McKinsey 
5. John 
Dunford 
Leader of the Secondary 
Heads Association (SHA) 
which later became 








Head of Education at the 
National Union of Teachers 3/10/12 33:39 NUT (Union) 
7. Ralph 
Tabberer 
CEO of the Teacher Training 












Former teacher educator 





Civil servant at the DfES 
who worked with Ralph 
Tabberer (later became head 
of TDA) 
30/5/12 49:12 DfES 
 










Founder/CEO of London 
First, previously founded 
Business in the Community – 
became Teach First’s co-
Chair of Trustees 
w/Iacobescu 
31/5/12 45:42 London First 
11. George 
Iacobescu 
Head of Canary Wharf 
Group, developer, and first 
corporate donor of TF -  
became co-Chair of Trustees 
of TF w/O’Brien 
11/1/13 33:33 Canary Wharf Group 
12. John May 
Director of Education for 
Business in the Community, 
London 
2/5/12 38:28 BITC 
13. Mark 
Seligman 
Credit Suisse, early but not 
initial supporter of TF 6/2/13 46:01 Credit Suisse 
14. Jennifer 
Scardino 
Director of Corporate 
Communications, Citigroup 18/05/15 39:41 Citigroup 
15. Rob 
Habgood 
Founder and Head of Capital 
One’s UK operations 28/4/15 44:30 Capital One 
16. Peter 
Lampl 
Founder of The Sutton Trust, 
educational philanthropist, 
made his fortune in setting up 
his own private equity firm in 
NYC 
12/6/12 27:51 Charity 
17. Patricia 
Lankester 
Director of the Paul Hamlyn 
grant making foundation 19/6/12 29:32 Charity 
18. Hilary 
Hodgson 
Director of Education, Esmee 
Fairbairn 2/2/15 20:04 Charity 
19. Andrew 
Adonis 
Head of Prime Minister’s 
Policy Unit, No. 10 Downing 
Street 
20/4/12 28:35 No. 10 
20. Patrick 
Diamond 
Assistant to Adonis in the 
Prime Minister’s Policy Unit 30/01/15 40:39 No. 10 
 














Schools minister until May 





London Schools Minister 
from May 2002, Labour MP, 
supported launch of TF 
24/4/12 28:14 Schools Minister 
24. Lynne 
Fabes 
DfES, Head of Business-
Partnership Unit 23/01/15 23:37 DfES 
25. Geoff 
Whitty 
Professor of Education and 
head of Institute of 
Education, London -  early 
supporter of the Teach First 
idea 
9/7/12 119:18 (1hr59m) IOE 
26. Michael 
Totterdell 
Head of ITT at Institute of 
Education, London – early 
supporter and collaborator 













Dean of Education at 
CCCUC 
 
20/03/15 87:57 CCCUC 
28. John Moss 
Education Professor at Christ 
Canterbury Church College, 
which became the training 
provider for TF 
17/09/12 94:13 CCCUC 
29. Nat Wei 
More senior colleague of 
Brett Wigdortz at McKinsey 
and member of first TF staff 
28/8/12 40:22 McKinsey & TF Staff 
30. Paul 
Davies 
More senior colleague of 
Brett Wigdortz at McKinsey 










Member of first TF staff, 
alumna of TFA 15/11/12 46:23 
TFA and Teach 
First Staff 
 










Recent graduate of Imperial 
College, London and a 
recruiter on first staff of TF 





Recent graduate of Oxford 
and a recruiter on first staff 
of TF 





Employee of the TTA then 








35. Lyndsey  
Salmon-
Davies 
Recruitment manager on the 
first staff of TF, previously 
graduate recruiter for Arthur 
Anderson 
11/12/12 67:01 Teach First Staff 
36. Iain 
Cassidy 
Experienced recruiter on the 
first staff of TF, previously 
graduate recruiter for 
Goldman Sachs 
14/12/12 46:19 Teach First Staff 
37. Tom 
Widdows 
Headteacher of Bexley 
Business Academy, one of 
the first academies in London 
and among first placement 
schools for TF teachers 
7/1/12 49:33 London School head 
38. Jill 
Coughlan 
Headteacher of Elizabeth 
Garrett Anderson, one of the 
first placement schools for 
TF teachers 
4/12/12 34:17 London School head 
39. Sally 
Coates 
Headteacher of Sacred Hearts 
RC High School, one of the 
first placement schools for 
TF teachers 
11/01/13 28:11 London School head 
40. Randall 
Lahann 
TFA alumn who helped with 




First staff  
(post 6/2003) 
41. Tia Lendo 
Staff member of TF from 
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A.3 Diagram of Teach First Individuals 
 
Figure 3:  Diagram of Teach First Individuals* 
*This list includes interviewees and others mentioned in the study.  Interviewees are 
in bold.  
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A.4 Code Developed to Analyze Transcripts 
 
1. Background:  Who?  
a. Age 
b. Background  
i. University 
ii. Work 
iii. International experience/Geographic 
iv. Other 
 
2. Defining the policy (TFA/TF): What is the purpose/mission and means?  
a. Their understanding of TFA & TF – Form, purpose, goal, strategies 
b. The importance of the TF goal and means 
c. What it meant to them 
 
3. Why?  Personal thinking behind decision to support TFA/TF: 
a. Improve ‘quality’ of teaching force/bring in ‘talent’ 
b. Need more teachers because of London shortage 
c. Chance to innovate in ITE 
d. Improve teaching for pupils in challenging schools 
e. Improve leadership challenging schools 
f. Be apart of an entrepreneurial start-up 
g. Prior knowledge of TFA 
 
4. Speed of Support 
a. Immediate support 
b. Needed persuasion 
c. Skeptical/ambivalent 
 
5. Influences on interviewees’ decision to support TF/TFA?  
a. Support through one or two trusted associate(s) 
b. Support through persuasion 
c. Support through bandwagon effects 
d. Support due to seeing/hearing about TFA success 
e. Support because would also help academies programme 
f. Personal or sentimental connection - Socially-conscious/’Meaningful’ 
job in non-profit sector (anyone) 
 
 
6. Personal, Career, or Organizational Motives: Ways interviewee benefit 
from supporting TF 
a. More funding and recognition for their organization (HEIs, TTA) 
b. Unique research opportunities (HEIs) 
c. Develop contacts/network in business world or education 
sector(Schools, HEIs) 
d. More staff/members for their organization (schools, HEI, unions) 
e. More skilled workforce to select from in the future (Employers) 
f. CV building  
g. Increased  power/influence – Increased engagement with policy-
makers, leading businesses, London education sector, etc.  
 
Reconstructing the Emergence of Teach First 
Page 378 
 
7. Types of TF Support:  How – meaning, in what ways – did interviewee 
support the programme? 
a. Financial donations 
b. Donated resources 
c. Donated/shared expertise 
d. Shared contacts/networks 
e. Advocated for publicly 
f. Advocated for through own networks 
g. Mentored/Advised the organization 
 
8. Timings – When?    
a. Dates 
i. Before launch (fall 2001-summer 2002) 
ii. Implementation (summer 2002-summer 2003) 
iii. This period is combined in TFA (summer 1989 - summer 
1990) 
iv. Consider phases of interstitial emergence – (1) innovation, (2) 
mobilization/critical mass, (3) structuration 
 
9. U.S. Contextual Factors – What settings, recent events, and other 




ii. Teacher Education 
iii. Labor Market 
c. Economic 
i. Labor Market 
ii. Teacher Salary 
d. Cultural 
e. Historical 
f. Geographical – National v. Local, Size/demographics 
 
 
10. England’s Contextual Factors – What settings, recent events, and other 




ii. Teacher Education 
iii. Labor Market 
c. Economic 
i. Labor Market 
ii. Teacher Salary 
d. Cultural 
e. Historical 
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11. Prior Policy Influence – Peace Corps/Federal Teachers Corps for TFA, TFA 
for TF   
a. Contacts 
b. Knowledge/Idea of TFA 
c. Experience with 
d. Role this prior policy influence affected development of TF support or 
programme design 
 
12. Personal Connection with TF Mission 
a. Same targeted educational background 
b. Same career trajectory of wanting to teach in a state school 
c. Similar social justice/social mobility goals 
d. Sympathy with start up 
 
13. Degree of Trust/Nature of Relationship…. Network Connections between 
People Involved 
a. Who knew/worked with whom 
b. How much trust appears to exist and influence relationship to TF 
c. What established networks are being used and what new networks are 
being formed? 
 
14.  Identity & Association:  Does the interviewee seem to express his/her 
identity in regard to the political landscape?  Who does he/she appear to 
identify and associate with? 
a. Specific sector 
b. Specific university 
c. Specific ideologies 
d. Other 
 
15. Influence of Business Culture/Ideas  
a. McKinsey 
b. New forms of philanthropy run as private equity firms or by self-
made capitalists favoring particular forms of charity 
c. Other common consulting practices, business models, ethos, and 
strategies being utilized or used for rationales in networking or 
running TFA/TF  
d. Policy vs. Social Entrepreneur and ideas of enterprise and social 
change – focus on social mobility vs. social efficiency 
 
16. Trends Among State Schools Involved 
a. Academies 
b. Staff shortages 
c. Other 
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A.5 Private Funding Sources of Teach First (July 2002 to June 2003) 
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A.6 Table of Teach First’s Milkround Schedule (Fall 2002)  
 
Table 5 – Teach First’s Milkround Schedule (Fall 2002)  
 
University Date in 2002 Type of Event 
1. Birmingham 08-Oct Milkround 
2. Imperial College 
London 09-Oct Milkround 
3. Nottingham 16-Oct Milkround 
4. Bristol 16-Oct Careers Fair 
5. Bath 17-Oct Milkround 
6. Durham 17-Oct Milkround 
7. London School of 
Economics 18-Oct Careers Fair 
8. York 21-Oct Milkround 
9. Bristol 24-Oct Milkround 
10. Dublin 29-Oct Milkround 
11. Edinburgh 30-Oct Milkround 
12. Glasgow 31-Oct Milkround 
13. Liverpool 04-Nov Milkround 
14. Imperial College 
London 06-Nov Careers Fair 
15. London 06-Nov Milkround 
16. Manchester 07-Nov Milkround 
17. Cambridge 13-Nov Milkround 
18. Cambridge 14-Nov Careers Fair 
19. Warwick 14-Nov Milkround 
20. Oxford 18-Nov Milkround 
 
 
 
 
 
